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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis aims at contributing to the literature on industrial policy by investigating 
patterns of 'association' between trade and industrial policies, the country’s national 
pharmaceutical policy (including pricing), the pre-January 2005 intellectual property rights 
regime, productivity and productivity growth in the Egyptian generics pharmaceutical 
sector. This thesis presented evidence that positive total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
can be observed under the auspices of a protectionist regime, however, there is a need to 
revisit pharmaceutical regulatory protectionism, as it impacts negatively on export growth 
and on fair pharmaceutical prices. 
 
Under the auspices of what can be categorised as a protectionist regulatory regime, this 
thesis examined trends in TFP growth in 13 of Egypt's pharmaceutical generics firms, 
which account for 50 percent of the generics market by value.  Empirical results indicated 
that the best-practice firm in terms of TFP change belonged to the private sector, while the 
laggard firm belonged to the state-owned public business sector. Empirical results indicated 
that mean TFP change for the sample firms throughout the study period 1993-2005 (1.01) 
exceeded the mean TFP change for all Egyptian industries (0.75), and that there was 
evident disassociation or weak correlation -at best- between productivity growth and the 
degree of export orientation. 
 
In light of both the absence of significant generics import competition in Egypt, it has been 
found that prices of generics were atypical in terms of exceeding standard worldwide 
generic-to-originator price ratios. Generic diffusion did not significantly bring down 
average prices, while an evident wedge was observed between the market shares of the 
most sold generics versus the least-priced generics to the advantage of the former.   
 
As a result of enforcing pharmaceutical product patent protection as of January 2005, the 
price-related impact of the TRIPS Agreement in the domain of Egypt’s top 42 therapeutic 
classes by market value (50 percent of the market), has been put in the range of LE 479 
million.   
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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1 Introduction 
To date, and within the confines of the large body of development literature, the debate 
concerning the nature and scope of government involvement in economic activity has 
perhaps been the longest standing. This thesis has been motivated by the debate concerning 
one important facet of government intervention in the economy, namely industrial policy. 
The importance of this debate stems from the fact that the success/failure of industrial 
policies as practiced in developed as well as developing nations has invariably contributed 
to shaping their growth outcomes.  
 
By examining the growth trajectory and performance attributes of Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry, I should be able to provide one interesting avenue to contribute to 
the debate concerning industrial policy. In this thesis, I will be making a case in favor of 
revisiting the country’s industrial policy as it impacts the generics pharmaceutical industry. 
The objective of a revised industrial policy is to sharpen the capabilities of local companies 
to withstand competition on local as well as on export markets, as well as to improve the 
levels of efficiency. Achieving these two objectives should better prepare Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry to meet the challenges of the immediate future.  
 
What renders the case study of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry relevant to the 
debate on industrial policy is that the development and expansion of pharmaceutical 
productive capacity has occurred within the context of protective non-tariff regulatory trade 
barriers, which have historically kept generics import competition at bay. While several 
episodes of trade liberalization have occurred following the endorsement of an Open Door 
Policy (ODP) in 1974, eventually lowering tariff levels and eliminating non-tariff barriers 
to trade shielding Egyptian industry -particularly under the framework of World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) commitments during the second half of the 1990s- the pharmaceutical 
industry stands out as being subject to relatively rigid regulatory non-tariff trade barriers, 
which have largely isolated local manufacturers of generics from import competition.  
 
13 
 
In addition, the case study of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry is equally 
interesting because of the fact that the enforcement of higher standards of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) has been changing the outlook for the pharmaceutical industry. In 
1995, Egypt became a founding member of the WTO and a signatory to the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In January, 2005, and in 
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement, pharmaceutical product patent protection was 
enforced for the first time ever in Egypt. Prior to this date, the Egyptian pharmaceutical 
industry has been thriving under the auspices of an IPRs regime, which excluded 
pharmaceutical products from patentability.  
 
Currently, issues of concern in policy circles have been related to the prices of 
pharmaceutical products in Egypt -particularly with higher standards of IPRs paving the 
way for the gradual increase in the relative prices of new pharmaceutical products coming 
to the market- as well as the efficiency and competitiveness of this industry. In close 
connection, two important studies concerning the affordability of pharmaceutical products 
in Egypt (WHO and HAI, 2004), as well as the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical 
industry (ADE/DOL, 2004) have cautioned that essential drug prices are actually higher 
than they need be, making essential medicine ‘unobtainable’ for many, and that the 
pharmaceutical industry has not been contributing much to national economic growth, with 
sector performance having been largely stagnant. 
 
In light of the fact that generics import competition on the Egyptian market has been a 
fairly new phenomenon, and that the enforcement of pharmaceutical product patent 
protection is also an equally new phenomenon, historically local companies have been 
operating in an environment which tended to increase their market power vis-à-vis other 
low cost manufacturers of generics, as well as subsidiaries of research-based companies 
with manufacturing presence in Egypt. In other words, local companies have enjoyed 
operating within a captive local market, while at the same time being legally able to 
manufacture products which were still protected by patents on other world markets. 
Commitment to strengthen the country’s IPRs regime, under the framework of the TRIPS 
Agreement, as well as the gradual increase in the market share of imported generics are two 
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key developments, which promise to change the nature of the competition matrix on 
Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. The Egyptian pharmaceutical industry is, therefore, a 
prime candidate to be affected in a major way as a result of two key developments: the 
country’s process patent regime giving way to a product patent regime since January 2005, 
and the gradual increase in generic import penetration, which has also been levying 
significant competitive pressure on the local segment of this industry. 
 
Taking into consideration the essential nature of pharmaceutical products, the motivation to 
select Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical sector as the case study of this thesis is primarily 
two pronged. On the health policy front, while concern regarding the affordability of new 
patent-protected pharmaceuticals in Egypt has been accentuated in the aftermath of the 
TRIPS Agreement, an equally important concern, which has been -more often than not- 
overshadowed, is related to the affordability and relative prices of generics pharmaceuticals 
in Egypt. On another front, this concern is directly tied up to the industrial policy issue of 
efficiency levels exhibited by Egypt’s generics industry.  
 
A pertinent question, which has been judged to be worth addressing, has been related to the 
extent to which Egyptian consumers have been paying relatively higher than average prices 
for locally manufactured generic products. On the front of industrial and regulatory 
policies, it became important to probe deeper into whether higher than average prices have 
been associated with an inefficient industry manufacturing at high cost, or with an efficient 
industry that has exploited the protectionist regulatory setting to its favour by charging 
higher than average prices. The enforcement of higher standards of IPRs in Egypt renders 
generics a life-saving line for low-income consumers, and hence from a policy perspective, 
it becomes not only important but mandatory to examine efficiency and market dynamics 
of this important segment of Egypt’s pharmaceutical market.  
 
Among the key reasons why the pharmaceutical industry was selected as the subject matter 
of this thesis has been also related to the associated human factor. Unlike other products of 
manufacturing industries, pharmaceuticals are correctly described as “life or death” 
products. In a country where 22 percent of the population are categorized as poor, and 
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another 6 percent as ultra-poor (Egypt Human Development Report, 2010),
1
 and where 
private out-of-pocket expenditure on drugs stands as high as 68 percent of total expenditure 
on drugs, affordability and access to health care in general and pharmaceuticals in 
particular have persevered as major policy concerns. With the partial coverage of social 
health care insurance, a significantly large segment of Egypt’s masses remains vulnerable 
to potential catastrophic health care expenditure and impaired access to medicine.  
 
1.2 Research Focus  
In light of the above backdrop, this thesis has been motived to contribute to the academic 
debate concerning industrial policy by examining patterns of 'association' between trade, 
industrial and health policies (regulatory protectionism), the ruling pre-January 2005 IPRs 
regime, pricing behaviour, productivity and productivity growth in the Egyptian generics 
pharmaceutical sector. In addition, this thesis has also taken the first attempt to quantify the 
cost to consumers as a result of enforcing a 20-year period of pharmaceutical product patent 
protection in conformity with the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
The study period extends between 1993 and 2008. This period spans a series of policy 
changes, both at the macroeconomic as well as the pharmaceutical sector levels. On the 
macroeconomic front, the early 1990s ushered an economic reform and structural 
adjustment program (ERSAP), which introduced far reaching institutional as well as 
regulatory change to the pharmaceutical sector. The 1990s and beyond also brought some 
of the most important of legislative changes in the history of Egypt’s pharmaceutical 
industry, namely the commitment to enforcing a 20-year period of pharmaceutical patent 
protection in the aftermath of the TRIPS Agreement, and the associated transitional 
institutional changes, which were eventually completed in January 2005.  
 
This thesis attempts to contribute to a diverse set of literature in four key areas. First, the 
fact that some of the privately owned local firms exhibit relatively high export-to-output 
                                                 
1
 According to the 2010 Egypt Human Development report, a person who spends less than LE1,648 per year 
(LE134 per month) in Egypt in 2008 was categorized as extremely poor, and a person who spent less than 
LE2,223 (LE185 per month) was categorized as poor. 
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ratios indicates that there have been efficiency gains in this sector sufficient enough for 
these companies to compete in world markets. The estimation of firm-level productivity 
growth under a protectionist regulatory regime is one important avenue to contribute to the 
literature on industrial policy (evaluating productivity growth under a protectionist 
regulatory regime).  
 
Second, this thesis also endeavours to verify whether there has been evidence of firm-level 
productivity dispersion in relation to ownership and output orientation in Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry. The answer should provide guidance to the pace and nature of 
privatisation policies (to date the state maintains majority ownership in the 11 public-
business sector pharmaceutical companies), as well as to policies which aim at soliciting 
increased export-orientation. 
 
To date, there has been no empirical work regarding the productivity of Egyptian 
pharmaceutical firms. Studies regarding productivity in Egypt have traditionally focused on 
analysing sources of aggregate economic growth using the traditional total factor 
productivity (TFP) (Kheir-El-Din and Moursi, 2003), as well as examined TFP in Egypt at 
the economy-wide level (Kamaly, 2007). With regards sector specific studies, Abdellatif 
(2004) looked into the course of growth of the manufacturing sector in Egypt at large, 
exploring its sources of growth over the past 50 years. Galal and El-Megharbel (2005) 
estimated TFP for 16 industries comprising the manufacturing sector in Egypt over the 
period 1980-2000 to answer the question of whether or not industrial policy in Egypt made 
a difference in the performance of different industries. In the absence of longitudinal 
microdata concerning any of Egypt's manufacturing sectors, this study should hopefully 
open the way to similar studies at the firm-level, particularly in one of the country's 
strategic and most socially sensitive of manufacturing activities. 
 
Third, to-date, there has been no evaluation regarding relative prices on the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical market. In major world markets, relatively standard price ratios exist 
between innovator and generic products, as well as between generics. By providing an 
evaluation regarding the consistency of price ratios on the Egyptian market with standard 
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world ratios, this thesis should be able to contribute to the evaluation of the extent to which 
the country’s pharmaceutical policy -including pricing- has been successful in terms of 
ensuring the prevalence of fair prices to consumers. By undertaking this analysis, the thesis 
will be able to contribute to the body of literature which examines the nature and 
determinants of relative prices on pharmaceutical markets. 
 
Fourth, an important contribution of this thesis will be in the domain of quantifying the 
impact of the TRIPS Agreement in terms of elevated cost to consumers on Egypt’s 
pharmaceutical market. To date, there are no studies that have attempted to quantify the 
impact of enforcing pharmaceutical product patent protection on market dynamics in Egypt 
using real market data. Empirical results should be valuable from a policy perspective, 
particularly in terms of throwing light on the nature of policy interventions, which may be 
needed in order to protect low-income consumers. The majority of these consumers mainly 
meet their pharmaceutical needs on the basis of out-of-pocket expenditure. The results will 
contribute to the body of literature which has endeavoured to evaluate the impact of the 
global harmonisation of IPRs in the domain of the pharmaceutical industry in emerging 
markets. 
 
1.3 Research Questions  
Against the above background, the following set of research questions will be addressed in 
the thesis: 
 To what extent have mechanisms used to protect and regulate the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical industry been associated with productivity growth?  
 To what extent is there evidence of productivity dispersion in the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical industry in accordance to ownership, and output orientation? 
 How far and in what ways have the regulatory framework(s) governing this industry 
allowed local generics companies to charge higher than average prices compared to 
other world markets? 
 What has been the impact of strengthening the country’s IPRs regime in conformity 
with the TRIPS Agreement on pharmaceutical price levels in Egypt, the associated 
cost to consumers, as well as on the market shares of key players? 
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1.4 Research Design 
The key objective of this thesis is to be able to contribute to the debate on industrial policy, 
through empirical evidence concerning productivity levels exhibited by Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry under the auspices of a protectionist regulatory regime.  
 
The review of the literature on industrial policy, presented the starting point for the 
research, as well as the ‘back-bone’ of the thesis. The review of the salient characteristics 
of the pharmaceutical industry followed, with the objective of highlighting the key 
differences between research-based and generics pharmaceutical manufacturers. It is 
against this background which details how and why similar as well as dissimilar 
pharmaceutical manufacturers operate on the world production and trade scenes, that the 
growth trajectory and performance of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical sector can be 
examined as well as evaluated.  
 
The core components of the industrial policy regime which ruled in Egypt during the study 
period are highlighted, in conjunction with the key performance attributes of this industry 
(output growth, employment creation, export performance and R&D strategies). The 
pharmaceutical industry distinguishes itself from other sectors of manufacturing activity by 
virtue of operating under the auspices of two policy and regulatory regimes. One is the 
industrial policy regime, while the other is the health policy regime. The exposé of the key 
features of Egypt’s health care sector, as well as the national drug policy became an integral 
part of the research design, having served the purpose of contextualising the research 
questions by highlighting how pharmaceutical prices are being set, as well as how 
pharmaceutical expenditure is being shouldered. 
 
Secondary sources were mostly relied on; however, primary sources such as minutes of 
board meetings of local Egyptian pharmaceutical companies as well as unpublished 
government documents related to the impact of policy change during the initial period of 
the ERSAP were collected and reviewed in order to gain insight to the nature of the debate 
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which was taking place between the various stakeholders within industry and in policy 
circles concerning the industrial policy regime. 
 
During the literature review phase as well as throughout the study period, a set of 
interviews were arranged for to complement the viewpoints expressed in the literature 
regarding the growth trajectory of Egypt’s pharmaceutical sector, with the reality on the 
ground. Interviewees were approached on the basis of their presence in the policy circles as 
well as within industry. Interviews were chosen to be conducted in an unstructured manner, 
whereby the nature of research was first explained, after which the interviewees provided 
their viewpoints regarding the various issues and research questions being raised. A list of 
interviewees and their professional affiliations is provided in Annex 1. 
 
In order to examine pharmaceutical market dynamics, the Intercontinental Medical 
Statistics (IMS) database for Egypt provided most of the data needed.
2
 However, because 
IMS data for Egypt is significantly large and embraces a wide range of therapeutic classes, 
a stratification of the Egyptian pharmaceutical market was conducted. The IMS data frame 
was organized by categories into separate therapeutic "strata". These strata which have been 
selected for analysis were based on the two criteria of embracing essential rather than over-
the-counter or lifestyle drugs, as well as accounting for the largest shares of the 
pharmaceutical market.  
 
For the estimation of TFP growth, initially all local generics pharmaceutical companies 
which have been in operation before 1991 have been approached for data collection. Of the 
16 companies that have been operative before this date, 13 companies accepted to provide 
the necessary data. As such, the sample is based on the non-probability ‘opportunity’ 
sampling approach, whereby only the interested companies became part of the study. The 
appropriateness of non-probability sampling as well as its limitation will be covered in 
more detail in Chapter Five.  
 
                                                 
2 IMS Health is a specialised market research company, which is the leading provider of reports concerning 
pharmaceutical retail sales in more than 70 countries, based on regular audits of retail pharmacies. 
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1.5 Research Methodology and Sources of Data 
The research questions posed in this thesis required a multi-pronged methodological 
approach. 
 
To evaluate efficiency levels exhibited by Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry, an 
estimation of trends regarding total factor productivity (TFP) growth in 13 of this sector’s 
largest and oldest generics pharmaceutical firms will be conducted. Data envelopment 
analysis (DEA), the non-parametric, frontier methodology, is relied upon to obtain the 
Malmquist productivity index for the sample firms, which account for 45 percent of Egypt's 
generics market by value. Best-practice firms and laggard firms in the three aspects of 
efficiency change, technical change and TFP change have been identified.  The estimation 
of TFP growth is based on a rich set of primary panel data obtained directly from the 
sample companies. 
 
In order to evaluate pharmaceutical pricing dynamics in Egypt, competition taking place 
between products manufactured by various players on the manufacturing and trade scenes 
in Egypt will be evaluated. Products examined fall within the domain of some 21 
molecules, covering a wide range of therapeutic classes. The list of molecules -originally 
30- has been featured in the World Health Organization (WHO) and Health Action 
International (HAI) study (2006) concerned with the international comparison of chronic 
disease medicines. Access to data from IMS for Egypt has allowed for the assessment of 
market dynamics during a five-year study period for which data was available. Special 
emphasis has been awarded to the issue of relative prices as well as the impact of the 
TRIPS Agreement in terms of increased cost to consumers.  
 
Quantifying the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market was 
based the identification of new molecules placed on the Egyptian pharmaceutical market by 
research-based companies, that have not been facing generic competition. This scan 
covered Egypt’s top-42 therapeutic classes by market value (50 percent of the market) and 
was undertaken in conjunction with information regarding the patentability status of new 
molecules placed on Egypt’s market, in one of the world’s key markets, namely the United 
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States of America (USA). The respective market shares for these new molecules/products 
in Egypt, and the associated cost to consumers in Egypt have been examined. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
Following the introductory Chapter, Chapter Two presents a review of the literature on 
industrial policy. The literature on industrial policy embraces a wide continuum of policy 
options, with free trade and protectionism falling on its extreme poles. Various incentive 
measures provided by governments to solicit certain outcomes also fall on this wide 
continuum. How and why have the policy choices made by governments differentially 
elevated some of the developing nations to the status of newly industrialized countries 
(NICs), while others have lagged behind, is perhaps the most important of insights to be 
derived from this body of literature. Chapter Two also presents the concept of efficiency, as 
well as the underlying reasons behind differential efficiency/productivity outcomes among 
various countries/ industries/ firms.  
 
In Chapter Three, the salient characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry are presented, 
with the objective of highlighting the key differences between research-based and generics 
pharmaceutical manufacturers as well as the structure of the world pharmaceutical market, 
in terms of both production and trade. Chapter Three highlights the fact that some 
developing countries such as India, have successfully managed to emerge as key players on 
the pharmaceutical production and trade scenes, while others have lagged behind (Egypt 
being a case in point). Chapter Three also examines in detail the growth trajectory of 
Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry against the nature of the industrial policy 
regime(s) which ruled during the study period(s). The key objective of Chapter Three is to 
provide the background against which the research question concerning the extent to which 
mechanisms used to regulate and protect the Egyptian generics pharmaceutical industry 
have been associated with productivity growth.  
 
The review presented in Chapter Three provided evidence that since the formative years of 
the Egyptian generics pharmaceutical industry, and passing through different policy and 
regulatory regimes, the focus as well as the key criteria for success for this industry has 
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primarily been on increasing the levels of self-sufficiency, in what has been regarded as a 
strategic sector. The various shifts in economic policy direction, as well as episodes of 
institutional and regulatory reforms have consistently defaulted in shifting the relatively 
excessive inward orientation of this industry. Unlike the majority of manufacturing 
industries in Egypt, which have seen protective tariff as well as non-tariff trade barriers 
systemically brought down during various intervals, the perseverance of non-tariff 
regulatory barriers shielding the generics pharmaceutical industry in Egypt has practically 
isolated this industry from import competition.  Chapter Three also documents the failure to 
transcend the boundaries of engaging in sheer pharmaceutical formulation activities by 
venturing towards expanding R&D capabilities on behalf of the local generics 
pharmaceutical industry in Egypt. Evidence presented also indicated that Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry has not been a key contributor to job creation in what is 
predominately a labor surplus economy. Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry has, 
therefore, not been a key contributor to job creation, to export growth or to technological 
advancement. This industry has, nonetheless, been closing-down on the levels of self-
sufficiency. The important question which was addressed further on was related to whether 
or not increasing the levels self-sufficiently have been attained while at the same time 
achieving respectable levels of manufacturing efficiency. 
 
Chapter Three documents the extent to which the key changes in Egypt’s industrial policy 
regime during the study period have been primarily concerned with addressing institutional 
as well as regulatory concerns such as public sector reform, privatisation, and price 
liberalisation. A key limitation of Egypt’s industrial policy as implemented within the 
domain of the generics pharmaceutical sector was that it failed to clearly tie up regulatory 
protection to performance indicators such as exporting as well as advancing technological 
capabilities. The outcome of this policy pitfall was that Egyptian generics companies have 
been outpaced by their counterparts in India, which have emerged at a far more 
advantageous position when it comes to competing on what is turning to be a highly 
aggressive global pharmaceutical market. India’s generics companies have assumed this 
advantageous position as a result of the government creating a home environment which 
has forced firms to improve their technological capabilities (Mourshed, 1999).  
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Chapter Four presents a review of the key components of the national drug policy in Egypt. 
The objective was to throw light on the characteristics of the pharmaceutical regulatory 
regime, which influence relative prices on the market. Chapter Four also examined the 
pharmaceutical industry in the context of the Egyptian health care system and how it 
"interacts" with it, both from a formal perspective (covering the costs and purchasing of 
medicines by the state/health system) and from the perspective of patients through direct 
purchases outside the remit of the health system. The objective has been to place the 
research question concerning relative price levels as well as the related findings in the 
context of who shoulders the burden of pharmaceutical expenditure in Egypt. Among the 
key findings of this chapter is that while the Egyptian government has been endeavoring to 
extend the benefits of social health insurance to the maximum number of beneficiaries, 
Egypt’s health care system has remained largely inequitable, leaving close to half of the 
country’s population to be fully vulnerable to potential catastrophic health care expenditure. 
 
Chapter Five attempted to address the research questions regarding the extent to which 
mechanisms used to regulate and protect Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical sector have been 
associated with productivity growth as well as the nature of productivity dispersion in 
accordance to ownership and output orientation. To be able to answer these research 
questions, Chapter Five began by presenting the methodology to estimate TFP growth in 
Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry during the period 1993-2005. The details of the 
non-parametric, frontier methodology known as data envelopment analysis (DEA) to obtain 
the Malmquist productivity index at the firm-level for a representative sample of firms 
operating in the Egyptian pharmaceutical sector is presented. The key empirical findings 
indicated that the best-practice firm in terms of TFP change belonged to the private sector, 
while the laggard firm belongs to the state-owned public business sector. In addition, no 
differences of significance existed between the performance of private sector and state-
owned generics companies. Additionally, state-owned companies which have been subject 
to partial privatization did not exhibit higher levels of TFP change compared to those which 
remained under full state-ownership. Interestingly, and in relationship to a protectionist 
regulatory regime, empirical results also indicated that mean TFP change for the sample 
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firms throughout the study period (1.01) exceeded the mean TFP change for all Egyptian 
industries (0.75), and that there was evident disassociation or week correlation -at best- 
between productivity growth and the degree of export orientation.  
 
Chapter Six attempted to provide an answer to the research question concerning how far 
and in what ways have the regulatory framework governing Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry allowed local companies to charge higher than average relative 
prices compared to other world markets. Chapter Six commenced by providing a brief 
review of the literature concerning the nature of competition on the pharmaceutical market, 
thus setting the scene to address the research question concerning relative prices of 
pharmaceuticals on the Egyptian market. Empirical evidence concerning relative prices on 
the Egyptian market for a selected sample of molecules was then presented. Sample 
molecules were selected on the basis of the methodology followed by the WHO and HAI 
(2006) concerned with the international comparison of the prices of chronic disease 
medicines. The examination of price competition on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market 
indicated that generic-to-originator prices in Egypt have been found to be higher than the 
standard ratios observed in major world markets. Of no less importance, generic diffusion 
has not necessarily been bringing down average prices on the Egyptian market. Evidence 
has also been presented that prescribing habits have resulted in a situation whereby the least 
priced generics were not necessarily the most prescribed.  
 
Chapter Seven attempted to provide an answer to the research question concerned with the 
nature and scope of impact of strengthening the country’s IPRs regime in conformity with 
the TRIPS Agreement on pharmaceutical price levels in Egypt, as well as the market shares 
of key players. Chapter Seven probed into the costs associated with enforcing 
pharmaceutical product patent protection in Egypt as of January-2005, by relying on 
proprietary data concerning the country’s  42 top therapeutic classes from IMS, in order to 
examine pharmaceutical market dynamics in Egypt during the period 2004-2008. A first 
step was to identify new products which have not been facing generic competition on 
Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. Results indicated that in 14 of Egypt’s top 42 study 
therapeutic classes (accounting for 50 percent of the retail market by value) as identified 
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through IMS, there was evidence regarding launches of new molecules by research-based 
pharmaceutical companies on the Egyptian market, with no evident generic competition. 
Together these 14 therapeutic classes account for two percent of the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical market by value, as well as 14 percent of the sample therapeutic classes.  
 
Within the 14 therapeutic classes, which have been impacted on by the TRIPS Agreement, 
a total of 24 molecules have not been facing generic competition against brand-name 
products falling within their domain. Between 2004 and 2008, Egyptian consumers paid a 
total LE 605 million for products falling within the domain of new molecules, which faced 
no generic competition. 
 
Of the total cost to consumers, some LE 126 million were incurred over products, which 
are not protected by patents, and yet have no visible generics competitors. These results 
indicated that the impact of the TRIPS Agreement has so far been relatively modest, 
compared to the overall market size. Of no less importance, the fact that it is not only 
patents that disallow generic competition, warranted special attention.  
 
Chapter Seven presented an assessment of the extent to which Egyptian consumers have 
been willing to trade-off lower prices of older drugs for more innovative new products. 
Results concerning shifts in market shares between old and new molecules have indicated 
an important trend regarding consumer preference for new generation molecules within the 
scope of the country’s top 42 therapeutic classes. In 15 out of some 24 molecules in which 
there has been no evidence of generic competition in Egypt between 2004 and 2008, 
consumer demand has been gradually shifting in favour of new products introduced. This 
shift has been occurring despite the fact that relative prices of new products were much 
higher than older generation molecules already present within the same therapeutic class. 
Market data has also indicated that between 2004 and 2008, the local private sector has 
maintained the position of the dominant player in 6 out of the 14 therapeutic classes which 
saw the introduction of patent-protected products. The same did not hold true for the public 
business sector, which has been losing share. This loss is, however, not necessarily 
attributable to the impact of the TRIPS Agreement, but rather to sector specific ownership 
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related problems, which have not allowed this important segment of the manufacturing 
sector to invest sufficient resources needed to compete in what is becoming a highly 
aggressive market.  
 
Chapter Seven also presented survey results which covered 25 of Egypt’s key players on 
the pharmaceutical manufacturing scene -including public business sector companies, local 
generics manufacturers and subsidiaries of research-based pharmaceutical companies- 
concerning their forecast regarding the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on their business. 
The survey was conducted in April 2004, almost one year before the enforcement of the 20-
year period of pharmaceutical patent protection in Egypt. By comparing the survey results 
to actual market dynamics after January 2005, Chapter Seven closed by highlighting that 
the survey results have indicated that the majority of perceptions regarding the future state 
of the business following full respect of pharmaceutical product patent protection in Egypt 
as reflected in the responses of the various players suffered from flaws in judgment.  
 
Chapter Eight presented a review of the research, the summary of findings and policy 
implications. By ‘connecting the dots’ concerning the mosaic of findings presented in the 
different chapters, it argued that the research has contributed to the debate on industrial 
policy with concrete empirical findings from Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry.  
 
From an efficiency perspective, and taking efficiency at the manufacturing sector-wide 
level in Egypt as a bench-mark for comparison, evidence has been provided that an industry 
can be protected, yet exhibit positive productivity growth as reflected in relatively healthy 
efficiency levels. While Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry -based on sample firms- 
proved to operate at relatively respectable levels of efficiency, it has been highlighted that 
this sector has been taking advantage of the captive local market, as well as the absence of 
pharmaceutical product patent protection, to drive up prices beyond standard world generic-
to-originator prices as evident in the sample molecules.  The consumer, who pays his/her 
pharmaceutical bill out-of-pocket is the ultimate looser from this protectionist formula. This 
protectionist formula is even harsher in light of the fact that the national drug policy in 
Egypt provides no clear guidelines to the private health care sector to either promote 
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generic prescription, nor to allow generic substitution by the dispensing pharmacists of the 
least priced generic available. 
 
On the policy front, a key message to be rallied was that to date, public business sector 
pharmaceutical companies have been bearing the full brunt of acting as the social arm of 
the state in terms of the provision of artificially low-priced pharmaceuticals in Egypt. This 
situation has remained unchanged, in spite of reforms targeting the institutional and 
legislative regimes brought about by the ERSAP as early as 1991. It was repeatedly 
expressed during interviews conducted with industrialists, as well as in the unpublished 
literature that by artificially repressing price adjustments in Egypt’s public business sector 
companies, this policy has impacted negatively on the profitability levels of these 
companies, and hence their ability to invest in technological upgrades, needed to support 
higher levels of efficiency. One policy option, though a long-term one is, to strengthen the 
outreach of the social health insurance scheme in terms of coverage of pharmaceutical 
needs. This option, will grant these public business sector manufacturing entities breathing 
space to advance in the right direction in terms of being able to revise prices upwards, and 
hence invest in the needed levels of technological upgrades to allow for sharpening their 
competitive abilities. 
 
Another important policy message related to the observed levels of export performance, is 
that for local generics companies to be able to secure acceptable levels of turnover and 
profitability, exporting will no longer be an option, but will be imperative for survival. The 
state has an important role to play, by creating the right incentive framework for these 
companies to export and by supporting the efforts of local companies to overcome 
regulatory hurdles in export markets.  
 
On the price competition front, while local companies have been complaining of the 
rigidity of the pricing system, it was evident, that generic products need a new pricing 
formula to ensure that prices align with standard world generics-to-originator ratios. The 
need for a clear generics substitution policy in Egypt should also be high on policy makers’ 
agenda. 
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Chapter Eight also presented a final policy-related message related to evidence concerning 
the impact of the TRIPS Agreement in terms of increased relative prices of new products, 
which have not been facing generics competition. While the price related impact has 
remained relatively modest compared to the overall market value, the price impact is 
gradually building up in terms of possibly adding hardship on the uninsured masses, and a 
safety net, which is to support low-income consumers need to be structured as early as 
possible. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THINKING ABOUT INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis has been motivated by the debate concerning industrial policy, and the nature of 
outcomes of the various policy options decided on by governments in their quest to achieve 
industrial development and diversification.  
 
To date, and within the confines of the large body of development literature, the debate 
concerning the nature and scope of government involvement in economic activity has been 
among the longest standing. In this chapter, I present a review of the literature on one 
important facet of government intervention in the economy, namely industrial policy. The 
key objective of this review is to eventually be able to contribute to this debate, with 
concrete empirical evidence presented through examining the performance of Egypt’s 
generics pharmaceutical industry. Egypt’s generic pharmaceutical industry provided an 
interesting case study with relevance to the debate on industrial policy, because of the fact 
that this sector of manufacturing activity continues to thrive behind protectionist non-tariff 
regulatory trade barriers, which have consistently sheltered local companies from import 
competition, in spite of several episodes of trade liberalization during the study period. 
What renders the case study of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry even more 
important in relation to the debate concerning industrial policy was the fact that if there was 
to be a cost associated with protectionism, then this cost is eventually shouldered by what 
can be called ‘patients’ rather than ‘consumers’. In Egypt, some 68 percent of 
pharmaceutical expenditure is made out-of-pocket (Partners for Health ReformPlus, 2005). 
The fact that 22 percent of Egypt’s population are categorized as poor, and another 6 
percent as ultra-poor (Egypt Human Development Report, 2010), renders this case study 
even more meaningful to the debate concerning industrial policy. 
 
The literature on industrial policy embraces a wide continuum of policy options, with free 
trade and protectionism falling on its extreme poles. Various incentives which solicit 
certain outcomes, also fall on this wide continuum. How and why have the policy choices 
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made by governments differentially elevated some of the developing nations to the status of 
NICs, while others have lagged behind, is perhaps the most important of insights to be 
derived from this body of literature.  
 
It is being argued that in the domain of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry, industrial 
policy has consistently fell short of embracing the hybrid mix of industrial policies behind 
the economic success of the NICs, particularly in terms of instigating rapid industrial 
growth and diversification. In the NICs, governments intervened to support the transfer of 
technology as well as the development of indigenous technological capabilities. While 
governments have been aggressively picking and creating winners at the industry and firm 
levels through interventionist policies, infant industries were more often than not awarded 
protection in conjunction with export targets. This policy-mix enticed industries to become 
competitive on world markets, thus sharpening their ability to sustain competition locally 
once liberalisation becomes part of the policy equation. The selectivity element of the 
industrial policy model followed by the NICs, has been primarily guided by the principle of 
efficiency and not any other motive.   
 
In this chapter I also cover the concept of efficiency, which has been at the heart of the 
debate concerning industrial policy. The underlying reasons behind differential 
efficiency/productivity outcomes among various countries/ industries/ firms are being 
presented. The conceptual framework of the thesis, therefore, rests on the notion of 
efficiency as comprehended in a manufacturing setting.  
 
This chapter is divided as follows. Section 2.2 presents an overview of the key perspectives 
on industrialisation as appearing in the literature.  Section 2.3 presents the conceptual 
framework. Section 2.4 summarizes the relevance of the literature review and conceptual 
framework presented to the research questions. 
 
2.2 Perspectives on Industrialisation, the Viewpoints of Competing Paradigms 
A starting point for the review of industrial development models was provided by the 
Bretton Woods Conference which was held in 1944, and which presented an important 
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point of departure for competing industrialisation paradigms following the end of World 
War Two. 
 
Free trade and the institutional foundation of the neoclassical school 
What the Bretton Woods Conference succeeded in, was to basically put in place the 
institutional foundations of neoclassical economic thought, which embraced the principles 
of a liberal international economic order (Bhagawati, 1984: 1-2).  
 
The main thesis of the neoclassical school was to basically allow free price mechanisms to 
rule with minimal involvement of governments in the economy, particularly with regards 
the productive sectors. Of no less importance has been the supremacy of the rules of 
comparative advantage in dictating specialisation in either the production of primary 
products versus industrial products, and as well as within various sub-sectors of industrial 
activity. The proper role of government, as viewed by the neoclassical paradigm, was not to 
go beyond its "lump-sum transfers of taxes and subsidies”, with market forces relied on to 
provide the efficient mechanism to set resource allocation.  
 
Any intervention by the state was seen as distortionary and was religiously advised against, 
particularly in the area of trade. A nation which resorts to the use of either tariffs or 
subsidies (protection or promotion) to create a wedge between market prices and social 
costs, rather than to close this gap, was regarded to challenge the efficient world allocation 
of resources. Free trade was regarded as the equally beneficial and binding policy from the 
perspective of both developed and developing counties (Bhagawati, 1985: 34).  
 
Chang (2002) pointed out through the critical review of the early industrialisation strategies 
and policies adopted by a group of the ‘now’ developed countries that “the policies that 
were used are almost the opposite of what the present day orthodoxy says”.  England, the 
United States, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, have themselves endorsed policies 
of infant industry promotion, and have deployed heavily protectionist trade policies during 
their early years of industrialisation.  
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The following section presents the case made in support of infant industry protection, 
which ultimately led to the rise of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) as known in its 
contemporary application. 
 
The theoretical case for industrial protection: the infant industry argument  
A debatable issue is whether trade policy determines industrial policy or whether the 
opposite is true. Viewing policy sequence from a Ricardain perspective reveals that under a 
free trade regime, industrial specialisation is dictated by a country’s comparative 
advantage, with trade policy basically determining industrial policy. List (1856) however, 
turned this notion upside down, having argued that a nation should 'decide' what it wants to 
manufacture and then structure its trade regime accordingly. List promoted what became 
known as the 'infant industry' argument, which laid the first analytical argument for 
industrial protection as we know it in the modern sense. List explained that a system of 
protection would not give rise to monopoly, but regarded it as a 'reward' to those who risk 
their capital and talent to the advancement of industrialisation. The notion of protection as 
advanced by List was based on the objective of capturing future gains by means of 'present 
sacrifice' (List, 1856: 224). 
 
While List provided significant intellectual and practical inspiration to the industrialization 
efforts of countries wishing to challenge the supremacy of British industrial hegemony 
during the late eighteenth century, particularly the United States where he lived in exile, ISI 
as applied during the 1950s and 1960s drew much of its theoretical foundation from the 
works of Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch. The Prebisch-Singer Thesis provided evidence 
regarding the secular decline in the terms of trade of industrial versus primary commodities, 
and the subsequent loses of income gains from trade. Evidence regarding the secular 
decline in the terms of trade was translated into policy action through ISI, which as a policy 
was supported by an array of tariff as well as non-tariff barriers to shield the newly 
established industrial entities.  
 
The market failure approach to modern welfare economics also challenged the neoclassical 
orthodoxy by pointing to the evident failure of the market mechanism in equating private 
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and social costs and benefits and with the possible correctives of such failures through state 
intervention (Chang, 1994). Discussions of market failure have traditionally focused on 
externalities, natural monopolies and public goods, as well as issues of incomplete markets, 
the pervasiveness of imperfect competition and information failures, moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and the inequalities of market outcomes (Stiglitz, 1988: 1991). 
 
ISI provoked considerable controversy due to the theoretical and policy challenge pushed 
against the neoclassical paradigm regarding the merits of free and uninterrupted mechanism 
of the market. Any "deliberate active economic policy designed to influence the amount 
and composition of investment could not, according to this school, raise national income in 
the long run" (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943: 204-7).  
 
The tools of industrial policy, the viewpoint of the competing paradigms  
Having set the basic difference to understanding how industrial development was to be 
attained from the perspective of the two main competing paradigms which emerged after 
World War Two, it follows that such differences in the perception of the context as well as 
the route to development were reflected in the policy tools which were put into actual 
practice by countries subscribing to either of the viewpoints. It is important to mention that 
regardless of which side of the fence is being examined, every nation in the world, 
regardless of its ideological and economic orientation, exercised some form of industrial 
policy.  
 
On the neoclassical side, however, whenever the debate regarding the merits of industrial 
policy is opened, a defensive attitude follows, simply because "both terms in 'industrial 
policy' are suspect" (Wildavsky, 1984: 24). Calls to "get the government off the back of the 
private sector" do not take into account that whether the private sector likes it or not, 
governments have been and will remain to be influential players in the global 
competitiveness game (Johnson, 1984:7).   
 
Industrial policy provokes little, if no controversy, if conceptualised in its broadest 
perspective as understood under a neoclassical framework. Such a broad definition views 
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industrial policy to be restricted to providing adequate infrastructure, a limit on the power 
of monopolies and cartels, indicative guidance regarding future industrial prospects (but 
without either compulsion or subsidies) a stable and simple tax structure, a free and flexible 
capital market and a progressive move towards zero sectoral protection (Corden, 1980). 
Along the same lines, non-controversial definitions of industrial policy view it to embrace 
"all government actions which affect industry: its domestic and foreign investment, foreign 
trade, regional location, innovation activities, labour absorption, access to capital markets 
and environmental use" (Donges, 1980: 1989). Key components of industrial policy are 
seen to be centred on promoting long-run economic growth, productivity as well as 
avoiding/eliminating structural rigidities, which are likely to impede change, with the best 
industrial policy being one which gradually ensures its own disappearance (Johnson, 1984; 
Corden, 1980).  
 
The tools of industrial policy as practiced in developing countries have been markedly 
different from the above. Selectivity, coupled with the targeting of industries ‘strategically’ 
posited to alter static comparative advantage, in favour activities of a higher value added 
nature, has been central to industrial policy as practiced in most developing countries under 
ISI. Protective and sometimes prohibitive tariffs and quotas as well as subsidies were the 
prime policy tools used to advance ISI. 
 
Industrial policy in a developing country context was also assigned the responsibility of 
initiating and co-ordinating government activities with the aim of leveraging upward 
particular industries.  Industrial policy in this sense was understood to target the 
preservation of employment in a particular sector or region (defensive), as well as taking 
the form of adjustment measures designed to improve the efficiency of particular industries 
(positive adjustment) (Corden, 1980). Industrial policy was, in a sense "a summary term for 
government activities that are intended to develop or retrench various industries in a 
national economy in order to maintain global competitiveness" (Johnson, 1984: 7).   
 
While the case for infant industry protection is difficult to refute as long as a time element 
is tightly integrated in it, more often than not, protected industries do not grow out of their 
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infancy stage, with subsidies (promotion) as well as tariffs (protection) giving rise to rent 
seeking activities, which otherwise would have not occurred in their absence. In addition 
"while these changes are supposed to permit productivity to increase more rapidly in 
protected infant industries of LDCs than in the developed countries, the evidence suggests 
that protection has rather retarded productivity growth… tends to discourage exports as 
production in the confines of domestic markets limits the exploitation of economies of 
scale, capacity utilisation and technological improvements” (Corden, 1985). 
 
The ascendancy of neoliberalism 
Several factors led to the disenchantment with ISI, thus paving the way for the neoliberal 
school of thought -the theoretical extension of the neoclassical paradigm- to emerge as the 
dominant economic paradigm, particularly after the looming of the debt crisis of the early 
1980s. Because most of import substituting industries was to varying degrees dependent on 
imports of either capital goods and/or intermediates, shortages in foreign exchange 
undermined the sustainability of this policy, particularly for excessively inward oriented 
industrial sectors. External shocks triggered by oil prices, exposed the vulnerability of ISI, 
thus ushering the demise of this model, which initially brought rapid growth, diversification 
and growing per capita income. Palma (2003) attributed the failure of ISI as implemented 
in Latin America to the dogmatic application, which excluded parallel export promotion.  
 
Comparing the strategies followed by the first tier of NICs Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea 
and Hong Kong, to Latin America revealed that “on the tariff front, the NICs used 
protection at levels often higher than those of Latin America, but the crucial difference was 
that huge effective protection -and cheap finance- was only granted if producers were able 
to fulfil specific export targets. In this respect, ISI and export-led growth were never 
mutually exclusive alternatives for the NICs: ISI was simply the platform and source of 
finance (due to ‘over-pricing’ a captive market) for their export drive. In turn, export 
orientation forced levels of investment, productivity and product quality that a purely 
inward-oriented ISI could never deliver” (Palama, 2003: 136-137).    
 
36 
 
Disenchantment with ISI seemed to vindicate the much earlier concern of J.S. Mill who 
cautioned in his ‘Principles of Political Economy’ that “.. it is essential that the protection 
should be confined to cases in which there is ground of assurance that the industry which it 
fosters will after a time be able to dispense with it” (Mill,1998). In other words, targeting 
did not mean the “promotion of technologies that are unlikely to develop at all on their 
own; it means, rather helping them rapidly to achieve the necessary economies of scale and 
manufacturing efficiency without which they can never become internationally 
competitive” (Johnson, 1984: 10). In fact this was the original essence of ISI as preached 
by Prebisch in the 1950s, who was initially concerned with the limits of ISI and was rather 
keen on the development of a free trade area in Latin America to allow for the development 
of a range of complementary light industries on a continent wide basis (Toye, 2003). This 
seems to have been ‘the’ critical missing ingredient which brought about the demise of ISI 
as a development strategy.  
 
Neoliberalism was fiercely replacing the Stucturalist approach to development, applying 
modern versions of the dominant economic doctrine of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Neoliberalism saw in the early twentieth century the golden age of 
capitalism, during which state ownership and regulations of industry and finance were 
absent, labour markets were flexible, strong anti-inflationary macroeconomic policies as 
well as the free international flows of capital and trade were binding. To emulate this 
golden age, the neoliberals advocated reform programs, which were basically made-up of 
privatisation, radical deregulation, liberalisation of the goods and capital markets and the 
adoption of tight macroeconomic policy (Chang, 2003). These policy items were featured 
in almost all stabilisation, economic reform and structural adjustment programs which were 
the standard policies advised by the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the World Bank, 
the IMF and more so on the trade front by the WTO, particularly after 1995. The TRIPS 
Agreement complemented what came to be known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, by 
breathing life into one of the previously neglected facets of the neoliberal paradigm, namely 
the developmental role of IPRs. Such a role was linked to the positive impact on the global 
harmonisation of IPRS on bringing the much-needed role of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into the development equation (Mansfield, 1994).  
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Comparisons between the dogmatic application of ISI (in Latin America and other parts of 
the developing world including Egypt) relative to the more pragmatic industrial strategies 
adopted by the first tier of NICs stirred a massive policy debate as to whether industrial 
policies applied in this highly successful part of the developing world were the triumphant 
victory of the neoliberal paradigm in delivering ‘development’ versus a unique model of a 
‘developmental’ state which increasingly used a hybrid of policy tools that in no evident 
way relied on exclusive market forces to achieve the development ‘miracle’ of East Asia. 
 
The East Asian model of industrial development 
Like success, which has many fathers, the East Asian Miracle was claimed to reflect the 
ethos of several competing paradigms. Bhagawati (1985) one of the most ardent supporters 
of free trade, saw in the experiences of the NICs a “superlative economic performance of 
those countries in particular the four tigers of East Asia that unilaterally liberalised their 
trade regimes during the 1950s”. Among the series of studies to follow this approach was 
the World Bank (1993) report of the East Asian miracle, with the suggestive title of 
‘Economic Growth and Public Policy’ arguing that the high growth success of the NICs 
was in large measures achieved by ‘getting the basics right’. From the perspective of the 
Bank, private domestic investment and rapid and growing human capital were the principal 
engines of growth. Macroeconomic performance was stable and macroeconomic 
management prudent. Against mounting evidence that targeting and intervention were 
characteristics of the NICs developmental model, the Report acknowledged that “in most of 
these economies, in one form or another, the government intervened -to foster development 
and in some cases the development of specific industries. Policy interventions took many 
forms; targeting and subsidizing credit to selected industries, keeping deposit rates low and 
maintaining ceilings on borrowing rates to increase profits and retained earnings, protecting 
domestic and import substitutes, subsidizing declining industries, making public 
investments in applied research, establishing firm and industry-specific export targets, 
developing export marketing institutions…” (World Bank, 1993: 5).  
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While most, if not all of these policies, did violate the dictum of the neoclassical paradigm, 
the Report was strictly adherent to the conclusion that:  
 
“Despite these actions…very little evidence that industrial policies have 
affected either the sectoral structure of industry or rates of productivity 
change..industrial structures in Japan, Korea and Taiwan China, have 
evolved during the past thirty years as we would expect given factor-based 
comparative advantage and changing factor endowments. It is not 
altogether surprising that industrial policy in Japan, Korean and Taiwan 
China produced mainly market-confirming results. While these 
governments selectively promoted capital and knowledge intensive 
industries, they also took steps to ensure that they were fostering 
profitable, internationally competitive firms…Moreover, their industrial 
policies incorporated a large amount of market information and used 
performance, usually export performance as a yardstick” (World Bank, 
1993: 21-22).  
 
The policy message relied from the Report is that “the promotion of specific industries 
generally did not work and therefore holds little promise for other developing counties.. 
Export-push strategies have been by far the most successful combination of fundamentals 
and policy interventions and hold the most promise for other developing economies”. This 
statement summarised the policy advice of the neoliberal paradigm. 
 
The challenge to the claim that the East Asian miracle was a neoliberal success story, came 
well ahead of publishing the World Bank Report. Wade (1990) presented a ‘governed 
market’ (GM) theory to the interpretation of the NICs success story, building on the 
foundations of the older vintage of development economics, as well as the concept of the 
‘developmental state’ theory of East Asian industrial success. The GM theory argued that 
the superiority of the East Asian economic performance was due to the combination of high 
levels of productive investment, which allowed for the rapid transfer and deployment of 
newer technologies into actual production as well as investment in key industries that 
would have otherwise not occurred in the absence of government intervention. The 
exposure of many industries to international competition in foreign export markets meant 
that efficiency and cost competitiveness were key to success. At a second level of 
causation, the government was successful in guiding/governing the market process of 
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resource allocation so as to produce different production, and investment outcomes than 
would have occurred under either free or simulated market policies. These included a 
mixture of incentives, controls as well as mechanisms to spread risk. At a third level of 
explanation, the organisation of the state structure and the symbiotic relationship with the 
private sector has allowed for the successful implementation of such policies (Wade, 1990: 
26-27). Of no less importance in Wade’s GM theory was the emphasis on the development 
virtues of a hard or soft authoritarian state in corporatist relations with the private sector. 
The centralised bureaucracy of such a state retained enough autonomy needed to influence 
resource allocation in line with long-term nationalist interest, which may sometimes come 
in conflict with short-run profit maximisation (Wade, 1990: 29).  
 
There was a consensus that the economic success of the NICs group of countries 
particularly in terms of industrial growth demonstrated how “active government 
intervention” (Stiglitz, 1996: 151) was conducive to the transfer of technology as well as 
the development of indigenous technological capabilities (Evans, 1995; Thurow, 1993).  
The interpretation of the East Asian experience provided evidence that governments were 
aggressively picking or creating winners at the industry and firm levels by intervening in 
trade, credit allocation, technology imports and local technology diffusion and creation, and 
in the area of education and training as well as export activity (UNIDO, 1994: 5). 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the success of interventionist policies provided by the East 
Asian NICs gave added support to List’s original infant industry argument but from a 
different perspective. Infant industries were only awarded protection in conjunction with 
export performance, which enticed them to become competitive on world markets and thus 
more able to sustain competition locally once liberalisation figures into the equation. Thus, 
while specific industries were targeted, the final aim was to improve the efficiency of the 
economy as a whole.  In many cases, "in an ‘industrial policy regime' if the efficiency 
objective of an industry is in conflict with that of the economy in general, that of the 
economy as a whole should be permitted to dominate" (Chang, 1994). The policy message 
was that the selectivity or targeting element of industrial policy should not conceal the fact 
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that its guiding principle should be efficiency and not other motives such as equity for 
example (Chang, 1994). 
 
The key objective of the above exposé was to pave the way for interpreting the results 
concerning the efficiency level exhibited by Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry 
during the study period against the competing paradigms regarding the outcome of 
protectionist policies in the domain of manufacturing activities. Whether or not the 
outcome of protectionism has been manifested in retarding productivity growth in the 
generics pharmaceutical industry rather than supporting it, is the key concern of the 
following chapters, which provide the empirical evidence to contribute back to this 
important debate.  
 
The following section presents the conceptual framework of the thesis. 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
Conceptually, productivity measures the efficiency with which resources (including capital 
and labour) are employed in production (Klein, 1983: 4561). The concept of technical 
efficiency dates back to the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951), when both 
scholars addressed the issue of efficiency in the economics literature. Farrel (1957) then 
followed by building on earlier work to introduce the notion of efficiency measurement.  
 
Firm-level efficiency essentially consists of two main components. The first is technical 
efficiency, which deals with the ability of a particular firm to obtain maximal output from a 
given set of inputs. The second is allocative (price) efficiency, which indicates the ability of 
firms to use inputs in optimal proportions. Combining these two measures provides a 
measure of total economic efficiency (Haghiri et al., 2004). Technical efficiency is defined 
as a comparison between the observed and maximum values of a particular firm’s inputs 
and outputs. Comparisons can embody the form of the ratio of observed to maximum 
potential output obtainable from given input (input-oriented measure), or the ratio of 
minimum potential to observed input required to produce the given output (output-oriented 
measure), or some combination of both (Haghiri et al., 2004). 
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Central to the measurement of productivity is total factor productivity (TFP). TFP measures 
the economic as well as the technical efficiency with which resources are transformed into 
products. TFP is the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs used in the 
production process. Levels of TFP are thus determined by how efficiently and intensely the 
inputs are utilized in the production process (Comin, 2006). TFP growth has assumed 
central importance in the economics literature because of the fact that the growth of an 
economy, an industry or a firm is determined by the rate of expansion of its productive 
resources and the ratio of TFP growth (Nishimizu and Robinson, 1984: 180).  
 
TFP growth essentially plays a pivotal role in economic growth, as well as cross-country 
per capita income differences. Solow (1956) has shown that the long-run growth in per 
capita income in an economy (with aggregate neoclassical production function) must be 
driven by growth in TFP. Achieving rapid and sustainable positive rates of TFP growth, has 
thus become a prime objective for policy makers, particularly in a developing country 
context.  
 
Looking into why there have been differential productivity outcomes among various 
countries/ industries/ firms, the literature has indicated that this may actually arise from a 
plethora of sources. Trends in TFP may mirror the efficiency of a particular reform 
program, learning effects, the deployment of new generations of technology, technical 
know-how, organizational skills, enterprise response to changes in competition -which is a 
central issue of this thesis- and other related aspects of market structure. In addition, TFP 
trends may also reflect the impact of social, political and institutional obstacles to 
potentially useful innovations. Nonetheless, it has remained difficult to ascertain the causes 
of productivity movements (Jefferson, Rawski and Zhend, 1996: 147). 
 
Two issues in relation to TFP growth are particularly important and relevant from a 
development policy perspective. The first issue is related to the range of TFP growth rates 
that one can be 'reasonably' expected. This can be addressed by looking at confidence 
intervals for TFP growth rates which can be obtained from historical records of firms, 
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industries or economies operating under various production and regulatory settings. For 
example, these observations provide significant insights in relation to an appropriate 
duration of infant industry protection. The second issue of policy relevance is related to the 
cause and source of TFP growth. In this regards, it has become important to both question 
as well as to find answers as to whether or not protection from import competition blunts 
the incentives for efficiency improvements (Nishimizu and Robinson, 1984: 180). It is this 
type of questions which is clearly central for this thesis. 
 
Researchers as well as policy makers have been interested in factors which underlie 
observations that some countries are more productive than others, some industries are more 
productive than others and some firms are more productive than others. Factors which 
proved to be important included ownership, the quality of labour, technology used, 
exposure to competition in export markets and the regulatory environment (Bartelsman and 
Doms, 2000: 586). In close connection, among the central issues invoked in the literature 
on productivity is related to the extent to which exposure to foreign markets relates to 
producers' choice and productivity dispersion within a particular industry. In fact, plant 
level exporting has gained significant attention, and has been motivated by evidence of a 
strong relationship between exporting and productivity growth (Bernard and Jensen, 1995). 
 
Researchers have extensively embarked on examining the underlying reasons behind 
observed productivity levels and growth rates in various nations, industries as well as firms. 
The objective has generally been to evaluate their mutual competitive positions, particularly 
with regards international trade. On this front, of significant policy relevance has been the 
contention that countries that have exhibited strong productivity growth, have also been 
highly competitive internationally (Klein, 1983: 4565). 
 
Research regarding productivity served to answer a rich plethora of questions, which have 
in turn been tackled by using a narrow set of measurement techniques as will be elaborate 
on further.  
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On one hand, a large body of literature has looked into the relative productivity of locally 
owned firms versus foreign owned firms, with the objective of formulating more effective 
policies with regards FDI. Along such lines, Asheghian (1982) attempted to evaluate the 
comparative efficiency of foreign firms and local firms in Iran in an effort to present intra-
firm efficiency comparisons (based on three indices of efficiency including TFP). The 
study concluded that international joint-venture firms (as opposed to wholly owned 
subsidiaries) which have been operating in Iran during the pre-revolutionary period 1971-
76 have been more efficient than locally owned firms. Chung et al (2003) focused on the 
influence of Japanese FDI on the productivity of US suppliers in the US auto-component 
industry during a study period which extended between 1979 and 1991. This study was 
based on observing linkages between various firms supplying auto-components to Japanese 
transplants, as well as the productivity and survival of the US component firms that did not 
supply Japanese transplants. The authors found out that the productivity of local suppliers 
with linkages to Japanese transplants did not grow faster than that of unaffiliated suppliers, 
and concluded that there was no evidence of direct technology transfer positively affecting 
US suppliers' productivity during the study period (which was coined as the initial stage of 
inward FDI in the USA).   
 
Among the interesting segments of research work on productivity, is the body of literature 
linking exporting to productivity growth. Exporting is regarded to positively contribute to 
productivity growth through three key channels: 1) economies of scale; 2) efficiency 
improvements on behalf of exporters though the process of 'learning by exporting', cross-
efficiency promotion and resource reallocation from the less to the more efficient firms at 
the industry level and 3) technical progress which result from technology spill-overs 
through foreign contracts and the encouragement of investment in research and 
development (Fu, 2005; Bartelsman and Domes, 2000).  
 
Empirical research examining whether or not export-oriented firms exhibit higher levels of 
productivity than non-exporting firms has produced mixed results. One faction of the 
literature has argued that there is a process of 'learning-by-exporting' whereby exporting 
firms serve as a conduit for technology transfer from abroad and do generate technological 
44 
 
spill-overs to the rest of firms operating in their domain of operations. Another faction 
states that the relatively high productivity of exporting firms reflects the mere fact that it is 
the relatively more efficient producers who do enter and sustain presence in the highly 
competitive export markets. This reflects a 'self-selection' process which works in the 
export industries (Fu, 2005).  
 
On one side, research based on examining microdata in developing countries has shown 
that exporting firms are generally more efficient than non-exporting firms. The study by 
Clerides et al. (1998) confirms this pattern and adds the interesting finding that plants that 
cease to export typically become less efficient. Taking a step further in the analysis by 
looking into causation flows from exporting to productivity improvements, data from 
Colombia and Morocco pertaining to export-oriented industries was found to be 
inconsistent with this pattern of causality (Clerides et al., 1998). Fu (2005) also investigated 
the relationship between exports and industry-wide productivity growth in China's 
manufacturing sector. By relying on industry-level panel data for the period 1990-97 (using 
a non-parametric Malmquist TFP approach), the author found out that export-oriented 
industries did not appear to have been more efficient than non-export industries. No 
productivity gains of significance have been caused by exports at the industry level (Fu, 
2005).  
 
In contrast to this kind of observations, basing their empirical work on data from the Penn 
World Tables for 102 countries, and using measures of 'real' openness (defined as imports 
plus exports in US Dollars exchange rate relative to GDP in purchasing power parity US 
Dollars) Alcala and Ciccone (2004) have found that the causal effect of trade on 
productivity is statistically significant as well as robust. This finding has indicated that the 
channels through which international trade impacts on average -labour- productivity is 
through TFP. Handoussa, Nishimizu and Page (1986) have also provided evidence from 
Egypt's state-owned companies in the manufacturing sector after the ODP, whereby 
exporting firms were found to be relatively more efficient than their inward-oriented 
counterparts.  
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Clerides et al. (1998) also posed the interesting question of whether firms become more 
efficient after becoming exporters. The authors track the causal link from exporting to 
productivity growth using plant-level panel data. They also looked into whether the cost 
process of individual firms undergoes change after they move into export markets. The 
results indicate that the relatively more efficient firms become exporters. However, firms' 
costs are not significantly affected by previous exporting activities. The positive association 
between exporting and efficiency gains documented in the literature is, nonetheless, 
explained by the self-selection of the more efficient firms into export markets (Clerides et 
al, 1998). In close connection, Pavcnik (2002) addressed the more boarder issue of trade 
liberalization and productivity growth using panel data for the 1979-86 period for all 
manufacturing plants in Chile employing ten or more workers. The author found that there 
was significant support for productivity improvements related to liberalized trade. 
Following trade liberalization during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the productivity of 
plants in the import competing sectors grew by an average of 3-10 percent more than in the 
non-traded-goods sector in Chile.  
 
Another important and interesting dimension of research on productivity, is that related to 
the nature of ownership of productive units. Hauner (2005) looked into the comparative 
efficiency performance of large German and Austrian banks, state-owned banks were found 
to be more cost-efficient (owing to their access to cheaper funds), while cooperative banks 
were found to be about as cost-efficient as private banks. The study also found out that 
Austrian banks were significantly less cost-efficient than German banks. In another attempt 
to link observed patterns of efficiency to ownership, Liu (2001) investigated the effect of 
state ownership on efficiency (using an econometric model which allowed for the 
separation of technical from allocative efficiency in a dynamic setting). Basing the 
estimation results on a sample of international airlines, the author suggested that state-
ownership is associated with lower technical and allocative efficiency.  
 
2.4 Summary and Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter, I provided a review of literature on industrial policy, as well 
as the outcomes of such policy choices during different historical intervals in various parts 
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of the world. It is safe to argue that the empirical evidence concerning the outcome of 
industrial policy choices has fueled rather than resolved the debate concerning what an 
optimal industrial policy should be. 
 
While the neoclassical paradigm, which propagated minimal involvement of governments 
in economic activity and the supremacy of the rules of comparative advantage in dictating 
specialization has dominated during the aftermath of World War Two, the Prebisch-Singer 
Thesis regarding the secular decline in the terms of trade of industrial versus primary 
commodities has elevated import-substitution-industrialization as the preferred policy 
option by the majority of developing nations, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
The infant industry argument has heavily influenced industrial policy in most -if not all- 
developing nations. Governments chose to erect tariff barriers to shield their nascent 
industries against import competition, with the objective of altering static comparative 
advantage in the production and trade of primary commodities. During the debt crisis of the 
late 1980s, neoliberalism challenged the basic foundations of the import-substitution 
paradigm, by providing mounting evidence that protection has retarded productivity growth 
rather than supported it. Evidence has been provided from Latin American countries, that 
the total exclusion of export promotion strategies made them vulnerable to external shocks 
triggered by rising oil prices, while their protected manufacturing industries were not able 
to capture any shares of significance on export markets or withstand competition on local 
markets. 
 
The review of the literature also provided the interesting case of the first tier of NICs, that 
enriched the literature on industrial policy with a new model which blended import-
substitution with export promotion strategies. Policy interventions in the NICs provided 
subsidized credit to selected industries, protected domestic and import substitutes and made 
public investments in applied research on condition that firms met industry-specific export 
targets. In this respect, import-substitution-industrialization and export-led growth were 
never mutually exclusive options for industrialization for the NICs. 
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The rich set of country experiences, documenting the outcomes of various industrial 
policies, has nonetheless not finally resolved the debate concerning what an optimal 
industrial policy should be. By examining the growth trajectory and key performance 
attributes of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry against the literature on industrial 
policy as well as against the concept of efficiency, I should be able to contribute to this 
debate with a set of empirical evidence.  
 
By presenting the conceptual framework of the thesis, this chapter also threw light on the 
concept of productivity and its measurement through estimating TFP, which will be 
employed in Chapter Five. 
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3. MAPPING THE GROWTH TRAJECTORY OF EGYPT’S GENERICS PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY AGAINST GLOBAL PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND TRADE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two, it has been presented through the review of the literature on industrial 
policy, that governments intervene to influence outcomes in the domain of industrial 
activities through a host of polices and regulatory measures. The nature of how do 
industries perform under the auspices of a protectionist or a liberal regime, has been a long 
standing question evoked by the literature on industrial policy.  
 
In this chapter, I will examine the growth trajectory of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical 
industry against the nature of the industrial policy regime(s) which ruled during the study 
period. The key objective is to provide the background against which the research question 
concerning the extent to which mechanisms used to regulate and protect the Egyptian 
generics pharmaceutical industry have been associated with productivity growth will be 
addressed.  
 
On the basis of the evidence presented in this chapter, it is safe to argue that since its 
formative years, and passing through different policy and regulatory regimes, the focus as 
well as the key criteria for success for the Egyptian generics pharmaceutical industry, has 
primarily been on increasing the levels of self-sufficiency, in what has been regarded as a 
strategic sector. The various shifts in economic policy direction, as well as episodes of 
institutional and regulatory reforms have consistently defaulted in shifting the relatively 
excessive inward orientation of this industry. Unlike the majority of manufacturing 
industries in Egypt, which have seen protective tariff as well as non-tariff trade barriers 
being systemically brought down during various intervals, the perseverance of non-tariff 
regulatory barriers shielding the generics pharmaceutical industry in Egypt has practically 
isolated this industry from import competition.   
 
This chapter also documents the failure to transcend the boundaries of engaging in sheer 
pharmaceutical formulation activities and venturing towards expanding research and 
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development (R&D) capabilities by the local generics pharmaceutical industry in Egypt. 
Evidence also indicates that Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry has not been a key 
contributor to job creation in what is predominately a labor surplus economy. The key 
achievement of this industry has been manifested in its ability to close down on the levels 
of self-sufficiency. The important research question which then persists becomes related to 
whether this achievement has been attained in an efficient manner.  
 
Chapter Three is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presented the salient characteristics of 
the pharmaceutical industry, with the objective of highlighting the key differences between 
research-based and generics pharmaceutical manufacturers. It is against this background 
section that details how similar as well as dissimilar pharmaceutical manufacturers operate 
on the world production and trade scenes, that the growth trajectory and performance of 
Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical sector will be examined and assessed. Section 3.2 
highlighted the fact that while generics companies in some countries such as India have 
continued to focus on the production of multiple-source generics for the home market, they 
have also managed to become key players on the global market. This contrasts markedly 
with the case of Egypt, in which generics companies remain confined to the local market. 
Section 3.3 evaluated the growth trajectory of the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry against 
the key objectives of the industrial policy regime(s) which governed during the study 
period. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 presented the key players on Egypt’s manufacturing scene and 
their market structure respectively. Section 3.6 presented the key performance attributes of 
this sector in terms of output growth, employment creation, trade performance and R&D 
activities. Section 3.7 presents the summary of key findings concerning the extent to which 
the reform program of the early 1990s, as well as the ruling pharmaceutical regulatory 
framework have been effective in inducing the desired performance attributes expected 
from this industry along lines the norms observed internationally. Section 3.7 also 
presented the concluding remarks which identify the key limitations of the ruling policy 
regime in terms of supporting the generics pharmaceutical industry meet the challenges of 
its current stage of development.  
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3.2 Salient Characteristics of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
In this thesis, the pharmaceutical industry is defined as one which is concerned with the 
manufacturing of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations. This 
definition is in accordance with the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
Rev. 4 of the United Nations, whereby pharmaceutical products fall under Section C for 
manufacturing, Division 21.  
 
Measured against a group of indicators such as share in world production, trade as well as 
profitability, the pharmaceutical industry has emerged as one of the key ‘sunrise’ industries. 
The term sunrise describes a range of industrial activities sharing the common denominator 
of being relatively new, technologically progressive concerns investing heavily in research 
and development R&D in order to foster not only growth, but more fundamentally, survival 
given the heightened vulnerability of their products to rapid technological obsolescence. 
These industries mainly operate in the domain of electronic data processing, electrical and 
electronic engineering, aerospace and pharmaceuticals (Wells, 1985:11). One of the most 
obvious features of the pharmaceutical industry is that it is characterised by a very large 
number of small sellers and a very small number of large companies, which are 
international in their outlook and competition (Taggart, 1993). The pharmaceutical industry 
is also by far the most research-intensive of industrial activities. In the USA, which is home 
to the largest of the research-based companies, pharmaceutical firms invest five more times 
in R&D relative to their sales, than the average in the manufacturing sector (CBO, 1998). 
Other characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry which differentiate it from other 
industries are that the industry has high fixed R&D costs and low marginal costs of 
production. The industry is also exceptional in terms of the fact that patents rather than 
first-time mover advantages or any other source of monopoly power provide the key 
protection from the perspective of innovators (Kremer, 2002).   
 
The pharmaceuticals industry is also characterised by atypical attributes, which render 
supply and demand dynamics of limited insight in understanding how the market for 
pharmaceuticals functions. In other words normal market discipline simply does not work 
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(Green, 1997: 1). Demand for pharmaceuticals is dictated by the tripartite division of 
separate actors, starting with the doctor who prescribes but does not consume the patient 
who consumes but may not pay and the third party responsible for payment (Cooper, 1966: 
114).  In fact, a fundamental feature of the health care market is that consumers generally 
do not choose to pay for the goods they consume (Bloom and Van Reenen, 1998: 323). 
This feature related to the separation of the authority that prescribes from the responsibility 
to pay means that in effect “prescribing physicians have little economic motivation to 
prescribe the lowest-priced brands … patients cannot substitute lower-priced brands for 
those prescribed by their physicians. As a result, the demand curve for individual drugs or 
for groups of related drugs are likely to be extremely inelastic” (Jadlow, 1979: 14). This 
inelasticity is what makes pharmaceuticals "life" and "death" products. Because 
governments are usually in a monopsonist position, being major buyers of pharmaceuticals 
-with probably the notable exception of the USA- cost containment efforts have subjected 
drug prices to extensive regulation (Green, 1997: 1). 
 
The above characteristics are responsible for distinguishing the pharmaceutical industry 
from all other sectors of manufacturing activity.  
 
3.2.1 A typology of the pharmaceutical industry 
The production of pharmaceutical preparations involves the physical production of a drug 
in its marketed form. This may involve an array of processes such as ingredient 
compounding and dispersion, granulation and drying, in addition to formulation in the final 
form (tablets, capsules, etc.). With certain exceptions, such as sterile production facilities, 
capital costs associated with the manufacturing process tend to be low and techniques are 
not highly complex, thus allowing companies of almost any size to produce finished 
pharmaceuticals (James, 1977: 16). Pharmaceutical manufacturers fall in three main 
categories. These include large integrated corporations, innovative companies and 
reproductive companies.  
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Integrated companies 
Integrated companies are the large vertically integrated entities capable of engaging in all 
three stages of drug production, including R&D, manufacturing and distribution. Most of 
the large drug companies also have their own raw material production facilities. The most 
important of characteristics shared by the integrated pharmaceutical companies, is the 
extent to which R&D outlays account for a large (and rising) share of sales. In 2007, the 
five largest spenders globally on pharmaceutical R&D were Pfizer (USD 8.1 billion), 
Roche (USD 6.7 billion), Sanofi-Aventis (USD 6.6 billion), Novartis (USD 6.4 billion), and 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) (USD 6.4 billion) (Pharmaceuticals Executive, 2008). Member 
companies of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) have 
seen their R&D expenditure as a percent of sales increasing significantly from 9.3 percent 
in 1970, to 14.4 percent in 1990 and 16.4 percent in 2007 (PhRMA, 2008). 
 
The operations of integrated pharmaceutical firms are concentrated in a few of the world 
leading industrial countries. These include the USA, United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
Germany, Japan, Belgium, Sweden and France. In terms of drug development, the USA 
leads the league. The share of the USA in the development of some 152 new drugs between 
1975-94 stood at 45 percent. The UK followed with a 14-percentage share (Barral, 1995). 
The USA assumes the same leading position, whereby it accounts for 43 percent out of 
6401 compounds currently in the development phase. Europe follows with a share of 22 
percent and Japan with 8.5 percent (PhRMA, 2008). It is, therefore, not surprising to find 
that nine of the world’s top 15 research-based pharmaceutical companies are headquartered 
in the USA.  
 
Countries hosting the world top research-based pharmaceutical companies share the 
common denominator needed to support the growth of pharmaceutical R&D. Foremost 
among these requisites are the basic scientific infrastructure in universities, government 
research institutes and within industry. These are the initial places where scientists are able 
to gather fundamental new ideas. It is, nonetheless, important to note that it has been 
industry, rather than academia, which had the resources and expertise to turn basic 
scientific theories into marketable medicines (Smith, 1985: 67).  
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Innovative and generics companies 
Innovative companies are the second type of companies. These companies distinguish 
themselves by being able to discover and develop new molecular entities (NMEs), but are 
typically engaged in the production of patent expired drugs. Their revenue ranges between 
USD 25-200 million, which does not allow them to fund product development. While they 
are able to develop NMEs, they often resort to licensing arrangements with larger 
companies in order to develop and market their products. The third type of companies is the 
generics manufactures or the imitation-based firms. These firms are often small-to-medium 
in size, lacking any in-house research capacity, and the drugs they produce are typically 
off-patent. While the above characterization of firms is not exhaustive, it is sufficient to 
yield a reasonably accurate typology of the world’s pharmaceutical industry (Balance et al, 
1992: 1-6). 
 
3.2.2 A Typology of products  
Pharmaceutical products are highly differentiated, and therefore, it is difficult to argue that 
there is ‘one’ market for pharmaceuticals, whether locally or globally. Pharmaceuticals do 
not fall in the category of products with large long run cross-elasticities of either supply or 
demand, to allow for their combination in a single market (Grabowski and Vernon, 1976: 
30).  
 
Pharmaceutical products can only be grouped in sub-markets, within which a reasonable 
degree of substitutability of one product for the other exists. To illustrate with an example, 
a tranquilliser will have no effect on the sales of an established antibiotic, even though both 
clearly fall in the category of pharmaceutical products (Cooper, 1966: 59). Distinction is 
also made between in-patent products, generics and branded generics, as well as between 
ethical products and over the counter (OTC) drugs. This distinction has significant 
implications in terms of the cost structure, pricing and competition between products. 
Competition, therefore, does not take place on an industry wide basis, but should be viewed 
and evaluated within the domains of particular therapeutic groups of drugs (Grabowski and 
Vernon, 1976: 32).  
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In general, the pharmaceutical market is not considered to be highly concentrated. 
However, when the market is divided into narrowly defined therapeutic classes, high levels 
of concentration become visible. In the USA, each of the top of brand-name drugs ranked 
by pharmaceutical sales does not account for more than 7 percent of the entire market for 
prescription drugs. However, within each of the therapeutic classes, higher levels of 
concentration are evident. The Congressional Budgetary Office (CBO) of the USA 
examined 66 of the therapeutic classes on the market, of which in 35, the top three 
innovator drugs accounted for 80 percent of retail pharmacy sales in their class (CBO, 
1998: xi). 
 
Prescription drugs are generally divided into two key categories: innovator drugs and 
generic drugs. Innovator drugs -also referred to as brand-name drugs- enjoy patent 
protection on their chemical formulations and are approved following extensive clinical 
testing under an original new drug application (NDA). Therapeutically similar patented 
brand-name drugs can exist, though each with a different chemical formulation. Originator 
drugs which are still under patent protection are called single-source-drugs. Generic drugs 
obtain regulatory approval under a relatively shorter process than innovator drugs, whereby 
they rely on the demonstration of “bioequivalence” to an innovator drug. They are, 
therefore, not patentable (CBO, 1998). 
 
Single-source drugs 
Pharmaceutical products which are protected by patents are referred to as single-source 
drugs. The most important characteristic of single-source drugs is their research-intensity, 
and hence high fixed R&D cost in relation to total production costs. Research-based 
pharmaceutical companies diverge from the norm of competitive markets, where prices are 
based on marginal cost. In light of their high fixed cost and low marginal cost, if innovative 
pharmaceutical products were to be priced according to their marginal costs, they would be 
very inexpensive, but on the long run, no R&D activities would be undertaken. The 
relevant model of price setting allows sellers to act as an oligopoly, whereby prices are set 
in excess of marginal cost. Higher prices are reinforced by limited competition due to 
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patent protection, which is not only viewed as a reward to innovation (Schweitzer, 1997: 9), 
but is increasingly looked upon as an essential means by which a firm could gain funds for 
future research (James, 1977: 149). 
 
The pharmaceutical industry in particular placed the highest importance on patents in terms 
of factors which are crucial and necessary to appropriate the benefits from investing in 
innovation (Grabowski, 2002). Patent protection in the domain of single-source drugs is 
theoretically regarded to stimulate technical progress in four ways; it encourages invention; 
it induces the disclosure of discoveries; it makes up for the expenses incurred during the 
process of developing an invention through commercial rewarding; and it induces the 
allocation of capital in new lines of production which may not appear profitable if many 
competitors embark on it simultaneously (Cooper, 1966: 97).  
 
In a single-source drug market, patent protection becomes one of the most significant 
barriers to entry, along with economies of scale in promotion, product differentiation (based 
on R&D expenditure) and economies of scale in R&D which require a large minimum scale 
(Schwartzman, 1976: 305-311). Converting all costs of a cohort of drugs to their present 
value at the date of their launch, R&D would roughly represent 30 percent of the total cost 
of production. There is consensus that R&D costs are the most expensive for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Estimates of R&D costs per NCE brought to the market in the US 
were put at USD 359 million (Danzon, 1997). Other estimates put the after tax cost per 
NCE in the range of USD 194 million and USD 241 million. According to PhRMA, the 
industry requires an average of USD 500 million to introduce a new marketed medicine 
(Maskus, 2000: 5). In another estimate, the average out-of-pocket cost per new drug was 
USD 403 million (in 2000 dollars). When capitalising out-of-pocket costs to the point of 
marketing approval (at a real discount rate of 11 percent), the total pre-approval cost 
estimate reaches USD 802 million (DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski, 2003: 151). 
 
Large R&D costs are partially associated with the fact that many failed compounds are 
investigated for each product that is shown to be safe, effective and patentable. It also takes 
between 12-15 years (in the USA) for a product to make it from the stage of pre-clinical 
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research through to clinical testing and regulatory marketing approval to product launch 
(Maskus, 2000).  In fact, most drug candidates actually fail to reach the market, as a result 
of toxicity, carcinogenicity, manufacturing difficulties and inadequate efficacy. Less than 
one percent of compounds examined during the pre-clinical period actually make it to the 
phase of human testing. Some 22 percent of compounds entering clinical trials survive the 
development process and actually gain regulatory approval. Together, the pre-clinical and 
clinical testing phases take more than a decade to be completed (Grabowski, 2002).  
 
It is important to mention that most pharmaceutical inventions are covered by a multitude 
of patents including new uses/indications, dosages and changes in formulations. This 
typically allows blockbuster drugs to have from 20 to over 40 patents covering the entire 
range of items (substance, compound, formulation, etc.). The patent system therefore 
enables patent holders to ensure their products are wrapped well in a series of subsequent 
protective patents (Lewis, 2001: 10). As such, pharmaceutical companies can build a 
portfolio of patents around a single product.  
 
It has been repeatedly argued that without patents, the return on investment in 
pharmaceutical R&D would fall, and there would be no incentive for private companies to 
engage in R&D. Because the process whereby duplication of drugs can take place in 
laboratories is fairly easy, patents in the pharmaceutical industry have greater value than for 
any other of the research-intensive industries (Schwartzman, 1976: 4).  Patents grant the 
innovator a temporal exclusivity right over the innovation as long as the product implies a 
relevant therapeutic advancement over existing products, and is not just a new chemical 
compound. Patents under the framework of ruling IPRs regimes can be viewed as a kind of 
a social contract between society and the innovator, allowing the production of a public 
good, while the innovator is allowed an otherwise restricted privilege (Rovira, 2002).  
 
Multiple-source drugs 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) does not usually use the term ‘generic 
pharmaceutical products’, usually referring to drugs which are off patent as ‘multiple-
source pharmaceuticals’. In the generic or multiple-source drug market, patent protection is 
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absent, entry barriers are low and products are supplied by several manufacturers, with the 
market close to a typical textbook case of perfect competition. While the definition of 
generics does not depend on whether the product is branded or not, there is an agreement 
that “a product, which is a copy of an original product whose patent has expired, and may 
be marketed either as a brand or using the generic name fall under the broad category of 
generics” (Lewis, 2001). Multiple-source drugs may sometimes be marketed in dosage 
forms and/or strengths which are different from those of the innovator product 
(Southworth, 1996: 5). Generic drugs only need to show bioequivalence to the originator 
drug, a process which costs only USD 1-2 million (Grabowski, 2002). 
 
In none of the major world pharmaceutical markets do generics represent more than 30 
percent of total market by value, while the volume share may be 40 percent and above. The 
degree of penetration of branded-multiple source drugs versus generics depends on the 
specifics of the market in question. In the USA for example, the branded sector is 
dominant, accounting for 80 percent of the total multiple-source drug market (Southworth, 
1996: 8-9). The level of generic substitution varies considerably across therapeutic 
categories, depending on whether the segments are relatively new. A typical example of 
relatively new therapeutic categories is anti-retroviral (ARVs). Therapeutic groups which 
are more mature and contain a multitude of patents that have expired, include the penicillin 
and antibacterial sub-markets in which generic competition is prolific (Southworth, 1996: 
10). 
 
Determinants of generic competition in a certain therapeutic category is dependent on a set 
of factors including: 1) market size, as the larger the therapeutic category the more likely is 
the generic interest, 2) number of products going off-patent, 3) the reluctance on the part of 
either patients or physicians for generic substitution to ensure consistent and steady therapy 
and 4) the level of substitution may in fact be controlled by the regulatory authorities which 
may either encourage/reduce generic substitution (Southworth, 1996: 11).  
 
The manufacturing of generics is conducted at minimal research costs, with the cost of 
production being comprised of product development, manufacturing and marketing. This 
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means that prices can be set as low as marginal cost. In a single-source drug market, 
product competition is usually more important than price competition, i.e. the ability to 
create new medicine is more important than the ability to produce them cheaply. 
 
Once a therapeutic category is open to generic competition, the original patent holder may 
be forced to reduce prices. The entry of rival products, eventually push the structure of the 
drug market towards perfect competition (Jadlow, 1979: 14). Using data from the USA, 
United Kingdom, West Germany and France, Hudson (2000) analysed the consequences of 
generic competition on the prices of incumbent single-source drugs, and concluded that in 
the cases of Germany and France, the entry of new generic products significantly reduced 
the price of incumbent drugs.   
 
Research-based pharmaceutical companies have also been known to establish their own 
generic subsidiaries. For example, in 1992, Merck established a generic subsidiary ‘West 
Point Pharma’, following an internal review of the company, known as Project Paradigm. 
Project Paradigm concluded that Merck might no longer be able to compete effectively by 
specializing only on ethical brand-name pharmaceuticals. This strategy has been adopted by 
several research-based pharmaceutical companies, who also launch generic versions of 
their own brands before they go off patent. This strategy allows research-based companies 
to retain market shares and be a step ahead of the generic companies which are unable to 
launch their own products until after patent expiry (Southworth, 1996: 24).  
 
Increased interest of research based pharmaceutical companies in the manufacturing of 
generics is explained against the increasing share of generics in the global medicines 
market. In 1991, the global market for generics was estimated at USD 15 billion, or roughly 
8 percent of world market sales (Balance et al., 1992: 12) In 2007, the global generic 
medicines market (audit and unaudited markets) reached USD 115 billion, which accounts 
for 16 percent of the world market (EGA, 2007). In some of the world’s largest markets, 
namely the USA, the share of generics has actually been increasing at a significant rate, 
having accounted for 67 percent of the market in 2007 compared to 51 percent in 2000 
(PhRMA, 2008). In Europe, generics account for a lower share of 18 percent in 2005-06, 
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whereby the generics’ medicines market stands at USD 31.1 billion, compared to USD 
138.6 billion for the originator market (EGA, 2007). 
 
3.2.3 The process of drug discovery and development 
Before scientists decide to focus on a disease area, an analysis of market potential is often 
conducted, taking into consideration the incidence or prevalence of the condition and the 
likelihood that the drug, if successfully produced, could be marketed. Once a disease is 
found to have economic potential, scientists go to work (Schweitzer, 1997: 2). 
 
A NCE is discovered after a long process of synthesizing new chemicals and early 
pharmacological studies and the attempt to improve the understanding of the 
physiopathological process. This phase is usually referred to as the “basic research” or the 
discovery phase. A NCE then enters what is called the development stage (Hansen, 1979). 
Testes performed during the development stage are short-term animal toxicity tests, in 
order to predict safety in humans. Only a small percentage of NCEs tested in animal are 
further judged to be suitable candidates for further development. If the results of the initial 
animal testing prove to be encouraging, a notice of claimed investigational for a new drug 
(IND) is submitted to the regulatory authorities. Human or clinical testing then follows in 
three stages (Hansen, 1979).  Details of the three stages are presented in Annex 2. It is 
actually the clinical testing phase of a new drug which is the most expensive single activity 
performed (Smith and O'Donnell, 2006: 8). When a company concludes the collection of 
data from clinical trials, it ends the process by submitting an application to the regulatory 
bodies for marketing approval. Firms then file the new drug application (NDA) including 
raw data on all of the tests conducted. For successful candidate firms, the review process by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for example usually takes around two years for 
the approval to be granted (Hansen, 1979: 154). The average time lag from the point of 
identifying a clinical candidate to approval of a new drug is approximately 10 years (Smith 
and O'Donnell, 2006: 9). 
 
Whether or not the large size of research-based pharmaceutical companies confers any 
advantages on an inventor is debatable. The chief ingredients in the innovation process are 
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imagination and familiarity with frontier scientific advantages. These ingredients in fact 
come in a non-costly manner. The only advantage large transnational companies (TNC) 
enjoy is in the development phase of the research process, which is relatively costly 
because it requires the cooperative efforts of many different specialists. Accordingly, the 
inventor can dispense of the burden of the development of his invention by selling the 
patent to a large corporation. The developer does not usually take much technical risk 
because a research-based pharmaceutical company can recognize a feasible idea. But this 
does not mean that the process of discovery and development are two completely separate 
phases. The chemist who synthesizes a compound may be called upon at any phase of the 
drug life for additional molecular modification, as both the chemist and the associated 
pharmacologists keep a close watch over compounds late into clinical testing 
(Schwartzman, 1976: 62-63). 
 
Schumpeter asserted that since modern industrial research requires large resources, large 
firms would do proportionally more research than small ones, thus producing 
proportionally more innovations. Three additional reasons for expecting large firms to be 
more innovative relative to their size include the facts that by undertaking several research 
projects simultaneously they can reduce their risks. Their diversification also permits them 
to exploit the unexpected benefits of research and they can achieve economies of scale in 
research (Schwartzman, 1976: 83).  
 
3.2.4 The cost structure of the pharmaceutical industry 
A frequently asked question in the domain of pharmaceutical production is related to the 
cost structure of the pharmaceutical industry and particularly to the estimation of true R&D 
costs. Unfortunately, the pharmaceutical industry has often been described as “extremely 
secretive” as a result the amount of information available on the industry has traditionally 
been limited (Balance et al, 1992: 3). Nevertheless, one of the most publicized cost 
components of the research-based pharmaceutical industry is related to R&D.  
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Discovery phase 
What raise the cost of drug production, and thus entry barriers, are the safety and efficacy 
regulations imposed by governments. Safety and efficacy related costs are concentrated at 
the development stage rather than the earlier phase of discovery. In fact, potentially 
significant drugs can be discovered for as little as ₤ 500,000. It has been often propagated 
that at the stage of product discovery, it is “brains that count and not money” which means 
that relatively small companies can play a major role in the early stage of pharmaceutical 
research (Green, 1997: 5). 
 
Research and development  
The development phase is relatively much costly due to regulatory hurdles and the long 
time lag associated with the process. In Europe, it takes an average of 6-12 years for a 
product to pass the development phase, with costs varying between ₤ 100-200 million. It is 
also important to note that during the screening phase, many products may seem promising, 
but are later abandoned during the testing phase. A number of independent studies have 
suggested that only one in 10,000 to 50,000 compounds succeed in reaching the market 
(Green, 1997:6).  
 
The 1990s, and the new millennium have actually brought major changes in the 
pharmaceutical industry form the vantage point of R&D as well as commercial operations. 
New technologies as well as processes such as 'high throughput screening"
3
 and 
"combinatorial chemistry"
4
 are currently being widely embraced. The objective of both 
approaches is to allow for very large numbers of NCEs to be screened for biological 
activity in vitro. On another front, advances in the fields of genomics and proteomics have 
                                                 
3
 “Using robotics, data processing and control software, liquid handling devices, and sensitive detectors, 
High-Throughput Screening or HTS allows a researcher to quickly conduct millions of biochemical, genetic 
or pharmacological tests. Through this process one can rapidly identify active compounds, antibodies or genes 
which modulate a particular biomolecular pathway. The results of these experiments provide starting points 
for drug design and for understanding the interaction or role of a particular biochemical process in biology” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org) 
4
 “Combinatorial chemistry involves the rapid synthesis or the computer simulation of a large number of 
different but structurally related molecules. Synthesis of molecules in a combinatorial fashion can quickly 
lead to large numbers of molecules.” (http://en.wikipedia.org) 
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made available historically unprecedented numbers of targets with which to search for new 
drug candidates (Smith and O'Donnel, 2006). 
 
Manufacturing 
Manufacturing costs are established to be relatively low in the pharmaceutical industry, as 
the industry has high fixed costs and low marginal costs. This means that additional costs 
associated with each additional unit of output is relatively very small. This aspect of 
pharmaceutical production is very important, as marginal costs determine prices in 
competitive market as opposed to fixed costs (Schweitzer, 1997: 101). 
 
Because the pharmaceutical industry is comprised of firms of varying sizes and 
specializations, generalizations about the cost structure are quite difficult. However, in the 
lead producing countries, manufacturing accounts for about 40 percent of all costs, while 
marketing absorbs 20-25 percent. Manufacturing therefore emerges as one of the largest 
costs components. The cost structure is slightly different in developing countries, whereby 
manufacturing accounts for a much larger portion of total costs, close to well over a half 
(Balance et al., 1992: 126). 
 
3.2.5 The world pharmaceutical market  
In 2010, the world pharmaceutical market has been estimated at USD 856 billion 
(compared to USD 365 billion in 2000), with North American and European markets 
accounting for 39 percent and 37 percent of the market respectively (IMS Health, 2011).  
 
Because the cost of launching a new drug is the same regardless of the number of users 
(Danzon, 1997), the world market is increasingly being tapped. According to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), world trade in pharmaceutical 
products
5
 increased from less than USD 45 billion in 1995 to USD 237 billion in 2006. 
Roughly speaking, one-half of world production is traded, with the industrialised countries 
accounting for 94 percent of world trade in pharmaceutical products (UNCTAD, 2008). 
Trade in pharmaceutical products by developing countries reached USD 10.9 billion in 
                                                 
5
 Figures apply to medicines including veterinary SITC Revision 3, 542. 
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2003 up from USD 2.1 billion in 1980. Developing countries currently account for 5 
percent of global trade in pharmaceuticals (down from 13 percent in 1980). China is the 
lead exporter of pharmaceutical products among developing countries, accounting for 26 
percent of total pharmaceutical exports by developing countries (up from 13 percent in 
1980), and 1.4 percent of total world trade. India follows at 1 percent of total world trade 
(up from 0.7 percent in 1980) and 18.4 percent of exports by developing countries 
(UNCTAD, 2005).  
 
Global variations in regulatory and IPRs regimes 
Global variations in IPRs regimes have given rise to concern by patent and copyright 
dependent industries regarding profitability levels, which are forgone due to ‘pirating’ 
activities by commercial as well as non-commercial entities present in markets with 
relatively less solid IPRs regimes. During the pre-TRIPS phase, the absence of 
pharmaceutical product patent protection in some developing countries has actually helped 
these countries emerge as key players on the global market for pharmaceutical production 
and trade. In India, which is a global player on the pharmaceutical manufacturing and trade 
scenes, the Indian Patent Act of 1970 was instrumental in terms of increasing the number of 
manufacturing firms from 2,237 licensed manufacturers in 1960-70 to an estimated 16,000 
in 1992-93. The country’s negative trade balance in bulk drugs and drug formulations 
during the 1970s and 1980s was turned into a surplus by the 1990s (Fink, 2000).  
 
Parallel trade 
An important feature of world trade in pharmaceuticals is related to parallel trade, which 
takes place when significant price differentials occur among trading markets. Traders buy 
in low-price countries and sell in high price markets. Price differentials usually result from 
the actions of governments, rather than those of manufacturers or distributors. Pricing 
policies and patent infringement by ‘small countries’ could be tolerated as long as markets 
remain separable, and therefore result in negligible effects on global incentives for drug 
innovation (Danzon, 1997: 3). Once markets are no longer separable, either because of 
parallel trade or due to the export growth of patent infringing products, the profitability 
matrix of the research-based industry is jeopardised.  
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The globalisation of the pharmaceutical industry 
To be better able to respond to the more stringent regulatory conditions in their home 
markets, particularly in the USA, pharmaceutical companies have been gradually moving 
towards globalising their operations. Firms first introduce new products in foreign markets 
in which regulatory conditions are less stringent. This strategy has allowed drug 
manufacturers to gain knowledge and realise sales revenues on the product, while the new 
compound is still under regulatory review and development in the home country. Some 
research-based TNCs have also resorted to undertaking their clinical trials outside of their 
home countries, but have been faced with institutional barriers. The FDA for example has 
historically been unwilling to accept data from foreign clinical trials (Grabowski and 
Vernon, 1976: 49). Pharmaceutical companies also have extensive international production 
systems. Transnational pharmaceutical firms based in the USA, have an average of 33.8 
foreign affiliates per parent firm, which is a larger number than any other of the US 
manufacturing industries (Maskus, 1998).  
 
The pharmaceuticals industry has adopted a fairly wide range of strategies to have access to 
overseas markets. The first of these was to cater at arms-length through exporting to these 
markets. In between the low-risk involved with exporting, and the relatively higher risk of 
direct investment in overseas subsidiaries, lies a continuum of investment strategies.  
 
The first of these is licensing options, by which a company grants the right to manufacture, 
distribute and sell a product to another company, together with the technical know-how. 
The second are marketing agreements whereby a host company takes on the sales 
management of the product from the ‘initiating company’. The difference between 
marketing agreements and standard license agreements is that the host is not normally 
given the right to the patented know-how, nor does the arrangement involve any capital 
agreements such as those associated with joint-ventures. Joint-ventures in turn involve the 
‘legal’ establishment of a jointly owned subsidiary. “This strategy is not widely used in the 
pharmaceutical industry since marketing agreements generally achieve the same objectives 
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without the capital expenditure in particularly financing the joint venture” (James, 1977: 
27-28). 
 
Establishing off-shore subsidiaries, through direct investment has also been one of the key 
strategies of pharmaceutical companies. Investing in international production systems fits 
well with the ownership-location-internalization framework (OLI) of international 
production. Because research-based pharmaceutical companies are firms with significant 
knowledge-based assets (patents, trademarks and marketing expertise), taking a direct 
investment position in the country concerned is in some cases more profitable (Dunning et 
al., 1978; Dunning 1981). Government policies have also played a powerful role in the 
decision of pharmaceutical companies to invest abroad. For example, local taxation and 
financial conditions have played a significant role in corporate decisions to allocate or to 
increase existing local investment. In France, for example, in order to avoid the problems of 
harsh currency exchange controls and royalty remittances legislation during the 1960s, 
firms have opted to establish R&D units in France to utilise profits generated locally. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s both Eire and Puerto Rico also provided bases for 
chemical and finished pharmaceuticals manufactured for Europe and the USA respectively. 
Both areas have had advantageous investment and training grants tax benefits designed to 
encourage industrial development and free access to major markets (James, 1977: 27-29).  
 
Research-based pharmaceutical companies, however, tend to be ‘nationalistic’ in their 
R&D activities, whereby these activities were usually centralised in their respective 
domicile markets. Unlike both production and distribution of drugs, “research centers have 
not migrated to other parts of the world. This part of the industry’s core activities remains 
to be highly concentrated, being located either in the country where the firm is 
headquartered or in one of the other industry leaders” (Balance et al., 1992: 10). In fact, 
recent research on TNCs had indicated that TNCs conduct research activities in their 
foreign affiliates to obtain access to the private knowledge created by local firms. For 
example, in the Indian pharmaceutical industry, while there has been evidence of 
technology spillovers from the presence of subsidiaries of research-based pharmaceutical 
industries, the only firms that have gained from foreign technology spillovers were the 
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TNCs themselves. Technology spillovers for the operations of TNCs did not affect Indian 
firms at any level of significance (Feinberg and Majumdar, 2000: 431).   
 
Against the above review, the following section provided evidence that throughout its 
history, Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry has remained to operate within the 
confines of sheer formulation activities. The niche market gained by local Egyptian 
pharmaceutical companies has always been in the production of multiple-source drugs. This 
niche market has been expanded and largely facilitated by the absence of pharmaceutical 
product patent protection in Egypt up to January 2005. None of Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical companies has embraced R&D activities, even at modest levels during the 
relatively inexpensive phase of drug discovery. While Egyptian companies have not 
advanced in terms of expanding their R&D outlays, their counterparts in India have opted 
for the more successful path of investing in upgrading their indigenous technological 
capabilities as well as R&D outlays (Mourshed, 1999), thus eventually differentiating 
themselves on the global pharmaceutical production and trade scenes.  
 
Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry has also been losing grounds on the global market 
by virtue of a diminishing share of total pharmaceutical exports by developing countries. 
The opposite trend has been observed by India, as well as relatively late comers to the 
regional pharmaceutical production and trade scenes, such as with the case of neighbouring 
Jordan. 
 
The remaining part of this chapter provided an in-depth overview of the industrial policy 
environment within which Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry has been operating, as 
well as its growth trajectory during the study period. The coverage also maped the 
dynamics -if any- of industrial policy governing Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry 
on the continuum of industrial policy options as presented in Chapter Two. The 
performance attributes of this sector in terms of output growth, employment creation, trade 
performance and R&D activities have also been presented in detail. 
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3.3 Growth Trajectory of Egypt’s Pharmaceutical Industry  
Starting from a very modest base comprised of three local companies during the early 
1930s, which together covered less than 10 percent of local demand, the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical industry has undergone significant expansion and growth. Today, the 
industry meets more than 81 percent of demand in one of the largest markets of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region (CAPMAS, 2009). During the long period which 
elapsed between the industry’s formative years and the current phase, one common 
denominator has persisted across the various policy and regulatory regimes encountered, 
namely increasing the levels of self-sufficiency. Increasing self-sufficiency was the key 
criteria used to evaluate the performance of the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry through 
the socialist regime of the 1960s, the Open Door Policy (ODP) regime of the 1970s and 
1980s as well as the ERSAP phase of the 1990s and beyond. The following sections 
elaborate on the journey of Egypt’s pharmaceutical industry, passing through the various 
policy and institutional regimes, which have governed this industry. 
 
3.3.1 The formative years: the 1930s 
The history of local production dates back to 1937, when Bank Misr established the first 
local pharmaceutical company in Egypt, with a capital of LE 100,000. The new company 
which was called ‘Misr’ faced great hardship during its first years of operation, due to 
competition within what was basically a foreign brand-name dominated home market. It 
was only during the inter-World War II period that the company began to make positive 
profits, as a result of the shortage in foreign drug imports. ‘Memphis’, the second company 
was established in 1939, with a capital of LE 40,000. Memphis specialized in the extraction 
of active substances from indigenous local plants (namely Ammidin and Khellin), which 
were developed by the founder of the company. In 1947, a third local company was 
established by Egyptian capitalists, and was called ‘Chemical Industries Development’ 
(CID) with a paid capital of LE 100,000 (Handoussa, 1974: 60-67). 
 
The three local companies had to compete extensively with their foreign counterparts which 
controlled 90 percent of the local market in 1952. During the 1950s, 500 foreign 
pharmaceutical firms and their network of 88 agents, supplied and distributed some 20,000 
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imported products in Egypt. During this early phase, the government did not intervene in 
the operation of the pharmaceutical sector, whether in terms of price setting or in terms of 
import controls. The local market was often flooded by the foreign equivalent of any new 
local brands of promise. Dispensing chemists were also given large incentives to promote 
foreign products, by being generously offered free samples as well as supplies for credit 
(Handoussa, 1974; Academy for Scientific Research and Technology, 1994). 
 
In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War and the ensuing economic blockade of Egypt, many 
essential drugs were in short supply, raising awareness of the need for greater levels of self-
sufficiency. An important point of departure for Egypt’s local pharmaceutical industry 
followed the creation of the first Ministry of Industry, and the Committee responsible for 
developing the national pharmaceutical industry in 1957.  During the same year, the Higher 
Organization for Drugs and Medical Requisites was established (Presidential Decree 
10/1957) and was headed by the Minister of Health. The Higher Organization was to 
supervise all matters pertaining to domestic production and supply of pharmaceuticals in 
Egypt. An independent executive committee was also set up under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Industry to implement the decisions of the Higher Organization (Handoussa, 
1974).  
 
The opportunity to further develop productive pharmaceutical capacity materialized when 
the Soviet Union offered the Egyptian government substantial loans to be invested in 
projects of the government’s choice. Setting up a huge pharmaceutical complex was 
proposed, and in January 1958, an agreement to establish El-Nasr Company for the 
Production of Pharmaceutical Chemicals -as the first state-owned pharmaceutical company- 
was signed between Egypt and the Soviet Union. During the same year, interest by the 
government to invite subsidiaries of foreign pharmaceutical companies to set up production 
facilities in Egypt eventually culminated in three foreign firms being awarded contracts in 
1958 and 1959 by the Ministry of Industry to set up foreign majority owned joint ventures 
locally (Handoussa, 1974). 
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In March 1959, the Ministry of Industry collected figures on pharmaceutical unit cost of 
production, and unilaterally decided on a ‘cost-plus percentage’ for profits.6 New -lower- 
prices were immediately enforced, as a result of which some domestic firms found that they 
were making negligible profits, and the government was obliged to adjust prices upwards. 
However, domestic firms were still facing hardship in gaining reasonable market shares due 
to the proportionately smaller profit margin earned by the retailer on domestically 
manufactured versus foreign drugs. To deal with this problem, the Higher Organization 
decided to allow for a 19 percent profit margin to the chemist on domestic brands as 
opposed to 10 percent on foreign brands. Towards the late 1950s, and with government 
support, the local industry was able to capture 20 percent of the pharmaceutical market. 
During the same year, the strategic decision to protect local manufacturing prohibited the 
importation of any product, which was produced by at least three local companies 
(Handoussa, 1974: 81-82). 
 
In 1960, the Higher Organization was given the sole regulatory authority over the 
importation of all drugs, pharmaceutical raw material and medical supplies in Egypt 
(Presidential Decree 212/1960). The Egyptian Organization for Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 
Chemicals and Medicals Requisites was also established (Decree 1253/1960), and was 
granted the exclusive privilege of taking control of all pharmaceutical importing agencies, 
all distribution agencies and all inventories of drugs in Egypt. During the same year, the 
first five-year plan 1960-65 for the development of the pharmaceutical industry was 
announced. The key objective of the plan was to increase the level of self-sufficiency from 
20 percent in 1960 to reach 65 percent by 1965. The plan stipulated an annual increase of 
30 percent in local production, a target which was in fact exceeded during the period 
specified (Handoussa, 1974; 93).  
 
Evidently, between the early 1930s and end of the 1950s, ensuring the initial survival of the 
local industry in the midst of aggressive import competition was the key concern of 
industrialists and policy makers alike. Increasing self-sufficiency levels, and the perception 
                                                 
6
 To date the cost-plus pricing system has been the ruling pricing system in Egypt. 
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that the pharmaceutical industry was ‘strategic’, marched hand-in-hand with the emergence 
of the socialist ideology towards the end of the 1960s.   
 
3.3.2 Nationalization and the move towards ISI: the 1960s 
On July 20, 1961 the government took controlling interest in the form of at least 50 percent 
of capital of the ten largest pharmaceutical companies in Egypt. The ten largest firms to be 
partially nationalized included CID, MISR and Memphis, which were to maintain their 
identity and management. Another six firms were merged into two large companies Kahira 
and Ein Shams (later to be enlarged and renamed Nile), and the tenth was to form the 
nucleus of Alexandria Company (Handoussa, 1974: 90). Socialism was adopted as the 
governing economic ideology, import substitution industrialization (ISI) became the 
dominant industrial paradigm, and the public sector became the arm of the state to achieve 
rapid industrialization and diversification. Throughout the 1960s, the government set the 
pace of economic development by being responsible for close to 90 percent of total 
investment in all modern industries, banks, insurance and construction, while controlling 
export and import activity (Mabro, 1974: 125). 
 
In July 1962, Presidential Decree 113/1962 established the General Organization for 
Pharmaceuticals, Chemical and Medical Appliances (GOPCA), taking over the duties of 
both the Higher Organization for Drugs and the General Organization for Trade and 
Distribution of Drugs. In 1962, full nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry was 
completed and COPCA was assigned exclusive responsibility over all matters related to 
drugs in terms of production, importation, exportation and distribution. Presidential Decree 
113/1962 also stipulated that a special committee whose membership includes the 
Ministries of Health, Industry and Supply was to assume responsibility over pharmaceutical 
pricing (local and imported). By 1964, four companies, which were producing auxiliary 
materials used in the manufacturing of pharmaceutical products, were also nationalized and 
placed under the control of COPCA. Two new state owned commercial companies were 
established, one for distribution, and another for the supply of chemicals and raw materials 
(Handoussa, 1974). 
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Throughout the 1960s, import substitution industrialization was the force driving Egyptian 
industry, and the pharmaceutical industry was no exception. While export departments 
were set up in state-owned companies to dispense of surplus output, export activities gained 
marginal importance.  The focus on the local market and the achievement of higher levels 
of self-sufficiency became the benchmark for successful performance, as a result of which 
between 1962/63 and 1968/69 local production coverage of domestic demand increased 
from 53 percent to 86 percent (Handoussa, 1974). 
 
3.3.3 The ODP and the shift towards a private sector led economy: the 1970s and 
1980s  
An ODP was adopted in 1974, with the investment encouragement Law 43 of 1974 as its 
legislative foundation.  The ODP envisioned “increased economic liberalization and the 
opening of the Egyptian economy to the larger world market, and the search for outside 
finance and technology” (Dessouki, 1981: 410). Law 43 was designed to provide adequate 
incentives to attract foreign capital and technology to a predominately labour surplus 
economy and to create a synergy of Egyptian skilled labour, Western technology and Arab 
capital to further develop and reorient industrial production towards outward orientation. 
Incentives provided under Law 43 were mainly fiscal in nature, with a five-year tax break 
on corporate profit, extendable to eight years for projects deemed ‘special to the economy’. 
Among the major incentives to incorporate under Law 43 were provisions for exemptions 
from labour laws, exchange control regulations and from the obligation to obtain import 
and export licenses (Handoussa, 1993). 
 
The transition from import-substitution industrialization to export-led growth following the 
ODP in 1974 and beyond was neither smooth nor immediate. Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, the public sector continued to be the dominant player on the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical production and trade scenes, with inward orientation, the continuation of 
protectionist measures, price controls and eventually deteriorating financial performance 
being key features which persisted throughout the two decades (for state-owned 
companies).  Moreover, while the private sector was re-mobilized to participate in 
industrial activity following the legislation of the ODP in 1974, it was not until the early 
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1980s that the manufacturing scene saw the entry of private sector pharmaceutical 
companies, but with marginal export interests. New private sector productive capacity 
remained predominantly inward oriented, thus adding further competitive pressure on 
public sector companies. 
 
In general, evaluating the ODP against the objective of mobilizing private (local and 
foreign) capital produced mixed results. While the new investment legislation after 1974 
gradually changed the ownership structure of Egyptian industry in favor of the private 
sector, it failed to alter its inward orientation. This outcome can be explained against the 
fact that the shift from an import-substitution/state-led to an export-promotion/private-led 
industrial drive was not accompanied by a parallel shift in industrial policy instruments 
needed to provide enough incentives for industries with export potential to actually export.  
Unlike the East Asian NICs, which have followed a selective approach to industrial 
development by opting to support particular groups of industries, Egypt’s industrial policy 
since 1974 did not attempt to promote any particular subsector.  To the contrary among the 
criticisms made against the investment encouragement code is precisely the absence of any 
selectivity in awarding incentives to domestic or foreign investors. The package of 
generous incentives provided did not discriminate between projects on the basis of field or 
operation (e.g. consumer versus producer goods or technology intensity or skill intensity) or 
according to whether the output is intended for the domestic or export market (Handoussa, 
1993). 
 
3.3.4 The ERSAP and beyond: the 1990s  
In recognition of mounting economic imbalances (Annex 3), and under pressure from the 
multilateral donor institutions, the government of Egypt initiated the economic reform and 
structural adjustment program (ERSAP) during the early 1990s. The key pillars of policy 
change during the early 1990s were trade policy reform, foreign exchange reform, financial 
liberalization, price liberalization and privatization (Al-Mashat and Grigorian, 1998; 
Handy, 1998; World Bank, 1998; Abdel-Khalek, 1995; Kheir El-Din and El-Dersh, 1992).  
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During the onset of ERSAP, industrial policies that can be identified focused on achieving 
price liberalization, removing quantitative restrictions on imports, trade liberalization, 
diluting state ownership through privatization and streamlining investment incentives. No 
conscious effort has targeted the support of new activities that have the potential to expand 
the capabilities of the Egyptian economy into new areas of comparative advantages (Galal 
and El-Megharbel, 2005). 
 
Apart from public enterprise reform and privatization, it is safe to argue that in the specific 
domain of the pharmaceutical industry, the reforms of the early 1990s and associated 
industrial policy components have only tangentially touched in a positive way on this 
sector. From an overall perspective, industrial policy within the domain of Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical sector continued to serve promoting import-substitution-industrialization by 
virtue of sustaining non-tariff regulatory trade barriers, as will be elaborated on further. The 
following sections detail the extent to which the key components of the ERSAP fell short of 
supporting the generics pharmaceutical industry become more export-oriented, as well as of 
inducing local companies to upgrade their technological capabilities in preparation for 
withstanding competition on local as well as on export markets.  
 
Public enterprise reform  
Public enterprise reform was based on promoting competition (by liberalizing the prices of 
factor inputs and output prices), privatizing those enterprises that were not in ‘strategic’ 
sectors and a reordering of public investment priorities (Kheir El-Din and El-Dersh, 1992). 
In 1992, the new ‘Public Business Sector’ law 230 of 1992 was enacted, relieving all state-
owned companies from making contributions to the Treasury other than paying their 
normal corporate profit taxes as well as indirect taxes. They were also relived from the 
intervention of relevant line ministries, and were free to make their autonomous decisions 
regarding output levels, prices, employment, wages, investment and finance independent 
from central control. The 11 state-owned pharmaceutical companies were treated as 
Affiliate Companies subject to the new law and were re-organized under the newly created 
Drug Holding Company. The Drug Holding Company performed the function of the 
manager of the state’s portfolio of assets in its group of affiliated firms, with the main 
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objective of maximizing the portfolio’s present value. The new mandate of what was 
renamed as the public ‘business’ sector singled out profit maximization as their main 
objective function (Handoussa, 1993). 
 
In reality, apart from the reorganisation of the 11 state-owned pharmaceutical companies 
under the newly established Drug Holding Company, and the re-appointment of top-level 
management, several of the key constraints of the 1970s and 1980s persisted. This was 
particularly true with regards the pricing policies governing these companies, and the 
subsequent evaluation of performance against social rather than economic and financial 
criteria (Interview, Hussein Zewail, Director, Al-Kahira Company, March, 1999).  
 
During the early phase of the reform program, the relationship between the newly 
appointed management of what were renamed as public 'business' sector pharmaceutical 
companies, the Drug Holding Company and the owner of capital (i.e. the state), became the 
subject matter of recurrent debate. This was particularly true following the transfer in 1991 
of regulatory authority over the pharmaceutical industry, from the dissolved Public Sector 
Drug Authority to the Ministry of Health. Failure to resolve the issue of ownership versus 
management in a clear-cut manner played a key role in delaying the reform program as it 
applied to this sector. The delay was also largely attributed to what has been coined as the 
‘social mission’ of the pharmaceutical industry, be it in public or private hands. This 
concept in fact defied the logic of the reform process. The review of public business sector 
company reports released at the eve of the ERSAP, reflected that the newly appointment 
management of public business sector pharmaceutical companies was made accountable for 
the difficult tasks of achieving a higher rate of return on investment and maintaining a 
competitive position on the market compared to the pre-ERSAP period on one hand, while 
continuing to operate within a distortion ridden policy environment on the other (PEO, 
1994).  
 
At the onset of the reform program, questioning whether or not public business sector 
pharmaceutical companies should concentrate exclusively on attaining higher levels of 
profitability along lines the private sector was an important policy issue debated during 
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board meetings of the newly established Drug Holding Company. As the manager of the 
state portfolio of assets, the Drug Holding Company resolved the debate by fully 
acknowledging the priority of the social mission governing the operation of pharmaceutical 
companies under its jurisdiction. The consensus reached was that it remained imperative for 
public business sector pharmaceutical companies to award greater weight to social versus 
financial returns, despite the mandate of the on-going ERSAP (Egyptian Drug 
Organisation, 1992). Evidently, the ‘social’ responsibility of the industry -as perceived by 
policy makers- obstructed the full pursuit of profitability objectives along lines the private 
sector. In application, what this meant was that for public business sector pharmaceutical 
companies, output price liberalisation fell short of full implementation as will be detailed 
further. 
 
To date, the decision of meeting social rather than economic targets has had a far-reaching 
impact on dictating the dynamics and competitiveness levels exhibited by these companies. 
 
Privatisation 
Privatisation has been regarded as a core component of the ERSAP, as well as the gateway 
to increase the autonomy of the newly appointment management of affiliate companies. 
Initially, criteria set for selecting companies for privatisation included the precondition of 
having to have positive earnings, minimal restructuring requirements, promising returns on 
equity, and low levels of outstanding debt. Of no less importance, these companies had to 
have a minimal numbers of workers to be made redundant. Privatisation in the domain of 
the pharmaceutical sector was, preceded by the rescheduling of outstanding debts owned by 
affiliate companies, and an increase in the level of working capital injected through the 
Drug Holding Company. The implementations of an early retirement scheme,
7
 together 
with placing a hold on new recruitments were also necessary preconditions for successful 
privatisation (Drug Holding Company, 2005).  
 
                                                 
7
 Eventually the total number of workers associated with affiliate companies declined from 34 thousand at the 
eve of the restructuring process to 24 thousand by 2000. 
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The Drug Holding Company started the privatization of public business sector 
pharmaceutical companies as late as 1995/96, with Alexandria Company being the first 
candidate for privatization. In 1995/96, the government sold 40 percent of the shares of 
Alexandria Company through an initial public offering. In 1996/97 four additional 
companies have been subject to partial privatization, namely El-Nile, Memphis, ADCO and 
El-Kahira. 
 
Table  3-1: Privatization status of affiliate companies of the Drug Holding Company 
Company Privatization Status (shares 
sold) 
Value of shares sold 
1. Alexandria  40 percent of total stocks  LE 104.5 million 
2. El-Nile  33.3 percent of the total stocks  LE 58.2 million 
3. Memphis  40 percent of the total stocks  LE 90 million 
4. ADCO 40 percent of the total stocks  LE 18.7 million 
5. El-Kahira  40 percent of the total stocks  LE 52.5 million 
Source: Drug Holding Company, 1995 
 
Plans to also privatise 40 percent of the shares of the Egyptian Pharmaceutical Trading 
Company, El-Gomhoreya Company and CID by 1998/99 were, however, postponed as a 
result of the slowdown in the reform program, coupled with the downturn in stock prices 
during the second half of the 1990s.   
 
While privatisation was a key component of the ERSAP, it is worth noting that as a policy, 
it was strongly opposed by several members of the Drug Holding Company. Minutes taken 
during board meetings of the Drug Holding Company which convened during the early 
years of the ERSAP, document that some members strongly opposed giving up majority 
ownership in public business sector pharmaceutical companies.
8
 The justification given was 
that the essential as well as the strategic nature of products supplied by these companies, as 
well as their high social (and hence political) sensitivity, makes it imperative that they 
remain under full government control. Concern regarding the fact that a large number of 
workers may be laid off as a result of privatisation constituted an additional hindrance to 
full privatisation (Drug Holding Company, 1992a). 
 
                                                 
8
 One of these members has been appointed Aisha Abdel-Hadi as the Minister of Manpower in 2004. 
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Consequently, the privatisation program as implemented within the domain of 
pharmaceutical production, proved to be atypical, compared to other sectors of 
manufacturing activity. While the conservative stance of the Drug Holding Company was 
indicative of the overall direction the privatisation program was to take within this sector, it 
was actually the conscious decision of the government to maintain its strong hold over 
public business sector pharmaceutical companies. The ultimate objective of the 
government was to control the movement of drug prices in Egypt, at least for the market 
segment under its direct jurisdiction. The government has in fact, repeatedly exploited its 
strong hold over the movement of drug prices in Egypt to gain popular appeal. The 
Minister of Health repeatedly affirmed that the government remains committed to provide 
affordable medicine to the Egyptian population, regardless of the level of profit (or loss) 
attained by manufacturing companies, be they in the private or public business sectors (Al-
Ahram Daily, 28.11.05). These words echo the same promises which were made by the 
Minister of Health in 1975 (Al-Ahram Daily, 9.11.75). 
 
The persistence of a large price differential between products of the private and public 
sectors, has increased the dependency of the government financed social health insurance in 
Egypt on low priced products supplied by the public business sector pharmaceutical 
companies (Interview, Hussein Zeweil, Director, El-Kahira Company, March 1999). 
Pharmaceuticals account for a staggering 60 percent of the cost of government financed 
social health insurance (compared to the standard world average of 20-22 percent), which 
currently covers half of the Egyptian population (Al-Ahram Al-Ikesadi, 5.2.96).  By 
retaining full control over supply side actors in the public business sector, especially with 
regards pricing policies, the government has been able to uphold the social mission which 
this industry has been historically serving. This mission, would have been clearly 
jeopardised, had full privatisation of this sector been implemented.   
 
The debate, which took place during the early 1990s, regarding the pace of privatisation in 
the domain of pharmaceutical production, has remained unresolved. To date, the 
government repeatedly announces that it will retain majority ownership of public business 
sector pharmaceutical companies. Privatisation as implemented in the domain of the 
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generics pharmaceutical industry has had no impact of significance in terms of allowing 
these companies to achieve higher levels of efficiency as will be presented in detail in 
Chapter Five. 
 
Price liberalisation 
Prior to 1987, 90 percent of the one thousand products manufactured by the state-owned 
companies in Egypt were subject to price controls. Starting 1992, the process of price 
liberalization of industrial, agricultural, energy and transport sectors -part of the ERSAP- 
progressed.  Industrial output was divided into groups according to their degree of 
competitiveness, with market concentration levels, as well as protection being the criteria 
for measuring competitiveness.
9
 Prices of products enjoying subsidized inputs or monopoly 
output were also set free, except for a small sub-set which became subject to a standard cost 
formula with an agreed mark-up factor (PEO, 1994). Pharmaceutical products were among 
those subject to price setting according to a cost-plus formula.  
 
In principle and according to the cost-plus pricing system, all pharmaceutical companies 
operating in Egypt should be able to guarantee positive earnings. Topping the cost of 
production submitted to the regulatory authorities with the profit margin specified for 
essential (15 percent) and non-essential (25 percent) products, has been perceived as a 
viable and fair system for the pricing of pharmaceutical products in Egypt. The cost-plus 
pricing system is however marred by pricing rigidities, which result in the aftermath of 
devaluations and the subsequent increase in the cost of raw material inputs. The fact that 
the industry imports more than 90 percent of its raw material inputs makes it particularly 
vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations.  
 
                                                 
9
 Products for which the public sector accounted for more than 70 percent of the domestic market (including 
imports) were regarded as subject of a high degree of market concentration, and hence were viewed as non-
competitive.  Products enjoying more than a 35 percent nominal tariff protection and/or import bans were 
considered to be highly protected.  Prices of products categorized as ‘competitive with low trade protection’ 
were freed in March 1990. Another group comprised of non-competitive products with low trade protection 
and competitive products with high trade protection, respectively, for which prices were also freed during the 
same year. Non-competitive products with high trade protection were freed in May 1992. 
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Public business sector pharmaceutical companies have in fact been trying to adjust to 
pricing rigidities throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
10
 At the eve of the reform program, 
public business sector pharmaceutical companies were incurring losses on 41 percent of 
total output (by volume), whereby in 1992/93, the financial burden of loss-making products 
to affiliate companies stood at LE 87 million (Drug Holding Company, 1994).  
 
Despite the high expectations held by the management of these companies regarding the 
seriousness of the reform program in addressing the issue of pricing, in 1993/94 loss 
making products were actually increasing in number with a total of LE 95.4 million in 
losses. The problem was that the majority of loss-making products were priced when the 
exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the US Dollar stood at LE 0.4, compared to 
LE 2.80 at the eve of the reform program (November 1991). If the prices of these loss-
making products were to be adjusted according to actual production cost, a price increase 
ranging between 200 to 800 percent had to be authorised by the regulatory authorities 
(Drug Holding Company, 1994). Given the social sensitivity of the industry alluded to 
earlier, such a price adjustment would have accounted for nothing short of political suicide 
on behalf of a government taking the first steps towards a reform program.  
 
Throughout the 1990s, practically all of the introductory paragraphs of the annual reports of 
the Drug Holding Company pleaded with the government to address pricing rigidities, 
cautioning that affiliate companies may be forced into a situation whereby they will cease 
to supply the essential drugs needed at the prices imposed (Drug Holding Company, 1994).  
 
                                                 
10
 The pervasiveness of state subsidies allocated to pharmaceutical products as well as the increase in the 
number of loss making products were two characteristics of the 1970s and 1980s. Most of newspaper articles 
published during the first half of the 1970s dealt almost exclusively with issues of pharmaceutical price 
increases, shortages in supply and government reassurance regarding the continuation of state subsidies, with 
the state repeatedly announcing that it was committed to ensure that international increases in the prices of 
pharmaceutical raw material inputs, as well as final products were not passed on to consumers (Al-Ahram 
Daily, 31.7.74; Al Ahram-Daily, 14,9,74) 
By 1985, almost all of the public sector pharmaceutical companies were incurring losses on most products, 
with an associated implicit subsidy of LE 42 million. The state was also shouldering an additional LE 20 
million in costs, as a result of selling imported insulin and baby formula below their import cost (Al-Ahram 
Daily, 22.2.85:8). Direct subsidies benefiting pharmaceutical products were also pervasive, with 411 products 
manufactured by public sector companies benefiting from state subsidies in the range of LE 65 million (Al-
Ahram Daily, 9.2.1985). 
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Pricing rigidities violated the principle of price liberalisation mandated by the ERSAP 
(being in conflict with article 7 of Law 203 of 1991) and represent one form of 
discrimination between public business sector and private sector pharmaceutical companies 
(Drug Holding Company, 1998). Discrimination becomes even more stark given the fact 
that private sector companies established during the 1980s and beyond benefited from tax 
exemptions on corporate profit for up to ten years, while the public business sector became 
subject to paying taxes as of 1991 (Drug Holding Company, 2004). Of no less importance, 
pricing rigidities did not allow these companies to generate acceptable levels of 
profitability, which in turn did not allow them to invest at acceptable levels in improving 
technological capabilities. 
 
Trade reform 
In 1991, Egypt’s tariff structure was streamlined as part of ERSAP. The range of tariffs was 
narrowed from 0.7-120 percent to 1-100 percent. The number of products subject to export 
bans was also reduced from 20 to 4, and all export prior approvals on 37 product categories 
were dropped except for raw cotton and fabrics. Production coverage of import bans was 
reduced from 37.1 percent of total output, to 22.7 percent in June 1991 (Kheir El-Din and 
El-Dersh, 1992). 
 
By June 1993, all import bans were removed, except for textiles, garments and poultry, 
reducing the production coverage of import bans to 4.3 percent of total agricultural and 
manufacturing output. The tariff rate also went down to 5-80 percent in February and to 5-
70 percent in December of the same year. Production coverage by quantitative restrictions 
declined from 37 percent for agricultural and manufacturing output in 1991 to 4 percent in 
1996. In July 1997 the maximum tariff rate was reduced to 50 percent and in January 1998, 
Egypt eliminated the import ban on textiles, and was committed to eliminating the import 
ban on clothing by January 1, 2001. Egypt also committed to eliminate all quantitative 
restrictions on agriculture. In July 1998 further tariff reduction of 10 percent took place 
(Kheir El-Din and El-Dersh, 1992). In 2007, and in a further wave of tariff reductions, the 
average weighted tariff rate has been reduced from 14.6 percent to an actual of 6.9 percent 
in February of 2007 (MOI, 2007). 
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Unlike the rest of Egypt’s manufacturing industries, tariffs on pharmaceuticals have always 
been relatively low. The reason being that high tariff levels on a vital product such as 
pharmaceuticals would have in principle been equivalent to taxing the sick. In 1994, the 
simple average tariff on pharmaceutical products stood at 8 percent, compared to the 
economy-wide average of 32 percent and the industrial sector average of 27 percent 
(Subramania and Abd-El-Latif, 1996). By 2005, tariff levels imposed on imports of 
pharmaceutical products were lowered to an average of 5 percent (Ministry of Finance, 
2005). In February 2007, a new tariff schedule was introduced in Egypt, whereby some 
medicines have been exempted from tariffs.
11
 In the new 2007 tariff schedule, tariffs on 
pharmaceutical products ranged between 2-5 percent depending on the nature of the 
product. 
 
Despite the low level of tariffs prevailing on pharmaceutical products, non-tariff barriers 
facing pharmaceutical imports in Egypt remain significant, particularly for products with 
local equivalents. Non-tariff regulatory trade barriers are manifested in the extent to which 
registration procedures facing imported products -as administered by the Ministry of 
Health- are made both stringent and cumbersome. For an imported product to be registered 
with the regulatory authorities in Egypt, proof of a free sales certificate in one of five of the 
world top pharmaceutical markets has to be provided by the importer. This requirement has 
historically ruled out import competition from low cost generic manufacturers in other parts 
of the world, most notability from India and China.  
 
To illustrate with evidence, and based on data obtained from the Ministry of Health, there 
are only 21 registered products imported from India and 11 products imported from China 
on the Egyptian market (Annex 4). In light of the sheer weight of India and China on the 
world market for generics, the meagre number of products imported from both countries is 
                                                 
11
 These products include antisera and other blood fractions and modified immunological products, whether or 
not obtained by means of biotechnological processes. Vaccines for human medicine. Contraceptives; tumours 
and cancer medicaments; organs transplantation medicaments; cardio vascular medicaments; bilharziasis 
medicaments; and artificial plasma substitutes; dangerous and chronic, psychological or neurogenic diseases 
medicaments. Chemical contraceptive preparations based on hormones, on other products of heading 29.37 or 
on spermicides. 
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indicative of the extent to which the Egypt’s pharmaceutical regulatory regime has 
consistently hampered the entry of imported generics.  
 
Institutional and regulatory reform 
The ERSAP brought further regulatory and institutional reforms to the pharmaceutical 
sector. From the perspective of the private sector, an important development which 
accompanied the ERSAP concerned the critical process of pricing. Prior to 1991, the 
responsibility of pharmaceutical pricing in Egypt fell under the jurisdiction of the Public 
Sector Drug Authority, thus constituting a clear form of conflict of interest. The reason is 
that the Public Sector Drug Authority was also responsible for the pricing of all products 
manufactured by all companies operating in Egypt. This included public sector companies 
within its portfolio, local private sector companies as well as foreign companies and 
imported products.  
 
Private sector companies operating in Egypt gained substantially from the restructuring and 
deregulation which accompanied the ERSAP.  In 1992 dissatisfaction with the fact that the 
Public Sector Drug Authority (which is a competing entity) still retained control over the 
registration and pricing of pharmaceutical products in Egypt, as well as the approval of the 
annual production plan was increasingly being voiced by leading private sector companies 
(SEDCIO, 1992). The transfer of this responsibility to the newly created Central 
Administration for Pharmaceutical Affairs at the Ministry of Health gave the private sector 
the opportunity to deal with a more transparent regulatory system compared to the one 
managed by the Public Sector Drug Authority (SEDICO, 1993). Following the 
establishment of the Drug Holding Company in 1991, responsibility over all regulatory 
issues concerning pharmaceutical production -including pricing- was transferred to the 
Ministry of Health.  
 
The monopoly position enjoyed by the public sector in the domain of pharmaceutical trade 
and distribution activities was also ended. In 1991, private sector companies (including 
multinationals) were freed from the obligation to import their raw material inputs through 
the public sector El-Gomhouria Company, which charged 7-11 percent of the import value 
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as a fee for the services provided. In addition, the monopoly position exercised by the 
Egyptian Pharmaceutical Trading Company, the public sector company operating in the 
domain of pharmaceutical distribution was also ended (Academy of Scientific Research and 
Technology, 1994). 
 
In light of the above review, it is safe to argue that the pharmaceutical industry has been 
well responding to the key targets set by the policy regimes under the auspicious of which it 
has been operating during the study period.  
 
During the 1960s, the targets of import substitution and increasing the levels of self-
sufficiency have been fully met in the domain of pharmaceutical industry. In the aftermath 
of the ODP during the late 1970s and 1980s, investments by private sector pharmaceutical 
companies, both local as well as foreign have been fully responsive to the opportune 
investment climate and the relatively large consumer market in Egypt. During the 1990s, 
the policy regime of the ERSAP phase and beyond did not solicit an outcome from 
potential as well as current investors in the pharmaceutical sector which was different in 
any respect from the policy regimes which ruled during the previous decades. Import-
substitution-industrialisation remained to be recognised as the key driver for growth. 
Hence, because individual companies never judged exporting as well as expanding R&D 
outlays to be beneficial to attaining higher levels of profitability (the key driver in this 
sector from the perspective of private investors), neither have been actively expanded.  
 
Of equal importance, it has been demonstrated that during the post-ERSAP phase, reforms 
targeting the pharmaceutical sector in Egypt have mainly been institutional and legislative 
in nature. The key pillars of ERSAP, namely trade liberalisation, price liberalisation and 
privatisation actually fell short of full implementation in the domain of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
 
3.4 Key Players on the Pharmaceutical Production Scene  
A total of 59 pharmaceutical manufacturing companies are currently present on the 
Egyptian manufacturing scene, including 9 companies which fall under public business 
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sector ownership, and 8 subsidiaries of research-based companies (Figure 3.1). Since 1979, 
the Egyptian market saw the establishment of some 42 private locally-owned generic 
pharmaceutical companies.  
 
Figure  3-1: List of companies present on Egypt’s pharmaceutical production scene 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2008 
 
Subsidiaries of research-based pharmaceutical companies 
Despite the fact that this thesis focuses on the generics industry, it was important to diverge 
and throw light on the presence of subsidiaries of research based companies in Egypt. 
 
When the nucleus of a national pharmaceutical industry was being developed during the 
1930s and 1940s, low tariff levels prevailing at that time provided little incentive for 
multinationals -invited by the Egyptian government as early as 1958- to set up production 
facilities locally. However, in response to government control of all imports and 
distribution of pharmaceuticals, this stance was revised, as the alternative of not losing 
business in Egypt has been to start setting up operation locally (Handoussa, 1974). Pfizer, 
 
State-owned 
Drug Holding 
Company 
  
Subsidiaries of Foreign  
Research-based 
Companies 
  
Local  
Private  
Sector Companies 
   
        
1   ADCO  1   AMGEN  1 Acapi 22 Marcyrl 
2   ALEX  2   AVENTIS  2 Adwia 23 Mepaco 
3   CID  3   BMS  3 Hikma 24 Minapharm 
4   KAHIRA  4   GLAXO  4 Amoun 25 Multiapex 
5   MEMPHIS  5   NOVARTIS  5 Amriya 26 MUP 
6   MISR  6   PFIZER  6 Arabcaps 27 New Life 
7   NASR  7   SERVIER  7 Arabcomed 28 October Pharm 
8   NILE  8   MERCK 8 Army (logistic) 29 Opi Pharm 
9   SEPCO    9 Atos 30 Pharco 
    10 Bio-Original 31 Pharopharm 
    11 Borg 32 Philopharm 
    12 Chemipharm 33 Rameda 
    13 Delta Pharm 34 Rivapharm 
    14 EIPICO 35 SEDICO 
    15 Epci 36 Sigma 
    16 European Egyptian 37 Simco 
    17 Eva Pharm 38 T3A 
    18 Global Napi 39 Technopharm 
    19 Haidelyna 40 Unipharm 
    20 Hi Pharm 41 Veitopharm 
    21 Jedco 42 Vitapharm 
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Hoechst
12
 and the Swiss consortium of Ciba Geigy, Sandos and Wander (Swiss Pharma)
13
 
established majority owned joint ventures in Egypt. Pfizer and Hoechst began operation in 
1962 and Swiss Pharma in 1965. In 1974 BMS entered the Egyptian market, as the first 
foreign wholly owned subsidiary of a research-based pharmaceutical company, while actual 
production began in 1979.  
 
During the onset of the ODP, hostility towards FDI in the pharmaceutical sector was acute 
in Egypt. The principle of allowing foreign companies to venture into the Egyptian market 
through wholly owned subsidiaries was resisted on the basis that this 'strategic' industry 
should remain in 'national' hands. This position was actually echoed at the highest levels of 
policy making. Following the first years of operation by BMS, the sign of hostility towards 
foreign ownership was reflected in the decision of the Egyptian Syndicate of Pharmacists
14
 
to freeze direct purchases of foreign products manufactured by the four foreign companies 
operating in Egypt, and replace them with 'national' products if available. Otherwise, 
purchases by pharmacies from foreign companies operating locally were to be conducted 
through the public sector distribution company, and at similar concessions given directly to 
pharmacies by the foreign companies (Al-Ahram Daily, 7.1.1985).  
 
The initial phase of hostility actually proved to be short-lived. In 1985, local capital was 
willing to join forces with foreign capital when Glaxo formed a joint venture with ABI 
(Amoun) marking the -brownfield- entry of the fifth foreign company to the Egyptian 
market. Between 1990 and 2005, three additional subsidiaries of foreign research-based 
pharmaceutical companies established manufacturing presence in Egypt.  
 
Together, the eight companies also accounted for 62 percent of the top 100 products sold on 
the Egyptian market by value, and 42 percent of the top 100 products by volume (IMS, 
2005). Six of the eight companies, namely GSK, Novartis, BMS, Aventis, Pfizer and 
                                                 
12
 Currently Hochest Marrion Russel. 
13
 Currently Novartis. 
14
 The Egyptian Syndicate of Pharmacists is one of the most powerful operators in the domain of 
pharmaceutical distribution in Egypt. 
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Servier are among the top 10 companies operating on the Egyptian market, holding 25 
percent of the local market by value in 2005 (IMS, 2005).  
 
With almost no exception, these companies realize relatively low levels of financial returns 
compared to the local private sector (Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges, 2006). 
Another distinct feature is that despite the fact that foreign companies currently account for 
30 percent of Egypt’s pharmaceutical exports, the absolute value of exports remained low 
(Table 3-2). Using Egypt as a low cost manufacturing export base failed to characterize the 
mandate governing these companies throughout their history in Egypt.  
 
Table  3-2: Pharmaceutical export sales by the three ownership structures operating in 
Egypt 
Sector 99/98 00/99 01/00 01/02 02/03 03/04 
Total (USD million) 60.2 52.9 49.2 55.4 50.6 49.4 
Public (%) 40.4 10.8 26.6 9.6 5.5 10.3 
Private (%) 31.7 65.6 52.8 66.8 66.6 59.7 
Foreign (%) 28.1 23.4 20.5 23.6 27.9 29.8 
Source: CAPMAS, 2005 
 
Two accusations have often targeted subsidiaries of foreign research-based pharmaceutical 
companies operating in Egypt. The first pertains to their failure in undertaking any R&D 
activities locally, while the second is related to the excessive focus on the local market. In 
fact, evidence suggests that these accusations are not warranted. Foreign companies will 
only be interested to export out of Egypt if these export activities contribute to their overall 
financial health. As long as prices and profitability margins in other manufacturing 
locations exceed those of Egypt, the advantage of having a low cost manufacturing base in 
Egypt will fail to account for a significant incentive for subsidiaries of foreign research-
based companies to use the country as an export spring board (Interview Mohamed 
Roushdy, Regional Director, Pfizer Middle East, April 2004). 
 
Benefits accruing to Egyptian consumers from the operation of foreign research-based 
pharmaceutical companies in Egypt are significant. By being present in Egypt, 
manufacturing has been taking place under license from the parent company, with the 
support of relatively low cost structure, and hence lower final prices to the consumer. Table 
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3-3 demonstrates the level of price differentials when comparing products of the research-
based pharmaceutical industry imported into the market of neighboring Jordan, with the 
prices of same products manufactured under license by subsidiaries of research-based 
companies in Egypt.   
 
Table  3-3: Comparative prices of products manufactured under license in Egypt by 
subsidiaries of research-based companies and relative import prices in Jordan 
 Company  
name 
Trade name Active 
ingredient 
Conc. Unit Filling Public 
Price 
USD 
Jordan Merck Baneocin oint Bacitracin 250 IU/g 20g 2.4 
Egypt Biochemie Baneocin oint Bacitracin 20 mg 
oint 
  0.9 
        
Jordan Merck KGaA Concor 10mg tab Bisoprolol 10 mg 30 17.6 
Egypt Merck Egypt Concor 10mg tab Bisoprolol 10 mg 10 1.7 
        
Jordan Merck & Co  Singulair 
Paediatric 
Granules 
Montelukast 4 mg 28 58.6 
Egypt  Merck Egypt Singulair 
Paediatric 
Granules 
Montelukast 5 mg 28 26.6 
         
Jordan BMS Capoten Tablets Captopril 50 mg 30 15.4 
Egypt BMS Egypt Capoten Tablets Captopril 50 mg 10 1.6 
        
Jordan BMS  Megace Oral 
Suspension 
Megestrol 40 mg/ml 240ml 166.6 
Egypt BMS Egypt Megace  Megestrol 40 mg 100 27.6 
        
Jordan Pfizer  Diflucan caps Fluconazole 150 mg 1 12.1 
Egypt Pfizer Egypt Diflucan caps Fluconazole 150 mg 1 4.2 
        
Jordan Pfizer  Lipitor Atorvastatin 10 mg 30 44.7 
Egypt Pfizer Egypt Lipitor Atorvastatin 10 mg 7 7.1 
        
Jordan Pfizer Zithromax caps Azithromycin 250 mg 6 21.7 
Egypt Pfizer Egypt Zithromax caps Azithromycin 250 mg 6 8.5 
Original prices were in local currencies and have been converted to USD 
Sources: Jordan Food and Drug Administration, 2006; Egypt IMS Data, 2009 
 
3.5 Market Structure  
In 2008, the value of the Egyptian pharmaceutical market stood at LE 13 billion, having 
multiplied several folds in a span of ten years from LE 1.6 billion in 1991. Imports account 
for 17.3 percent of the retail market, of which generics account for 50 percent. In 2004, 
imports accounted for 12.2 percent of the country’s LE 6.2 billion market (IMS Egypt, 
2009). 
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Table  3-4: Value of the Egyptian pharmaceutical retail market (LE billion in current 
prices) 
 91 93 95 97 99 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
Retail sales 1.6 2.4 3.1 4.1 4.8 5.8 5.5 6.3 7.9 9.3 10.9 12.6 
Sources: Ministry of Health, 2002a; IMS Egypt, 2009 
 
One of the most notable developments of the 1990s was the decline in market shares held 
by public-business sector pharmaceutical companies, and the gradual increase in the shares 
of the private sector, both local and foreign.  
 
While the relatively low prices charged by public business sector companies may have 
worked in favour of increasing turnover and thus market shares, this did not hold true 
beyond the early 1990s. In the pharmaceuticals sector, marketing is one of the most 
important of post manufacturing activities, whereby the size of the marketing force 
employed by competing companies becomes the ultimate ‘bottom-line’ for successful 
competition. The absence of direct-to-consumer advertising in the domain of 
pharmaceutical sales renders "face-to-face" marketing, which entails regular visits to 
prescribing physicians, one of the most important determinants for gaining market share. 
 
During the 1970s and to a large extent during the early 1980s the mere existence of a 
product on the market was sufficient for gaining market share.  However, during the 1990s, 
and with the saturation of the local market and the increase in the number of competing 
products, marketing capabilities emerged as the most important determinant for sustaining, 
as well as for expanding market shares. Public business sector pharmaceutical companies 
were simply unable to cope, as a result of which they were always ranked in the ‘third-line’ 
after the private sector, whether local or foreign (Interview, Dr. Magedy Hassan, Chairman 
of Drug Holding Company, January, 2006). 
 
The increase in the number of private sector companies, which were established during the 
1980s and the 1990s, was an additional factor, which levied competitive pressure on the 
public sector. When the private sector began to diversity its line of business from trading to 
manufacturing activities during the 1980s and 1990s, the "un-written" mandate was to 
89 
 
specialize in the production of drugs which were not already present on the market, or 
which were being imported. What actually happened was that the newly emerging private 
sector began to compete with the public sector by manufacturing exact replicas of their 
already existing product portfolios. Duplication was an easy task in light of the fact that 
top-level management moved from the public sector to join the newly emerging private 
sector. The chief executive officer of SEDICO, which is a top ranking local company, was 
the former general manager of two of the large public sector companies namely CID and 
El-Nile. The same applies to EIPICO, which is the top ranking local company on the 
market (2002), whose managing director since establishment was the former manager of 
Memphis, another public sector company. Both SEDICO and EIPICO commenced 
production by replicating the product portfolio of the public sector companies they were 
managing earlier (Interview, Dr. Ali Mohammad, Managing Director CID, May 2004). 
 
In unit terms the market share of public business sector companies declined from 43 
percent in 1994, to 23 percent in 2002 and to 18.4 percent in 2008 (Table 3-5). In value 
terms, their market share declined from 29 percent to 12 percent, and eventually to 10 
percent during the same years. The difference between the magnitudes of decline in unit 
terms, versus value shares, is attributed to the relatively low prices of products 
manufactured by this group of companies compared to the local private sector as well as to 
subsidiaries of foreign companies. 
 
Table  3-5: Pharmaceutical Market structure 2004 and 2008 (%) 
 Units/2004 Units/2008 LE Sales/2004 LE Sales/2008 
Total market (LE '000) 873,498 1,323,496 6,279,026 12,565,859 
Public business sector  25.8 18.4 14.9 10.2 
Imported  4.4 6.8 12.2 17.3 
Multinational  23.5 18.7 28.4 22.4 
Private (local generics companies)  46.3 56.2 44.6 50.0 
Source: IMS, 2009 
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3.6 Key Performance Attributes of Egypt’s Pharmaceutical Industry  
In this section, the key performance attributes of the pharmaceutical industry will be 
presented. The focus will be on output growth and job creation, export performance and the 
nature of R&D activities.   
 
3.6.1 Output growth and job creation in Egypt’s pharmaceutical industry 
The pharmaceutical industry currently accounts for 4 percent of total manufacturing output 
in Egypt (excluding the public business sector). The relative output growth performance of 
the pharmaceutical industry does not indicate that this sector has been particularly dynamic 
in terms of outpacing the rate of growth of total output in the manufacturing sector at large 
(Table 3-6). 
  
Table  3-6: Manufacturing and pharmaceutical output value in Egypt (LE billion at 
factor cost) 
 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
Manufacturing output 54 62 59 69 71 97 110 130 154 211 
Pharmaceutical output 3 3 5 4 3 5 5 6 7 8 
Manuf. output growth (%)  15.0 -3.8 17.0 2.8 36.4 13.3 17.7 19.0 36.5 
Pharm. output growth (%)  5.2 72.9 -5.2 -21.9 40.8 11.1 0.6 21.2 15.5 
Source: CAPMAS, 2009 
 
The pharmaceutical industry in not a labor-intensive industry. Some 22 thousand workers 
are employed in the pharmaceutical sector (excluding the public business sector), 
accounting for 2.8 percent of total employment in the -formal organized- manufacturing 
sector (Table 3-7). Promoting growth in the pharmaceutical industry has, therefore, not 
been targeting the creation of job opportunities for Egypt’s labor surplus economy, but 
rather to ensure access to pharmaceutical needs though domestic manufacturing and supply.  
 
Table  3-7: Employment in Egypt’s manufacturing sector and in pharmaceutical sub-
sector (‘000) 
 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
Manufacturing sector* 590  591  584  594  615  619  638  645  648  801  
Pharmaceuticals 11  7  14  13  17  17  19  18  21  22  
Pharmaceuticals share employment (%) 1.9 1.3 2.4 2.2 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.1 2.8 
Manufacturing employment growth (%)  0.1 -1.2 1.6 3.6 0.6 3.1 1.2 0.5 23.5 
Pharmaceutical employment growth (%)  -31.9 82.1 -9.5 32.6 0.1 13.5 -4.3 9.9 9.7 
*In the organized sector Source: CAPMAS, 2009 
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3.6.2 Trade performance  
To date, Egypt maintains a deficit on the pharmaceutical trade balance, with imports 
standing at LE 887 million and exports at LE 238 million (in fiscal year 2006/07). The 
pharmaceutical trade deficit has actually been widening, from LE 410 million in 2000/01 to 
LE 649 million in 2006/07 (Table 3-8). 
 
Table  3-8: Pharmaceutical trade (LE million) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Pharmaceutical output (factor cost)   4,718    4,472    3,493    4,918    5,467    5,501    6,665    7,697  
Pharmaceutical exports 51  49  83   130   209   215   125   238  
Pharmaceutical imports 583 499 477 525 627 887 469 n.a 
Exports as a share of total output 1.06 1.10 2.38 2.64 3.82 3.91 1.88 3.09 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, 2009; CAPMAS, 2009 
 
In Egypt, export sales remain relatively meagre, particularly when compared to other 
countries which have begun the development of the pharmaceutical generics industry at 
much later stages. While Egypt accounted for 1.7 percent of total pharmaceutical exports 
by developing countries in 1980, this share declined to reach 0.5 percent by 2003. An 
opposite trend was registered by Jordan, India and China (Table 3-9).   
 
One of the explanations behind the relatively modest pharmaceutical export performance in 
Egypt finds roots in the public sector legacy. During the 1960s, import substitution 
industrialization was the force driving Egyptian industry, and the pharmaceutical industry 
was no exception. While export departments were set up in the state-owned companies to 
dispense of surplus output, export activities gained marginal importance. The focus on the 
local market and the achievement of higher levels of self-sufficiency became the “only” 
benchmark for successful performance. As a result, between 1962/63 and 1968/69 the 
coverage of domestically manufactured drugs of total demand increased from 53 percent to 
86 percent (Handoussa, 1974).  
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Table  3-9: Pharmaceutical exports as a share of total pharmaceutical exports by 
developing countries, Egypt and comparator countries 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Egypt   1.68  0.22  0.38  0.57  0.03  0.55  0.67  0.47  
 Jordan   0.83  1.73  1.97  2.39  1.35  2.11  2.22  1.93  
 Brazil   1.40  2.90  2.48  2.71  3.21  3.03  2.91  2.86  
 India   5.16  6.15  14.37  11.73  15.15  14.72  17.92  18.44  
 China   12.51  11.84  20.40  25.62  21.59  21.60  23.66  26.10  
Source: UNCTAD, 2009 
 
Another explanation is related to the fact that a large segment of products manufactured by 
local generic companies in Egypt are manufactured under license. The output structure of 
local pharmaceutical companies indicated that a large segment of total output was by 
default not exportable. In 1980, 20 percent of total output was manufactured under license. 
By 1995, this share increased to reach 33 percent (CAPMAS, 1997). A standard license 
agreement clearly states that the sale of products manufactured under license was only 
authorized within the territory of Egypt. Only a few license agreements allowed for export 
sales. Unless negotiations allow for wider geographic coverage for products manufactured 
under license, output is made exclusive to the local market. Almost all of the company 
executives interviewed confirmed that manufacturing under license is one of the restrictive 
factors, which does not allow local companies to export. Pharmaceutical registration 
procedures in importing markets were also among the significant regulatory barriers to 
exports. In some cases, the cost of obtaining the license to market the product in the 
importing market reached USD 200,000 with no grantee that the product will eventually get 
the license (Interview, Mr. Tharwat Abdelshahid, CFO EIPICO, June 1999). 
 
An important reason explaining why local companies have been relatively slow in 
expanding their export markets is related to the allegation that most of the private as well as 
the public business sector companies have been incurring losses on a significant number of 
their products. This has been particularly true following the devaluation of the Egyptian 
pound in January 2003. No price adjustment has been allowed to accommodate for the 
increase in the cost of imported raw material inputs. With importing countries stipulating 
that the price charged for its consumers has to match the price charged on the Egyptian 
market, if pharmaceutical companies were to export –some products- at the prices charged 
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in Egypt, this would in fact constitute a direct subsidy to foreign consumers. Pricing 
remains to be one of the most important export related dilemma’s facing pharmaceutical 
companies in Egypt. The Managing Director of CID, one of the public business sector 
companies stated that he is incurring losses on most of his products on the Egyptian market, 
and if he thinks of exporting at the same price as stipulated by importing country 
regulations, he will in fact be subsidizing the consumers in the importing market at his own 
expense (Dr. Ali Mohammad, Managing Director, CID, May 2004). This argument has 
been widely acknowledged by all of the company executives interviewed.  
 
The aggressive nature of competition in export markets is another important deterrent 
against exporting. The founder of Amoun, which is one of the largest and most successful 
generic companies in Egypt, admitted that the importance of sales on the local market 
continues to overweight the importance of export sales. It is an ambitious attempt to expand 
its international presence during the 1980s and early 1990s, Amoun opened a representative 
office in New Jersey. The intense level of competitive pressure characterizing the US 
market, together with the stringent standards imposed by FDA inspections rendered 
presence on the US market too costly in terms of the required investment. The 
representative office was eventually closed down, and Amoun’s operations on the US 
market were downsized (Interview, Dr. Tharwat Bassily, Director Amoun, January 2004).  
 
Government support to the industry in its export drive, as represented by the Ministry of 
Health was also lacking in Egypt. This is particularly true when compared to neighbouring 
Jordan for example. During his visits to Europe, the late King Hussein, personally 
supported and followed-up on the registration of Jordanian pharmaceutical products. It was 
also believed that there is little scope for Egyptian companies to compete in the markets of 
the EU or the USA, because even if the regulatory hurdles can be overcome, and Egyptian 
products can compete on the basis of low prices, they cannot beat foreign companies in 
their marketing capabilities (Interview, Khaled Nosseir, Chairman, Alkan, May 1999). 
 
Other developing countries have achieved high rates of pharmaceutical export growth as a 
result of allowing the private sector to run the industry much earlier than in the case of 
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Egypt. Jordan again is a case in point, where the private sector has been able to respond to 
export opportunities in a much swifter manner than was the public sector of Egypt. It has 
been argued by public business sector executives during the interviews conducted that if the 
industry was privately managed since its early days, Egypt would have been among the key 
players on the global market for generics. There is a marked difference between the speed 
of response to an export opportunity by a private, versus a public sector company. This was 
one of the most interesting viewpoints, having been stated by one of the public business 
sector managers (Interview, Dr. Hussein Zeweil, Director, Al-Kahira, March 1999). 
 
Low levels of export sales by public sector companies can be understood against the fact 
that economic policy change during the 1970s and 1980s was very slow in altering the 
import substitution ideology of the 1960s, which was well entrenched as the benchmark for 
successful performance for public sector companies. Surplus output was mainly stocked as 
inventory, and was regarded as a strategic hedge against potential shortages. Moreover, 
export sales were viewed as a waste of scarce foreign exchange resources, particularly since 
raw material inputs accounted for roughly 40 percent of total manufacturing cost 
(Interview, Mr. Ahmed Saleh, First Under Secretary, Ministry of Industry, February 1999). 
Export promotion by public sector companies may have been an objective on paper, but in 
reality it ceased to be a driving force as an outlet for local production, even at times when 
inventory levels were already reaching exceptionally high levels of LE 1.1 billion at the eve 
of the ERSAP (Drug Holding Company, 1992b). A case in point was demonstrated in 1975, 
when Foad Moheildin, who was then the Minister of Health (later on to become Prime 
Minster) stated in Parliament that he has issued instructions that export activities by public 
sector companies should not be at the expense of local needs (Al-Ahram Daily, 9.11.75).  
 
Among the factors which explain the relatively unsatisfactory performance with which 
Egypt contracted its presence on the world pharmaceutical trade scene was the fact that up 
to the early 1990s, public sector companies were exclusively responsible for Egypt’s export 
sales, particularly since subsidiaries of foreign companies were not engaged in any export 
activities of significance. Exporting pharmaceuticals was becoming increasingly difficult 
for public business sector companies as a result of competition over export markets 
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becoming intense, especially in terms of having to compete against large companies. Most 
of Egypt’s exports during the 1960s, 1970s and the early part of the 1980s were based on 
‘barter’ trade with Eastern Europe, and therefore there was no element of entrepreneurship 
with respect to marketing these products outside of Egypt (Interview, Khaled Nossier, 
Chairman, Alkan, May 1999).  
 
The private sector of the post-1974 period was also not mandated to meet any export 
targets. When Bristol Myers Squib began to operate in Egypt during the late 1970s, the 
condition was made that it had to export. However, this condition was not realized. Setting 
clear export targets was never part of the industrial policy vision governing the industry. 
The Ministry of Health, in fact penalized Abou Zaabal company, for exporting during the 
1970s, as this was judged as a waste of foreign exchange rather than a contribution to 
foreign exchange earnings (Interview, Mr. Ahmed Saleh, First Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Industry, February, 1999). The role of the Ministry of Health was not 
envisioned to go beyond that of the regulator, being concerned with regulatory issues such 
as registration, pricing with no serious attempt to promoting the export capabilities of this 
industry. 
 
Subsidiaries of foreign companies operating in Egypt since the 1960s, never considered 
exports as part of their operations mandate. For example, Pfizer Egypt does not engage in 
export activities of any significance. Exports are based on ad-hoc demand which result 
from the inability of any of the permanent supply-sources to meet the needs in a particular 
neighbouring market (Interview, Dr. Mohamed Roushdi, Regional Director of Pfizer, 
March, 1999). 
 
3.6.3 R&D and innovation strategies  
None of the generic companies operating in Egypt are involved in pharmaceutical R&D. 
Local companies conduct 'product development' activities in areas such as formulation 
development, stability studies for bulk drug and formulations, process development for 
bulk drugs and the coordination of clinical studies with various Egyptian universities. None 
of these activities can be categorized as R&D proper. However, from the perspective of a 
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generics manufacturing firm, it was important to question the extent to which R&D was a 
crucial element of competitive strategies. 
 
When questioned about expanding the scope of R&D undertaken -as part of the future 
defence mechanism against the strengthening of the IPRs regime and as publicized by the 
popular opinion expressed regarding future options available to the industry- local generics 
companies were actually very candidate in terms of their viewpoint regarding the 
importance of R&D to their operations. Dr. Tharwat Bassily, the founder of Amoun, which 
is one of Egypt’s largest generic companies, argued that the ability of local firms operating 
in Egypt to compete on the basis of investing in pharmaceutical R&D was very remote 
(Interview, Dr. Tharwat Bassily, Founder and CEO of Amoun, January 2004). The same 
viewpoint was shared by many ‘realists’ in the industry. According to the former Managing 
Director of GSK Egypt, it may take two generations or more for Egypt to join the league of 
innovating countries in the domain of introducing NCE. It was being argued by 
industrialists that placing pressure on generics manufacturers in Egypt to expand their 
scope of R&D reflects complete lack of knowledge about the specifics of the single-source 
drug industry. Innovation is a function of two factors, which are very weak in Egypt. The 
first is the educational system, which provides the skills needed to support innovation, 
while the second concerns the necessary financial resources needed to finance the process 
of product development. In Egypt, these preconditions have been short of the required 
standards, thus any pressure levied on private sector companies to engage in 
pharmaceutical R&D along lines the research-based companies indicates unrealistically 
high expectations (Interview, Dr. Negad Sharawi, Former CEO GlaxoSmithKline, April 
2004).  
 
In contrast to the above viewpoints, the Business Development Manager of SEDICO, 
which is also one of the key players on the generics manufacturing scene, maintained the 
view that the R&D costs propagated by the research-based industry are exaggerated, which 
is why he is confident that Egyptian generics companies can well venture into this area. He 
gave the example of one of SEDICO’s top-earning products, which was developed by the 
company’s research team. A copy of this product was also manufactured by another local 
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generics company, which was eventually acquired by one of the research-based 
pharmaceutical companies operating in Egypt. The copy of SEDICO’s product, became the 
property of the research-based company, and has been competing in export markets against 
SEDICO’s original product. The interesting part of this story is that the copied competing 
product, was being sold at three times the price of SEDICO’s product on export markets. 
The justification given was that the research-based company has spent some USD 280 
million to develop the product (Interview, Dr. Hossan AboulEnein, Business Development 
Manager, SEDICO, May 2004). 
 
The inconsistent viewpoints held by manufacturers of generic in Egypt regarding the 
importance of R&D related investments, falls in sharp contrast with the experience of 
Indian manufacturers of generics. Ranbaxy, India’s pharmaceutical giant which was 
established in 1961, allocates 6 percent of its sales to R&D. In 2009, Ranbaxy’s sales stood 
at USD one billion. What is important from the perspective of evaluating the performance 
of Egypt’s generics industry is the fact that Ranbaxy followed a track which differentiated 
it on the world market, having managed to “beat global drug firms at their own game”. 
When Germany’s Bayer wanted to develop a once-a-day version of Cipro which is the 
antibiotic treatment for anthrax, it turned to Ranbaxy. This product now generates USD one 
million in royalty per month. (Paul Durman, 2004). Ranbaxy is also progressing in the 
domain of R&D under alliances with giants such as GlaxoSmithKline and Merck 
(Ranbaxy, 2009).  
 
Low profitability levels associated with pharmaceutical pricing rigidities in Egypt have also 
allegedly limited the ability of both public business sector as well as private sector 
companies to allocate sufficient funds to product development, which even for generics 
manufacturers remains to be of vital importance. To date, public business sector 
pharmaceutical companies allocate a meager one percent of sales to R&D (Al-Ahram Al-
Iktisadi, 2003). Moreover the impact of pricing rigidities on profitability levels played an 
indirect role in delaying the expansion, rehabilitation and modernization of existing 
productive capacity as well as supporting R&D even in its most narrow definition. The 
majority of company executives interviewed complained that losses associated with pricing 
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rigidities negatively affect their ability to expand productive capacity, as well as to upgrade 
plant and equipment. Regular inspections conducted by the Ministry of Health (in 1999 and 
2000) cautioned that the manufacturing facilities of the Arab Drug Company (ADCO) for 
example had to be rehabilitated, otherwise, some of the production units may be subject to 
closure. The reason was that some of ADCO’s machinery, which date back to 1963, were 
still in operation. Foreign licensors have been threatening ADCO to withdraw their 
licenses, unless concerns regarding the rehabilitation and modernization of the company’s 
manufacturing facilities were to be addressed (ADCO, 2003). Three other companies were 
judged to be technically incapable of surviving with the current condition of their capital 
stock, namely, CID, Al-Kahira and Misr (Interview, Dr. Galal Ghorab, Director Drug 
Holding Company, April, 2004). 
 
3.7 Summary and Conclusion  
In retrospect, two key objectives have driven the analysis presented in this chapter. First, in 
relation to the review of the literature on industrial policy, it was important to throw light 
on the nature of industrial policy choices governing Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical 
industry during the study period, as well as on their respective outcomes. Second, in 
relation to the review of the salient characteristics of the world pharmaceutical industry, it 
was important to be able to identify where such policies have landed Egypt on the world 
map for pharmaceutical production and trade.  
 
To meet these two objectives, a survey of the literature on the salient characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical industry was undertaken, and the findings have been contrasted against the 
survey of the literature concerning the highlights of the growth trajectory of Egypt’s 
generics pharmaceutical industry and its key performance attributes. While secondary 
sources have been relied upon to undertaken the analysis, a series of unstructured 
interviews meant to solicit the viewpoints of key players in the policy making and 
manufacturing circles regarding the research questions posed have been conducted. A 
review of primary sources of information and data, as present in minutes of board meetings 
of various companies as well as internal unpublished government documents has also been 
undertaken.  
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The exposé presented in Chapter Three yielded the following results. While the majority of 
Egypt’s manufacturing industries have been subjected to the phasing-out of protectionist 
measures during the study period, in clear contrast, the pharmaceutical industry has 
benefited from protracted regulatory non-tariff protection. This has been the consistent and 
most prominent feature of the industrial policy regime governing Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical sector. Regulatory protection has allowed local manufacturers of generics 
to enjoy prolonged exclusive presence on the local market vis-à-vis other low-cost 
manufacturers of generics from other parts of the world.  
 
While ISI was officially ‘shelved’ as a policy direction as early as the formative years of 
the ODP in 1974, to date, ISI remains entrenched as a benchmark against which most 
companies operating on Egypt’s pharmaceutical manufacturing scene evaluate their 
performance. When policy makers praise the high levels of self-sufficiency achieved by 
this industry, while neglecting the equally important indicator of success in terms of 
penetrating export markets, the wrong message is being consistently rallied to the local -as 
well as foreign- segment of this industry. Incentives for companies to actually export (as 
demonstrated through the experience of the NICs) have been absent through the study 
period. The merits of exporting do not just touch on addressing trade balance of issues, but 
to linking exporting to productivity growth. As detailed in Chapter Two, exporting supports 
productivity growth through the key channels of economies of scale, efficiency 
improvements on behalf of exporters through the process of 'learning by exporting', cross-
efficiency promotion and resource reallocation from the less to the more efficient firms at 
the industry level and technical progress, which result from technology spill-overs through 
foreign contracts and the encouragement of investment in R&D (Fu, 2005; Bartelsman and 
Domes, 2000). Most, if not all of these benefits have been compromised when 
manufacturers confined themselves to the local market. 
 
The key changes in Egypt’s industrial policy regime during the study period have been 
primarily concerned with addressing institutional as well as regulatory issues such public 
sector reform, privatisation, and price liberalisation. Changes on the aforementioned fronts 
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have only tangentially touched on the performance of the majority of companies operating 
within the domain of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry. Privatisation, as well as 
price liberalisation -as key components of ERSAP- proved to be circumscribed by the need 
to sustain the social objective of availing affordable medicine to the Egyptian population at 
large. The series of institutional and legislative changes brought about by the ERSAP as 
early as 1991, have also only benefited the public business sector on paper. In reality, this 
important segment of the industry’s manufacturing base remains to be constrained by the 
most limiting burden of the 1960s and 1970s, namely relegating profitability objectives to 
secondary importance. This has invariably impacted the overall industrial health of this 
group of companies, particularly in terms of the resources available to investment in 
modernising plant and equipment, as well as marketing activities. The outcome has been 
reflected in the consistent loss in market share as well as relatively modest efficiency levels 
as will be detailed further in Chapter Five. 
 
A key limitation of Egypt’s industrial policy as implemented within the domain of the 
generics pharmaceutical sector, is that it failed to award any importance to investing in 
R&D. The outcome was that generics companies failed to see the real merits of R&D 
investments, having argued that generics firms are not expected to invest in R&D proper 
along lines the research-based industry. This viewpoint falls in sharp contrast with the 
rhetoric voiced in Egypt’s mass media concerning the need to consolidate financial 
resources towards unified R&D investments by local companies. The outcome of this 
policy pitfall is that Indian generics companies have outpaced their Egyptian counterparts 
in terms of positioning themselves at a far more advantageous position when it comes to 
competing on what is turning to be a highly aggressive global pharmaceutical market. India 
generics companies have basically assumed this advantageous position as a result of the 
government creating a home environment which has forced firms to improve their 
technological capabilities (Mourshed, 1999).  
 
  
111 
 
4. THE BURDEN OF HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURE UNDER THE FRAMEWORK OF EGYPT’S 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY REGIME 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The regulatory framework governing Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry is 
multifaceted. The country’s industrial policy regime is one facet of the regulatory 
framework, while the health care system and its associated framework(s) account for the 
other.  
 
The main concern of this chapter, is to review the key components of the national drug 
policy in Egypt. The objective is to throw light on the characteristics of the pharmaceutical 
regulatory regime, as influencing relative prices on the market. This chapter is, therefore, 
meant to provide the background against which the research question concerning relative 
price levels on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market will be addressed.  
 
This chapter will also examine the pharmaceutical industry in the context of the Egyptian 
health care system and how it "interacts" with it, both from a formal perspective (covering 
the costs and purchasing of medicines by the state/health system) and from the perspective 
of patients through direct purchases outside the remit of the health system. The objective is 
to place the findings concerning relative price levels in the context of who shoulders the 
burden of pharmaceutical expenditure in Egypt. 
 
Among the key findings of this chapter was that while the Egyptian government has been 
endeavoring to extend the benefits of social health insurance to the maximum number of 
beneficiaries, Egypt’s health care system has remained largely inequitable, leaving close to 
half of the country’s population to be fully vulnerable to potential catastrophic health care 
expenditure. While 68 percent of expenditure on drugs is shouldered by out-of-pocket 
expenditure, a clear and coherent generics policy to support alleviating such burden 
remains to be largely absent.  Generics substitution in pharmacies is not formally supported 
from a policy perspective, nor is it common practice in Egypt. Generics do not attract lower 
copayments compared to the branded version of the same medicine, whereby under the 
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umbrella of social health insurance, differential co-payments to promote generic drugs 
remained to be absent. These findings rendered the research question concerning relative 
pharmaceutical prices in Egypt both pertinent as well as important. 
 
When writing this chapter, a key challenge faced, was related to the dearth in the body of 
analytical literature covering the pharmaceutical regulatory regime in Egypt, particularly 
within the realms of the health care sector. The limited set of available secondary sources 
on health and national pharmaceutical policies in Egypt -the majority of which are 
unpublished reports- have provided the basis for evaluating the country’s health care 
system during the study period.  
 
This chapter is divided as follows. Section 4.2 presents an overview of the organization, 
finance and delivery of health care services in Egypt. Section 4.3 provides an overview 
health care finance. Section 4.4 outlines the national drug policy in Egypt. Section 4.5 
presents the key components of the pharmaceutical regulatory regime. Section 4.6 presents 
trends in pharmaceutical expenditure and consumption, while Section 4.7 provides a 
summary of the key findings and concluding remarks. 
 
4.2 Organization, Finance and Delivery of Health Care Services in Egypt 
Egypt’s population currently stands at 79 million. With some 22 million individuals 
categorized either as poor or as ultra-poor, and in light of the fact that more than half of the 
Egyptian population does not have access to social health insurance, ensuring that the 
health care system delivers equitable and affordable access to medical treatment, and to 
affordable drugs becomes a necessity for policy intervention. This section looks into how 
Egypt’s health care system operates in terms of organization and finance, with the guiding 
question being whether or not the current system ensures access to quality health care for 
all segments of the population, irrespective of their financial means. 
 
The structure of the Egyptian health care system is comprised of a large number of public 
and private providers and financing agents (Figure 4.1). The Ministry of Health (MOH) is 
by far the key player on Egypt’s health care scene by virtue of being the single major 
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provider of health care services, as well as the regulator of services provision in the 
country. Other players on the health care scene include the public government sector, the 
public institutional sector -mainly the Teaching Hospitals Organization (THO), the 
Curative Care Organization (CCO), the Health Insurance Organization (HIO), and the 
private sector.   
 
 
Source: Nihal Hafez,1996 
 
4.2.1 The government sector 
The MOH is the major provider of primary, preventive and curative care in Egypt, through 
a dense network of 4,300 health facilities (and 66,440 beds nationwide). Public government 
sector providers receiving direct funding from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) include the 
MOH, the Ministries of Education, Defense and Interior as well other ministries and public 
entities directly providing health care services (agriculture, railways and electricity). Some 
of these government providers are permitted to supplement transfers received from the 
MOF by charging user fees in special ‘economic units’, known as ‘self-financing units’ 
(Ministry of Health, 2002).  
 
Free subsidized health care services in government facilities are availed to all eligible 
citizens, through the public delivery systems under the auspices of the MOH, THO and 
university hospitals. In other words, and in principle all Egyptian citizens have access to 
‘free’ services provided by the MOH facilities. However, medical care outside of a defined 
 Government of Egypt 
Public sector 
THO 
CCO 
HIO 
Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of Defense 
Ministry of Education 
Ministry of Health & Population 
Private Sector 
NGOs 
 
Private Pharmacies 
 
      Private Insurance Co. 
 
 
      Private Practitioners 
 
Private Hospitals/Policlinics 
Figure 4-1: Health care providers in Egypt 
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subset of treatments must be paid for out-of-pocket. This subset includes lab fees, and drugs 
(World Bank, 2009a: 3).  
 
4.2.2 The public institutional sector 
The public institutional sector is made up of quasi-governmental organizations in which the 
state maintains control over the decision-making process. These institutions include HIO, 
CCOs and THO.  
 
The Health Insurance Organization 
The HIO was created in 1964, to provide managed health care services for a constituency of 
government employees covered by the mandatory government health insurance scheme. 
When the HIO was created, the objective was to expand its scope of coverage to include the 
whole Egyptian population in a span of ten years. Judging by the current coverage level, 
this target proved to be too ambitious.   
 
The HIO delivers health care services through a large network of hospitals, clinics, and 
pharmacies, as well as by contracting private sector providers. A total of 31.9 million 
inhabitants are officially under the umbrella of the HIO (HIO, 2010). According to the 
latest published National Health Accounts (NHA) 2001-02, the HIO accounts for some 5.2 
percent of total health care expenditure in Egypt (Partners for Health ReformPlus, 2005: 
48).
15
 While there are co-payment requirements under the benefits package of the HIO, the 
package is considered to be very generous, with no limits on the frequency or cost of 
services. Services provided by the HIO cover all aspects of curative care -including drugs- 
as well as preventive care for its student and infant beneficiaries. Some 45 percent of 
expenditure by the HIO is on drugs (Partners for Health Reform, 1997: 17).  
 
The Curative Care Organization 
The CCO is an independent organization created following the nationalization of several 
private hospitals in 1964, and provides health care services to the public for a nominal 
charge. While maintaining its independence, the CCO falls under the jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
15
 In 2009, a new round to update the NHA was undertaken for 2007/08. The results have not been published. 
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MOH. The nature of services provided by CCOs are mainly curative in nature, with the 
revenue-base being fee-for-service, with some free care made available for the ultra-poor 
patients. The bulk of CCO funding comes from contractual agreements with private and 
public firms to provide health care services to their employees (Partners for Health 
ReformPlus, 2005: 40). 
 
The Teaching Hospitals Organization 
The THO, is also an independent entity under the direct jurisdiction of the MOH. There are 
10 general teaching hospitals in Egypt, which serve a small segment of the population 
(Partners for Health ReformPlus, 2005: 41). While in principle health care services 
provided in teaching hospitals are free of charge, including inpatient care, drugs, laboratory 
and diagnostic services, dental care, in reality patients are more often than not requested to 
purchase their drug requirements out-of-pocket.  
 
4.2.3 The private sector 
The private sector includes for-profit private sector hospitals and clinics, as well as non-
profit charity clinics. Pharmacy retail outlets are also considered an integral part of the 
country’s private health care sector. According to the 2001-02 round of NHAs, private 
health care facilities absorb 54 percent of total health care expenditure in Egypt, while 
public providers account for the balance (Table 4-1).  
 
Table 4-1: Comparison of expenditures by type of health care provider, 94/95 & 01/02 
 1994/95  2001/02 
MOH facilities  19%  25.6% 
CCO hospitals  4%  0.7%  
THO hospitals  2%  1.9%  
University hospitals  8%  8.6%  
Other ministries hospitals  3%  1.0%  
HIO facilities  8%  5.2%  
Total, public providers  44%  42.9%  
Private hospitals  4%  5.6%  
Private clinics  10%  24.9%  
Independent Pharmacies  36%  23.2%  
Total, private providers  50%  53.7%  
Other facilities  5%  3.3%  
Total  100%  100%  
Source: Partners for Health ReformPlus, 2005 
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4.2.4 Health care expenditure in Egypt 
In 2008, total expenditure on health care services in Egypt accounted for 6.4 percent of 
GDP, registering a modest increase of two percentage points from 4.7 percent of GDP a 
decade earlier in 1998. Per capita health care expenditure in Egypt currently stands at USD 
333 in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), a significant increase from USD 150 in 1998. This 
increase has run parallel to the general improvement in per capita income in Egypt as well 
as the overall increase in the cost of health care services.  
 
While the Government has been the single key provider and financier of primary, 
preventive as well as most inpatient curative care in Egypt, since the early 1990s, budget 
constraints have left government expenditure on health care services as a percent of total 
government expenditure relatively stagnant (see Table 4-4). Per capita government 
expenditure on health care remained largely unchanged during the last ten-year period. In 
2008, government expenditure on health care services accounted for 38 percent of per 
capita health care expenditure, compared to 34 percent in 1998.  
 
Out-of-pocket expenditure as a percent of private health care expenditure in Egypt stands at 
the alarmingly high rate of 95 percent.  Table 4-2 indicates that the two largest components 
of household out-of-pocket health care expenditure by type of provider fall in the domain of 
private clinics (42 percent) and pharmacies (33 percent). The relatively large proportion of 
expenditure in pharmacies is explained in light of the facts that a large segment of the 
Egyptian population resorts to self-prescription, as well as reliance on the pharmacist for 
medical advice and hence prescription. 
 
The distribution of out-of-pocket expenditures by various cost components indicates that 
the single largest component of health care expenditure is on drugs, at 43 percent (Table 4-
3).  
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Table  4-2: Distribution of household health care expenditures by type of provider 
2001-02 
Type of Provider Percent 
MOHP hospitals  3.5 
University hospitals  3.1 
Other public hospitals  0.9 
HIO hospitals  0.8 
Private hospitals  9.0 
Private clinics  41.9 
MOH health centers  3.2 
Pharmacies  33.6 
Others  4.0 
Total LE (billion) 13.6 
Source: Partners for Health ReformPlus, 2005 
 
 
Table  4-3: Annual per capita health care expenditures on various cost components 
2001-02 
Cost component Share of per capita expenditure 
Hospitals  4% 
Doctors  5% 
Drugs  43% 
Lab  8% 
X ray 15% 
Transport  2% 
Others  24% 
Total LE (billion) 13.6 
The ‘other’ category includes a large portion for dental costs 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2002a 
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Table  4-4: Selected ratio indicators for health care expenditure in Egypt 
 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
I. Expenditure ratios                           
Total expenditure on health (THE) as % of GDP 3.9 5.0 4.7 5.4 5.5 5.9 6.3 6.3 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.3 6.4 
Financing Sources measurement                           
External resources on health as % of THE 2.7 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.1 
Financing Agents measurement                           
General government expenditure on health (GGHE) as % of THE 46.5 38.2 33.9 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.4 39.1 37.4 37.6 41.0 38.1 38.3 
Private expenditure on health (PvtHE) as % of THE 53.5 61.8 66.1 60.4 60.4 60.4 60.6 60.9 62.6 62.4 59.0 61.9 61.7 
GGHE as % of General government expenditure 5.3 6.3 6.4 7.2 7.3 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 
Social security funds as % of GGHE 25.7 24.8 30.3 24.0 24.3 24.6 25.2 25.0 26.8 26.8 26.9 26.8 26.8 
Private insurance as % of PvtHE 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Out of pocket expenditure as % of PvtHE 89.6 93.4 93.5 93.9 94.1 94.5 94.9 95.0 94.9 94.9 94.9 95.1 95.1 
II. Selected per capita  indicators for expenditures on health                           
Total expenditure on health / capita at exchange rate 36 57 59 71 77 75 72 61 62 73 86 101 124 
Total expenditure on health / capita at Purchasing Power Parity (NCU 
per USD) 
107 149 150 182 196 217 235 245 246 261 294 310 333 
General government expenditure on health / cap x-rate 17 22 20 28 31 30 29 24 23 27 35 39 48 
General government expenditure on health / cap Purchasing Power 
Parity (NCU per USD) 
50 57 51 72 78 86 93 96 92 98 121 118 127 
Source:  WHO, 2010   
 
Table  4-5: Health system expenditure and financing agents’ measurement (LE million) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008   
                               
Total expenditure on health  7,883 9,841 12,891 13,586 16,724 18,853 21,191 23,757 26,335 29,281 32,502 38,930 45,783 55,047   
General government expenditure on health 3,666 4,059 4,930 4,610 6,627 7,472 8,393 9,359 10,290 10,962 12,207 15,945 17,424 21,065   
   Ministry of Health 1,716 2,073 2,583 3,087 3,524 3,961 4,435 5,288 5,400 5,600           
   Social security funds 943 1,075 1,225 1,396 1,591 1,814 2,067 2,356 2,573 2,937 3,271 4,282 4,673 5,652   
Private expenditure on health 4,217 5,782 7,961 8,976 10,097 11,381 12,798 14,398 16,045 18,319 20,295 22,985 28,359 33,983   
Private insurance  43 43 44 44 44 45 45 45 37 42 46 52 62 74   
Non-profit institutions serving households  32 29 27 24 22 20 18 17 18 21 23 26 32 39   
Out of pocket expenditure 3,780 5,301 7,433 8,395 9,482 10,709 12,095 13,660 15,245 17,390 19,265 21,805 26,959 32,330   
Financing Sources measurement                                
Rest of the world funds / External resources 215 210 205 200 195 190 186 181 183 279 297 295 519 613   
Population (in thousands)  63,858 65,076 66,313 67,573 68,860 70,174 71,518 72,894 74,296 75,718 77,154 78,602 80,061 81,527   
"n/a" Used when the information accessed indicates that a cell should have an entry but no estimates could be made. 
"0" Used when no evidence of the schemes to which the cell relates exist. Some estimates yielding a ratio below 0.04 percent are also shown as ‘0’. 
Source:  WHO, 2010   
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4.3 Health Care Finance and Insurance 
The Egyptian health care system is primarily financed through the government budgetary 
transfers (38 percent), and individual out-of-pocket payments (62 percent). As a share of 
the entire government budget, budgetary allocations to the health care sector in Egypt have 
seen a meager increase from 6.4 percent in 1998 to reach 7.1 percent 2008. Table 4-5 
details developments in the contribution of different financing agents to health care finance 
in Egypt during the 1995-2008 period. 
 
The private household sector (out-of-pocket expenditure) shoulders 62 percent of total 
health care finance in Egypt (including private employees). Private prepaid plans as a 
percent of private expenditure on health remain negligible, at less than 0.2 percent. What is 
worth noting, is that health care finance costs incurred by the household sector have seen a 
significant increase of 8 percentage points between 1995 and 2008. Part of this large 
increase has been attributed to the escalation of health care costs in Egypt, and increased 
demand for private sector services (Partners for Health ReformPlus, 2005: 43). Such an 
increase is judged to be relatively high in light of two important facts. Firstly, the Egyptian 
Constitution stipulates that health care in Egypt is theoretically free, or in other words falls 
under the direct responsibility of the state. Second, and as mentioned earlier, the scale of 
poverty in Egypt remains significant, with 22 percent of the population being categorized as 
poor, and 6 percent as ultra-poor (Egypt Human Development Report, 2010). Table 4-6 
provides a summary of the system of health care coverage, eligibility and financing in 
Egypt. 
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Table  4-6: Health care financing in Egypt: coverage, eligibility and benefits 
Population 
coverage/eligibility 
Benefits Main sources of 
financing 
Main providers 
Government health 
services: all citizens 
eligible for free 
subsidized care in the 
following public 
delivery systems: 
a.  MOH (central/ 
governorate 
level) 
b.  THOs 
c.  University 
hospital 
Comprehensive: primary 
preventive and curative 
care, hospital inpatient 
care, drugs, laboratory 
and diagnostic 
services, dental care, 
chronic care, referrals to 
tertiary care providers, 
and limited number of 
overseas treatment. 
a.  General revenues, 
central 
government 
budget allocated 
to MOHP (central 
and governorate). 
b.  Direct budget 
transfers from 
MOF. 
c.  Budget transfers 
from Ministry of 
Higher Education 
and user fees. 
Government primary 
health care units and 
hospitals of MOHP. 
For tertiary care, THIOs 
and university hospitals. 
Social Health Insurance 
(HIO): public and 
private employees of 
formal sector, excluding 
dependents and 
school children (infants 
under the new law). 
Comprehensive: primary 
care of GP and specialist 
services, including home 
visits, dental, drugs, 
hospital inpatient care, 
prosthesis, and 
physiotherapy. 
Employee and employer 
contributions (payroll 
tax), tobacco 
consumption tax for 
SHIP, household 
premium (LE4), co-
payments, and general 
revenues (MOF).  
HIO facilities, HIO 
contracted GPs, 
specialists, clinics and 
hospitals, including 
CCOs, MOHP, and 
private providers (CCOs 
for vocational school 
health). 
CCO patients 
a.  Employees of 
companies with 
CCO contracts  
b.  Accident cases 
c.  Private patients 
(fee for service)  
d.  Limited number 
of poor patients 
(MOH grant) 
Services limited to those 
available within the 
CCO network, which 
includes comprehensive 
curative care. 
Government grants for 
poor patients, service 
fees and contracts with 
private enterprises, and 
HIO. 
 
CCO facilities. 
Armed forces, Ministries 
of Interior and Transport 
Not available. Government budget. Military hospitals and 
facilities. 
Private sector 
Households willing to 
pay for private services. 
Variable and is 
dependent on 
individual’s ability to 
pay and availability of 
services in the provider 
market. 
Direct household out-of-
pocket payments, limited 
insurance premiums, and 
corporate contributions. 
Mainly ambulatory care 
provided by private 
physicians and clinics 
and more limited 
numbers of private/NGO 
hospitals 
Source: WHO EMRO, 2006 
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4.3.1 The health insurance system 
Social health insurance 
While the 1952 Constitution stipulates that free medical care is a basic right for all 
Egyptians, to date, the Egyptian population does not enjoy universal social health care 
insurance coverage. The publicly-managed health insurance scheme is neither 
comprehensive nor mandatory for the private sector. Social health care insurance provided 
by the state, which covers 31 million citizens, remains fragmented by beneficiaries. The 
current system of social health insurance has developed into multiple programs with 
different coverage and benefits package for various segments of the population, resulting in 
what has been described as a patchwork of coverage (World Bank, 2006:17).   
 
With a budget of LE 2.7 billion in 2009, the largest provider of government social health 
care insurance in Egypt is the HIO (HIO, 2010). Following its creation in 1964, health care 
coverage to all government employees was made mandatory, while non-mandatory 
provision of health insurance was also extended to private sector employees.
16
 The HIO 
manages a set of separate compulsory social health insurance programs for its constituency 
of formal sector workers, pensioners, widows, and schoolchildren, and for infants. The 
private sector has the option of choosing to benefit from public provision of health 
insurance under the administrative umbrella of the HIO against an annual fee charged, or to 
opt for privately managed health insurance. In 1992, Health Insurance Law number 99 
expanded the coverage of the public health insurance scheme under the general umbrella of 
the HIO to all students in their schooling years.
17
 Currently, the bulk of the population 
segment under HIO coverage (close to 80 percent) is comprised of school students and 
infants. In 1997, all newborns were also made beneficiaries of the social health insurance 
coverage.  
 
                                                 
16
 The health insurance scheme for government employees (mandatory) and permanent private sector 
employees (non-mandatory) is financed by the mandatory monthly subscription of 3% of the payroll for 
employers and 1% for employees. A nominal fee is also charged upon utilizing the service. 
17 Students’ health care coverage is financed through an annual fee of LE 12 per student, covered by the state 
budget and an annual fee of LE 4 covered by the student. A charge is also taken upon utilizing the service. 
Health care provision under the public health insurance scheme (HIO) covers all medical services provided by 
the general practitioner, all services provided by specialists including dental care, hospital care, medical 
operations and medicine. 
112 
 
Through its network of 13 regional branches, the HIO operates an extensive network of 
health care facilities for its beneficiaries, and also contracts with public and private 
providers to extend services for its beneficiaries. The HIO, therefore, functions both as a 
purchaser and a provider of health care services for its beneficiaries (World Bank, 2006:7).  
 
The copayment component under each category of social health insurance beneficiaries 
indicates that eligible public and private sector workers, pensioners and widows governed 
by Insurance Law 79 of 1975 are not subjected to any copayment requirements when it 
comes to drug costs. For government workers (civil servants) governed by Insurance Law 
32 of 1975, a copayment of 50 percent of the cost of drugs is required. For school children 
and infants governed by insurance Laws 99 of 1992 and 380 of 1997 respectively, there is a 
copayment of 33 percent on drugs (Table 4-7). 
 
The HIO maintains its own list of drugs for its beneficiaries, providing the guidelines and 
scope for prescription. This list is periodically revised to include more products as per the 
needs of patients, and based on the judgment of the Higher Drug Committee of the HIO. 
Based on the prescription written by physicians in HIO facilities, or by contracted private 
physicians, drugs are dispensed to patients either in HIO pharmacies, or in contracted 
private sector pharmacies. In 2007/08, the HIO spent some LE 656 million on drugs, 
accounting for 45 percent of the total budget (HIO, 2009).
18
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Excluding administrative overhead costs. 
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Table  4-7: Coverage and eligibility of HIO beneficiaries, 2005 
 
 
Governing Law 
 
Law 32 of 1975 
Workers 
Law 79 
of 1975 
Workers 
Law 79 of 
1975 
Pensioners 
Law 99 of 
1992 
School 
Children 
Decree 380 
of 1997 
Infants 
Beneficiaries Government  
workers 
Public 
and 
private 
sector 
workers 
Pensioners 
and widows 
Students up 
to high 
school 
Infants 
Number (millions) 3.74 3.29 1.75 16.89 9.14 
Payroll tax or annual 
premium 
     
Employee share 0.5% of salary 1% of 
salary 
1% 
pensioners; 
2% widows 
LE 4 per 
student 
LE 5 
Employer/government 
share 
1.5% of salary 3% of 
salary 
plus 1% 
for 
disability 
None LE 12 for 
government 
budget and 
cigarette tax 
 
Copayments GP visit: LE 0.05 
Specialist: LE 0.10 
Tests: <LE 1 
Drugs: 50% 
 
None None Drugs 33% Visit: LE 
0.05 
Drugs: 33% 
Source: World Bank, 2009a 
 
The uninsured segment of the population predominantly belongs to the informal sector and 
the poor, as well as many dependents of the insured workers and workers in otherwise 
formal small and medium enterprises (World Bank, 2009a).  
 
Individuals not covered by either public or private health insurance (poor and ultra-poor 
patients), health care services are mainly provided for free through MOH facilities, 
university hospitals falling under the umbrella of MOH or private charity clinics (World 
Bank, 2009a). Because services provided in MOH facilities exclude relatively expensive 
lab fees and drugs, health shocks and the associated episodes of ‘catastrophic’ expenditure 
present an alarmingly high risk of impoverishment for many Egyptian families and 
individuals.  
 
The state is also considered as the insurer of ‘last-resort, whereby the MOH manages a 
program of treatment at the expense of the state for citizens who are incapable of covering 
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their medical expenses. Eligibility is considered on a case-by-case basis. In 2008, some 1.7 
million patients benefited from free state-funded medical treatment, with a total bill of LE 
2.5 billion (CAPMAS, 2010). 
 
Private health care insurance 
The market for private health care insurance in Egypt is currently very small. As mentioned 
earlier, the share of private prepaid plans of private expenditure on health remains low at a 
meager 0.2 percent of total private expenditure on health. One of the reasons behind such a 
low share, is that the ruling regulatory environment does not provide an attractive business 
opportunity for enterprisers operating in the domain of private health insurance. Premiums 
in Egypt are heavily regulated, and are regarded to be relatively low compared to costs. 
Another key constraint to the expansion of the health care insurance business in Egypt, is 
that the governing insurance law guarantees employees the right to refuse to participate in 
co-payment mechanisms (WHO EMRO, 2006). 
 
4.3.2 The Health Sector Reform Program and establishment of the Family Health 
Fund 
In 1997, the Health Sector Reform Program (HSRP) was launched by the government, 
marking a new milestone for Egypt’s health care system.19 The key long-term objectives of 
the Program were the achievement of universal coverage of basic health services for all 
Egyptian citizens. An immediate priority objective was to target vulnerable population 
groups for health care coverage. Because of the relatively comprehensive nature of reforms 
to be undertaken, a staggered approach has been endorsed, with the eventual full 
implementation of the HSRP to be achieved in a span of 15-20 years (Partners for Health 
ReformPlus, 2005: 11-12). The Program implementation began with shifting the focus of 
health care in Egypt from excessive reliance on “vertical programs and inpatient care to a 
more integrated and less costly primary care model” (Partners for Health RefromPlus, 
2005: 3).  
 
                                                 
19
 The HSRP has been supported by several development agencies, including the World Bank, USAID, and 
the European Commission. 
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In 1999, the HSRP initiated a new primary care strategy in 26 accredited facilities, known 
as Family Health Units (FHUs). The new model included the adoption of the family health 
care model of service delivery, as well as a package of basic benefits. Cost sharing was a 
focal feature of the model. Separating health care finance from provision was also began by 
channeling government finance through a Family Health Fund (FHF), which was 
established as a nascent public insurance/payer organization, with a mandate to go into 
contractual arrangements with providers (WHO, 2006).  
 
The FHF has been piloted in five of Egypt’s 27 governorates. For utilization control, the 
FHU facilities charge nominal registration and co-payment fees (with HIO members 
currently being exempt from such fees). In 2002, and after three years of implementation, 
some 30 family health units were established, with 75,000 citizens enrolled to receive care 
in these facilities (Partners for Health ReformPlus, 2005: 4). In 2003, and as part of the 
HSRP, Ministerial Decree 147 was issued as a step towards outpatient treatment cost-
sharing at accredited MOH public health care facilities. Part of the basic health care 
benefits package, patients pay one-third of the cost of medication (as well as LE 3 per 
visit). The Decree, nonetheless, included an exemption for the ultra-poor patients who 
cannot afford (WHO, 2006). 
 
In 2005, a medium-term strategic framework for reforming the health sector in Egypt was 
unveiled by the government. The strategy has been based on a set of pillars, which included 
improving the management capacity and financing sustainability of the HIO, as well as 
expanding social health insurance coverage to all uninsured Egyptian citizens. The 
fragmented components of the health care system are also to be merged into a national 
social health insurance system over the medium term (World Bank, 2006: 24).  
 
The above review of Egypt’s heath care system yieldrd three clear results. First, and on the 
positive note, while roughly 50 percent of Egypt’s population -irrespective of income 
levels- have no access to social health insurance, free inpatient and outpatient services 
provided through the MOH facilities as well as teaching hospitals, provide a viable avenue 
to ensure access to physicians’ consultations as well as inpatient care. Surgeries are also 
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provided free of charge in these facilities. Second -and on a less positive note-, when it 
comes to meeting drug needs, patients who are not covered by social health insurance 
remain increasingly vulnerable to potential catastrophic health care expenditure associated 
with drug needs, particularly for chronic illnesses. Third, three segments of beneficiaries 
under the umbrella of social health insurance are obliged to make copayments towards the 
cost of drugs, namely government workers (civil servants), school children and infants, at 
50 percent and 33 percent of the cost of drugs respectively. For chronic illnesses, 
copayments of this nature remain to be excessively burdensome on these groups of 
beneficiaries. In Egypt, while the scope of social health insurance coverage remains 
comparable to countries with similar income levels and government budgetary constraints, 
the fact that a large segment of the population is fully exposed to the burden of out-of-
pocket payment for health care remains to be a serious policy concern. This issue is 
compounded by the anticipated increases in drug costs as a result of strengthening the 
countries IPRs regime, as well as impending changes in the pharmaceutical pricing policies 
as will be elaborated on further in the coming section.  
 
4.4 Overview of the National Drug Policy in Egypt 
In 2001, a national drug policy (NDP) was formulated and issued in Egypt, and has been 
integrated into the overall National Health Policy. To date, the NDP remains at a nascent 
stage, and still continues to develop over time, with the objective of achieving the 
dissemination of NDP strategies and concepts to the constituency of stakeholders in the 
health sector. The key components of the pharmaceutical policy in Egypt -particularly in 
terms of organization and regulation- can be summarized in the following points: list of 
essential drugs, pricing that targets the balance between equity and profitability; number of 
products on the market; drug registration; and the local pharmaceutical industry (MOH, 
2003). 
 
Egypt’s national drug policy remains to be an aspiration for a roadmap, rather than a clear 
and coherent ‘commitment to a goal and a guide for action’, expressing and prioritizing 
goals set by a government for the pharmaceutical sector, as well as identifying the main 
strategies for attaining these goals. According to the World Health Organization, a national 
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drug policy document is presented as an official government document, which covers the 
aspirations, objectives and commitments of various stakeholders. The core value of a 
national drug policy document is that it outlines the national goals and objectives for the 
pharmaceutical sector, as well as the strategies to meet these objectives. Key common 
denominators in all national drug policy documents include the objectives of ensuring 
equitable access, good quality and rational use of drugs. The various components of a 
national drug policy document are linked to these key objectives (WHO, 2001: 6-7). Table 
4-8 provides a list of the key components of standard national drug policy documents, 
indicating their relevance to the three main objectives of the policy. 
 
Table  4-8: Components of a national drug-policy linked to key policy objectives 
Components Objectives 
 Access Quality Rational 
use 
Selection of essential drugs X (X) X 
Affordability X   
Drug financing X   
Supply systems X  (X) 
Regulation and quality 
assurance 
 X X 
Rational use   X 
Research X X X 
Human resources X X X 
Monitoring and evaluation X X X 
X= direct link; (X) indirect link 
Source: WHO, 2001 
 
As the key element of Egypt’s national drug policy have been covered in the previous 
sections, the following sections will present an evaluation of the extent to which the various 
elements of Egypt’s national pharmaceutical policy -which can be captured- fulfill the 
objectives of access, quality and rational use as outlined in the table above, for all 
consumers of pharmaceuticals in Egypt. 
 
4.4.1 Essential drug list 
The concept of essential drugs is “that a limited number of carefully selected drugs based 
on agreed clinical guidelines lead to more rational prescribing, to a better supply of drugs 
and to lower costs” (WHO, 2001).  The first Essential Drug List was issued in Egypt in 
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1998, with the objective of ensuring that essential pharmaceutical products included in the 
list are available "when" and "where" they are needed. The list has also helped reduce the 
number of drugs and lower their cost for beneficiaries of social health insurance. Tendering 
drug requirements for mandatory social health insurance, helped obtain these products at 
significant discounts. The Essential Drug List has been updated in 2006, in order to comply 
with the strategy of the MOH. As mentioned earlier, beneficiaries of the social health 
insurance scheme, however, have access to medicines listed on the HIO drug list, which is 
not identical to the Essential Drug List. Similarly, the drug list for HSRP pilot sites which is 
being used for the outpatient facilities -under the umbrella of the Basic Benefits Package- is 
different from the MOH Essential Drug List (WHO, 2006).  
 
In Egypt, the majority of the population are treated with drugs prescribed by physicians 
who fall outside of the remits of the social health insurance system, and are paid for out of 
pocket. One of the key problems with the essential drug list, is that there has not been any 
effort to promote the essential drug list concept in the private sector in Egypt. The concept 
of an essential drug list in the private sector health care sphere in Egypt is totally absent. 
This fact, together with the relatively larger marketing budgets of manufacturers of 
expensive drugs, has ultimately meant that patients are more often than not prescribed 
relatively high priced drugs, in small quantities, rather than therapeutic amounts of essential 
drugs (WHO, 2001). 
 
4.4.2 Strategies to increase pharmaceutical affordability in Egypt 
One of the key challenges of any health care system is to ensure that pharmaceutical prices 
are affordable, whether in the public or private sectors. The challenge of ensuring 
affordable pharmaceutical prices is amplified due to the fact that market failure is prevalent. 
On one hand, information imbalances are caused by the patient knowing less than the 
prescribing physician or the dispensing pharmacist about the efficiency and appropriateness 
of the drug to be consumed. On the other hand, competition failure related to production 
being concentrated in the hands of a few suppliers is the ultimate outcome of market power 
being entrenched through exclusive rights related to patent protection (WHO, 2001). To 
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‘dilute’ the market failure related implications in the domain of pharmaceuticals, and in 
order to ensure affordability, prices are usually regulated by governments.  
 
In Egypt, the regulation of drug prices has been at the core of the controversy over 
industrial policy toward pharmaceuticals (Nathan Associates Inc., 1995:3). The majority of 
industrialists as well as policy makers interviewed during the course of writing this thesis 
have argued that pharmaceutical pricing policy in Egypt remains to be a key component of 
the government strategy to ensure drug affordability, thus serving a health rather than an 
industrial policy objective. The following section explores the key components of strategies 
to increase drug affordability in Egypt, including pricing policy. 
 
Pricing  
Pharmaceutical products in Egypt are priced on the basis of a cost-plus formula, in order to 
ensure both the affordability of medicine and to guarantee a positive profit on all drug 
products sold on the Egyptian market (Nathan Associates, 1995:4). Cost-plus pricing has 
been the standard pricing model in Egypt since the inception of local pharmaceutical 
manufacturing activities during the 1930s (Handoussa, 1974). The Pricing Committee of 
the Central Administration of Pharmaceutical Affairs (CAPA) of the MOH is responsible 
for price setting on the basis of reviewing the cost sheet presented by applicant firms to 
determine ex-factory prices for locally manufactured products, and importer-to-distributer 
prices for imported products.  
 
For a locally manufactured product to be priced, a pharmaceutical company submits a cost 
sheet including direct manufacturing costs, which are categorised into the cost of raw 
material inputs, packaging material, and overhead costs. Direct costs are then topped with a 
series of other indirect cost items (Table 4-9), as well as with the profit margin of the 
manufacturer to eventually reach the x-factory price. For imported products, the free-on-
board (FOB) prices which are submitted to the Pricing Committee of the CAPA, including 
the price in the country of origin presents the basis for the pricing add-ons to eventually 
reach the importer-to-distributer price (Table 4-10). The Pricing Committee is mandated to 
compare the suggested price submitted by companies with the prices of similar products of 
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competing companies, as well as against a list of international prices for raw material inputs 
(Interview, Dr. Gamila Moussa, Director, Central Pharmaceutical Affairs, March 1999).  
 
Pharmaceutical pricing does not differentiate between local products manufactured by 
subsidiaries of research-based companies with manufacturing presence in Egypt and local 
generics companies. If a product is manufactured under license in either case, then a royalty 
fee of 11.6 percent is included in the indirect cost items. The difference in the final price is, 
nonetheless, heavily impacted by the fact that subsidiaries of research-based companies 
operating in Egypt import their raw material inputs from the mother company, which means 
that this direct cost component is usually higher than for generics companies, as they are 
able to source their raw material inputs from less costly sources.  
 
The profit margin ceiling is 15 percent for essential drugs, 25 percent for non-essentials and 
40 percent or more for over the counter drugs. The cost sheet is then topped by a 
distribution mark-up (7.86 percent), pharmacists’ mark-up (25 percent) a sales tax (5 
percent of ex-factor price). The public (retail) price for local products is 45.5 percentage 
points above the ex-factory price. Once a price is set, it is rarely re-evaluated to account for 
any adjustments in cost, and has to be approved by the Prime Minister.  Prices submitted by 
companies in response to tenders either by the government or private hospitals, usually 
provide significant discounts which can go up to 50 percent of the retail price for a product.  
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Table  4-9: Pricing list of local pharmaceutical products according to Ministerial 
Decree 314 of 1991 
Raw material(s) cost 
Packaging materials cost 
Direct salaries (up-limit) 
Total direct costs 
Indirect industrial expenses 20% 
Financial & administrational expenses 30% 
Marketing expenses 15% 
Research expenses 3% 
Scientific office expenses 11.6% (in case of products under license) 
Royalty expenses 11.6% (in case of products under license) 
Total costs 
Manufacturer's profit (15% or 25 %)* 
X- Factory Price 
Payment in cash 4.5% 
Distribution expenses 7.86% 
Wholesaler Price 
Pharmacy profit 25% 
Sales taxes ** 
Medical stamps 
Retail price 
* 15 % Profit for essential drugs and 25 % profit for others ** 5 % from x- factory price 
Products indicated for treatment of chronic or life threatening diseases are exempted from sales taxes 
Source: Drug Planning and Policy Center, 2009 
 
Table  4-10: Pricing list for imported pharmaceutical products according to “Pricing 
Criteria” approved by the Minister of Health (in 30/8/1988) 
Trade name:                                                                    Dosage form: 
Importing company:                                                       Pack: 
Foreign manufacturer:                                                    FOB (or CIF) price in foreign currency: 
Exchange rate:                                                                FOB (or CIF) price in L.E. 
F.O.B Price in LE 
Cost of freight 5 % OF F.O.B price 
Insurance 1% OF FOB price 
C.I.F. Price 
Bank Charges 1% OF FOB 
Customs duties * 
Clearance charges & internal transportation 0.55% of CIF 
Total Cost / Unit 
Importer profit 6.4% 
Price of the importer to distributer 
Distributor Profit 7.53% 
Wholesaler price 
Pharmacist Profit 13.64% 
Public price before adding taxes 
Sales Taxes** 
Medical Stamps (2% of public price without taxes) 
Retail Price 
* 5 % of CIF price     ** 2 % from public price without taxes Products indicated for treatment of chronic or 
life threatening diseases are exempted from customs duties and from Sales taxes 
Source: Drug Planning and Policy Center, 2009 
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In 1991, and as part of the reform program, Ministerial Decree 314 of 1991 was issued, 
according to which pharmaceutical prices were to be reviewed bi-annually (or when 
needed) to accommodate for inflation and devaluation. While the cost-plus pricing formula 
has been meant to guarantee a positive profit on all drug products, in reality all 
manufacturing as well as importing companies have been complaining about the rigidity of 
pricing policies in the face of increasing production costs associated with inflationary 
pressures as well as currency fluctuations. In response to inflexibilities exercised by the 
regulatory authorities to revise prices to adjust to inflation and devaluation, drug 
manufactures in Egypt have managed to deal with stringent price re-evaluations by 
resorting to a process called ‘vintaging’. Vintaging means “that identical products 
introduced at different times will be sold at different prices, with the more recent ‘vintage’ 
of products being sold at a higher price” (Nathan Associates, 1995:6). 
 
Current market data indicates that the more than one-third of pharmaceutical products on 
the Egyptian market are priced at less than LE 5 (Table 4-11). 
 
Table  4-11: Price categories for all registered pharmaceutical products up to April 
2008 
Price category Percent of registered products 
Less than LE 5 34.59 
From 5-10 24.38 
From LE 10-20 16.56 
From LE 20-30 6.56 
From LE 50-100 4.96 
From LE 100-500 4.56 
From LE 30-40 4.28 
From LE 40-50 2.81 
From LE 500-1000 0.78 
From LE 1000 0.78 
Source: Bayoumi, 2008 
 
In an unprecedented move by the Minister of Health, Ministerial Decree 373 was issued in 
2009 to change pharmaceutical pricing in Egypt, ushering a storm of controversy regarding 
its impact on drug prices. Ministerial Decree 373 of 2009 stipulated a change in the cost-
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plus pricing system in Egypt. Prices for innovative products will be set at 10 percent less 
than the lowest-priced version available in 36 reference markets. The decree mandates the 
Ministry of Health to consult prices in reference markets in order to issue local prices. As 
for generics, prices are to be set at a fixed percentage markdown of innovative drugs. 
Ministerial Decree 373 provided three categories of generic drugs, as per the good 
manufacturing practices (GMP) certifications to be obtained by applicant companies. The 
first category of generics, which are to be priced at 30 percent less than their brand-name 
equivalents, includes products of companies with manufacturing facilities licensed by the 
Ministry of Health and certified by international agencies. The second category of generics 
will be priced at 40 percent lower than their brand-name equivalents. This category 
includes generics manufactured by companies with manufacturing facilities only licensed 
by the Ministry of Health. The deadline for these companies to also receive quality 
accreditation from international agencies is set for the year 2020, after which failure to 
receive accreditation will result in the closure of their manufacturing facilities. The third 
category of generics to be priced at 60 percent lower than their brand-name equivalents 
includes drugs manufactured under toll-manufacturing agreements. Toll-manufacturing is 
prolific in Egypt, whereby companies that do not have their own manufacturing facilities, 
lease production lines from other companies that are not fully utilising their manufacturing 
capacity.   
 
A legal case to stop the attempt to change pharmaceutical pricing in Egypt has been raised 
by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights. In April 2010, Egypt’s Court of 
Administrative Justice issued a ruling to suspend work under the new drug-pricing system. 
The legal case has been based on the contention that for locally manufactured generics, the 
new pricing system has been judged to unnecessarily tie drug prices in Egypt with global 
prices that do not reflect manufacturing costs in Egypt, nor accommodate for the country’s 
low income levels (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 2009).   
 
Additionally, among the key flaws of the new pricing decree, is that it does not refer in any 
way to the pricing policy when it comes to products manufactured under license by 
subsidiaries of research-based companies present in Egypt. By moving away from the cost-
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plus system, which reflects Egypt’s low cost of production manufacturing base, products 
manufactured under license by subsidiaries of research-based companies will be priced 
according to the lowest-priced version in reference countries. If research-based companies 
further centralise their manufacturing facilities -as is currently the case- in Europe and 
North America, tying up prices in Egypt to prices in these relatively high cost of production 
locations, will ultimately mean that average price levels of products manufactured under 
license by subsidiaries of research-based companies currently present in Egypt will 
increase.  
 
Tariffs and taxation 
As mentioned earlier (Chapter Three) tariff levels imposed on imports of pharmaceutical 
products in Egypt have always been relatively low. Tariff levels currently range between 2-
5 percent depending on the nature of the product (Ministry of Finance, 2005).  
 
The sales tax on pharmaceutical products stands at 5 percent of the x-factory price for local 
products and at 2 percent from public price for imported products. Local and imported 
products indicated for the treatment of chronic or life threatening diseases are exempted 
from sales taxes. 
 
Promoting competition in the multiple-source drug market, including generic 
substitution 
Using generic names is an important strategy to promote price competition between 
products manufactured by different companies in the multi-source drug market. A clear 
policy of using generic names in the public and private sectors is meant to reduce drug 
costs as well as increasing drug availability and consumer access (WHO, 2001: 34). 
Promoting the use of generic drugs can be achieved through various avenues, including the 
competitive bulk procurement using generic name for essential drug programmes, as well 
as the promotion of price competition in the private market through generic prescribing and 
generic substitution. Four key factors do influence the use of generic drugs in any particular 
market, namely supportive legislation, quality assurance capacity, acceptance by 
prescribers and the public, and economic incentives (WHO, 2001: 35).  
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Promoting competition among equal medicines from different sources through the usage of 
generic names in Egypt is practically absent in the private health care sector. Physicians 
practicing in the domain of the private health care sector in Egypt do not prescribe on the 
basis of generic names.  
 
In addition, from a legislative and regulatory stance, until the end of the study period in 
2008, no more than four identical products in terms of therapeutic value and dosage forms 
were allowed registration and marketing authorisation on the local market. The exception, 
however, was for production for export sales or for public tenders on the local market. If a 
company wishes to introduce a new product in excess of the specified limit of four, the 
suggested retail price has to be 25 percent less than that for similar competing products 
(Interview, Dr. Samia Saleh, Director, CAPA, May 2007). While the logic of such 
restriction is primarily geared towards limiting the degree of confusion a prescribing 
physician may face when having to choose between a relatively large numbers of generic 
products, such a limitation has invariably worked against promoting price competition 
between various suppliers on the Egyptian market. 
 
Because the use generic names is virtually absent in the domain of the private health care 
sector in Egypt, dispensing pharmacist do not engage in the practice of generic substitution.  
In addition to placing a limit on the number of products sharing the same therapeutic value, 
generic substitution is practicality absent in Egypt. Due to the relatively small size of 
private health care insurance schemes in Egypt, economic incentives whereby 
reimbursement in insurance schemes is based on the promotion of low-cost generic 
equivalents also remains absent.   
 
4.5 Pharmaceutical Regulatory Framework  
The main tasks of a drug regulatory authority are to ensure the quality, safety and efficacy 
of drugs and the appropriateness of product information. The core elements of drug 
regulation include quality, safety, efficacy and information (WHO, 2001).   
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The regulation of the pharmaceutical sector in Egypt currently falls under the jurisdiction of 
the MOH. Several laws, decrees and regulatory measures govern the registration, marketing 
authorisation, production, pricing, and sale of pharmaceutical products in Egypt.  
 
The Egyptian Drug Authority (EDA) is the pharmaceutical regulatory entity within the 
MOH performing the key services of license provision, registration, medical custom 
releases and pharmaceutical inspection. The EDA is the institutional umbrella for three 
bodies, namely the Central Administration for Pharmaceutical Affairs (CAPA), the 
National Organization for Drug Control and Research (NODCAR) and the National 
Organisation for Research and Control of Biologicals (NORCB). The three organizations, 
CAPA, NODCAR and NORCB cooperate in managing the registration, pricing and 
marketing authorisation of pharmaceutical products in Egypt. Administrative functions are 
undertaken by the CAPA, laboratory and bioavailability analysis are undertaken by 
NODCAR, while the safety and efficacy of all imported and domestic biologicals falls 
under the responsibility of NORCB (EDA, 2010). 
 
Licensing of pharmaceutical manufacturing establishments 
For a pharmaceutical company to commence operation in Egypt, a license has to be granted 
by the EDA, through the General Department of Pharmaceutical Licenses. The 
manufacturing site is visited by relevant committee members from EDA, to verify that that 
the factory is compliant with the requirements of WHO GMP (EDA, 2010).  
 
Registration 
For a pharmaceutical product to be registered, an application for registration is to be 
submitted to the Registration Committee of the CAPA for approval. The application 
reviewed by the Technical Committee of CAPA along with product documentation, and 
finally a sample is analysed in the labs of the NODCAR for a variety of tests which include 
physical, microbiological, and pharmacological and bioavailability, involving human 
volunteers. The requirements for the completion of the registration file for pharmaceutical 
products in Egypt differ, depending on whether the product is imported or manufactured 
locally. The set of common required documents include the full scientific file of the 
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product, including the formula, pharmacological, toxicological and clinical studies as well 
as stability data (EDA, 2010).  
 
While imported pharmaceutical products are segmented into originator products and 
generics, the registration form is the same for both. Similarly, while local products are also 
categorised as either ‘new’ (originator) or generic, the registration form for both products is 
the same.  New local products are those manufactured under license by subsidiaries of 
research-based companies with manufacturing presence in Egypt.  
 
For imported products to be registered, providing a free sales certificate for the product 
from the FDA in the USA, EMEA in Europe, JPMA in Japan or evidence that the company 
is a member of the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements 
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, is the basis on which a product may be 
approved for registration in Egypt (EDA, 2010).  
 
For local products to be registered, in addition to the standard documentations required, in 
case the product is being manufactured under licence -as with the case of any new product 
to appear on the market- the license agreement has to be submitted, as well as the free 
sales-certificate of the product in the country of origin. For registration to be completed, the 
average time-frame is four months. 
 
Marketing authorisation and number of products on the market 
The CAPA of the EDA is exclusively responsible for granting marketing authorisation for 
pharmaceutical products. Following the completion of the registration files, the length of 
time and nature of processes for granting marketing authorisation in Egypt depends on the 
nature of product being considered. On average, it takes from 5-6 months for imported 
products to obtain marketing authorisation.  For new local products, as well as for generics 
the time-span for obtaining marketing authorisation is 8 months.  
 
Procedures for granting marketing approval for an originator product include the provision 
of documentation from the Egyptian Patent Office concerning the patentability status of the 
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product. For generics, a similar document has to be obtained from the Patent Office 
indicating that the product is not under patent protection. 
 
Regarding new conditions put forward by the CAPA for granting marketing authorisation 
for generic products, the most important change which occurred following the enactment of 
the TRIPS-consistent Patent Law 82/2002, was the requirement that for any product to be 
granted marketing authorisation, a certificate from the Egyptian Patent Office has to be 
provided, clearly indicating that the product is not currently under patent protection. 
Providing a free sales certificate in one of the reference markets is the basis on which a 
generic product may be approved for registration in Egypt.  
 
From the angle of promoting competition, Egypt’s TRIPS consistent Patent Law 82 of 2002 
allowed generic manufactures to use patented inventions for the purpose of "preparing" to 
obtain marketing approval prior to patent expiration. Patent Law 82 allows generic 
companies to proceed during the period of patent protection of a product, with the 
manufacturing, assembly, use or sale, with a view to obtain a marketing license, provided 
that the marketing starts after the expiry of such a protection period.  
 
A total of 7419 registered products are currently present on the Egyptian market, of which 
82 percent are manufactured locally, and 18 percent are imported (Bayoumi, 2008). Before 
2009, no more than four identical products in terms of therapeutic value and dosage forms 
were allowed sale on the local market. The exception, however, is for production for export 
sales or for public tenders on the local market. If a company wishes to introduce a new 
product in excess of the specified limit of four, the suggested retail price has to be 25 
percent less than that for similar competing products (Interview, Dr Samia Saleh, CAPA, 
May 2007). 
 
4.6 Trends in Pharmaceutical Expenditure and Consumption 
In Egypt, total pharmaceutical expenditure (in the private retail sector) increased from LE 
1.6 billion in 1991, to LE 6.3 billion in 2004 and to LE 12.6 billion in 2008. This 
129 
 
significant increase is attributed to increased demand for health care services in Egypt, 
rather than to inflationary pressures.  
 
Public and private pharmaceutical expenditure 
According to Egypt’s NHAs, pharmaceutical expenditure (expenditure incurred at health 
care facilities as well as independent retail pharmacies) accounts for 37 percent of total 
healthcare expenditure (Table 4-12). Private out-of-pocket expenditure on pharmaceutical 
products accounts for 68 percent of total expenditure on pharmaceuticals (Partners for 
Health ReformPlus, 2005: 54). 
 
Table  4-12: Summary of pharmaceutical expenditure, 2001-02 
Summary LE Percent 
Total pharmaceutical expenditures   8,584,524,962 37% 
Total health care expenditure  23,081,139,867  
     Public pharmaceutical expenditure 2,715,134,099 32% 
     Private (households) pharmaceutical expenditure 5,869,390,864  68% 
Total pharmaceutical expenditures per capita  129   
Total expenditure on drugs at retail pharmacies  5,360,745,709  62% 
Total expenditure on drugs administered at care at health facilities 3,223,779,252  38% 
Source: Partners for Health ReformPlus, 2005 
 
The MOH is the largest public entity expending on pharmaceutical products in Egypt, 
followed by the HIO and university hospitals (Table 4-13). 
 
Table  4-13: Distribution of drug consumption 2001-02 (LE) 
 Total pharmaceutical consumption 
MOH 1,361,030,856 
HIO  701,653,559 
CCO  29,618,500 
Universities (MOHE)  511,612,787 
HIO  41,653,100 
Public firms  65,643,111 
Total public  2,711,211,979 
Total private   5,869,487,251 
Grand total 8,584,524,962 
Source: Partners for Health ReformPlus, 2005 
 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion  
The key concern of this chapter has been to review the components of the national drug 
policy in Egypt, with the objective of throwing light on the characteristics of the 
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pharmaceutical regulatory regime, as it influences relative prices on the market. This 
chapter provided the background and context against which the research question 
concerning relative price levels on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market will be addressed.  
 
This chapter also examined the pharmaceutical industry in the context of the Egyptian 
health care system and how it "interacts" with it, both from a formal perspective (covering 
the costs and purchasing of medicines by the state/health system) and from the perspective 
of patients through direct purchases outside the remit of the health system. The objective 
was to place the findings concerning relative price levels in the context of who shoulders 
the burden of pharmaceutical expenditure in Egypt. 
 
Based on a limited set of available secondary sources on health and national pharmaceutical 
policies in Egypt, among the key findings of this chapter has been that while the Egyptian 
government has been endeavoring to extend the benefits of social health insurance to the 
maximum number of beneficiaries, Egypt’s health care system remains largely inequitable, 
leaving close to half of the country’s population to be fully vulnerable to potential 
catastrophic health care expenditure.  
 
Of equal importance from a policy stance, and despite the fact that Egypt has the largest 
generic manufacturing base in the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as the 
largest consumer market, the review of the country’s health care system and pharmaceutical 
regulatory regime indicates that a clear and coherent generic policy remains to be largely 
absent.  While 68 percent of expenditure on drugs is shouldered by out-of-pocket 
expenditure, a generics policy to support alleviating such burden remains to be largely 
absent.  The exclusion of pharmaceutical products from patentability, was perhaps the most 
easy to capture component of supply-side related generic policy in Egypt. Such exclusion 
from patentability has primarily targeted supporting access to affordable drugs rather than 
supporting the pharmaceutical manufacturing base from an industrial policy perspective. 
While a 20-year period of pharmaceutical patent protection has been enforced in Egypt 
since January 2005, Bolar-kind of practices are, nonetheless, allowed under Patent Law 82 
of 2002,
 
in a clear stance of supporting generics penetrate the market once a patent 
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expires.
20
 Marketing authorization in Egypt, however, remains to be largely indifferent as 
to whether or not a product is an originator brand or a generic product, particularly from a 
timeframe perspective. In other words, generics do not follow an accelerated track for 
obtaining marketing authorisation. 
 
Supporting the penetration of generics by verture of a lax patent regime has been the most 
“easy to capture” component of generics policy in Egypt. However, if such support is not 
matched with clear policies which target iliciting increased demand for gnerics on behalf of 
prescribing physisians, insurares and  consumers, then the outcome will not be effective in 
any major way. This has been the actual case in Egypt. The retail market, which caters to 
the largest demand base, is to date operating without clear policy guidelines with regards 
generic policy. In the domain of private health care services, where the scope of the 
associated retail pharmaceutical market stands in excess of LE 13 billion, there is no formal 
policy regarding promoting generic prescription. Local generic companies have often 
complained that the relatively large marketing budgets of research-based companies -which 
are also supported by first-movers advantage in the generics market- work to their 
disadvantage as these budgets are translated into more frequent visits per physician as well 
as a larger number of free samples for giveaways, thus influencing prescribing preferences.  
 
The findings also indicate that while the share of generic pharmaceutical products listed on 
the reimbursement (positive) list of key institutional insurers such as the HIO, as well as for 
MOH tenders is larger than the share of originator products, the demand base of these two 
largest institutional consumers of medicine in Egypt remains to be relatively small 
compared to the overall market.   
 
In 2008, while generics accounted for 50 percent of Egypt’s retail market by value, generics 
substitution in pharmacies is not formally supported from a policy perspective, nor is it 
common practice in Egypt. While dispensing pharmacists in private pharmacies often 
                                                 
20 The Bolar Provision (as originated in the USA) refers to the ability of generic manufacturers to proceed 
with the necessary work, which is meant to assist in obtaining regulatory approval as well as marketing of a 
product which is still in-patent. This includes reliance on the technology used to manufacture the innovator 
brand. The Bolar Provision allows generic companies to immediately launch their products once the patent on 
the concerned product expires.  
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propose alternatives to products which may not be available, this practice is rarely 
exercised in a systemic method to relieve patients from paying higher prices for 
originator/brand-name drugs by proposing generic substitutes.  
 
Limiting the number of identical products in terms of therapeutic value and dosage forms to 
four, is also one of the key limitations of the regulatory regime as it negatively impacts on 
increased competition.  
 
With regards requirements for co-payments towards the cost of drugs for the three largest 
groups of beneficiaries under the umbrella of social health insurance, differential co-
payments to promote generic drugs remain to be absent. In other words, generics do not 
attract lower copayments compared to the branded version of the same medicine. 
 
This chapter provided the necessary context against which the research question concerning 
relative price levels on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market can be addressed. Chapter Six will 
examine in more detail, and based on real market data, the nature of price competition 
between various products on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market and the extent to which 
consumers (patients) have been able to capitalize fully on the cost advantage of having 
access to a large generics medicine manufacturing base.  
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5. HAVE MECHANISMS USED TO PROTECT AND REGULATE THE EGYPTIAN 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we provide an answer to the research question concerning the extent to 
which mechanisms used to protect and regulate the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry have 
been associated with productivity growth will be undertakne.  
 
In order to provide an answer to this question, and after having reviewed the nature of 
regulatory protectionism in Egypt -as detailed in the two previous chapters- total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth in Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry during the period 
1993-2005 will be estimated. The non-parametric, frontier methodology known as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) to obtain the Malmquist productivity index at the firm-level 
for a representative sample of firms operating in the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry will 
be relied upon. The results provided insight to identify the best-practice firm and the 
laggard firm in the three aspects of: efficiency change, technical change and TFP growth. 
Efficiency change, technical change and TFP growth are the qualitative productivity 
improvements needed to achieve long-term economic growth. 
 
Empirical results indicated that the best-practice firm in terms of TFP change belonged to 
the private sector, while the laggard firm belonged to the state-owned public business 
sector. No differences of significance exist between the performance of private sector and 
state-owned generics companies. Additionally, state-owned companies which have been 
subject to partial privatization did not exhibit higher levels of TFP change compared to 
those which remained under full state-ownership. Empirical results also indicated that mean 
TFP change for the sample firms throughout the study period (1.01) exceeded the mean 
TFP change for all Egyptian industries (0.75), and that there was evident disassociation or 
week correlation -at best- between productivity growth and the degree of export orientation.  
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents the methodology to estimate TFP 
growth in Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry. Section 5.3 presents the empirical 
results, while section 5.4 summarises the key findings and presents the concluding remarks. 
 
5.2 Research Methodology 
Research that has relied on longitudinal microdata has traditionally been divided into two 
key groups. The first group has been concerned with documenting and describing 
productivity, while the second has been concerned with examining the factors behind 
productivity growth. The first group endeavoured to document the cross-sectional 
distribution of productivity and the evolution of productivity growth. This faction of 
empirical work has presented useful stylized facts regarding the dispersion of productivity 
"across firms and establishments, productivity differentials and the consequences of entry 
and exit and the importance of changes in the resource allocation across firms to aggregated 
productivity growth" (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). It is to this strand of the literature that 
this thesis is aligned. The second strand of the literature documented the correlation 
between productivity and variables believed to influence it. The more analytical faction of 
the literature takes a step further to answer the relatively more difficult yet highly important 
question of causality (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). 
 
5.2.1 Estimation of TFP growth using non-parametric productivity measurements 
Methods to estimate TFP growth on an economy-wide level fall in two key classes. The 
first is growth accounting which has been the standard measurement approach since Solow 
(1957). In this case, measurement relies on accounting for the contribution of growth in 
factor inputs to the growth of output. The residual part of output growth, which cannot be 
accounted for by inputs, is TFP growth (Krüger, 2003(. The conventional approach based 
on the Solow residual method has four basic assumptions 1) that the form of the production 
function is known; 2) constant returns to scale exist; 3) firms exhibit optimizing behaviour, 
with no room for inefficiencies and 4) that there is neutral technical change. Once these 
assumptions do not hold, measurements of TFP will become biased (Coelli et al., 1998; 
Arcelus and Arocena, 2000). The second method measures TFP growth by estimating 
frontier production functions "and then derive productivity changes from both the changes 
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in inputs and outputs …. and the shifts of the frontier function” (Krüger, 2003(. These are 
basically the two techniques to measuring TFP growth. Details regarding the advantages of 
each methodology is covered in more detail in Mahadevan (2004).  
 
Within the second strand, two conceptually different methods exist. In the first case, the 
estimation of the frontier function can be done using parametric methods for the stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). The advantage of this method is being able to deal with 
measurement errors. However, it requires the specification of the functional form of the 
production function. In addition, specific distributional assumptions are necessary for the 
separation of the distance to the frontier from measurement error (Krüger, 2003). "The 
primary shortcomings of parametric frontier estimation techniques are the need to use 
predetermined functional forms (e.g. Cobb-Douglas, translog, transcendental etc.) and their 
reliance on pre-specified types of error distribution. In the second case, a non-parametric 
estimator is a robust estimator that allows the data to determine the shape of the functional 
form without any constraints derived from relevant economic theory. The advantage of 
nonparametric estimators is that they do not possess the same limitation as parametric 
frontier estimation techniques because they do not rely on these same strict assumptions. 
Among the commonly used non-parametric methods is the DEA" (Haghiri et al, 2004, p. 
1235). The development of DEA is attributed to Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). What 
DEA does, is that it analyses the inputs and outputs of products/services providers -termed 
decision-making units- (DMU), and assesses their overall efficiency (Nyhan and Martin, 
1999).  
 
This thesis uses a non-parametric, frontier methodology known as DEA to obtain the 
Malmquist productivity index at the firm-level for a sample of firms operating in the 
Egyptian pharmaceutical industry. The study period extends between 1993 and 2005. The 
results will provide insight to identify the best-practice firm and the laggard firm in the 
three aspects of: efficiency change, technical change and TFP growth. Efficiency change, 
technical change and TFP growth are the qualitative productivity improvements needed to 
achieve long-term economic growth. 
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DEA is a special application of linear programming, and has become an important and 
much used tool in conducting provider/manufacturer comparisons. The technique of DEA 
to measure firm-level performance is useful for the comparative evaluation of firm-level 
efficiency and has been extensively used in the literature (Ahuja and Majumdar, 1998). 
DEA has been used to make provider comparisons in schools (Callen, 1991; Chalos and 
Cherian, 1995), to compare human services agencies (Ozcan and Cotter, 1994), court 
systems (Lewin, Morey and Cook, 1982) as well as the quality of health care providers 
(Capettini, Dittman and Morey, 1985). By making such comparisons, the expectation is that 
the best-practice manufacturers can be identified and then used as the benchmarks for 
improving the efficiency and quality of similar activities (Nyhan and Martin, 1999: 349). 
Within the framework of DEA, the location of the frontier relative to each of the observed 
firms/providers is constructed as an artificial benchmark firm. This benchmark is the linear 
combination of efficient firms in a possibly different sample (Berg, Førsund and Jansen, 
1992: S218). 
 
While both efficiency change as well as technical change will be examined, emphasis will 
be placed on TFP. It is important to note that TFP is evaluated to be theoretically superior 
as an indicator of technical efficiency than any other partial factor measure of productivity 
including labour productivity, because it measures the productivity of all inputs used in the 
production process jointly (Keay, 2000).  
 
5.2.2 Advantage of using DEA 
The advantage of using DEA is that it provides significant flexibilities in terms of data 
selection. Inputs and outputs can be continuous, ordinal or categorical variables, and can be 
measured in different units of analysis such as dollars, score tests, hiring rates or units of 
output. Output within the context of DEA can be broadly interpreted to include not only 
output performance measures, but also quality performance measures and outcome 
performance measures. Similarly, the term efficiency can be interpreted to include not only 
the assessment of efficiency, but also an assessment of both quality and effectiveness. In 
other words, outcome. DEA can, therefore, make assessments of efficiency, quality, 
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effectiveness or any combination thereof. DEA has three key advantages over simple ratio 
analysis as well as regression analysis:  
“First, DEA assigns mathematically optimal weights to all inputs and 
outputs being considered, whereas ratio analysis and regression 
analysis rely on the preferences of policymakers and policy 
evaluations in the assigning of weights. Because DEA is a non-
parametric technique, no need exists for the a priori assignment of 
weights. …Second, DEA can make simultaneous comparisons of 
multiple dependent performance measures (output, quality, and 
outcome) and can provide a scalar measure of best overall practice, a 
feature that neither simple ratio analysis nor regression analysis can 
duplicate. …. Thirdly. DEA can calculate the amount of resources that 
can be saved or, conversely, the amount of additional output, quality, 
or outcome that can be produced for any provider found to be 
inefficient” (Nyhan and Martin, 1999:354-355). 
 
In the case of the nonparametric approach of DEA, the deviation of observations from the 
frontier function is taken as a result of inefficiency. Measurement error is neglected and 
results are made more sensitive to outliers. Using linear programming methods, the 
advantage of DEA (against SFA) is that the frontier function is determined without any 
functional or distributional assumptions. "DEA is a local method in that it calculates the 
distance to frontier function through a direct comparison with only those observed in the 
sample that are most similar to the observations for which the inefficiency is to be 
determined" (Krüger, 2003: 267)  
 
5.2.3 Limitations of DEA 
To begin with, DEA is not a ‘panacea’ for making service/manufacturer provider 
comparisons as technical as well as practical limitations exist. The mathematical 
complexity of DEA represents one of the hurdles that need to be overcome, as it may turn 
out to be too technical for practical usage. DEA specific software applications have helped 
to ‘deemphasize’ the mathematics of the analysis, while at the same time increasing the 
conceptual understanding and practical value as a decision-making tool for policy makers 
as well as policy evaluators. By virtue of being a nonparametric technique, DEA has no 
statistical indicators to measure error (noise) as does regression. In general, nonparametric 
techniques are not appropriate for hypothesis testing. In light of such limitations, 
researchers using DEA must be well grounded in their data. The number of providers to be 
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included in a DEA is also one of the important technical considerations. There is a need for 
between 4 and 15 observations for each independent variable included in a regression for 
DEA. Studies which use small numbers of decision making unites (DMUs) may risk being 
potentially biased, whereas studies using large numbers of DMUs do add to the robustness 
of the DEA solutions. An important note, which also needs to be taken into considerations, 
is that because DEA uses relative comparisons, it is possible that all DMUs in a study could 
be inefficient, but with some being relatively less inefficient. Another important 
consideration is related to the number of input and performance variables included in a 
DEA. Using large numbers of input and performance variables in an “exploratory data 
analysis” approach may be considered as methodologically unsound. Parsimonious 
numbers of input and performance variables tend to actually have greater explanatory 
value. One of the characteristics of DEA is that as more input and performance variables 
are included in the analysis, the proportion of efficient or best practice firms tends to 
increase (Nyhan and Martin, 1999:360-361).  
 
An important consideration is also related to one potentially significant issue ignored in the 
application of the Malmquist productivity index, which is related to the possibility that 
changes in technical efficiency may be partially explained by changes in the utilization of 
production capacity (De Borger and Kerstens, 2000: 304). 
 
5.2.4 The Malmquist Index 
Regardless of the methods used to calculate distances, growth of TFP is then quantified by 
the Malmquist index. DEA generates an efficiency score for each DMU, relative to a 
reference technology based on the sample of efficient firms. In order to identify 
productivity growth in a firm between two time periods, the Malmquist productivity index 
is used. The Malmquist index has been introduced by Malmquist (1953) in a consumption 
context and by Caves et al. (1982) as a productivity index, and has been extensively 
referred to in the literature (Krüger, 2003: 267). The Malmquist productivity index is 
defined as a ratio of distance functions. Fare et al. (1995) developed a straightforward 
computational procedure to calculate the index relative to nonparametric frontier 
technologies by means of using the inverse relationship between output distance functions 
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and output-oriented technical efficiency measures. Fare et al. (1995) also demonstrated that 
the Malmquist productivity index can be decomposed into technical efficiency changes and 
technological shifts (De Borger and Kerstens, 2000: 303).  
 
The Malmquist index remains to be a valuable tool in terms of allowing for the 
decomposition of productivity into two important components, namely innovation and 
imitation. The first component which is innovation, is also called technological change, and 
it captures any expansion of the production possibilities frontier. The second component, 
which is called imitation, captures the convergence of firms in the direction of the existing 
technology. This phenomenon is called efficiency change or “catching up” (Alam, 2001). 
 
The following section presents the essential of procedures to obtain the Malmquist index of 
TFP growth, as detailed in Krüger (2003). 
 
Essentials of the procedures to obtain the Malmquist Index of TFP 
The Malmquist index of TFP growth M between period t and period t+1 is stated as 
follows:  
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The two inputs (in the case of this thesis there are three inputs) capital K and labour L of 
firm h (h=1, …,n) in period t are contained in the input vector xth  = (Kht
, 
Lht)' and the sector 
wide output Y is replicated Y
t
h =( Yht). The Malmquist index is the geometric mean of two 
ratios of distance functions of the type 
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this gives the reciprocal of the maximum augmentation of output in period q that is needed 
to reach the boundary point of the technology set 
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p
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h ≥ 0, h= 1,…, n)  (3) 
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in period p. The Malmquist index will then indicate positive (negative) TFP growth 
between period t and t+1 if it is larger (smaller) than 1.   
 
The Malmquist index can be decomposed into two factors of importance                         1/2 
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In which the first factor EF denotes the change in productive efficiency between period t 
and t+1, while the second factor TP denotes the rate of technological change (Krüger, 
2003).
 
 
Using real data, the application of the above theoretical device for inputs and output a 
method for the quantification of the various distance functions (2) is required. Such 
calculations are performed by solving the linear programming problems of DEA. In this 
chapter the output-oriented envelopment for firm h (assuming constant returns to scale) 
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and then setting D
p
h  ( x
q
h ,
y
q
h ) =
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1
h for all (p,q) Є {(t,t), (t,t+1),(t+1,t), (t+1,t+1)}. 
 
According to this procedure, the input-output combinations each firm in period q is 
compared to the piece-wise linear frontier production function which consists of the input-
output combinations of the most productive firms in period q. The maximization increases 

h . Each firm in period q is compared to a point on the frontier function that is constructed 
by the λ-weighted linear combination on the inputs and outputs of the all firms in period p, 
whereby only the firms that are most similar to h are assigned a positive value to λ (Krüger, 
2003(. 
 
The software DEAP, which has been developed by Coelli (1996), has been used to compute 
the indices. 
 
5.2.5 Data Sources  
Data needed for the application of the Malmquist-DEA procedure was obtained directly 
from the sample firms for the period 1993-2005. Three inputs have been used, namely 
labour, intermediate inputs and capital. Labour input has been quantified by the number of 
workers. Intermediate inputs included raw material (local+ imported), packaging material, 
gas, electricity and spare parts. Capital input is based on the value of the capital stock. As to 
the output variable, output value (in current prices) for each firm was used. 
 
Several price indices have been resorted to in order to deflate output, intermediate inputs 
and capital stock values. The investment deflator has been obtained from the Ministry of 
Planning, and has been used to deflate the value of the capital stock. The various 
components of the wholesale price index (WPI) have been relied on to deflate intermediate 
input values. The consumer price index (CPI) has been used to deflate output values 
(Annexes 5, 6 and 7).  
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Sample companies 
Initially, all companies which have started production during the first year of the study 
period or earlier have been approached for inclusion in the sample. However, some 
companies chose not to cooperate, whereby a total of 13 companies out of the pool of 16 
generic companies which were operative throughout the study period were included in the 
sample (see Annex 8 for a full list of companies in Egypt and first year in operation). The 
main reason for not including companies which began actual production after 1993 was that 
there was a need for having continuous availability of data for a common sample. The 
approach to sample selection has been based on nonprobability sampling. Nonprobability 
sampling which is based on “convenience”, whereby cases are being selected based on their 
availability for the study. A limitation of nonprobability samples is, however, that there is 
an element of uncertainty when the sample is used to represent the population. As such the 
selection procedure does not provide rules or methods to infer sample results to the 
population in contrast to probability sampling (Henry, 1990). Nonprobability sampling was, 
nonetheless, the only method to obtain data in the situation of this thesis. Moreover, the fact 
that 13 out of the total of 16 companies (the whole population of companies which began 
actual production during the early 1990s) reduced the level of uncertainty and bias. 
 
Of the 13 generics pharmaceutical companies subject to study, 8 companies are majority 
owned by the state, of which 5 have been subject to partial privatization under the umbrella 
of the 1991 ERSAP. A few of these state-owned companies exhibit higher exports-to-
output ratios compared to the others. Hence for this group of companies, productivity 
trends can be linked to their privatization status, as well as to export performance.  
 
Locally owned private sector companies also reflect a set of differences. Some companies 
are of older age in terms of years of operation. In addition, some of the sample companies 
export as much as 15 percent of total output, while others export as little as three percent. 
 
EIPICO holds the largest share of the pharmaceutical market, which stood at 9.4 percent in 
2008, while PHARCO is the lead firm in terms of exports as a percent of output value at 
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14.7 percent. Only one of the private sector companies, namely SEDICO, has a large 
foreign equity share which stands at 34 percent of issued capital (GAFI, 2009). 
 
Table  5-1: Sample characteristics 
Company 
name 
Establishment 
Date 
Production Issued 
Capital 
LE '000 
Ownership Market Share 
2008 
(by value) 
% 
Exports % 
of 
 output 
2006 
% Misr 1937 n.a. n.a. Public sector 1.3 14.6 
Memphis 1940 n.a. n.a. Public sector 
40 percent of 
total stocks 
privatized 
2.0 8.5 
CID 1950 n.a. n.a. Public sector 2.5 3.0 
Alex 1963 n.a. n.a. Public sector 
40 percent of 
total stocks 
privatized 
1.3 7.7 
Kahira 1963 n.a. n.a. Public sector 
40 percent of
total stocks 
privatized 
3.6 12.0 
Nile 1963 n.a. n.a. Public sector 
33.3 percent of
the total stocks 
privatized 
2.4 8.6 
ADCO 1964 n.a. n.a. Public se tor
40 percent of
total stocks 
privatized 
1.5 5.7 
Nasr 1964 n.a. n.a. Public sector 0.4 8.5 
EIPICO 1981 1985 n.a. Private 9.4 14.5 
PHARCO 1982 1987 511,111 Private 7.9 14.7 
SEDICO 1983 1991 223,768 Private 2.6 12.6 
Amirya 1984 1988 216,111 Private 2.6 7.4 
MUP 1984 1989 313,387 Private 7.3 7.3 
Sources: Drug Holding Company, 1992a; General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, 2009; IMS 
Health, 2009; Handoussa, 1974 
 
In 2008, and based on IMS data, the 13 sample companies were among the largest players 
on the local market, having accounted for 62 percent of the generics market in Egypt by 
volume and 45 percent by value (Table 5-2). 
 
Apart from differences related to the date of establishment, ownership structure, market 
shares, export-to-output ratios and installed productive capacity, all of the sample 
companies are considered to be highly similar in light of the fact that they engage in generic 
formulation activities. Like all generic companies in Egypt, no pharmaceutical R&D 
activities are undertaken by the sample companies.  
 
Annex Table 9 provides the full data which portrays relative output levels of the sample 
companies, size of the workforce and capital stock during the study period. 
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Table  5-2: Market share of the 13 sample companies 2004-2008 
 Units (‘000) LE Sales (‘000) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total pharmaceutical market 873,498 1,013,349 1,105,487 1,209,421 1,323,496 6,279,026 7,864,763 9,319,250 10,954,963 12,565,859 
Generics market 650,367  786,654  867,524  953,950  1,043,137  4,079,421  5,331,087  6,322,684  7,546,539  8,686,921  
Public sector sample companies share of the generics market (%) 
     ADCO  3.0 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 
     ALEX  3.5 3.5 3.3 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.5 1.3 
     CID  6.9 6.5 5.8 5.7 5.3 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.8 2.5 
     KAHIRA  6.0 5.1 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.6 
     MEMPHIS  4.2 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 
     MISR  4.4 3.8 3.3 2.8 2.7 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 
     NASR  1.5 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 
     NILE  5.1 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4 
Private sector sample companies share of the generics market (%) 
     AMRIYA  6.6 5.9 3.4 3.3 3.9 5.5 4.7 2.5 2.3 2.6 
     EIPICO  10.9 12.2 14.1 13.6 13.0 8.2 8.9 10.0 9.7 9.4 
     MUP  8.2 7.9 7.6 7.8 8.1 8.9 8.3 7.8 7.6 7.3 
     PHARCO  11.5 11.3 11.2 11.0 11.3 8.8 8.6 8.4 7.9 7.9 
     SEDICO  2.8 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.1 3.9 3.2 3.5 3.5 2.6 
Sample % generics market 74.4 70.4 66.5 63.5 61.6 58.3 54.3 50.4 47.4 44.6 
Source: IMS, 2009 
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The estimation of productivity for the sample companies will allow for several layers of 
analysis. With regards ownership, the estimation of productivity growth of firms in the 
public sector versus the private sector will be conducted. In addition, the estimation of 
productivity growth exhibited by public sector firms subject to partial privatization, versus 
firms which remained under full state ownership will also be undertaken. The productivity 
of all local firms in the public and private sector will also be estimated against the criteria 
of output-to-export ratios.  
 
5.3 Empirical Results  
This section summarizes the results which have been obtained through DEA by calculating 
the required distances functions using the DEAP programme developed by Coelli (1996). 
For the ith firm, four distance functions to measure the TFP change between two periods 
has been calculated. This required solving four linear programming (LP) problems (four for 
each firm of the sample).The pool of data required for the calculation of the MPI has been 
detailed earlier in this chapter.  
 
Looking at the empirical results, an index of one represents no change in productivity 
growth from the previous to the current period. In any year, an index of 0.90 represents a 
decline of 10 percent in productivity growth, while an index of 1.01 would represent an 
increase of one percent in productivity growth. 
 
5.3.1 Time series technical efficiency change (catching-up) 
Table 5-3 presents the scores for average efficiency change for all sample firms during the 
13-year study period. The years 1995 and 2000 recorded the largest effects on efficiency 
change. The Malmquist index summary of annual means indicated positive technical 
efficiency change (relative to constant returns to scale) in 7 out of the 13-year study period. 
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Table  5-3: Malmquist index summary of annual means 
year Technical 
efficiency 
change 
(relative to a 
CRS 
technology) 
Technological 
change 
Pure technical 
efficiency 
change 
(relative to 
VRS 
technology) 
Scale 
efficiency 
change 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
Change 
1994 0.693 1.544 0.821 0.844 1.071 
1995 1.426 0.743 1.267 1.126 1.060 
1996 1.036 0.911 1.004 1.032 0.944 
1997 1.018 1.007 1.016 1.003 1.026 
1998 0.963 1.037 0.982 0.981 0.999 
1999 1.028 0.985 0.995 1.033 1.012 
2000 1.046 0.958 1.046 1.000 1.002 
2001 1.017 0.978 1.023 0.994 0.995 
2002 0.995 0.983 0.977 1.018 0.978 
2003 1.025 0.977 1.014 1.011 1.001 
2004 0.950 1.009 0.957 0.993 0.959 
2005 0.962 1.101 0.976 0.986 1.059 
mean 1.002 1.006 1.002 1.000 1.008 
 
5.3.2 Time series technological efficiency change (innovation) 
Empirical evidence indicated that for the sample firms, there has been limited scope for 
innovation. Table 5-3 indicates that the highest scores for technological change occurred in 
1994, in 1998, and then as late as 2005.  Most of the private sector sample firms have 
commenced actual production during the late 1980s, with the early years of the 1990s 
witnessing the expansion in their productive capacity. During the second half of the 1990s, 
and particularly with the uncertainty associated with what was judged to be a relatively 
detrimental impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the future of the local generics industry, 
most of the private sector companies in Egypt were in a situation which entailed 
conservative investments in new state-of-the art capital goods. In addition, during the 
second half of the 1990s and up to January 2003, Egypt has been facing significant foreign 
exchange shortages, which has hampered the ability of local companies to import and 
deploy new generations of technology.  
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Local generics companies have also been particularly sensitive to exchange rate 
fluctuations, as they import close to 90 percent of their intermediate raw material inputs, 
and have been rarely able to accommodate exchange rate movements in terms of price 
adjustments. It was largely argued within industry circles that the implications for 
profitability levels have been significant, which in turn affected the ability to modernize 
their capital stock as well as to invest in state of the art generations of technology necessary 
to impact positively on technological efficiency change.  
 
Because public business sector companies account for the largest number of firms in the 
sample of companies, results are likely to be sensitive to the overall performance of these 
companies. On the technological efficiency front, public business sector companies have 
been facing serious profitability problems (in association with pricing) and have not been 
able to invest appropriately in technological upgrading. CID, Al-Kahira and Misr have been 
judged to be technically incapable of surviving with the deteriorating condition of their 
capital stock (Interview, Dr. Galal Ghorab, Director, Drug Holding Company, April, 2004). 
For example, and as mentioned earlier, regular inspections conducted by the Ministry of 
Health (in 1999 and 2000) cautioned that the manufacturing facilities of the Arab Drug 
Company (ADCO) were in dire need for rehabilitation, otherwise the companies facilities 
would be subjected to closure. The reason is that some of ADCO’s machinery, which date 
back to 1963, were still in operation. Foreign licensors have been threatening ADCO in 
particular to withdraw their licenses, unless the rehabilitation and modernization of the 
company’s manufacturing facilities were to be addressed (ADCO, 2003). 
 
5.3.3 Time series TFP change 
Table 5-3 also indicates that during the study period, mean TFP change for the entire 
sample of firms was relatively favourable in terms of exceeding the threshold of an index of 
1. This is particularly true if compared to the overall performance of Egyptian 
manufacturing industries (Annex Table 10). Mean TFP change throughout the study period 
(1.01) exceeded mean TFP change for all Egyptian industries (0.75) during the period 
1980/80-2000/01 (Galal, Ahmed and El-Megharbel, 2005). Taking into consideration that 
this industry has been thriving behind significant regulatory non-tariff barriers, TFP change 
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has been generally positive, with only 5 out of the 13-year study period registering 
productivity regress.  
 
5.3.4 Firm-level technical efficiency change 
One important observation concerning firm-level technical efficiency change (Table 5-4) is 
that three of the private sector companies, namely Amriya, PHARCO and MUP have 
experienced no change in technical efficiency during much of the study period. The three 
firms are in fact among the oldest in terms of year of establishment and also among the key 
players on the market by virtue of market shares. The remaining two private sector 
companies in the sample -EIPICO and SEDICO- have experienced fluctuations in technical 
efficiency change, with a non-consistent pattern moving from the positive to the negative 
throughout the study period. Public business sector companies have also shared the same 
pattern.  
 
Table  5-4: Firm level technical efficiency change (relative to a CRS technology) 
  94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 
ADCO* 0.69
4  
1.44
6  
1.11
8  
1.04
3  
0.95
5  
0.91
1  
1.29
5  
1.07
7  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
0.91
4  
0.88
1  
Alex* 0.63
7  
1.38
5  
1.04
9  
1.09
0  
0.96
8  
0.98
8  
1.08
3  
1.03
8  
0.97
1  
1.08
3  
0.84
4  
0.92
1  
Amirya 0.76
1  
1.31
4  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
CID* 0.47
5  
1.98
2  
1.03
2  
1.03
7  
1.02
0  
1.08
5  
1.15
4  
1.00
0  
0.99
6  
0.90
3  
0.94
8  
0.83
1  
EIPICO 1.00
0  
1.00
0  
0.98
0  
1.00
3  
0.89
7  
1.12
7  
0.86
6  
0.96
0  
1.09
1  
1.04
8  
1.05
9  
0.93
7  
Kahira* 0.77
1  
1.39
1  
1.01
6  
1.02
9  
0.89
6  
0.97
9  
1.03
9  
0.99
7  
0.97
5  
1.05
3  
0.98
7  
0.87
9  
Memphi
s  
0.55
2  
1.63
8  
0.99
7  
1.15
3  
0.97
2  
1.04
6  
1.01
9  
0.97
3  
1.05
3  
1.03
2  
0.87
0  
0.97
4  
Misr* 0.59
1  
1.59
3  
1.15
3  
1.11
9  
0.97
3  
0.97
7  
1.29
6  
0.99
5  
1.01
5  
0.92
0  
1.06
3  
0.97
0  
MUP 1.05
6  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
Nasr* 0.39
2  
3.06
9  
1.14
9  
0.79
8  
0.80
0  
1.21
1  
0.98
5  
1.23
6  
0.92
9  
1.02
6  
0.98
7  
0.96
4  
Nile*  0.51
8  
1.72
9  
1.04
6  
1.02
3  
1.03
3  
1.04
2  
0.99
2  
1.04
9  
0.93
4  
1.13
4  
0.74
0  
1.26
4  
PHARC
O 
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
1.00
0  
SEDIC
O 
0.99
2  
1.00
8  
0.95
1  
0.98
8  
1.03
5  
1.02
9  
0.95
8  
0.92
4  
0.97
9  
1.15
4  
1.00
0  
0.94
7  
Mean 0.69
3  
1.42
6  
1.03
6  
1.01
8  
0.96
3  
1.02
8  
1.04
6  
1.01
7  
0.99
5  
1.02
5  
0.95
0  
0.96
2  
* Public Business Sector Companies 
 
5.3.5 Firm level Technological change 
Table 5-5 indicates that 1994 and 1998 have been two years of significance for 
technological change for all sample firms. MUP has been the lead firm in terms of 
consistency in positive technological change in 9 of the 13-year study period (see Table 5-
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8). There are no significant differences between public and private sector firms in terms of 
achievements on the technological change front. Overall, the results indicate a weaker 
performance on the innovation front by all companies in the sample. 
 
Table  5-5: Firm level technological change 
 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 
ADCO 1.63
1  
0.63
5  
0.89
0  
1.02
0  
1.04
4  
1.00
4  
0.81
1  
1.01
9  
0.98
2  
0.98
5  
1.02
3  
1.16
2  
Alex 1.59
0  
0.73
0  
0.88
0  
0.99
6  
1.02
9  
0.99
9  
0.98
4  
0.90
4  
1.02
0  
0.97
7  
1.01
7  
1.13
9  
Amriya 1.51
1  
0.80
1  
0.95
2  
0.96
7  
1.05
6  
0.98
0  
1.07
9  
1.05
1  
0.94
9  
0.91
8  
1.02
4  
0.89
3  
CID 1.97
4  
0.59
8  
0.87
4  
0.99
5  
1.03
6  
0.99
9  
0.93
6  
0.97
6  
0.99
9  
0.98
6  
1.04
0  
1.14
8  
EIPICO 1.56
9  
0.77
9  
0.81
8  
1.03
9  
1.06
1  
1.00
2  
1.02
1  
0.94
9  
1.00
0  
0.94
1  
0.96
0  
1.15
2  
Kahira 1.41
7  
0.72
3  
0.89
4  
1.02
9  
1.05
4  
1.00
2  
0.98
5  
0.96
1  
0.99
2  
0.97
0  
1.02
6  
1.10
4  
Memphi
s 
1.93
1  
0.64
4  
0.92
0  
0.95
2  
1.00
3  
0.99
3  
1.01
4  
1.00
4  
0.95
0  
0.95
1  
1.03
0  
1.05
7  
Misr 1.82
7  
0.58
4  
0.87
9  
1.00
5  
1.03
9  
1.00
1  
0.96
5  
0.96
2  
1.00
1  
0.96
1  
1.02
8  
1.11
6  
MUP 1.22
3  
1.13
8  
1.07
0  
1.06
8  
1.02
0  
0.86
7  
1.06
4  
0.98
4  
1.03
4  
1.03
9  
0.87
4  
1.27
9  
Nasr 1.84
3  
0.64
4  
1.04
2  
0.96
0  
1.00
1  
0.99
1  
1.03
6  
1.10
6  
0.92
8  
0.93
9  
1.04
7  
0.99
0  
Nile 1.68
5  
0.58
7  
0.87
7  
0.97
1  
1.01
2  
0.99
6  
0.99
9  
0.96
8  
0.98
1  
0.95
5  
1.00
5  
0.98
4  
PHARC
O 
1.08
9  
1.10
6  
0.77
8  
1.03
8  
1.10
0  
1.01
5  
0.63
0  
0.91
2  
0.95
4  
1.18
6  
1.15
1  
1.21
2  
SEDIC
O 
1.13
0  
0.94
5  
1.02
1  
1.06
6  
1.03
4  
0.96
1  
1.04
2  
0.94
1  
1.00
0  
0.92
1  
0.91
6  
1.13
5  
mean 1.54
4  
0.74
3  
0.91
1  
1.00
7  
1.03
7  
0.98
5  
0.95
8  
0.97
8  
0.98
3  
0.97
7  
1.00
9  
1.10
1   
5.3.6 Firm level TFP Change 
Table 5-6 indicates that MUP emerged as the best practice firm in terms of positive TFP 
change. No difference of significance mark TFP change between public and private sector 
firms. TFP change exhibited by public business sector firms which have been subject to 
partial privatization did not differ much from those which remained under full state 
ownership. In fact Misr, which is under full state ownership, achieved consistently positive 
TFP change compared to an all other of the public business sector companies. Foreign 
participation in equity (SEDICO) did not seem to have had an impact of significance on 
TFP change.  
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Table  5-6: Firm level TFP change 
 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 200
1 
02 03 04 05 
ADCO 1.13
2 
0.91
7 
0.99
6 
1.06
4 
0.99
7 
0.91
5 
1.05
1 
1.09
8 
0.98
2 
0.98
5 
0.93
5 
1.02
4 
Alex 1.01
2 
1.01
1 
0.92
2 
1.08
6 
0.99
7 
0.98
6 
1.06
5 
0.93
9 
0.99 1.05
8 
0.85
9 
1.04
9 
Amirya 1.15 1.05
3 
0.95
2 
0.96
7 
1.05
6 
0.98 1.07
9 
1.05
1 
0.94
9 
0.91
8 
1.02
4 
0.89
3 
CID 0.93
7 
1.18
6 
0.90
2 
1.03
3 
1.05
6 
1.08
4 
1.08 0.97
6 
0.99
5 
0.89 0.98
6 
0.95
5 
EIPICO 1.56
9 
0.77
9 
0.80
2 
1.04
1 
0.95
2 
1.12
9 
0.88
5 
0.91
1 
1.09
1 
0.98
7 
1.01
7 
1.07
9 
Kahira 1.09
3 
1.00
5 
0.90
9 
1.05
9 
0.94
5 
0.98 1.02
4 
0.95
8 
0.96
7 
1.02
2 
1.01
3 
0.97 
Memphi
s  
1.06
5 
1.05
5 
0.91
7 
1.09
7 
0.97
5 
1.03
8 
1.03
3 
0.97
7 
0.99
9 
0.98
2 
0.89
7 
1.02
9 
Misr 1.08 0.93
1 
1.01
3 
1.12
5 
1.01
1 
0.97
8 
1.25 0.95
7 
1.01
6 
0.88
4 
1.09
2 
1.08
3 
MUP 1.29
2 
1.13
8 
1.07 1.06
8 
1.02 0.86
7 
1.06
4 
0.98
4 
1.03
4 
1.03
9 
0.87
4 
1.27
9 
Nasr 0.72
3 
1.97
8 
1.19
7 
0.76
6 
0.80
1 
1.20
1 
1.02
1 
1.36
7 
0.86
2 
0.96
3 
1.03
3 
0.95
4 
Nile 0.87
2 
1.01
5 
0.91
7 
0.99
2 
1.04
5 
1.03
7 
0.99
1 
1.01
6 
0.91
6 
1.08
3 
0.74
3 
1.24
4 
PHARC
O 
1.08
9 
1.10
6 
0.77
8 
1.03
8 
1.1 1.01
5 
0.63 0.91
2 
0.95
4 
1.18
6 
1.15
1 
1.21
2 
SEDIC
O 
1.12
2 
0.95
2 
0.97
1 
1.05
3 
1.07 0.98
8 
0.99
8 
0.86
9 
0.97
9 
1.06
3 
0.91
6 
1.07
5 
mean 1.07
1 
1.06 0.94
4 
1.02
6 
0.99
9 
1.01
2 
1.00
2 
0.99
5 
0.97
8 
1.00
1 
0.95
9 
1.05
9  
Table 5-7 indicates that the dominant effect for the sample firms has been TFP change.  
 
Table  5-7: Malmquist index summary of firm means 
 Technical 
efficiency change 
(relative to a CRS 
technology) 
Technological 
change 
Pure technical 
efficiency 
change (relative 
to VRS 
technology) 
Scale 
efficiency 
change 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
Change 
ADCO  1.011   0.995   1.026   0.986   1.006  
Alex  0.990   1.006   0.990   1.000   0.996  
Amriya  1.000   1.003   1.000   1.000   1.003  
CID  0.992   1.011   0.988   1.004   1.003  
EIPICO  0.995   1.009   1.000   0.995   1.004  
Kahira  0.992   1.002   0.991   1.001   0.994  
Memphis   0.997   1.007   0.994   1.003   1.004  
Misr  1.031   1.000   1.034   0.996   1.031  
MUP  1.005   1.049   1.002   1.003   1.053  
Nasr  1.014   1.017   1.004   1.010   1.031  
Nile   1.005   0.977   1.001   1.004   0.982  
PHARCO  1.000   0.999   1.000   1.000   0.999  
SEDICO  0.995   1.007   1.000   0.995   1.002  
mean  1.002   1.006   1.002   1.000   1.008  
All Malmquist index averages are geometric means 
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Table 5-8 indicates that MUP is the top ranking firm in the sample, as indicated by the 
number of times it has ranked as having positive TFP change. MUP is also the top ranking 
company as indicated by the number of times it has ranked as technically efficient. While, 
MUP has been one of the most dynamic and reputable of generic firms in Egypt by virtue 
of market share, it has been consistently losing market share (as reflected in Table 5-2). 
ADCO and CID which are public business sector companies, as well as SEDICO (private) 
rank least in terms of the number of times they scored positive TFP change during the study 
period. The problems of the public business sector have been alluded to earlier. The 
categorisation of SEDICO among the least performing companies, however, raises concern 
as it has been one of the dynamic generics companies on the Egyptian market for 
pharmaceuticals, with active presence on export markets. 
 
Table  5-8: Number of times sample companies ranked as efficient between 1992-05 
 Total factor 
productivity 
change 
Technical efficiency change  
(relative to a CRS technology) 
Technological 
change 
MUP 9 12 9 
Misr 8 6 7 
PHARCO 8 12 8 
Alex 6 6 5 
Amirya 6 11 5 
EIPICO 6 7 4 
Kahira 6 5 6 
Memphis 6 6 6 
Nasr 6 5 6 
Nile 6 8 3 
ADCO 5 7 7 
CID 5 7 4 
SEDICO 5 5 7 
 
Table 5-9 indicates that the levels of efficiency of individual firms are not dependent on the 
growth strategy adopted by these firms. The correlation coefficients for the variables output 
growth and technical efficiency change; technological change and TFP change during the 
study period 1993-2005 indicates that they have not been moving in the same direction. 
The exception has been for the two public sector companies Memphis and CID.   
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Table  5-9: Correlation between efficiency levels and growth strategy for sample firms 
 Average 
growth rate of 
output  
1993-2005 
Correlation coefficient for output growth and 
  Technical efficiency change  
(relative to a CRS technology) 
Technological  
change 
TFP Change 
PHARCO 16.7 n.a. 0.20 0.20 
MUP 12.4 0.40 0.37 0.40 
Nasr 10.8 0.03 0.13 -0.09 
Nile 8.0 -0.46 0.56 -0.13 
SEDICO 5.2 0.05 -0.20 -0.14 
EIPICO 4.3 -0.02 -0.74 -0.72 
Misr 3.6 -0.52 0.61 0.20 
ADCO 3.2 0.37 -0.23 -0.14 
CID 2.2 0.49 -0.12 0.68 
Memphis 2.2 0.21 0.16 0.83 
Kahira 1.4 -0.30 0.36 0.18 
Amirya 0.6 -0.33 0.04 -0.31 
Alex 0.5 0.05 0.21 0.56 
 
5.3.7 Export-orientation and productivity growth 
Table 5-10 indicates evident disassociation or very weak correlation -at best- between 
productivity growth and the degree of export orientation. Firms that exported a larger share 
of output were not necessarily gaining on the efficiency front compared to those exporting 
relatively smaller shares. The opposite is also true. Firms which were not exporting much 
of their output, were not necessarily less efficient than their opposites.  
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Table  5-10: TFP Change and export orientation 
 ADCO  Alex  Amriya  CID  EIPICO  Kahira  Memphis  
 TFP ∆ Exports*  TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports  
1994   1.132  3.9   1.012  4.2   1.150  1.2   0.937  4.1   1.569  10.2   1.093  6.4   1.065  5.1 
1995   0.917  5.5   1.011  4.1   1.053  1.3   1.186  2.3   0.779  11.9   1.005  6.6   1.055  4.6 
1996   0.996  7.2   0.922  5.5   0.952  2.7   0.902  0.7   0.802  10.6   0.909  5.6   0.917  5.7 
1997   1.064  5.4   1.086  3.7   0.967  2.4   1.033  2.9   1.041  9.5   1.059  7.5   1.097  5.1 
1998   0.997  6.9   0.997  4.2   1.056  2.6   1.056  3.9   0.952  13.8   0.945  13.9   0.975  5.0 
1999   0.915  10.8   0.986  4.9   0.980  2.6   1.084  3.3   1.129  11.4   0.980  13.7   1.038  5.3 
2000   1.051  7.8   1.065  4.0   1.079  1.6   1.080  2.0   0.885  10.7   1.024  10.5   1.033  1.9 
2001   1.098  6.6   0.939  4.0   1.051  2.5   0.976  2.2   0.911  11.9   0.958  12.0   0.977  4.5 
2002   0.982  7.8   0.990  4.5   0.949  2.8   0.995  2.6   1.091  12.1   0.967  14.3   0.999  5.1 
2003   0.985  13.3   1.058  5.5   0.918  5.8   0.890  3.9   0.987  12.7   1.022  11.5   0.982  3.6 
2004   0.935  18.1   0.859  6.8   1.024  4.1   0.986  4.5   1.017  12.3   1.013  13.3   0.897  6.9 
2005   1.024  6.0   1.049  7.1   0.893  9.0   0.955  4.7   1.079  12.7   0.970  11.2   1.029  8.8 
Correlation Coefficient  -0.56  -0.34  -0.73  -0.14  -0.25  -0.29  -0.19 
 Misr  MUP  Nasr  Nile  PHARCO  SEDICO    
 TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports  TFP ∆ Exports   
1994   1.080  9.7   1.292  1.2   0.723  7.1   0.872  9.1   1.089  7.5   1.122  0.2   
1995   0.931  9.0   1.138  0.8   1.978  8.1   1.015  9.3   1.106  10.4   0.952  0.5   
1996   1.013  10.8   1.070  2.6   1.197  4.2   0.917  8.5   0.778  14.7   0.971  1.4   
1997   1.125  13.5   1.068  2.6   0.766  4.1   0.992  7.2   1.038  12.6   1.053  0.6   
1998   1.011  14.1   1.020  3.4   0.801  3.8   1.045  7.9   1.100  13.1   1.070  2.0   
1999   0.978  15.4   0.867  3.5   1.201  4.7   1.037  9.7   1.015  12.6   0.988  3.6   
2000   1.250  5.0   1.064  3.4   1.021  5.2   0.991  8.1   0.630  9.3   0.998  3.7   
2001   0.957  8.6   0.984  4.4   1.367  5.7   1.016  9.6   0.912  13.2   0.869  6.0   
2002   1.016  11.3   1.034  5.0   0.862  9.0   0.916  13.1   0.954  17.8   0.979  6.3   
2003   0.884  13.6   1.039  0.7   0.963  8.6   1.083  16.1   1.186  18.9   1.063  8.0   
2004   1.092  13.2   0.874  7.0   1.033  9.5   0.743  15.5   1.151  19.5   0.916  4.8   
2005   1.083  12.3   1.279  6.7   0.954  8.8   1.244  11.1   1.212  15.5   1.075  12.8   
Correlation Coefficient  -0.39  -0.25  0.11  -0.17  0.34  0.00   
*Exports as a share of total output 
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5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, an attempt to address the research question concerning the extent to which 
mechanisms used to protect and regulate the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry have been 
associated with productivity growth was undertaken.  
 
To provide an answer to this question, TFP growth in Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical 
industry during the period 1993-2005 for a sample of 13 firms has been estimated. The non-
parametric frontier methodology known as data envelopment analysis (DEA) to obtain the 
Malmquist productivity index at the firm-level for a representative sample of firms 
operating in the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry was relied upon.  
 
Empirical results indicated that the best-practice firm in terms of TFP change belonged to 
the private sector, while the laggard firm belonged to the state-owned public business sector 
as well as the private sector. No differences of significance exist between the performance 
of private sector and state-owned generics companies. Additionally, state-owned companies 
which have been subject to partial privatization did not exhibit higher levels of TFP change 
compared to those which remained under full state-ownership. Empirical results also 
indicated that mean TFP change for the sample firms throughout the study period (1.01) 
exceeded the mean TFP change for all Egyptian industries (0.75), and that there was 
evident disassociation or weak correlation -at best- between productivity growth and the 
degree of export orientation.  
 
While there has been empirical evidence regarding positive TFP growth in Egypt's 
pharmaceutical industry (sample firms), under the -relatively protectionist- ruling trade and 
regulatory regime which has historically kept generics import competition at bay, this 
should not be generally judged to be a healthy phenomenon. Protectionism may have 
supported this industry to survive during its formative years, especially since there has been 
ample historical proof of the inequality and possibly detrimental competition with foreign 
companies during the 1930s (Handoussa, 1974). Had Egyptian policy makers supported a 
free trade regime, and eliminated non-tariff regulatory trade barriers in the domain of the 
 155 
pharmaceutical sector beyond the 1930s, it is most likely that Egypt would not have had a 
local pharmaceutical industry of the magnitude which is currently present.   
 
While efficiency levels seem to be respectable compared to Egypt’s manufacturing sector at 
large, protracted non-tariff regulatory barriers to trade in the domain of the generics 
pharmaceutical industry in Egypt have ran parallel to prolonging its inward orientation. The 
important question which accordingly came to mind has been related to why has an 
industry which was basically efficient compared to other sectors of manufacturing activity 
in Egypt not been exploiting export markets to further support growth in output and 
profitability. The probable answer will be presented in Chapter Six. Chapter Six provided 
evidence of atypical above average generics-to-originator prices for a selected sample of 
molecules which account for 4.4 percent of Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. Weak generic 
import competition during most of the history of this industry has created an environment 
in which local manufacturers of generics were able to cluster their prices around the prices 
of the originator brands or the price of the first market entrants. If this industry is 
successfully able to charge atypical prices compared to standard generic-to-originator price 
ratios prevalent in other world markets, then venturing on the tough track of exporting 
becomes less attractive. Pharmaceutical exports are made cumbersome due to the high 
registration fees with the regulatory authorities in export markets, not to mention having to 
compete with heavy weight generics manufacturers such as India and China.   
 
The absence of a positive correlation between export orientation and TFP growth must also 
be interpreted with caution. As explained earlier, because of pricing rigidities, which have 
in fact been present during the entire period which saw the rise of Egypt's modern generics 
pharmaceutical industry, some companies have limited their exports to products -which in 
their judgment- reflect fair pricing and hence fair profitability levels. In the face of rare 
incidences of price readjustment, the majority of executives interviewed have argued that 
they have been limiting export activities to products on which they are incurring higher 
profitability levels.  
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Additionally, it has been argued that exporting in the case of pharmaceuticals does involve 
atypical costs, whereby pharmaceutical registration procedures in importing markets may 
cost as high as USD 200,000 for a single product, with no grantee that the product will 
eventually obtain the registration license and marketing approval. These factors may 
provide a possible explanation with regards the absence of a positive correlation between 
productivity growth and outward orientation. 
 
The absence of evidence regarding differential efficiency performance based on 
privatisation status, indicates the need for re-evaluating the objectives and the overall 
approach to privatisation in Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical sector. 
  
 157 
6. WHAT HAS BEEN THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF PRICE COMPETITION ON THE 
EGYPTIAN PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will attempt to provide an answer to the research question concerning how 
far and in what ways have the regulatory framework governing Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry allowed local companies to charge higher than average prices 
compared to other world markets. This chapter will also throw light on the interface 
between the IPRs regime which ruled up to January 2005, the pharmaceutical policy regime 
(including barriers facing imports of generics), and the associated impact in terms of the 
observed dynamics of price competition on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. The extent to 
which consumers (patients) have been able to capitalize fully on the cost advantage of 
having access to a large generics medicines manufacturing base will also be evaluated. 
 
Three key concerns have been driving the investigation in this chapter. First, are generic-to- 
originator drug prices in Egypt in line with the standard ratios in major world markets. 
Second, has generic diffusion been bringing down average pharmaceutical price levels in 
Egypt? Third, within the context of an IPRs regime which excluded pharmaceutical 
products from patentability up to January 2005, have Egyptian consumers been fully 
capturing the financial benefits of having access to -relatively- cheap generics?  
 
The importance of the analysis presented in this chapter stems from the fact that examining 
the nature of competition between originator and generic products, as well as between 
generics in Egypt has never been subject to investigation, and has been greatly neglected as 
well as eclipsed by the relatively larger emphasis awarded to evaluating the impact of the 
TRIPS Agreement on pharmaceutical supply as well as demand side actors. Of no less 
importance, exploring the nature of demand for generics in Egypt, the extent to which there 
is a need to revisit the country’s national drug policy will be highlighted. 
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In order to address this research question, I will rely on the methodology followed by the 
WHO and HAI (2006) concerned with the international comparison of the prices of chronic 
disease medicines. The IMS Egypt database provided the main source of market data. 
 
The examination of price competition on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market has brought up 
some concerning results with regards generic-to-originator price levels in Egypt for the 
selected sample of molecules. Generic-to-originator prices in Egypt have been found to be 
higher than the standard ratios observed in major world markets. Of no less importance, 
generic diffusion has not necessarily been bringing down average prices on the Egyptian 
market. 
 
On another important front, Egyptian consumers have not been fully capturing the financial 
benefit of having access to a large generics manufacturing base, particularly in light of a lax 
IPRs regime which ruled up to January 2005. Prescribing habits have resulted in a situation 
whereby the least priced generics were not necessarily the most prescribed. This kind of 
evidence throws light on the need to revisit generic policies as well as prescribing practices 
in Egypt. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents a review of the literature to which 
the empirical findings of this chapter endeavour to contribute to, namely the literature 
covering the nature of competition in the market for pharmaceuticals. Section 6.3 presents 
an overview of competition on Egypt’s generics market. Section 6.4 presents the empirical 
strategy to address the research questions posed. Section 6.5 examines the relative prices of 
products competing within the domain of a sample of molecules. The focus of the 
examination will be on the relative prices and market shares of the products examined, in 
conjunction with launch dates for products introduced by various companies. Section 6.6 
examines the extent to which generic diffusion has been driving prices on a downward 
trend for late market entrants. Section 6.7 evaluates the extent to which consumers of 
pharmaceutical products in Egypt have been able to capitalize fully on the cost advantage 
of having access to a large generics medicines manufacturing base by actually consuming 
the least expensive products. Section 6.8 concludes with a summary of key findings. 
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6.2 Competition on the Market for Pharmaceutical Products 
Competition on pharmaceutical markets is distinctly different from competition taking 
place in most markets for goods and services. Competition on the pharmaceutical market 
usually occurs between generics and the brand-name version of the same active ingredient 
instead of across products that are therapeutics substitutes. Therapeutic substitutes are 
products with different active ingredients, yet belong to the same therapeutic class. 
 
In markets where pharmaceutical product patent protection in upheld, originator products 
enjoy a period free from generic competition, up to the date of patent expiry. Originator 
products usually enjoy premium prices as well as exclusivity profits during the period of 
patent protection. Price competition eventually becomes fierce after patent expiry, hence 
policies supporting price competition through the diffusion of generics after patent 
expiration are most important to ensuring consumer (patient) benefit. On another important 
front, from an industrial policy and competitiveness perspective, the empirical literature 
shows that increased market competition contributes to foster efficiency and to design 
adequate incentives to innovate (Magazzini, Pammolli and Riccaboni, 2004: 12-14) 
 
Upon patent expiry, generic manufacturers typically enter sequentially in waves. The first 
to enter the market are branded generics, which accordingly, are able to capture a 
significant share of the entire market at a price premium. With additional generic entry, 
price competition intensifies. Increased competition may eventually lead to the exit of some 
players from the product market or some components of it (Kanavos et al, 2008: 524). The 
larger the number of generic equivalents which are allowed to compete within the domain 
of a particular molecule, the heavier is the downward pressure exerted on prices and the 
larger is the loss in market share originally held by the innovator product and first generic 
entrants. 
 
Competition and market dynamics of this nature is nonetheless, atypical of markets in 
which pharmaceutical patent protection is absent, and in which the regulatory regime 
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allows only a relatively limited number of generic products to compete in the domain of a 
particular molecule, dosage form and strength.  
 
Generic entry and the nature of competition on the market for pharmaceuticals 
The entry of generics in a particular therapeutic class has very important implications for 
the nature of competition taking place between single and multiple-source drugs, as well as 
among multiple-source drugs. Competition of this nature is mostly translated to price 
revisions to the benefit of consumers (patients). Competition in the pharmaceutical markets 
usually takes three forms: among brand-name drugs that share therapeutic similarities, 
between brand-name drugs and generic substitutes, and among generic versions of the same 
drug (CBO, 1998). 
 
Competition among single-source drugs 
Patents do not usually grant complete monopoly power in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Competing research-based companies can frequently discover and patent several different 
drugs that use the same ‘basic mechanism’ to treat illness, whereby the first drug using the 
new mechanism to treat the illness -breakthrough drug- usually enjoys between one-to-six 
years on the market before a therapeutically similar patented drug (me-too drug) enters the 
market. Economic theory and empirical studies suggest that the presence of several 
therapeutically similar drugs limits the ability of manufacturers to raise prices as much as 
possible otherwise (CBO, 1998). 
 
Competition between single-source drugs and generics 
Regarding competition between single-source and multiple-source generic drugs, once a 
patent on a product expires, generic products enter the market at significant discounts to the 
originating brand. Discounts in fact grows larger with the increase in the number of generic 
competitors Examining a sample of commercially significant products coming off patent in 
the early to mid-1990s in the USA, indicates that after one year of generic competition, 
generic products were being offered at an average discount of over 50 percent relative to 
the originating brand, and have captured a total market share of 64 percent (Grabowski and 
Vernon, 2000). However, it is important to note that what happens after generic entry, is 
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nothing along the lines of a two-way price rivalry between branded and generic 
manufacturers (Scherer, 1993). There is evidence that indicates that on average, branded 
drug prices do increase when generic competition begins (Frank and Salkever, 1992; 
Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). On average, generic competition reduced the incumbent 
brand's prices by a modest two percent (Caves et al. 1991). Brand-name products typically 
loose an average of 44 percent of their market share following generic entry during the first 
year of competition (CBO, 1998: xii-viii). 
 
This outcome is basically due to the fact that brand-name products try to maintain the level 
of profits realised prior to patent expiry by maintaining –or in some cases even increasing- 
their prices in order to compensate for the loss of market shares. In fact, the study by Frank 
and Salkever (1992) indicates that the prices of brand-name drugs do increase after generic 
entry, while those of existing generic drugs do tend to decrease. 
 
Competition among generics 
Economic theory suggests that product differentiation dampens price competition. When 
products become identical, such as with the case of generics, price competition intensifies. 
The more generic manufacturers enter the market, they should face increased pressure to 
lower prices in order to sustain their market shares (CBO, 1998: 32). 
 
Analysis indicates that when 10 firms manufacture and distribute generic versions of a 
particular drug, the generic retail price of this drug falls to an average of 60-34 percent of 
the brand-name price. With 20 manufacturers, the generic price may well go to 20 percent 
of the brand-name price (CBO, 1998). Generic manufacturers are generally most profitable 
as first entrants into a particular market (Caves et al, 1991).  
 
Regulatory mechanisms to accelerate generic entry 
Because the costs of drugs is a concern, which is equally important in developed as well as 
developing countries, these costs may be potentially reduced if government regulations 
succeed in fostering a more powerful competition between the original manufacturers and 
generic substitutes (Aronsson, Bergman and Rudholm, 2001). In fact, the more competition 
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also takes place between generic products, the more will be the gain by consumers.  In 
some of the world's leading pharmaceutical markets, governments have introduced 
mechanisms which accelerate the introduction of generic drugs. For example, in the USA, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act has eliminated the duplicative tests required from generic drugs to 
obtain regulatory and marketing approval from the FDA. Prior to 1984, manufacturers of 
generic drugs were actually required to prove the safety and efficacy of their products 
independently, being prohibited from using the unpublished test data of the innovator. Test 
results were considered to be trade secrets which belonged to the original manufacturer. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act stipulated that generic drugs were only required to demonstrate 
"bioequivalence" to an already approved innovator product. The test required to prove 
bioequivalence are much less costly and time consuming than those required proving safety 
and efficacy. The Act also allowed generic manufacturers to commence with their clinical 
tests before the patent expires, thus reducing the delay of generic entry for more than three 
years to less than three months for the top selling drugs. The Act also increased the 
proportion of brand-name drugs facing competition from generic products once their patent 
expire (CBO, 1998).  
 
6.3 Competition on Egypt’s Pharmaceutical Market 
During the pre-Janaury-2005 phase in Egypt, pharmaceutical product patent protection has 
been absent, thus mechanisms driving competition cannot be fully understood against the 
traditional distinction made between in-patent/originator products and their chemically 
equivalent and bioequivalent generic competitors. In close connection, several features of 
Egypt's pharmaceutical regulatory regime are worth being highlighted. The absence of 
pharmaceutical patent protection in Egypt during the study-period, meant that competition 
between originator products and their generic bioequivalents became immediate once the 
originator product registers for marketing approval with the regulatory authorities. 
Registration involved the mandatory submission of a product file,
21
 which -in light of the 
absence of data protection- is more often than not easily replicated by generic companies 
                                                 
21
 The file includes copies of the complete formula, quantity of active ingredients, copies of the method of 
analyses and a detailed illustration of the active ingredients of the finished product, data sheet including 
indication, contra-indications, over dose, and warning of side effects and a full scientific file for the new 
product including the formula, pharmacological, toxicological and clinical studies as well as stability data. 
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for the purpose of gaining regulatory and marketing approval. The market power of 
research-based companies and their ability to temporarily earn excess profit, typical of 
markets where IPRs standards are strong, was thus greatly circumscribed during the study 
period in Egypt.  
 
In addition, the fact that the regulatory framework governing pharmaceutical registration in 
Egypt only allows for a maximum of four generic bioequivalent products to compete within 
the domain of the concerned molecule (and dosage form), has granted generic companies -
particularly first movers- the power of an oligopoly to set prices in accordance to clear 
calculations regarding the potential threat of competition. Of no less importance with 
regards the brunt of competitive pressure, is the fact that regulatory barriers facing imported 
generics have also allowed generic manufacturers, for a very long time in Egypt, to 
compete almost exclusively amongst each other. Limited number of competing products 
within the domain of any specific molecule, as well as meagre generic import competition, 
have meant that marginal competitive pressure was levied on local generic firms to engage 
in price wars, which are ultimately beneficial to consumers.  In addition, what also made 
the pre-2005 pharmaceutical market in Egypt unique is the fact that once prices were set by 
the regulatory authorities, they are rarely revised downwards, bringing out another distinct 
feature of price competition between various chemically and bioequivalent products.  
 
Based on the contention that the Egyptian market for generic medicine is protected by 
virtue of non-tariff regulatory barriers facing generic imports, the duel effect of the ruling 
pharmaceutical patent regime, regulatory restraints on the number of products competing 
within the domain of the same molecule, and weak import competition on generic medicine 
prices will be examined.  
 
6.4 Empirical Strategy, Core List of Molecules to be Examined and Sources of Data 
In order to evaluate pharmaceutical pricing dynamics in Egypt, competition taking place 
between products falling within the domain of 21 molecules, covering a wide range of 
therapeutic classes will be subject to examination. The list of molecules -originally 30- has 
been featured in the WHO and HAI study (2006) concerned with the international 
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comparison of chronic disease medicines. Of the 30 molecules featured in the WHO/HAI 
study, only 21 were candidates for the evaluation of relative generic-to- originator prices in 
Egypt. The remaining molecules have been excluded, either because of limited information 
provided by IMS Egypt, the complete absence of generic competition or the absence of 
originator brands to allow for comparison.  
 
The focus of the WHO/HAI study was on relative prices, availability and affordability of 
this core list of molecules. The study specified one dosage form, one strength, and one 
recommended pact size and up to three products to be measured:  
▪ the originator brand 
▪ the most sold generic equivalent (MSG)  
▪ and the lowest price generic (LPG) equivalent for the core list of 30 molecules. 
 
The study molecules selected as the basis for evaluating the nature of competition on 
Egypt's pharmaceutical market (Table 6-1) meet the criteria of being used to treat common 
conditions (global burden of disease), both acute and chronic that cause significant 
morbidity and mortality. In terms of availability, these products are also available in 
standard formulations and are widely used in most countries. The majority of these 
products are included in the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines and they represent 
products that are both new (in-patent in some countries) and older generations of medicines 
which are off-patent (WHO/HAI, 2006). As such, the selected molecules will enable the 
comparison and analysis of generic pricing and diffusion for mature molecules as well as 
for molecules which have recently gone off-patent.  
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Table  6-1: Core list of survey medicines 
Medicine category and generic name Strength/form Basic patent expiry date 
Antacid    
Omeprazole 20 mg between 1998-2005 
Ranitidine 150 mg before 1998 
Antiasthmatic    
Beclomethasone 50 mcg dose before 1998 
Salbutamol 0.1 mg/ dose before 1998 
Antibacterial    
Amoxicillin 250 mg before 1998 
Ceftriaxone 1 gm  between 1998-2005 
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg Tablet after 2005 
Co-Trimoxazole 8+ /40 mg/ml before 1998 
Antidepressant    
Amitriptyline 25 mg - 30 
Tab 
before 1998 
Fluoxetine 20 mg - 20 
Cap 
between 1998-2005 
Antidiabetic    
Glibenclamide 5 mg - 20 Tab before 1998 
Metformin 500 mg - 10 
Tab 
before 1998 
Antiepileptic    
Carbamazepine 200 mg - 10 
Tab 
before 1998 
Phenytoin 100 mg - 50 
Cap 
before 1998 
Antifungal     
Fluconazole 200 mg between 1998-2005 
Antihypertensive    
Atenolol 50 mg - 10 
Tab 
before 1998 
Captopril 25 mg - 20 
Tab 
before 1998 
Hydrochlorothiazide 25 mg - 30 
Tab 
before 1998 
Losartan 50 mg - 7 Tab after 2005 
Nifedipine Retard 20 mg - 30 
Tab 
before 1998 
Anti-Inflammatory     
Diclofenac Sodium 25 mg - 30 
Tab 
before 1998 
Antimalarial    
Artesunate n.a. before 1998 
Pyrimethamine 25 mg - 6 Tab before 1998 
Antipsychotic     
Fluphenazine Decanoate 25 mg 1 ml - 
Vials 
before 1998 
Antiviral    
Acyclovir 200 mg - 20 
Tab 
before 1998 
Indinavir n. . after 2005 
Nevirapine n.a. after 2005 
Zidovudine 100 mg - 100 
Cap 
between 1998-2005 
Anxiolytic     
Diazepam 5 mg - 20 Tab before 1998 
Serum Lipid Reducing    
Lovastatin 20 mg - 10 
Tab 
between 1998-2005 
Source: WHO/HAI, 2006 
 
  
 166 
 
Data sources  
Market data from the IMS database for Egypt pertaining to the molecules under 
examination has been relied on for the assessment undertaken in this chapter. IMS Egypt 
provides historical data covering details concerning dispensed medicines in the retail 
pharmaceutical market (pharmacies) for a period up to six years. The analysis is, therefore, 
limited to the period between 2003 and 2008, for which data is available. The prices of 
products subject to examination have been cross-checked with the prices provided by the 
Drug Planning and Policy Center of the Ministry of Health in Egypt. Because of differences 
in pack size (for the same strength), comparisons are made on the basis of unit prices, 
whereby the price per pack was divided by the number of fillings.  
 
IMS data provides details concerning product brand names, manufacturers' name, launch 
dates, sales volume and value as well as price data for the products competing in the 
domain of the 21 candidate study molecules. IMS data has been be used to identify the 
prices, launch dates, and market shares of originator brands, the least priced generic (LPG) 
and the most sold generic (MSG) for the study molecules. The information was provided 
with full reference to whether the product belongs to the public business sector, the 
multinational sector (subsidiaries of research-based companies with manufacturing 
facilities in Egypt) or the local generics sector. In addition, the information is also classified 
according to whether the product is imported or manufactured locally (including 
agreements for toll-manufacturing).  
 
6.5 Relative Prices of Originator Products and Their Generic Bioequivalent Products 
in Egypt 
Because it was not feasible to examine the prices of all generic products relative to 
originator products on the Egyptian market, the evaluation was confined to the list of 21 
molecules operating in the domain of 14 therapeutic classes. The 21 study-molecules 
account for 4.4 percent of Egypt’s pharmaceutical market, and involved competition 
between some 196 products. Table 6-2 presents the market shares of the sample-molecules, 
as well the share of generic products within the domain of each subsequent molecule. As 
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evident from Table 6-2, in 17 of the study molecules, generics dominate as the key players 
by virtue of accounting for the largest market shares. In 4 molecules, innovator brands 
dominate subsequent market shares.  
 
Table  6-2: Market share of sample molecules 
  
Units (‘000) LE Sales (‘000) 
 
 2003 2008 2003 2008 
 
Egyptian market 849,159  1,323,496  5,474,280  12,565,859  
 
Share of sample-21 molecules (%) 3.32  3.68  5.03  4.36  
 
Antacid 
    1 OMEPRAZOLE 
    
 
Market for Omeprazol (value) 1,181.1  2,740.1  31,651.5  69,245.1  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.1  0.2  0.6  0.6  
 
Generic Share of Omeprazole market (%) 96.9  98.9  94.3  97.9  
2 RANITIDINE 
    
 
Market for Ranitidine (value) 5,830.1  14,073.6  65,156.4  137,947.3  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.7  1.1  1.2  1.1  
 
Generic Share (%) 61.2  67.6  39.5  44.5  
 
Antiasthmatic 
 
            
3 BECLOMETASONE 
    
 
Market for BECLOMETHAZONE (value) 931.4  1,364.2  11,178.1  22,246.5  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  
 
Generic Share (%) 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
Antibacterial 
    4 AMOXICILLIN 
    
 
Market for AMOXICILLIN (value) 1,310.3  1,088.3  4,945.9  6,883.2  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1 
 
Generic Share (%) 81.7  86.5  83.1  90.4  
5 CEFTRIAXONE 
    
 
Market for CEFTRIAXONE (value) 240.8  1,609.3  8,714.8  45,435.3  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.0  0.1  0.2  0.8  
 
Generic Share (%) 42.2  64.4  39.7  56.8  
6 CIPROFLOXACIN (%) 
    
 
Market for CIPROFLOXACIN (value) 1,160.8  3,173.8  33,060.7  84,831.6  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.1  0.2  0.6  1.5  
 
Generic Share (%) 59.4  59.8  63.9  69.9  
 
Antidepressant 
    7 AMITRIPTYLINE 
    
 
Market for AMITRIPTYLINE (value) 473.1  448.2  1,784.4  1,679.3  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.06  0.03  0.03  0.03 
 
Generic Share (%) 100.0  100 100 100 
8 FLUOXETINE 
    
 
Market for FLUOXETINE (value) 480.6  643.3  7,926.8  11,500.2  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  
 
Generic Share (%) 94.1  97.7  94.1  97.7  
 
Antidiabetic 
    9 GLIBENCLAMIDE 
    
 
Market for GLIBENCLAMIDE (value) 3,738.6  3,213.2  13,956.9  14,945.1  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.4  0.2  0.3  0.12 
 
Generic Share (%) -    3.4  -    4.4  
10 METFORMIN 
    
 
Market for METFORMIN (value) 2,036.5  2,649.6  5,113.5  11,469.6  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.2  0.2  0.1  0.09    
 
Generic Share (%) 91.4  74.4  84.7  40.3  
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Cont. Table 6.2: Market share of sample molecules  
 
  Units (thousands) LE Sales (‘000) 
  2003 2008 2003 2008 
 Antidiabetic     
11 CARBAMAZEPINE 
 
            
 
Market for carbamazepine (value) 2,269.3  2,216.2  19,934.2  33,630.5  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.3  0.2  0.4  0.3  
 
Generic Share (%) 100.0  95.7  100.0  98.9  
12 PHENYTOIN 
    
 
Market for PHENYTOIN (value) 180.5  256.7  1,816.2  3,128.7  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.02  0.02 0.03  0.06 
 
Generic Share (%) 99.8  93.0  99.9  90.9  
 
Antifungal 
    13 FLUCONAZOLE 
    
 
Market for FLUCONAZOLE (value) 968.6  2,289.9  14,311.8  31,454.7  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.6 
 
Generic Share (%) 80.1  84.0  67.0  68.5  
 
Antihypertensive 
    14 ATENOLOL 
    
 
Market for ATENOLOL (value) 1,968.8  3,036.8  11,857.4  18,597.7  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
 
Generic Share (%) 32.2  89.4  22.6  82.1  
15 CAPTOPRIL 
    
 
Market for CAPTOPRIL (value) 1,825.9  1,851.8  15,832.2  24,930.0  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.2  0.1  0.3  0.5 
 
Generic Share (%) 37.8  99.2  43.0  99.6  
16 LOSARTAN 
    
 
Market for LOSARTAN (value) 283.0  598.8  10,694.5  19,367.0  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.03 0.0  0.2  0.35 
 
Generic Share (%) 52.3  67.4  43.1  53.1  
17 NIFEDIPINE 
    
 
Market for NIFEDIPINE (value) 839.1  5,740.3  4,609.9  8,006.1  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.1  0.4  0.1  0.1 
 
Generic Share (%) 90.9  24.3  87.4  100.0  
 
Anti-inflammatory 
    18 DICLOFENAC 
    
 
Market for DICLOFENAC (value) 1,772.6  1,565.9  8,986.3  11,116.9  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2 
 
Generic Share (%) 51.4  56.7  45.9  38.1  
 
Antiviral 
    19 Acyclovir 
    
 
Market for Acyclovir (value) 75.6  106.9  958.9  1,335.4  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 
 
Generic Share (%) 16.5  15.0  27.3  25.1  
 
Anxiolytic 
    20 DIAZEPAM 
    
 
Market for DIAZEPAM (value) 643.0  956.3  484.6  1,108.9  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  
 
Generic Share (%) 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
Serum lipid reducing 
    21 LOVASTATIN 
    
 
Market for LOVASTATIN (value) 3.4  4.9  57.9  83.9  
 
Share of retail market (%) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 
Generic Share (%) 100 100 100 100 
Source: Based on IMS, 2009 
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For each of the study molecules, the prices of all generic products competing in the domain 
of the concerned molecule (same dosage form and strength) were observed, starting from 
the first to the last market entrant to obtain regulatory approval. Generic prices are 
compared to the price of the originator product. For molecules which are relatively mature, 
the price of products manufactured by research-based pharmaceutical companies, whether 
imported or manufactured locally, was taken as the benchmark for comparison.  
 
A key finding prsented was that in only 4 out of 18 molecules (3 molecules have been 
excluded because there was no originator brand to compare with), the price of the examined 
list of generic equivalents went below the 50 percent threshold of the price of the originator 
brand (Presented in detail in Annex 11). In 9 molecules, atypical generic-to-innovator 
prices were observed. What was even more important to note, is the finding that generic 
diffusion has not been bringing down average prices on the Egyptian market to any levels 
of significance. With only one exception, for products competing within the domain of the 
21 molecules, the prices of subsequent market entrants were either clustered around the first 
entrant, or went above it (Details presented in Table 6-4).  
 
The following sections detail the results concerning relative prices in the domain of the 9 
molecules in which atypical generic-to-innovator prices were observed. For products 
competing within the domain of each molecule, a table indicating the prices charged by 
each new market entrant is presented to document the phenomenon of atypical generic-to-
originator prices. 
 
Antibacterial 
The first case documenting higher than standard generic-to-originator prices in the sample-
molecules fell in the domain of Amoxicillin. Because Amoxicillin is a relatively mature 
molecule -its basic patent expired before 1998- the expectation was that generic 
competition was likely to be prolific. In the domain of Amoxicillin, a total of 5 generic 
companies compete over market shares for the dosage from and strength examined against 
Bristol-Myers Squibb's (BMS) originator brand 'Hiconcil', which was first marketed in 
Egypt in 1990. Amoxicillin generic-to-originator prices range between 60-167%  
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1. Amoxicillin caps 250 mg  
Sector Company Product Launch 
year 
Public 
price 
Price per unit 
 
Generic-to-originator  
Prices  perce 
Originator Multinational BMS Hiconcil 1990 4.5 0.38  
Holdi Pharma CID Amoxycid 1980 4.3 0.36 96 
Private AMOUN. Ibiamox 1981 3.7 0.31 82 
Private EIPICO Flumox 1985 7.5 0.63 167 
Private SEDICO Flucamox 1994 6.3 0.53 140 
Private SEDICO Biomox 1997 5.3 0.44 118 
Holdi Pharma ADCO Amoxycillin n.a. 2.7 0.23 60 
 
The antibacterial market provided another example of atypical generic-to-originator prices. 
Ciprofloxacin is a relatively new molecule, with the patent expiry date falling after 2005. 
The prices of the generic versions of 'Ciprofloxacin' which range between 88-140 percent 
stand in sharp contrast to standard global ratios as detailed in Chapter Three.  
 
2. Ciprofloxacin tabs 500 mg  
Sector Company Product Launch 
year 
Public 
price 
Price  
per unit 
 
Generic-to- 
originator  
Prices   
Originator Multinational  SANDOZ Serviflox 1997     28.0  0.36   
Private  EIPICO Ciprocin 1996     32.0  0.31 88 
Holdipharma CID RANBAXY Rancif 1997     22.5  0.44 124 
Holdipharma MISR Mifoxin 1997     29.7  0.34 94 
Private  PHARCO Ciprofar 2002     20.0  0.50 140 
Private  EURO.EGY.PH. Ciprofloxacin 2006     30.0  0.33 93 
 
Antidiabetic 
In the antidiabetic class, in the domain of the 'Glibenclamide' molecule, Roche's originator 
product 'Euglucon' had one generic competitor, namely Pharco's product 'Diaben'. Diaben 
was marketed in Egypt starting 1988, some 8 years following the entry of 'Euglucon'. The 
absolute absence of generic competition allowed Pharco to price its product at a staggering 
107 percent of the price of the originator brand.  
 
3. Glibenclamide tabs 5 MG  
Sector Company Product Launch 
year 
Public 
price 
Price 
per 
unit 
Generic-to-originator  
Prices % 
Originator Multinational  GLAXO EG.  Euglucon 1980 2.8 0.09  
Private  PHARCO Diaben 1988 2.0  0.10 107.1 
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Metformin is the second molecule examined in the antidiabetic class. Despite the fact that a 
total of 5 generics companies and 9 products (in various dosage forms) compete cover 
market shares, standard generic-to-innovator prices have remained absent. Generic-to-
originator prices range between 100-300 percent. 
 
4. Metformin tabs 500 MG  
Sector Company 
 
Product Launch 
year 
Public 
price 
Price 
per 
unit 
Generic-to- 
originator  
Prices % 
Originator Multinational  Novartis egypt Glucoformin 2002       2.0  0.10   
Originator Multinational Novartis egypt Glucoformin 2002       8.0  0.10   
Holdipharma Nasr Metformin 0000     20.0  0.10 100 
Holdipharma Cid Cidophage 1996       1.3  0.13 130 
Holdipharma Cid Cidophage 1996       2.5  0.13 125 
Holdipharma Cid Cidophage 1997     62.5  0.13 125 
Holdipharma Nasr Metformin 1999       3.0  0.10 100 
Private  Amoun  Amophage 2000       1.5  0.15 150 
Private  Amoun  Amophage 2000       4.5  0.15 150 
Private  Pharco Diaformin 2000       2.0  0.10 100 
Private  Pharaonia. Diaphage 2001       2.0  0.10 100 
Private  Minapharm merck Glucophage 2006     15.0  0.30 300 
 
Antiepileptic 
In the antiepileptic market, the Phenytoin molecule provides further evidence of the above 
standard generics prices. The prices of generic products which entered the market between 
1998 and 2006 ranged between 100-145 percent of the price of the originator product, 
which was introduced in 1995. 
 
5. Phenytoin caps 100 mg  
Sector Company Product Launch 
year 
Public 
price 
Price 
per 
unit 
Generic-to-
originator  
Prices % 
Originator Multinational  NILE PFIZER Epanutin 1995     10.0  0.10  
Originator Multinational  NILE PFIZER Epanutin 2000     12.0  0.24  
Holdipharma NASR Phenytoin 1998       5.8  0.15 145 
Holdipharma NILE Phenytin 2004     12.0  0.24 100 
Holdipharma ARAB GELAT. Ipanten 2005     16.0  0.32 133 
Holdipharma MEMPHIS Phenytoin 2006     14.0  0.28 117 
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Antihypertensive 
In the antihypertensive market, a total of five companies compete in the domain of the 
Captopril molecule, with generic-to-innovator prices ranging between 60-70 percent.  
 
6. Captopril tabs 25 MG  
Sector Company Product Launch 
year 
Public 
price 
Price per 
unit 
Generic-to-
originator  
Prices % 
Originator Multinational  BMS EGYPT Capoten 1983     10.0  0.50  
Originator Multinational  BMS EGYPT Capoten 2003     20.0  0.50  
Originator Multinational  GSK EG Capoten 2008     10.0  0.50  
Originator Multinational  GSK Capoten 2008     20.0  0.50  
Holdipharma KAHIRA Lontensin 1995       7.0  0.35 70 
Private  EIPICO Capotril 1996       6.4  0.32 64 
Private  AMOUN  Hypopress 1999       3.0  0.30 60 
 
Nifedipine is another molecule examined in the antihypertensive market, in which generic-
to-innovator prices ranged between 96-150 percent.  
 
7. Nifedipine tabs 20 MG  
Sector Company Product Launch 
year 
Public 
price 
Price 
per 
unit 
Generic-
to-
originator  
Prices % 
Originator Multinational ALEXANDRIA BAYER Adalat 1995     10.5  0.35  
Private sector EIPICO Epilat 1989     10.5  0.53 150 
Private sector MINAPHARM B.O.I Dilcor 1992       6.7  0.33 96 
Private sector SIGMA TIBA Tenolat 2003     10.0  0.50 143 
Private sector SIGMA TIBA Tenolat 2004     15.0  0.50 143 
 
Anti-inflammatory  
In the anti-inflammatory market, generic-to-innovator prices in the domain of the 
Diclofenac molecule range between 53-106 percent, despite active competition between 9 
generic companies which entered the Egyptian market between 1991 and 2008. 
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8. Diclofenac tabs 25 MG 30 
Sector Company Product Launch 
year 
Public 
price 
Price 
per 
unit 
Generic-
to-
originator  
Prices % 
Originator Multinational  NPE NOVARTIS  Voltaren c.h. 1989 11.3  0.38  
Originator Multinational  NOVARTIS PH.  Cataflam 1991 5.0  0.50  
Originator Multinational  NOVARTIS PH.  Cataflam 2005 10.0  0.50  
Private sector PHARCO Declophen 1991 4.5  0.23 60 
Private sector SEDICO Rheumarene 1994 4.8  0.24 64 
Holdipharma NASR Diclofenac 1995 6.0  0.20 53 
Private  MUP MEPHA Olfen 1995 10.5  0.35 93 
Multinational  GSK EG Rheumafen 1996 6.9  0.35 92 
Private  T3A Antiflam 1998 3.4  0.34 90 
Private  MINAPHARM  Potafen 1999 3.3  0.33 88 
Private  MUP MEPHA Oflam 2000 3.5  0.35 93 
Multinational  GSK EG Rapiflam 2004 4.0  0.40 106 
Private  MINAPHARM  Potafen 2005 6.5  0.33 86 
Private  DELTA Dolphin-k 2008 6.0  0.30 80 
Private  EIPICO Epifenac 2008 4.0  0.20 53 
 
Antiviral 
In the Antiviral market, generic-to-innovator price in the domain of Acyclovir stands at 76 
percent, with only one generic product competing against the originator brands Novirus and 
Zovirax of GSK.  
 
9. Acyclovir 
Sector Company Product Launch  
year 
Public  
price 
Price  
per unit 
Generic-to- 
originator  
Prices % 
Originator Multinational GSK EG Novirus 1994 11 1.38  
Private sector SEDICO Cycloviral 1997 21 1.05 76 
 
One important observation regarding the above expose of generic-to-innovator prices is 
that, generic import competition is virtually absent. This observation raises concern 
regarding the association of higher than average generic-to-innovator prices with the 
absence of import competition. 
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6.6 Has Generic Diffusion Contributed to Bringing down Average Prices on Egypt’s 
market for pharmaceuticals? 
One of the benefits of generic diffusion is that with each new market entrant, prices are 
usually brought down further, mostly to the benefit of consumers. To evaluate the extent to 
which the highly genericised pharmaceutical market in Egypt supports this healthy 
phenomenon, prices charged by each new generic market entrant in the domain of the 
sample molecules were evaluated against the prices of competitors, which entered the 
market of the concerned molecules at an earlier stage.  
 
The following sections detail price dynamics during the period which elapses between the 
entry of the first and last generic products in the domain of 19 of the sample molecules. 
Two out of the 21 study molecules have been excluded from the analysis. Amitriptyline in 
the antidepressant market was excluded as there has been only one product manufactured 
by the public sector company Kahira present. Acyclovir in the domain of antivirals was 
also excluded as the only two products on the market were GSK’s Novirus and Zovirax. 
 
The trend is also presented in relation to the price of the originator brand. On the graphs 
pertaining to each product, indications will be made with reference to the originator brand, 
the most sold generic (MSG) and the least priced generic (LPG). The same company may 
appear twice on the graphs, since the same product can be available in various doses. 
Companies appearing on the graphs are to begin with the first to enter the market and end 
with the last market entrant. In each graph, the first column represents the manufacturer of 
the originator brand/ first market entrant. 
 
Results have indicated that generic diffusion has not been bringing down average prices on 
the Egyptian market to any levels of significance. With only one exception, for products 
competing within the domain of the 19 molecules, the prices of subsequent market were 
either clustered around the first entrant, or went above it.  
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Antacid: Omeprazole and Ranitidine 
In the antacid therapeutic class, the first molecule examined was 'Ompeprazole'. 
Ompeprazole has been approved as a new molecular entity (NME) in the USA by the FDA 
for marketing in September, 1989, and the basic patent expiry date fell between 1998 and 
2005 (Orange Book, 2011; WHO/HAI, 2006). The originator brand 'Losec' was introduced 
to the Egyptian market as an imported product by AstraZeneca in 1993, selling at LE 10 per 
unit. One year following the introduction of Losec on the Egyptian market, the first two 
generic competitors were launched in 1994, under the brand names 'Gastrazole' by Amriya 
Pharmaceuticals, selling at LE 3.03 per unit, and 'Epiraz' by EIPICO selling at LE 3.14 per 
unit. By 2007, a total of 13 generic companies in the domain of Ompeprazole were 
competing, with the unit price of the last entrant being LE 3. Despite the fact that the 
market for the 'Ompeprazole' molecule embraced a large number of generic competitors, 
the 13-year period which elapsed between the launch of the first generic competitor and the 
last market entrant did not see a large drop in the mean price per unit.  
 
Figure  6-1: Relative prices in the Ompeprazole molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
The second molecule examined in the antiacid market was 'Ranitidine'. Ranitidine was 
approved by the USA FDA as a new molecular entity in June, 1983, with its basic patent 
expiry date falling before 1998. In Egypt, the generic version of ranitidine was introduced 
to the market in 1989 under the brand name 'Ranitidine' by Medical Union 
Pharmaceuticals, selling at LE 0.63 per unit. Five years later, GSK's originator product 
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'Zantac' entered the market, selling at LE 1 per unit. Zantac was manufactured by GSK's 
subsidiary in Egypt under license from the mother company. Between 1989 and 2009, a 
total of 10 generic companies entered the market. Examining the price per unit of products 
entering this market segment sequentially, indicates that price levels have not experienced 
significant reductions over this 20-year period.  
 
Figure  6-2: Relative prices in the Ranitidine molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
Antiasthmatics: Beclometasone 
In the antiasthmatic therapeutic class, 'Beclometasone' was introduced to the Egyptian 
market in 1985, under the brand name 'Clenil' by Chiesi under a special toll manufacturing 
agreement with the public business sector company ADCO, selling at LE 16 per inhaler. In 
1996, GSK introduced its brand 'Becon Spray', selling at LE 19 per inhaler. The market for 
the Beclometasone molecule (50 mcg dose) is highly concentrated in Egypt, whereby only 
two generic products are present on the market. In 2006, Amoun introduced the second 
generic version of Beclometasone under the brand name 'Beclo' selling at LE 19 per unit, 
which is the same price as the originator manufactured by the subsidiary of GSK in Egypt.  
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Figure  6-3: Relative prices in the Beclometasone molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
Antibacterials: Amoxicillin, Ceftriaxone and Ciprofloxacin 
Four molecules falling under the therapeutic class of antibacterials have been examined. 
'Amoxicillin' was first introduced to the Egyptian market by BMS in 1977 through its 
brand name 'Hiconcil'. Given the considerable maturity of this therapeutic class, a relatively 
large number of manufacturers compete in the domain of the Amoxicillin molecule under 
an equally large number of strengths and dosage forms. The focus of the analysis has been 
on the 250 MG capsules specified in the WHO/HAI (2006) study. The first 250 MG 
capsule form of Amoxicillin was introduced by the public business sector company CID in 
1980, selling at LE 0.36 per unit. Between 1980 and 1997
22
, a total of 5 generic companies 
were competing in the domain of the dosage form and strength subject to examination, in 
addition to BMS's brand 'Hiconcil' which was launched in 1994, selling at LE 0.38 per unit. 
The last market entrant in 1997 was SEDICO's brand 'Biomox' which sold at LE 0.44 per 
unit. The prices of the majority of new entrants into the domain of Amoxicillin 250 MG 
capsules domain have been higher than that of the initial entrant. In fact, the most sold 
generic version of Amoxicillin 250 MG capsules is EIPICO's brand name 'Flumox', which 
sells at double the price of both the first generic entrant as well as that of BMS's brand-
product 'Hiconcil'. 
                                                 
22
ADCO's product Amoxycillin was launched on a date not specified by IMS data. 
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Figure  6-4: Relative prices in the Amoxicillin molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
A total of five products compete in the domain of the 'Ceftriaxone' molecule (V.IM Dry 
1G1 unit). The first market entrant was Roche in 1988 through a special toll manufacturing 
agreement with the local generic company EIPICO. Roche's brand 'Rocephin' sold at LE 46 
per unit. Within the domain of the examined dosage form and strength, four new products 
entered the market during the ten-year period between 1998 and 2008. The first generic 
company to enter the 'Ceftriaxone' 1G market was T3A under a special toll manufacturing 
agreement with the public business sector company CID, selling at LE 30 per unit. This 
price stood at 65 percent of the price of the Roche's originator product. The last entrant to 
the market in 2008, actually brought down prices to 43 percent of the price of the originator 
product, with Pharco's brand 'Cefaxone' selling at LE 20 per unit. 
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Figure  6-5: Relative prices in the Ceftriaxone molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
The last molecule to be examined in the domain of antibacterials is 'Ciprofloxacin', which 
is a relatively mature molecule, as it was first patented in 1983 by Bayer. In the domain of 
'Ciprofloxacin', a total of 4 generic companies compete in the 500 MG tablets market. The 
first market entrant was the local generic company Amriya through its brand 'Ciprocin' in 
1996, selling at LE 0.33 per unit. In 1997, Bayer launched its product 'Ciprobay' selling at a 
much lower price of LE 0.22 per unit. Further generic entry to the domain of the 
Ciprofloxacin' molecule (500 MG tablets) actually increased generic unit prices beyond that 
of the initial entrant.  
 
Figure  6-6: Relative prices in the Ciprofloxacin molecule (LE per unit) 
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Antidepressants: Amitriptyline and Fluoxetine 
In the antidepressants therapeutic class, competition in the domain of two molecule was 
examined, namely 'Amitriptyline' and'Fluoxetine'. The market for 'Amitriptyline' is 
highly concentrated in Egypt, with the public business sector pharmaceutical company 
Kahira having the only product on the market, namely 'Tryptizol' selling at LE 5 per 10 MG 
tablet and LE 3.5 per 25 MG tablet. 
 
The second molecule examined in the antidepressants class was 'Fluoxetine', which was 
approved by the US FDA as a NME in December 1987. Fluoxetine was introduced to the 
Egyptian market in 1996 through the originator product 'Prozac', which was imported by 
Eli Lilly and sold at LE 4.68 per unit of 20 MG capsule. During the same year, the public 
business sector company Misr introduced the competing product 'Fluxotine' which sold at 
LE 1.55 per unit. By the date the last generic product in the domain of the 'Fluoxetine' 
molecule entered the market, the unit price was more than halved to reach LE 0.66. 
 
Figure  6-7: Relative prices in the Fluoxetine molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
Antidiabetics: Glibenclamide and Metformin  
Pricing in the domain of two molecules in the antidiabetics therapeutic class has been 
examined. In the domain of the 'Glibenclamide' molecule, the first product to be launched 
in Egypt was Roche's brand 'Euglucon' in 1980, selling at LE 0.09 per unit of 5 MG tablets. 
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In 1988, the first and only generic competitor appeared on the market, when Pharco's 
'Diaben' began to be marketed, selling at LE 0.10 per unit. The price of the generic version 
of Glibenclamide stands at 107 percent of the price of the originator product.  
 
Figure  6-8: Relative prices in the Glibenclamide molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
The second molecule examined is 'Metformin', which was first marketed in France in 
1979, and received approval by the USA FDA for Type 2 diabetes in 1994. In 2002, 
Novartis Egypt launched its brand product 'Glucoformin' selling at LE 0.10 per unit of 500 
Mg tablets. Generic diffusion in the domain of the 'Metformin' molecule was relatively 
extensive in Egypt, with a total of 5 companies and 9 products (because of different dosage 
forms and strengths) on the market. The first product to enter the Egyptian market in 1996 
was CID's brand 'Cidophage', which sold at LE 0.13 per unit. Surprisingly, and contrary to 
expectation, further generic entry was either priced exactly the same as the first entrant or at 
higher unit prices. 
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Figure  6-9: Relative prices in the Metformin molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
Antiepileptic: Carbamazepine and Phenytoin      
In the antiepileptic class, two molecules 'Carbamazepine' and 'Phenytoin' were 
examined. Carbamazepine is a relatively mature molecule, as it was first marketed as a drug 
to treat trigeminal neuralgia in 1962, and has been used as an anticonvulsant in the UK 
since 1965. Carbamazepine has been approved in the USA since 1974. Carbamazepine was 
launched on the Egyptian market in 1985 under the brand name 'Tegral' by the public 
business sector company CID, selling at LE 0.19 per unit. In 1991, Novartis lunched its 
brand 'Tegretol' through its local subsidiary, selling at LE 0.8 per unit. A total of 14 generic 
products compete in the Carbamazepine market, whereby generic diffusion did not lead to 
any lowering of significance in price levels.  
 
Figure  6-10: Relative prices in the Carbamazepine molecule (LE per unit) 
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The second molecule examined, Phenytoin, is also a relatively mature one, having been 
first synthesized by German chemist Heinrich Biltz in 1908 (http://en.wikipedia.org). 
Phenytoin was first launched on the Egyptian market in 1995 by Pfizer, selling at LE 0.24 
per unit. The first generic competitor appeared on the market in 1998, through the entry of 
the brand of Nasr Company Pheny at LE 0.15 per unit. Four generic products compete in 
the Phenytoin market, with the each subsequent entrant raising the price much further 
beyond the initial entrant.  
 
Figure  6-11: Relative prices in the Phenytoin molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
Antifungal: Fluconazole  
In the antifungal therapeutic class, one molecule was examined, namely 'Fluconazole'. 
Pfizer received approval from the US FDA to market Fluconazole in 1990 under the brand 
name 'Diflucan', with the patent expiry date falling between 1998 and 2005. Diflucan was 
first introduced to the Egyptian market by Pfizer Egypt in 1993, selling at LE 27 per unit. 
In 1996, the first generic competitor appeared on the market, following the entry of 
SEDICO's brand Flucoral, which sold at LE 7.3 per unit. With only one exception, each 
new generic entrant to the market increased the level of unit prices beyond that of the initial 
entrant.  
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Figure  6-12: Relative prices in the Fluconazole molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
Antihypertensive: Atenolol, Captropril, Losartan and Nifedipine 
In the Antihypertensive class, four molecules were examined. The first is the domain of the 
'Atenolol' molecule, for which AstraZeneca received regulatory approval from the US 
FDA to market its brand name 'Tenormin' in 1981. Tenormin was first brought to Egypt by 
AstraZeneka through a toll manufacturing agreement with the public business sector 
company Kahira in 1993, selling at LE 0.47 per unit. The first generic competitor appeared 
in 1993, when Prodes manufactured its brand 'Blokium' through a toll manufacturing 
agreement with MUP, selling at LE 0.33 per unit. The first Egyptian, generic product was 
launched in 1998, when EIPICO marketed its product 'Ateno', selling at LE 0.16 per unit. 
All generic entries beyond 1998, were launched at much higher unit prices compared to the 
first entrant. 
 
Figure  6-13: Relative prices in the Atenolol molecule (LE per unit) 
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For the 'Captropril' and the 'Losartan' molecules, generic entry brought down unit prices, 
but not to levels of significance.  
 
Figure  6-14: Relative prices in the Captropril molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
Figure  6-15: Relative prices in the Losartan molecule (LE per unit) 
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For the 'Nifedipine' molecule, all generic products which entered the market both prior to 
and after the entry of the originator band 'Adalat' of Bayer, charged much higher unit prices 
than the originator. 
 
Figure  6-16: Relative prices in the Nifedipine molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
Anti-inflammatory: Diclofenac 
'Diclofenac' was the key molecule examined on the Egyptian anti-inflammatory market. 
Diclofenac was approved for marketing in the USA in 1988, when Novartis launched the 
brand name Voltaren (source). Voltaren was introduced in Egypt by Novartis in 1989, 
selling at LE 0.38 per unit. The first generic product to enter the market for Dicloenac was 
Pharco's 'Declophen', which sold at LE 0.23 per unit. A total of 12 competing products 
entered the market between 1991 and 2008, with the mean unit price standing at LE 0.3 as 
each new market entrant increased unit prices beyond the level of the previous entrant.  
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Figure  6-17: Relative prices in the Diclofenac molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
Anxiolytic and Serum Lipid Reducing 
 
In both the molecules of 'Diazepam' and 'Lovastatin', only generic companies are present 
on the market, with no significant reduction in prices for new market entrants for both 
molecules. 
 
Figure  6-18: Relative prices in the Diazepam molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
0
.5
0
 
0
.2
3
 
0
.2
4
 
0
.2
0
 0
.3
5
 
0
.3
5
 
0
.3
4
 
0
.3
3
 
0
.3
5
 
0
.4
0
 
0
.3
3
 
0
.3
0
 
0
.2
0
 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
O
ri
g
in
at
o
r 
N
O
V
A
R
T
IS
E
G
Y
P
T
 1
9
9
1
M
S
G
 P
H
A
R
C
O
 1
9
9
1
S
E
D
IC
O
 1
9
9
4
L
P
G
 N
A
S
R
 1
9
9
5
M
U
P
 M
E
P
H
A
 1
9
9
5
G
S
K
 E
G
 1
9
9
6
T
3
A
 1
9
9
8
M
IN
A
P
H
A
R
M
 1
9
9
9
M
U
P
 M
E
P
H
A
 2
0
0
0
G
S
K
 E
G
 2
0
0
4
M
IN
A
P
H
A
R
M
 2
0
0
5
D
E
L
T
A
 2
0
0
8
L
P
G
 E
IP
IC
O
 2
0
0
8
0
.0
3
 
0
.1
3
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.1
3
 
0
.1
0
 
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
A
D
C
O
 (
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
)
M
S
G
 N
IL
E
 1
9
8
9
L
P
G
 M
E
M
P
H
IS
 1
9
9
1
P
H
A
R
C
O
 1
9
9
5
A
M
O
U
N
 2
0
0
0
 188 
Figure  6-19: Relative prices in the Lovastatin molecule (LE per unit) 
 
 
A key finding from examining prices in conjunction with the rate of generic diffusion for 
the sample molecules is that generic diffusion does not significantly bring down average 
prices on the Egyptian market. With only one exception, for products competing within the 
domain of the 19 molecules examined, the prices of subsequent market were either 
clustered around the first entrant, or went above it.  
 
Table 6-3 provides the summary results of the correlation coefficient of the two variables 
the number of products on the market (starting with the first year a product was launched 
within the domain of the concerned molecule) and the mean price per unit within each 
molecule following subsequent generics market entrants for each year up to 2008. In 6 out 
of the 19 molecules (in which there was significant generic diffusion), there was no 
evidence of a positive correlation between the increase in the number of generic product 
within the molecule and the decrease in the mean price per unit following the entry of each 
subsequent market entrant. 
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Table  6-3: Correlation coefficient of the two variables the number of products on the 
market and mean prices 
Class/molecule Number of generic 
products 
Correlation coefficient of 
number of products on the 
market starting with the launch 
of first product and mean price 
per unit within molecule 
following each new generic 
entrant  
Antacid 
 
 Omeprazole 17 -0.93 
Ranitidine 13 -0.53 
Antiasthmatic 
  Beclometasone 2 1 
Antibacterial 
  Amoxicillin 6 0.69 
Ceftriaxone 4 -0.05 
Ciprofloxacin 4 0.80 
Antidepressant   
Fluoxetine 6 -0.86 
Antidiabetic 
  Glibenclamide 2 -1 
Metformin 9 0.31 
Antiepileptic 
 Carbamazepine 14 0.86 
Phenytoin 4 0.97 
Antifungal 
  Fluconazole 6 0.73 
Antihypertensive 
  Atenolol 6 0.26 
Captopril 4 -0.98 
Losartan 10 -0.63 
Nifedipine 4 -0.52 
Anti-inflammatory 
  Diclofenac 12 0.99 
Anxiolytic 
  Diazepam 4 -0.62 
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6.7 Have Egyptian Consumers Been Capturing the Financial Benefits From Having 
Access to Cheaper Generics?  
This section attempts to answer the important question of whether or not Egyptian 
consumers have been fully capturing the financial benefits from having access to -cheaper- 
generics. As indicated in Table 6-2, in the case of the majority of the sample molecules, 
generics dominated the market, both in terms of volume as well as value shares. 
 
To evaluate the extent to which Egyptian consumers (patients) are capitalizing on the cost 
advantage of a highly genericised market, the prices and market shares of originator 
products were compared to those of the most sold generic and the least priced generic 
within the domain of the study molecule. IMS data provided the necessary information 
regarding dispensed volumes in the retail (pharmacies) sector, sales value as well as 
information regarding prices and market shares.  
 
Table 6-4 presents the summary results, which provide evidence that of the 21 study-
molecules for which IMS Egypt provided sufficient information, in only 2 cases were the 
most sold generic also the least priced generic. In half of the molecules examined (10) the 
single largest product market share has been held by the innovator brand(s). For each of the 
sample molecules in Table 6-4, the originator product is listed on top raw(s), followed by 
generic products listed sequentially according to their launch dates. 
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Table  6-4: Sales by originator brands, least priced generic (LPG) and most sold generic (MSG) on the Egyptian market 
2003 and 2008 
Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public 
Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antacid          
1.OMEPRAZOLE                   
Originator Imported  ASTRAZENECA LOSEC ENT.FILM CAP 20 MG 14 1993 0.0   -   140.0  10.00 
Originator Imported  ASTRAZENECA LOSEC ENT.FILM CAP 20 MG 7 2003 5.7  2.1   49.0  7.00 
 Private  AMRIYA. GASTRAZOLE CAPS ENTERIC 20 MG 14 1994 21.14 0.00 42.40 3.03 
 Private  EIPICO EPIRAZOLE CAPS ENTERIC 20 MG 14 1994 4.80 3.42 44.00 3.14 
 Private  PHARCO ULSTOP CAPS ENTERIC 20 MG 14 1995 1.86 0.05 42.40 3.03 
 Imported  JULPHAR RISEK CAPS ENTERIC 20 MG 14 1996 4.0  3.4   40.0  2.86 
 Imported  JULPHAR RISEK CAPS ENTERIC 20 MG 28 1996 0.5  1.7   75.0  2.68 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. HYPOSEC CAPS 20 MG 14 1996 1.2  0.3   42.0  3.00 
 Private  MUP MEPHA GASEC 20 CAPS 20 MG 7 1996 9.0  5.1   22.0  3.14 
 Private  PHARCO ULSTOP CAPS ENTERIC 20 MG 8 1996 3.8  1.6   24.0  3.00 
 Private  MUP MEPHA GASEC 20 CAPS 20 MG 14 1997 8.4  7.9   37.7  2.69 
 Private  SEDICO OMEPAK CAPS 20 MG 7 1998  12.6   10.8   16.5  2.36 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. HYPOSEC CAPS 20 MG 5 1999 2.2  0.5   15.0  3.00 
 Private  SEDICO OMEPAK CAPS 20 MG 14 1999 2.9  5.2   33.0  2.36 
 Holdipharma MEMPHIS OMEPRAL CAPS 20 MG 14 2000 6.9  6.9   21.0  1.50 
MSG Private  GLOBAL NAPI NAPIZOLE CAPS 20 MG 14 2000  14.8   21.7   23.0  1.64 
 Private  GLOBAL NAPI NAPIZOLE CAPS 20 MG 28 2001 0.1   -  42.0  1.50 
 Private  OCTOBER PHARMA FASTCURE CAPS 20 MG 7 2004  - 0.4   18.9  2.70 
 Private  OCTOBER PHARMA FASTCURE CAPS 20 MG 14 2005  - 1.4   24.0  1.71 
 Private  EURO.EGY.PH. GASTRAZOLE CAPS 20 MG 14 2006  -  15.3   42.4  3.03 
LPG Private  PHARAONIA PH. OMEZ CAPS 20 MG 14 2007  - 7.2   13.5  0.96 
 Private  UNITED PH.MNF. OMISEC CAPS 20 MG 14 2007  - 4.8   42.0  3.00 
 Holdipharma is the Drug Holding Company 
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Cont.  
 
Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antacid          
2.RANITIDINE          
Originator MULTINATIONAL  GSK EG ZANTAC FILM C.TABS 150 MG 20 1994        31.1         23.2         20.0  1.00 
Originator MULTINATIONAL  G GSK EG ZANTAC TABS EFF 150 MG 20 1997          5.2           5.2         24.0  1.20 
 PRIVATE SECTOR MUP RANITIDINE C.TAB 150 MG 20 1989          9.4           7.2         12.5  0.63 
 PRIVATE SECTOR SEDICO RANITAK FILM C.TABS 150 MG 20 1990          8.2           6.0         14.0  0.70 
 HOLDIPHARMA CID RANBAXY HISTAC TABS 150 MG 20 1997          1.2           0.8         13.0  0.65 
 HOLDIPHARMA NASR RANTIDOL TABS 150 MG 20 1997        14.1           5.7           9.5  0.48 
 HOLDIPHARMA ADCO RANTIDINE TABS 150 MG 10 1998          0.0           0.0           5.0  0.50 
MSG PRIVATE SECTOR PHARCO RANI POWD. EFF 150 MG 6 2000          5.6         20.3           4.0  0.67 
 PRIVATE SECTOR PHARCO RANICAP CAPS 150 MG 20 2000          0.5            -           12.5  0.63 
 HOLDIPHARMA ADCO RANTIDINE TABS 150 MG 20 2001          0.1           0.1           9.9  0.50 
  IMPORTED SECTOR JULPHAR RANTAG TABS 150 MG 20 2003          0.2           0.2         15.0  0.75 
 PRIVATE SECTOR PHARCO RANI POWD. EFF 150 MG 60 2007           -             4.2         40.0  0.67 
 PRIVATE SECTOR SIGMA ACILOC EFF.GRA.SACH 150 MG 10 2008           -             0.0           6.0  0.60 
 PRIVATE SECTOR SIGMA ACILOC EFF.GRA.SACH 150 MG 5 2008           -             0.1           3.0  0.60 
 PRIVATE SECTOR UNI PHARMA RANIDIL FILM C.TABS 150 MG 20 2008           -             0.1           9.0  0.45 
LPG PRIVATE SECTOR UNI PHARMA RANTIBLOCK FILM C.CAPS 150 MG 20 2009           -              -             9.0  0.45 
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Cont.  
 
Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public  
Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antiasthmatic          
3.BECLOMETASONE          
Originator Multinational  GSK EG BECONASE SPRAY 50 Y 200 1996 0.0   -  19.0   19.0  
MSG Holdipharma ADCO CHIESI CLENIL  INHA.DOSIER 50 Y /DOS 200 15 G 1985  50.0   44.0   16.0   16.0  
 Holdipharma ADCO CHIESI CLENIL  INHA.DOSIER 50 Y /DOS 200 15 G 1985  50.0   44.0   16.0   16.0  
  Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. BECLO NASAL SPRAY 50 Y /DOS 200 20 ML 2006  -  11.9   19.0   19.0  
Antibacterial          
4.AMOXICILLIN          
Originator Private  PHARCO BMS HICONCIL CAPS 250 MG 12 1990  16.9  9.6  4.5  0.38 
 Holdipharma CID AMOXYCID CAPS 250 MG 12 1980 0.0   - 4.3  0.36 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. IBIAMOX CAPS 250 MG 12 1981  18.4   10.0  3.7  0.31 
MSG Private  EIPICO FLUMOX CAPS STRIPS 250 MG 12 1985  43.9   75.2  7.5  0.63 
 Private  SEDICO FLUCAMOX CAPS 250 MG 12 1994 4.1  1.4  6.3  0.53 
 Private  SEDICO BIOMOX CAPS 250 MG 12 1997 7.6  3.9  5.3  0.44 
LPG Holdipharma ADCO AMOXYCILLIN CAPS 250 MG 12 oooo 9.0   - 2.7  0.23 
5.CEFTRIAXONE          
Originator Holdipharma KAHIRA SANDOZ CEFTRIAXONE V.IM DRY 1 G 1 3.50 ML 2003  22.6   25.3   29.0   29.0  
  Private  EIPICO ROCHE ROCEPHIN V.IM DRY 1 G 1 1988  37.6   17.8   46.0   46.0  
 Private  EIPICO ROCHE ROCEPHIN V.IV DRY 1 G 1 1988  14.8  7.0   46.0   46.0  
 Holdipharma CID T3A CEFOTRIX T3A V.IM/IV DRY 1 G 1 1998  15.2  1.1   30.0   30.0  
 Holdipharma KAHIRA SANDOZ CEFTRIAXONE V.IV DRY 1 G 1 5 ML 2003 9.7  7.9   29.0   29.0  
MSG Private  PHARCO CEFAXONE V.IM 1 G 1 2005  -  21.7   20.0   20.0  
 Holdipharma CID RANBAXY OFRAMAX V.IM DRY 1 G 1 3.50 ML 2005  - 9.3   22.5   22.5  
 Holdipharma CID RANBAXY OFRAMAX V.IV DRY 1 G 1 10 ML 2005  - 1.1   22.5   22.5  
LPG Imported  TABUK PH. TRIAXONE V.IV LYOP. 1 G 1 10 ML 2005  - 0.9   35.0   35.0  
  Imported  TABUK UNITE.PH.MNF LONGACEF V.IM DRY 1 G 1 2007  - 5.0   35.0   35.0  
  Imported  TABUK UNITE.PH.MNF LONGACEF V.IV DRY 1 G 1 2007  - 1.7   35.0   35.0  
 Private  PHARCO CEFAXONE V.IV DRY 1 G 1 2008  - 1.0   20.0   20.0  
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Cont. 
 
Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antibacterial          
6.Ciprofloxacin          
Originator Private  HIKMA BAYER CIPROBAY FILM C.TABS 500 MG 10 1997  22.8   -  46.0  0.22 
  Multinational  NPE SANDOZ SERVIFLOX TABS 500 MG 10 1997  13.3   30.1   28.0  0.36 
 Private  AMRIYA PHARMACEUT. CIPROFLOXACIN FILM C.TABS 500 MG 10 1995  13.4   10.3   30.0  0.33 
 Private  MUP MEPHA BACTIFLOX FILM C.TABS 500 MG 10 1996  18.6   13.8   31.0  0.32 
 Private  EIPICO CIPROCIN TABS 500 MG 10 1996 9.6   11.6   32.0  0.31 
 Holdipharma CID RANBAXY RANCIF TABS 500 MG 10 1997 2.6  2.8   22.5  0.44 
 Holdipharma MISR MIFOXIN TABS 500 MG 10 1997  10.4  7.3   29.7  0.34 
MSG Private  PHARCO CIPROFAR TABS 500 MG 10 2002  -  17.3   20.0  0.50 
LPG Imported  SPIMACO CIPROMAX FILM C.TABS 500 MG 10 2002 7.7  6.1   33.0  0.30 
 Private  EURO.EGY.PH. CIPROFLOXACIN TABS 500 MG 10 2006 1.6  0.6   30.0  0.33 
 Private  UNI PHARMA CIPROQUIN FILM C.TABS 500 MG 10 2008  -  -  15.0  0.67 
 Private  EL-OBOUR PH. CIPROXIL-XL C.TAB 500 MG 10 2009  - 0.0   18.0  0.56 
Antidepressant          
7.AMITRIPTYLINE          
 Holdipharma KAHIRA TRYPTIZOL TABS 10 MG 100 2000   428.2    369.1  5.0   
 Holdipharma KAHIRA TRYPTIZOL TABS 25 MG 30 2000   1,356.2    1,310.2  3.5   
          
8.FLUOXETINE          
Originator Imported  ELI LILLY PROZAC CAPS 20 MG 14 1996 5.3  2.3   65.0  0.22 
Originator Imported  ELI LILLY PROZAC TABS DISPERS 20 MG 7 2002 0.6   -  33.0  0.21 
          
 Holdipharma MISR FLUXOTINE CAPS 20 MG 10 1996  25.9   18.1   15.5  0.65 
MSG Private  AMRIYA PHARMACEUT. DEPREBAN CAPS STRIPS 20 MG 10 1998  20.8   21.5   15.2  0.66 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. PHILOZAC CAPS 20 MG 10 1999  24.2   40.2  9.0  1.11 
LPG Private  OCTOBER PHARMA OCTOZAC CAPS 20 MG 10 1999 3.2  7.9   18.0  0.56 
 Private  T3A FLOROSIN CAPS 20 MG 10 2001  11.8  7.2  9.0  1.11 
 Private  EIPICO FLUTIN CAPS 20 MG 14 2003 8.1  2.9  9.2  1.52 
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Cont.  
Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antidiabetic          
9.GLIBENCLAMIDE          
Originator Private  GLAXO EG. ROCHE EUGLUCON TABS 5 MG 30 1980 9.9   14.5  2.8  0.09 
 Multinational  SANOFI AVENTIS EGY DAONIL TABS 5 MG 20 oooo 5.2   - 6.0  0.30 
  Multinational  CHEMIPHARM EUGLUMIDE TABS 5 MG 30 2005  84.9   81.1  6.0  0.20 
MSG/LPG Private  PHARCO DIABEN TABS 5 MG 20 1988  - 4.4  2.0  0.10 
          
10.METFORMIN          
Originator Multinational  NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT GLUCOFORMIN TABS 500 MG 20 2002  15.3   12.5  2.0  0.10 
 Multinational  NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT GLUCOFORMIN TABS 500 MG 80 2002  -  47.1  8.0  0.10 
          
LPG Holdipharma NASR METFORMIN TABS STRIPS 500 MG 200 0000 6.9  2.5   20.0  0.10 
 Holdipharma CID CIDOPHAGE TABS 500 MG 10 1996 0.1  0.3  1.3  0.13 
 Holdipharma CID CIDOPHAGE TABS 500 MG 20 1996 0.8  0.6  2.5  0.13 
 Holdipharma CID CIDOPHAGE TABS 500 MG 500 1997 0.1   -  62.5  0.13 
LPG Holdipharma NASR METFORMIN TABS 500 MG 30 1999  15.3  1.6  3.0  0.10 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. AMOPHAGE TABS 500 MG 10 2000 0.1   - 1.5  0.15 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. AMOPHAGE TABS 500 MG 30 2000  24.5   16.1  4.5  0.15 
LPG Private  PHARCO DIAFORMIN TABS 500 MG 20 2000 0.0   - 2.0  0.10 
LPG Private  PHARAONIA PH. DIAPHAGE TABS 500 MG 20 2001 0.4  1.6  2.0  0.10 
MSG Private  MINAPHARM MERCK GLUCOPHAGE FILM C.TABS 500 MG 50 2006  36.4   17.7   15.0  0.30 
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Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antiepileptic          
11.CARBAMAZEPINE          
Originator Multinational  NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT TEGRETOL TABS C.R 200 MG 20 1991  - 0.5   16.0  0.80 
 Multinational  NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT TEGRETOL TABS 200 MG 30 2005  - 0.6   16.5  0.55 
 Holdipharma CID TEGRAL TABS 200 MG 50 1985  - 0.4  9.5  0.19 
LPG Holdipharma CID TEGRAL TABS 200 MG 10 1985  - 0.0  1.9  0.19 
 Multinational  NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT TEGRETOL TABS 200 MG 20 1986  - 0.6   11.0  0.55 
  Imported  GEROT NEUROTOP TABS 200 MG 10 1998 1.1  4.9  3.8  0.38 
 Private  PHARCO-T3A TONOCLONE F.C.TABS CR 200 MG 10 2000 0.2  0.0  3.3  0.33 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. CARBATOL TABS 200 MG 20 2003  72.4  0.0  9.0  0.45 
  Imported  GEROT NEUROTOP TABS 200 MG 100 2004  - 1.7   55.0  0.55 
 Private  PHARCO-T3A TONOCLONE F.C.TABS CR 200 MG 20 2004  - 0.3  5.0  0.25 
 Private  UNI PHARMA MAZEMAL TABS 200 MG 20 2005  26.4   28.3  8.5  0.43 
MSG Private  UNI PHARMA MAZEMAL TABS 200 MG 50 2007  -  62.2   21.3  0.43 
 Private  T3A TONOCLONE TABS C.R 200 MG 10 2007  - 0.0  2.5  0.25 
  Imported  MULTIAPEX PH. CARBAPEX TABS C.R 200 MG 30 2008  - 0.4   22.5  0.75 
  Imported  MULTIAPEX PH. CARBAPEX TABS 200 MG 30 2008 0.0   -  18.0  0.60 
          
12. PHENYTOIN          
Originator Holdipharma NILE PFIZER EPANUTIN TABS 100 MG 100 2000 0.0   -  10.0  0.10 
Originator Holdipharma NILE PFIZER EPANUTIN CAPS 100 MG 100 1995 0.1   -  10.0  0.10 
Originator Private  NILE PFIZER EPANUTIN CAPS 50 MG 100 1995  - 9.1  5.0  0.05 
 Holdipharma ALEXANDRIA BAYER COMITAL L TABS 100 2000  17.1  0.9   15.0    
 Holdipharma NILE PFIZER EPANUTIN CAPS 100 MG 50 2000 0.0   -  12.0  0.24 
LPG Holdipharma NASR PHENYTOIN CAPS 100 MG 40 1998  62.0  0.8  5.8  0.15 
 Holdipharma NILE PHENYTIN A.IM 100 MG 1 2 ML 2004  -  - 2.3    
 Holdipharma NILE PHENYTIN A.IM 100 MG 10 2 ML 2004  20.8  7.3   22.5    
MSG Holdipharma NILE PHENYTIN CAPS 100 MG 50 2004  -  68.6   12.0  0.24 
 Holdipharma ARAB GELAT.ACDIMA IPANTEN CAPS 100 MG 50 2005  - 0.2   16.0  0.32 
 Holdipharma MEMPHIS PHENYTOIN CAPS 100 MG 50 2006  - 5.0   14.0  0.28 
 Holdipharma ALEXANDRIA COMIDAL-L TABS 100 2008  - 8.1   40.0    
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Cont. 
 
Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antifungal          
13.FLUCONAZOLE          
          
Originator Multinational  PFIZER EGYPT DIFLUCAN CAPS 150 MG 1 1993  33.0   31.5   27.0  27.00 
LPG/MSG Private  SEDICO FLUCORAL CAPS 150 MG 2 1996  37.9   29.3   14.6  7.30 
 Private  HIKMA PLC ALKANAZOLE CAPS 150 MG 1 1998 2.6  1.9   14.7  14.70 
 Private  RAMEDA T3A TRICONAL CAPS 150 MG 1 1998 5.3  2.1   14.7  14.70 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. FUNGICAN CAPS 150 MG 1 2001  14.6   17.1   10.0  10.00 
 Private  EIPICO TREFLUCAN CAPS 150 MG 1 2002 6.7   16.1  8.0  8.00 
 Imported  SPIMACO FLOCAZOLE CAPS 150 MG 1 2006  - 2.0   18.0  18.00 
          
Antihypertensive         
14.ATENOLOL          
Originator Holdipharma KAHIRA ASTRAZENECA TENORMIN TABS 50 MG 14 1993  69.6  1.0  6.6  0.47 
Originator Imported  ASTRAZENECA EGYPT TENORET FILM C.TABS 50 MG /12 14 2007  - 1.9  9.0  0.64 
Originator Imported  ASTRAZENECA EGYPT TENORMIN FILM C.TABS 50 MG 14 2007 7.8   14.9  8.0  0.57 
                    
LPG Private  MUP PRODES BLOKIUM TABS 50 MG 15 1993  - 0.1  5.0  0.33 
  Private  EIPICO ATENO TABS 50 MG 20 1998  - 0.6  3.3  0.16 
 Private  SIGMA TENEDONE TABS 50 MG 20 2000  - 0.5   11.0  0.55 
 Imported  JEDCO ATENOLOL TABS 50 MG 20 2004 7.7   13.8  4.3  0.31 
 Private  PHARCO ATELOL TABS 50 MG 20 2004  14.9   14.3  3.5  0.18 
MSG Holdipharma KAHIRA TENOTENS TABS 50 MG 14 2008  -  52.8  6.0  0.43 
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Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antihypertensive          
15.CAPTOPRIL          
Originator Multinational  BMS EGYPT CAPOTEN TABS 25 MG 40 2003  56.4  0.0   20.0  0.50 
Originator Multinational  BMS EGYPT CAPOTEN TABS 25 MG 20 1983 0.6  0.4   10.0  0.50 
 Holdipharma KAHIRA LONTENSIN TABS 25 MG 20 1995  -  12.2  7.0  0.35 
 Private  EIPICO CAPOTRIL TABS 25 MG 20 1996 1.9  1.3  6.4  0.32 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. HYPOPRESS TABS 25 MG 10 1999  - 0.1  3.0  0.30 
 Multinational  GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG CAPOTEN TABS 25 MG 20 2008  28.9   67.1   10.0  0.50 
 Multinational  GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG CAPOTEN TABS 25 MG 40 2008  -  -  20.0  0.50 
LPG/MSG Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. HYPOPRESS TABS 25 MG 30 2008  12.3   18.9  9.0  0.30 
 Private  PHARAONIA PH. ANGIOPRESS TABS 25 2009  -  - 3.0    
          
16.LOSARTAN          
Originator Imported  M.S.D. HYZAAR TABS 50 MG 14 1998  56.9   45.2   52.0  3.71 
Originator Imported  M.S.D. COZAAR TABS 50 MG 14 1998  - 1.7   52.0  3.71 
MSG Private  SIGMA LOZAPRESS TABS 50 MG 14 2001  31.7   29.8   27.0  1.93 
 Private  AMRIYA PHARMACEUT. LOSARTAN TABS 50 MG 10 2001 0.0  0.0   18.0  1.80 
   Private  SIGMA MEPHA LOSARMEPHA TABS 50 MG 14 2003 8.5   12.3   27.0  1.93 
   Private  SIGMA MEPHA LOSARMEPHA TABS 50 MG 7 2003  - 1.2   13.5  1.93 
   Private  UNI PHARMA LOSAR TABS 50 MG 7 2003 0.4   -  13.0  1.86 
   Private  SIGMA MEPHA LOSARMEPHA PLUS TABS 50 MG /12 7 2004  - 1.3   13.5  1.93 
   Private  UNI PHARMA LOSAR TABS 50 MG 28 2007  - 0.1   52.0  1.86 
 Private  HIKMA PLC KANZAR-H FILM C.TABS 50 MG /12 7 2007 1.4  2.7   12.0  1.71 
 Private  HIKMA PLC KANZAR TABS 50 MG 7 2007  - 0.3   12.0  1.71 
LPG Private  PHARAONIA PH. LOSARTAN TABS 50 MG 14 2008 1.1  5.4   18.0  1.29 
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Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antihypertensive          
17.NIFEDIPINE          
Originator Holdipharma ALEXANDRIA BAYER ADALAT TABS 20 MG 30 1995  37.1   -  10.5  0.35 
MSG Private  EIPICO EPILAT TABS L.A 20 MG 20 1989  84.5   80.3   10.5  0.525 
LPG Private  MINAPHARM B.O.I DILCOR CAPS L.A 20 MG 20 1992 0.0   - 6.7  0.335 
 Private  SIGMA TIBA TENOLAT CAPS S.R 20 2003 2.8   19.6   10.0  0.5 
 Private  SIGMA TIBA TENOLAT CAPS S.R 30 2004  - 0.1   15.0  0.75 
Anti-inflammatory         
18.DICLOFENAC          
Originator Multinational  NPE NOVARTIS C.H. VOLTAREN C.H. ENTER.C.TABS 25 MG 30 1989  11.1  8.3   11.3  0.38 
Originator Multinational  NOVARTIS . EGYPT CATAFLAM C.TAB 25 MG 10 1991  43.0  0.0  5.0  0.50 
Originator Multinational  NOVARTIS  EGYPT CATAFLAM C.TAB 25 MG 20 2005  -  53.7   10.0  0.50 
          
MSG Private  PHARCO DECLOPHEN TABS 25 MG 20 1991  15.1  8.4  4.5  0.23 
  Private  SEDICO RHEUMARENE TABS 25 MG 20 1994 3.0  2.4  4.8  0.24 
LPG Holdipharma NASR DICLOFENAC TABS 25 MG 30 1995 2.1  1.2  6.0  0.20 
 Private  MUP MEPHA OLFEN LACTABS 25 MG 30 1995 7.9  7.1   10.5  0.35 
 Multinational  GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG RHEUMAFEN C.TAB 25 MG 20 1996 2.4  1.0  6.9  0.35 
 Private  T3A ANTIFLAM TABS 25 MG 10 1998 7.1  2.7  3.4  0.34 
 Private  MINAPHARM TOP PHAR POTAFEN TABS 25 MG 10 1999 1.1  0.0  3.3  0.33 
 Private  MUP MEPHA OFLAM TABS 25 MG 10 2000 7.2  6.4  3.5  0.35 
 Multinational  GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG RAPIFLAM TABS 25 MG 10 2004  - 3.8  4.0  0.40 
 Private  MINAPHARM TOP PHAR POTAFEN TABS 25 MG 20 2005  - 1.3  6.5  0.33 
 Private  DELTA DOLPHIN-K TABS 25 MG 20 2008  - 1.6  6.0  0.30 
LPG Private  EIPICO EPIFENAC TABS 25 MG 20 2008  - 2.2  4.0  0.20 
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Class/molecule Sector Company Product Pack Launch 
Year 
Sales value (LE ‘million) Public Price 
LE 
Price 
per unit 
LE 
      2003 2008   
Antiviral          
19.Acyclovir          
Originator Multinational  GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG NOVIRUS CAPS 200 MG 8 1994  72.4   74.9   11.0  1.38 
Originator Multinational  GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG ZOVIRAX TABS 200 MG 25 1986 0.2   -   166.8  6.67 
 Private  SEDICO CYCLOVIRAL TABS 200 MG 20 1997  27.3   25.1   21.0  1.05 
          
Anxiolytic          
20.DIAZEPAM          
 Holdipharma ADCO CALIUM TABS 5 MG 20 0000 5.1   - 0.6  0.03 
MSG Holdipharma NILE VALINIL TABS 5 MG 10 1989  72.6   85.3  1.3  0.13 
LPG Holdipharma MEMPHIS NEURIL TABS 5 MG 10 1991  20.6  6.5  0.7  0.07 
 Private  PHARCO FARCOZEPAM TABS 5 MG 20 1995  - 0.3  2.5  0.13 
 Private  AMOUN PHARM.CO. VALPAM TABS 5 MG 10 2000 1.6  7.9  1.0  0.10 
Serum lipid reducing         
21.LOVASTATIN          
 Private  EIPICO LOWCHOL TABS 20 MG 10 2000 2.2   -  17.5  1.75 
 Holdipharma MEMPHIS LOVASTAN TABS 20 MG 10 2001  67.4   -  17.0  1.70 
MSG Private  EL-OBOUR PH. CHOLILYSIS TABS 20 MG 10 2003  30.4    100.0   17.0  1.70 
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6.8 Summary and Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide an answer to the research question concerning 
how far and in what ways have the regulatory framework governing Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry allowed local companies to charge higher than average prices 
compared to other world markets. Three key concerns have been driving the investigation 
in this Chapter. First, are generic-to-originator drug prices in Egypt in line with the standard 
ratios in major world markets. Second, has generic diffusion been bringing down average 
pharmaceutical price levels in Egypt? Third, within the context of an IPRs regime which 
excluded pharmaceutical products from patentability up to January 2005, have Egyptian 
consumers been fully capturing the financial benefits of having access to cheap generics?  
 
In order to address the research question, I have relied on the methodology followed by the 
WHO and HAI (2006) concerned with the international comparison of the prices of chronic 
disease medicines. The IMS Egypt database provided the main source of data. 
 
The examination of price competition on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market has brought up 
some concerns about generic-to-originator price levels in Egypt for the sample molecules. 
Evidence has been presented that generic-to-originator prices in Egypt are higher than the 
standard ratios observed in major world markets. Of no less importance, generic diffusion 
has not necessarily been bringing down average prices on the Egyptian market for the 
sample study molecules. In close connection to the review presented in Chapter Four, these 
results indicate that pricing policies in Egypt need to be revised to induce a visible 
downward trend regarding relative prices for new generics market entrants, similar to 
observed patterns in major world markets. The results also indicate that the levels of profit 
generated by local companies in association with higher than standard generic-to-originator 
prices for the sample molecules are likely to be high. 
 
On another important front, Egyptian consumers have not been fully capturing the financial 
benefit of having access to a large generics manufacturing base, particularly in light of a lax 
IPRs regime which ruled up to January 2005. Prescribing habits have resulted in a situation 
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whereby the least priced generics are not necessarily the most prescribed. The nature of 
prescribing norms have to be influenced in a way that entices prescribing physicians to 
prescribe by generic name, and dispensing pharmaceutics to be able to dispense the lowest 
priced generic. Inducing such change in prescribing habits should elevate some of the 
financial burden falling on the uninsured segment of the population that is obliged to cover 
its needs for drugs out-of-pocket. 
 
The evidence presented threw light on the pressing need to revisit generics policies as well 
as prescribing practices in Egypt as detailed in Chapter Four. This need is made all the 
more pertinent, in light of the exerted upward pressure on prices as a result of enforcing 
pharmaceutical product patent protection in Egypt, as will be detailed in Chapter Seven. 
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7. WHAT HAS BEEN THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF IMPACT OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
ON PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE LEVELS IN EGYPT AND ON MARKET SHARES OF KEY 
PLAYERS? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will attempt to provide an answer to the research question concerned with the 
impact of strengthening the country’s IPRs regime in conformity with the TRIPs 
Agreement on pharmaceutical price levels in Egypt, as well as the market shares of key 
players. 
 
This chapter probes deeper into the costs associated with enforcing pharmaceutical product 
patent protection in Egypt as of January-2005. Costs are narrowed down to the differential 
between what consumers actually pay for new originator products -which are protected by 
patents- and what they would have incurred in terms of prices and cost had generic 
products been available.  
 
This chapter takes the first attempt in Egypt to quantify the impact of the TRIPS Agreement 
on the country’s pharmaceutical market by focusing the analysis on the extent to which 
Egyptian consumers have been willing to trade-off lower prices of older drugs, for more 
innovative new products, as well as on how this varies across different therapeutic classes. 
To date, no attempt has been made to evaluate the nature and magnitude of impact of the 
TRIPS Agreement on Egypt’s pharmaceutical sector using real market data, and hence this 
chapter contributes to the debate surrounding the TRIPS Agreement with the support of 
empirically grounded findings. This chapter relies on proprietary data concerning a 
selection of therapeutic classes from IMS in order to examine pharmaceutical market 
dynamics in Egypt during the period 2004-2008. The 42 therapeutic classes account for 50 
percent of the market by value. 
 
Survey results which covered 25 of Egypt’s key players on the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing scene, including public business sector companies, local generics 
manufacturers and subsidiaries of research-based pharmaceutical companies concerning 
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their forecast regarding the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on their business will also be 
presented. The survey was conducted in April 2004, almost one year before the 
enforcement of the 20-year period of pharmaceutical patent protection in Egypt. By 
comparing the survey results to actual market dynamics after January 2005, we will be able 
to evaluate the degree of precision firms operating on Egypt’s pharmaceutical 
manufacturing scene have had regarding their state of business after the enforcement of 
pharmaceutical patent protection, and accordingly, the effectiveness of their survival 
strategies.  
 
The results have indicated that the cost-related impact of the TRIPS Agreement in the 
domain of Egypt’s top 42 therapeutic classes by market value has been put in the range of 
LE 479 million. Results indicated that in 13 of these top 42 therapeutic classes, there was 
evidence regarding launches of new molecules by research-based pharmaceutical 
companies on the Egyptian market, with no evident generic competition. 
 
Shifts in terms of consumer/prescribing physician’s preference in favour of new versus 
mature molecules has, nonetheless, been evident. Such a shift has not yet been reflected in a 
full-fledged movement in market shares to the disadvantage of local companies. In fact the 
local private sector has been gaining market shares at a remarkably agile fashion. 
 
Survey results have indicated that most of the perceptions regarding the future state of the 
business following full respect of pharmaceutical product patent protection in Egypt as 
reflected in the responses of the various players have suffered from flaws in judgment.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 presents the review of the literature to 
which the empirical findings of this chapter endeavour to contribute to. This literature 
covers the key developments which led to the inclusion of IPRs issues on the agenda of the 
Uruguay Round (UR) and the eventual global harmonisation of IPRs. Section 7.3 presents a 
brief overview of the operation of Egypt’s pharmaceutical manufacturers under the 
framework of the pre-TRIPS IPRs regime. Section 7.4 presents the empirical strategy to 
answer the questions posed. Section 7.5 quantifies the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on 
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Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. Section 7.6 presents the survey findings. Section 7.7 
presents the summary of findings and conclusion. 
 
7.2 The Uruguay Round and the Global Harmonisation of IPRs 
The UR of multilateral trade negotiations, which was launched in Punta del Este in 1986, 
and ended eight years later in Marrakech, provided -for the first time ever- the framework 
for negotiating a global agreement on IPRs. The TRIPS Agreement, together with the 
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) have become the main pillars of the WTO, the new international 
trade bureaucracy which came into force in January 1995, replacing the General Agreement 
on Tariff and Trade (GATT). The TRIPS Agreement has, therefore, become the first 
comprehensive multilateral accord to establish unconditional obligations for all WTO 
members on IPRs policies with regard to copyright and related rights, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, 
and trade secrets (Stegemann, 2000:1237).  
 
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), which is one of the UN agencies, 
has managed the pre-TRIPS global IPRs system, which consisted of highly variable IPRs 
laws and enforcement measures across countries, as well as a set of international treaties. 
The most notable agreements that fell under the jurisdiction of WIPO were the Paris 
Convention (1883) for the protection of industrial property and the Bern Convention (1886) 
for the protection of artistic and literary property. These conventions were, nonetheless, 
concluded by a relatively small number of counties and were not comprehensive in 
coverage and enforceability (Maskus, 2000). One of the major drawbacks of the system 
administered by WIPO was the lack of a dispute settlement mechanism, which promoted 
unilateral actions by countries defending the interests of their patent and copyright 
dependent industries. 
 
While former rounds of GATT negotiations have traditionally been restricted to trade 
issues, patent as well as copyright dependent industries, foremost among which has been 
the pharmaceutical industry, lobbied extensively to bring IPRs to the forefront during the 
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UR negotiations. At the onset of the UR in 1986, only a few months following its launch, 
the President of the US Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association stated that the industry 
was working closely with Congress to get it to strengthen the hand of the US government in 
urging trading partners to respect the industry’s rights in inventions and trademarks (Finger 
and Nogues, 2001). The inclusion of IPRs issues on the UR Agenda was, therefore, largely 
owed to the insistences of US firms whose profits have been eroded by infringing activities 
elsewhere in the world, particularly in terms of competition with what has been coined as 
‘pirate firms’ in third country markets (Deardorff, 1990, 497).  
 
The USA, led the league of developed countries which were dissatisfied with the -absence 
of an- international system of IPRs and the subsequent losses incurred by patent and copy 
right dependent industries. It was the United States that played the critical role in 
introducing the issue of IPRs into the deliberations on global trade rules during the UR. The 
USA framed the case along lines the traditional argument that the net transfer from 
consumers in developing country markets in the form of royalty payments and increased 
imports of IPRs intensive products and services, will be compensated by an increase in FDI 
flows into developing country markets.  Of no less importance was the argument that better 
protection for IPRs in foreign (mainly developing and newly industrialised) countries, was 
to be exchanged for improving and securing access to developed countries import markets 
(Stegemann, 2000, 1238-41). On a more substantive and immediate front, the real gain 
perceived by developing countries from their participation in the UR and the concessions 
on IPRs was reaching an agreement on phasing out the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) 
and the success in bringing agriculture into the GATT/WTO (Krueger, 1999).   
 
The years which followed the creation of the WTO and the transitional enforcement of the 
TRIPS Agreement by member countries, however, proved to be highly eventful, casting 
considerable doubt on the validity of the initial assumptions of the mutual benefits of a 
harmonised IPRs regime to all countries, developed and developing alike.  
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7.2.1 Lobbying by patent-dependant industries 
The TRIPS Agreement represented a major point of departure for national IPRs policies 
and the global harmonisation of IPRs. The Agreement mandated WTO member countries to 
set up mechanisms for enforcing stronger IPRs, thus forming the ‘vanguard’ of efforts to 
establish deep integration of domestic regulatory policies on a global level (Maskus, 2000).  
 
While most countries members of the former GATT showed no interest in extending the 
scope of the negotiations beyond traditional trade issues, for the USA the inclusion of IPRs 
issues ‘was a fundamental requirement for .. participation in the talks’ (Bradley, 1987, 57). 
Corporations with strong interest in patent and copyright issues in the USA lobbied the 
Congress and Administration (the president) to shape the intellectual-property diplomacy of 
the USA prior to and during the UR (Maskus, 2000). 
 
The USA has often resorted to unilateral retaliation against countries which were judged to 
provide heavens for infringing industries, using Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974,
23
 
which stipulated that the failure of a foreign country to protect intellectual property 
adequately is an ‘unreasonable practices’ that could cause a United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) investigation and subsequent trade sanctions (retaliation). The so-
called Special 301 process mandated the USTR each year to identify foreign countries 
denying effective protection for intellectual property rights, to be followed by an agenda for 
intervention (Stegemann, 2000, 1239). Intervention is a synonymous word for trade 
sanction.
24
 Target countries for the Special 301 actions have mainly been developing or 
newly industrialised countries. The USTR has used the ‘Section 301’ status of the Trade 
Act to classify countries in accordance with the strength of their IPRs regimes. Countries 
with the weakest IPR industry wide, are classified as ‘Priority Foreign Countries’. Those 
with a slightly better protection are considered to be ‘Priority Watch Countries’, while 
                                                 
23
 The Trade Act of 1974 was amended by the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act and the 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act. 
24
 Egypt has frequently appeared on the list of ‘Priority Watch Countries’, and so have Brazil, Argentina and 
India (http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2002/special301.htm. Egypt has been moved from the Priority Watch List 
to the Watch List in 2003 following the enactment of a TRIPS consistent IPRs laws (USTR, 2006). 
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those, which only need to be monitored for progress, are placed on the ‘Watch List’ (Rozek 
and Berkowitz, 1998, p.4). 
 
The following section presents a synopsis of the TRIPS Agreements, bringing to the 
forefront the various Articles, which pertain to the operations of the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 
7.2.2 The TRIPS Agreement 
According to the text of the TRIPS Agreement, the logic of the Agreement is mainly build 
on the assumption that the ‘protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to 
a balance of rights and obligations’. Investigating the relationship between investing in 
R&D and the strength of a country’s IPR regime actually provides conflicting evidence. On 
one hand, utilising a cross-country panel of 32 countries during the period 1981-90, 
Evenson and Kanwar (2001) provide evidence of a strong positive association between a 
country’s protection of IPRs and the level of R&D investments. They conclude that “the 
evidence unambiguously indicates the significance of IPRs as incentives for innovation”. 
On the other hand, Branstetter (2004) reviewed several empirical studies undertaken by 
economists to evaluate the validity of the claim that strengthening IPRs systems induces 
higher levels of innovation by local firms, and indicated that most studies reviewed actually 
fail in providing evidence of a strong positive response by domestic innovators that could 
be correctly attributed to the effect of stronger IPRs. The same study indicated that the 
impact of stronger IPRs are more likely to occur instead from the acceleration in the 
domestic deployment of advanced technology by the affiliates of foreign firms.  
 
Advocates of the TRIPS Agreement have argued that while it will result in significant 
revenue transfers from consumers in developing countries to industrial country producers in 
the form of royalty payments, in return, developing countries will themselves become 
attractive locations for FDI. This assumption finds root in the literature linking the major 
 219 
determinants of FDI in patent dependent industries to the strength of the IPRs regime in 
host countries (Rozek and Berkowitz, 1998; Rapp and Rozek 1990; Redwood, 1995). 
Reality, however turned out to be less favourable, as the immediate cost to developing 
countries as a result of adopting new domestic regulations in areas such as IPRs and the 
expected increase in the prices of in patent products has been more tangible than the 
benefits side which is yet to be secured (Finger and Nogues, 2001). Proponents of IPRs 
protection have also argued that a globally harmonised regime will enhance the 
international dissemination of ideas, as owners of patents will be encouraged to disclose 
their inventions. While knowledge will be disseminated more freely, it is the use of 
knowledge that will be restricted (Deardorff, 1990, 497). The initial assumption of a win-
win situation may hold in certain domains of technology, but it has provoked an unresolved 
debate in the sphere of pharmaceutical production. Of particular concern were those aspects 
of the Agreement related to the issue of access to and prices of new pharmaceutical 
products. Because the TRIPS Agreement restricted access on the basis of commercial 
considerations, a feared consequence was that higher prices for pharmaceuticals and other 
health care inventions will eventually prevent low-income consumers in the developing 
world from obtaining life-saving drugs at affordable prices (Lanoszka, 2003). 
 
Terms of protection  
The terms of protection awarded to patent holders is standard to a 20-year period of patent 
protection from the filing date (Part II, Section 5: Patents, Article, 33). The Agreement 
confers exclusive rights to patent owners and prevents “third parties not having the owner’s 
consent from the actions of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for those 
purposes that product” (Part II, Section 5: Patents, Article 28). This Article has significant 
‘trade related’ implications, as it not only prohibits the working of active patents, but 
extends beyond manufacturing to prohibiting the importation of patent-infringing products 
into any of the WTO member countries. 
 
WTO member country classifications 
The Agreement classified WTO member countries into four major categories; developed 
(industrialised) countries; countries in transition (mainly in Eastern Europe), developing 
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countries and least developed counties. Each group was subjected to a set of enforcement 
dates and transitional arrangements (Part VI, Article 65).
25
 
 
Thirteen WTO members have opted for the longer transitional period, and have indicated 
that they will not grant patent protection to pharmaceutical products before January 2005. 
These countries were Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay. Some of these countries 
have significant generics pharmaceutical production capacities, most notably, India, Brazil 
and Egypt.   
 
Transitional arrangements 
Part VII of the TRIPS Agreement stipulates the introduction of institutional arrangements 
(Article 70) by countries, which opt for a longer transition period. Countries which do not 
provide patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products have been 
obliged to “provide as from the date of entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement a means 
by which application for patents for such inventions can be filed” (The TRIPS Agreement, 
Part VII, Article 70). This stipulation has come to be commonly named the ‘mailbox’. 
 
The mailbox provision 
The idea of a ‘mailbox’ is that a country that chooses to delay the introduction of patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products will have to provide a mechanism of accepting 
patent applications for inventions which were patented after the Agreement came into force 
in January 1995. These patent applications will reside unprocessed in this ‘mailbox’ until 
this country introduces a TRIPS consistent patent law for pharmaceuticals. Patents for 
products which were in the mailbox are then granted as if they have been in effect since the 
Agreement came into force. The patent is therefore enforced for the remaining duration of 
what is left of the standard 20-year period of patent protection.   
                                                 
25
 All WTO member countries were given a period of up to one year following the date of entry into force of 
the WTO (January 1995) until 1 January 1996 for full enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement. Developing 
countries were entitled to a delay of a period of up to four years i.e. to January 2000 to apply the provisions of 
the Agreement. Members in the process of a transformation from a ‘centrally-planned into a market, free-
enterprise economy’ may also benefit from a delay of four years. As for the least developed countries, they 
were granted a longer transition period of a total of eleven years until January 2005, with the possibility of an 
extension. 
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Exclusive marketing rights 
In addition to the mailbox obligation, all WTO Member countries (developed and 
developing countries alike) are obliged to provide marketing exclusivity for drugs whose 
patent application dates after 1995, for a period of five years (TRIPS Agreement, Part VII, 
Article 70). During this five-year period, exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) are obtained 
after a product is granted marketing approval in that member or until a product patent is 
granted or rejected.  
 
7.2.3 Difficulties in reaching a global consensus regarding the importance of the 
global harmonisation of IPRs 
There was a consensus that when the UR ended, newly industrialised, developing and 
transition countries would not have accepted the TRIPS Agreement had it stood by itself 
(Martin and Winters, 1996).   
 
Reaching closure on a harmonized global system of IPRs in 1994 did not necessarily 
indicate that conformity was reached between WTO member countries with regards the 
importance of a stronger global IPRs regime and the expected mutual benefits to ensue. In 
other words, each of the WTO member countries accepted all of the UR agreements as a 
‘single undertaking’. The TRIPS Agreement being part of the WTO membership package, 
applied to all member countries regardless of their enthusiasm for commitments to be made 
in the field of IPRs. Flattening enthusiasm on behalf of developing countries, which were 
obliged to accept the WTO Agreements as a single undertaking began to surface as the 
various transitional obligations came into force.
26
 The ability of developing countries to 
                                                 
26
 Several disputes have erupted between governments of developing countries and the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry. The most publicized of these disputes has been the case filed by the USA against the 
Brazilian government with the WTO, for issuing a compulsory licensing for the HIV/AIDS drug whose patent 
is held by Roche. Almost a year after in June 2001 did the USA agreed to end the trade dispute with Brazil. 
The trade-off was that the Brazilian government agreed to consult with the US before resorting to compulsory 
licensing in the future (Reuters, 2001). Of no less importance has been the case raised by 29 pharmaceutical 
firms against the South African government, over importing generic versions of  HIV/AIDS drugs from 
abroad (mainly from Brazil, Thailand and India). The pharmaceutical companies then dropped the lawsuit, 
which was raised in South Africa to stop the authorities from importing various generic versions of the drugs 
(Capella, 2001). 
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have access to medicine at affordable prices has by far been the most pertinent issue 
invoked during the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
From Marrakech onwards: Singapore, Geneva, Seattle, Doha and Cancun 
WTO member countries have agreed in Marrakech on a ‘built-in-agenda’ which specified 
future dates for the continuing review/negotiations of specific sectors and subject areas. 
Officially, a WTO Ministerial Conference should convene at least once every two years, 
and this is the opportunity for member countries to place their most pertinent issues on the 
agenda.   
 
The first Ministerial Conference was held in Singapore, December 1996. However, it was 
relatively early for the TRIPS Agreement to be featured on the agenda.  
 
Seattle, 1999 came as a setback to the WTO member countries that were hoping to launch 
the Millennium Round. Not only was there failure to launch a new round, but the meeting 
ended with the WTO facing considerable criticism from many areas, particularly in terms 
of accommodating the needs of developing countries (Sampson, 2000). The failure of the 
Seattle meeting meant that most/all of the issues proposed in relations to the TRIPS 
Agreement were to be postponed to a following meeting.  
 
The Fourth Ministerial Conference which was held in Doha, November 2001 was hailed to 
have brought “an end the uncertainty, loss of momentum and lack of confidence created by 
the frustrating failure at Seattle two years earlier”. The launch of a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations was coined as a "turning-point in the history of the WTO and 
in relations between developed and developing countries" (WTO, 2002). The true turning 
point from the perspective of developing countries members of the WTO came with the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which was adopted on 
November 14, 2001.  
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The Doha declaration on the trips agreement and public health 
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health came against a 
background of evidence regarding the fact that harmonised IPR standards sharply curtailed 
the traditional capacity of suppliers of some of the public goods, such as in the case of 
health care to properly address priority needs of the less affluent members of society, 
particularly in the case of developing countries. In connection to the Doha Declaration, the 
Waiver Decision of 30 August 2003, and Article 31bis Protocol of Amendments have re-
opened the door for policy intervention in terms of supplying new pharmaceutical products 
against the relatively restrictive elements of the TRIPS Agreement (Abbott, 2007). The 
Doha Declaration also mandated further negotiations on one important subject provided in 
Paragraph 6 "We recognise that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to 
find an expeditious solution to this problem (Abbott, 2007: 317). 
 
The Doha declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health came to be very much in 
favour of developing countries, and was in fact the first acknowledgment by the WTO of 
the potential adverse ‘effects on prices’ of the enforcement of higher standards of IPRs in 
the domain of pharmaceutical production in developing countries (WTO, 2002, 36). More 
importantly, the Doha Declaration conferred on member countries the right to grant 
compulsory licenses as well as the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such 
licenses are to be granted. Taking the stance of the research-based pharmaceutical industry 
into account, the Doha Declaration has been considered a triumph for consumers and 
producers of pharmaceutical products in developing countries.  
 
During the same meeting held by the TRIPS Council on June 27, 2002, the Council also 
approved the waiver that will exempt least-developed countries from the commitment to 
provide exclusive marketing rights for products whose patent application dates after 
January 1995 during this period of transition. This waiver is to be submitted to the WTO 
General Council for approval on July 8, 2002. Both decisions have come to ensure that 
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‘intellectual property protection supports and does not obstruct poorer countries’ need to 
tackle serious public health problems” (WTO, 2002). 
 
This decision of the Council for TRIPS conforms to the pre-TRIPS literature on the 
assumed benefits to developing countries from enforcing higher standards of IPRs. 
Deardorff (1990) has argued that the extension of intellectual property rights to the entire 
world is inefficient, in the sense that it will result in disproportionate costs to be borne by 
poor countries. The poorest of developing countries were the proposed candidates to be left 
out of a system of otherwise global IPRs (Deardorff, 1990:500-1). 
 
7.3 Egypt’s IPRs Regime 
Patent Law 132 of 1949 emerged as one of the most consistent denominators which 
characterized Egypt's patent regimes during the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  
 
According to Law 132 of 1949, patents were granted for every new invention susceptible to 
industrial exploitation, whether related to industrial products, to new industrial processes or 
to new application of known industrial methods or ways. The exclusion from the 
framework of patents, however, covered chemical inventions including foodstuff and 
pharmaceutical products. It was during this early period characterized by shortages in 
supply as well as very limited innovative capacity in the domain of pharmaceuticals that the 
logic underlying the exclusion of pharmaceuticals from patentability can be understood. 
 
After several decades of being virtually absent, the developmental role of patents was at the 
heart of the debate surrounding the future of the pharmaceutical industry following Egypt 
becoming a signatory of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995. The debate engaged the key 
stakeholders involved, from industrialists to policy makers and from media specialist to 
consumer protection agencies.   
 
In 2002, the new TRIPS consistent Law 82 on the 'Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights' was enacted, replacing law 132/1949. While the new law stipulated that the period 
of pharmaceutical product patent protection is twenty years, in an environment where the 
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science and technology base is weak, and where the innovative capabilities of local 
pharmaceutical companies remains largely absent, the new patent regime presented a new 
challenge of a continuous nature to generic companies operating in Egypt. 
 
Having made use of the longest transition period allowed for developing countries under 
the framework of the TRIPS Agreement, Egypt did not enforce TRIPS consistent 
pharmaceutical product patent protection except in January 2005. Egypt was, however, 
obliged to meet all other TRIPS transitional requirements by January 1, 2000. Under the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, the Government of Egypt was obliged to provide full 
protection of process patents as stipulated by Article 28, formal protection of confidential 
data (Article 39.3) and the patent mailbox and EMR (Article 70.8 and 70.9).  
 
On the transitional obligations front, Article 43 of the Agreement stipulated that as of 
January 1
st, 1995, Egypt’s Patent Office is to receive pharmaceutical patent applications, 
and shall maintain such applications, pending their examination as of 1st January 2005. 
This is what has been commonly known as the ‘mailbox’ provision. 
 
Accordingly, the Egyptian Government activated the mailbox provision, and Prime 
Ministerial Decree No. 547 of 2000 was issued to ensure EMRs. Prime Ministerial Decree 
2211 was also issued in November 2000 to safeguard data protection.  
 
In Egypt, while data protection for a period of five years has been enforced in accordance 
to Prime Ministerial Decree 2211 and has been integrated in Law 82/2002, the 
interpretation is significantly different compared to other countries such as Jordan for 
example.
27
 In Egypt, generic companies are allowed to run their own tests and submit their 
own data to the regulatory authorities for marketing approval for drugs subject to data 
protection. From the perspective of the Egyptian government this interpretation is not in 
conflict with Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, since the regulatory authorities have 
not been engaged in the disclosure of protected data. Prior to the issuance of Prime 
                                                 
27
 In October 2000, Jordan and the USA singed a free trade agreement (FTA), with various TRIPS-plus 
stipulations including the interpretation of data protection.  
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Ministerial Decree 2211, generic companies were only obliged to refer to the information 
submitted by innovator drugs to approve their own application. 
 
After having covered the policy and regulatory settings, the following section presents a 
brief review concerning the operation of generic pharmaceutical companies under the 
framework of the pre-January 2005 IPRs regime. 
 
7.3.1 Operation of generic pharmaceutical companies under the framework of the 
pre-January 2005 IPRs regime 
Up to December 2005, the exclusion of pharmaceutical products from patentability in 
Egypt meant that local companies were able -if they decide to do so- to immediately 
manufacture products, which were still under patent protection in major world 
pharmaceutical markets without negotiating with the patent holder or paying the due 
royalty fees involved in case the product was to be manufactured under license. The pre-
January 2005 IPRs regime, has thus allowed local generics companies to compete with 
patent holders over local market shares as well as shares in export markets. These market 
shares would have otherwise been exclusive to the patent holder. However, for local 
generics companies in Egypt to be able to copy in-patent products, these products had to be 
already present on the market and registered with the Ministry of Health.  
 
For a local company to start manufacturing a generic version of a patent-protected product 
already present on the local market by virtue of being imported or manufactured by one of 
the subsidiaries of foreign research-based companies operating in Egypt, the only requisite 
was the provision of the certificate of bioequivalence indicating that the generic version 
submitted for registration has comparable therapeutic effects as the originator product. The 
certificate which is submitted to the regulatory authorities cites the name of the originator 
company, the brand name of the product, the batch number, the registration and expiration 
dates. This information is filed by the Ministry of Health (Interview, Hossam Aboulenein, 
Business Development Manager, SEDICO, May 2004). The regulatory authorities in Egypt 
have often been blamed by the research-based industry of facilitating the process of 
consulting and referring to the files submitted by originator products in order to facilitate 
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the process for generics companies to register their products. The newly emerging private 
sector of the 1980s and 1990s clearly had a wide palate of products to copy, without 
breaking any laws in Egypt. This fact was an important source of competitive pressure 
levied on subsidiaries of foreign companies operating in Egypt, who were more often than 
not reluctant to bring their latest products to the Egyptian market out of fear of infringing 
activities (Interview, Dr. Mohamed Roushdy, Regional Director, Pfizer Middle East, April 
2004).  
 
The ability to infringe pharmaceutical patents in Egypt, without actually breaking any law 
has had important cost related implications. As a result of bypassing both the payment of 
royalty fees as well as sourcing raw material inputs from low-cost countries, generic 
companies benefited from a relatively lower cost structure as well as higher profitability 
margins than would have otherwise occurred with production under license.  
 
The public business sector 
In addition to being the early players on the Egyptian pharmaceutical production scene, 
public business pharmaceutical companies have also upheld the practice of respecting the 
rights of patent owners, despite the fact that pharmaceutical process rather than patents 
have been respected in the domain of pharmaceutical production. Respecting the rights of 
patent owners allowed public  companies to gain the know-how needed to be able to 
manufacture the product once it was off-patent. Manufacturing a product under license also 
meant that savings reached 30-70 percent of import value (Sallam, 1981). Refraining from 
infringing patents, which were still upheld in major world pharmaceutical markets, was a 
fact acknowledged by foreign companies operating in Egypt. The Managing Director of 
Pfizer Egypt argued that the threat of infringing activity has emanated mainly from the 
private, with the public business  described as ‘respectable’ in terms of acknowledging the 
rights of patent holders (Interview, Dr. Mohamed Roushdy, Regional Director, Pfizer 
Middle East, April 2004).  
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The private sector 
Relative to the public business sector, Egypt’s private sector was more active in taking 
advantage of excluding pharmaceutical products from patentability. The Egyptian market 
provides a group of interesting cases documenting the ease by which the local generic 
companies began to expand their presence on the local market during the 1980s and beyond 
on the basis of exploiting the country's patent regime to their favour.  
 
Pharco, which is one of the local private sector companies which began operation in 1982, 
initially had strong relations with foreign licensors, yet it was also successful in exploiting 
this relationship to expand its market shares to its own advantage given the absence of 
product patent protection for pharmaceuticals in Egypt. Pharco exploited its relationship 
with licensors to manufacture a generic version of products manufactured under license 
once the agreement ends. Bristol Myers was the licensor of one of Pharco’s best-selling 
products, which was the antibiotic ‘Duricef’. When the merger between Bristol Myers and 
Squibb took place, the license was ended because the product competed with Squib’s best-
selling product ‘Velocef’. Pharco took advantage of the know-how gained during the period 
it held the license for Duricef, and launched its own generic version in 1991, giving its own 
brand name of ‘Curisefe’. BMS’s 500mg vial sells for LE 6.3, while Pharco’s Curisefe sells 
for LE 6 (CIB, 1998). The price differential between the originator brand and the competing 
generic version was surprisingly very low. 
 
However, with infringing activity by the local segment of the Egyptian pharmaceutical 
industry -private and public- estimated to range between 3-4 percent of the total market 
(Al-Ahram Al-Iktesadi, 16.01.2004; Al-Ahram Daily, 13.12.99; Subramanian and Abd-El-
Latif, 1996), it is safe to argue that local manufacturers of generic products have not 'fully' 
exploited lax IPRs standards in Egypt to expand their product portfolios and accordingly 
their market shares.  
 
This relatively small share has also meant that concern regarding the impact of the TRIPS 
Agreement on the local segment of the industry has been blown out of scale. In spite of 
evidence regarding the small share accounted for by infringing products on the Egyptian 
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market, during the build up to January 2005, pharmaceutical manufacturers in Egypt 
lobbied extensively to convince policy makers of the potentially negative impact of the 
Agreement on the survival of this industry. The strategy was to downplay the supply side 
profitability implications of the TRIPS Agreement, as well as the associated transitional 
arrangements, having focused instead on the demand side price impact. While this tactic 
proved to have limited success in terms of altering government commitment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, it proved successful in terms of the interpreting some clauses of the new patent 
law to the favour of the local industry. A case in point is the interpretation of data 
protection to the advantage of manufacturers of generics. 
 
Impact of transitional arrangements: EMRs 
Having preceded the enforcement of pharmaceutical patent protection, the impact of 
enforcing EMRs on market dynamics has been felt at an earlier stage on in Egypt. The case 
of Eli Lilly’s brand-name ‘Zyprexa’ is a case in point. In 2003, the Egyptian judicial system 
refused a request submitted by Apex -one of the local Egyptian generics companies- to 
revoke the decision to grant Eli Lilly EMRs for one of its products. In 1998, Eli Lilly was 
granted EMRs for its brand-name product Zyprexa, with the active ingredient/molecule 
being ‘Olanzapine’ (Al-Ahram Weekly, 2003).  The verdict was based on Prime Ministerial 
Decree 547 of 2000, which authorized the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology 
to grant certificates of EMRs.  
 
Zyprexa, which has some 20 patents wrapped around it, has been approved for marketing 
by the FDA in September 1996, with Olanzapine categorized as a NME. It was only in 
2005, that competing generic products within the Olanzapine molecule began to emerge on 
the Egyptian market, when Apex launched the first generic version. In 2007, the second 
competing generic product surfaced. One year following the launch of the competing 
generic product, Zyprexa lost 36 percent of the Olanzapine market, and by 2008 it lost 57 
percent (Table 7-1). The case of Zyprexa demonstrated two key developments concerning 
Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. The first is that the loss to consumers as a result of the 
absence of generic entry because of EMRs was significant. Generics in the domain of the 
Olanzapine molecule have been introduced at an average of 30 percent of the price of the 
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originator brand. The second development concerned the steep loss in the market share of 
the originator brand upon generic entry, indicating that Egyptian consumers have been 
quick in terms of shifting demand to lower priced generic products within the domain of 
Olanzapine. 
 
Table  7-1: Market shares of the originator brand and generic entrants in the domain 
of Olanzapine (percent) 
Product Manufacture Launch 
Year 
Pack 2004  2005  2006 2007  2008  Public 
Price 
2009 
(LE)  
Zyprexa Eli Lilly 1998 TABS 5 MG 14 73.3 57.5 35.7 26.4 23.8 160 
Zyprexa Eli Lilly 1998 C.TAB 10 MG 7 26.7 42.0 28.2 25.5 19.0 160 
Olapex Multiapex Ph. 2005 FILM C.TABS 10 MG 30 0.0 0.3 24.2 31.1 34.9 180 
Olapex Multiapex Ph. 2005 FILM C.TABS 5 MG 30 0.0 0.2 11.9 13.4 15.6 120 
Olazine Eipico 2007 FILM C.TABS 10 MG 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 6.6 35 
Source: Based on data from IMS Health Egypt, 2009 
 
7.4 Empirical Strategy  
The TRIPS Agreement had no impact in terms of increases in prices or shifts in market 
shares for products which have already been on the market when it came into force in 
January 1995. As such, the impact of the Agreement has been exclusive to 
products/molecules whose patent applications were filed after it came into force. Bearing 
this fact in mind, the method resorted to in order to address the research questions regarding 
the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market was fairly straight 
forward. The impact of enforcing a 20-year period of pharmaceutical product patent 
protection in Egypt has been manifested in the “inability” of domestic generics companies 
to manufacture new products for which the patent application on the active 
ingredients/molecules has been filed after January 1995. The impact of the TRIPS 
Agreement can, therefore, be quantified by the market value captured by these new 
products/molecule.   
   
Accordingly, as a first step, and based on data obtained from IMS Egypt, the identification 
of new molecules placed on the Egyptian pharmaceutical market by research-based 
companies, which have not been facing generic competition was undertaken. This scan was 
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undertaken in conjunction with respective market shares for these new molecules/products, 
and the associated cost to consumers.  
 
According to IMS data, the Egyptian market is segmented into some 600 therapeutic 
classes, with detailed product-level information concerning therapeutic classes, propriety 
name, manufacturer, launch year, pack size and strength and molecule. Since it was not 
feasible to investigate demand and market dynamics in all of the 600 classes, a sample of 
the country’s 42 largest therapeutic classes in terms of market value has been selected to 
support the analysis (Annex Table 12). Together the 42 therapeutic classes account for 
more than 50 percent of Egypt’s LE 12.6 billion (USD 2.3 billion) retail pharmaceutical 
market. The 42 therapeutic classes also cover essential products, meaning that all classes 
which were either related to life-style or are of an over-the-counter/non-essential nature 
have been excluded. The share of the 42 therapeutic classes subject to analysis will, 
therefore, significantly increase if the market share is exclusively related to essential drugs.  
 
All new molecule placed on the market by research-based pharmaceutical companies were 
scanned for the presence/absence of competing generic products within each molecule. In 
conjunction with launch dates, and taking evidence regarding the absence of generic 
competition within any given new molecule a step further, a search for the status of the 
concerned molecule/brand-name was undertaken in the Orange Book of the USA FDA. 
This search provided information regarding the approval date of the brand-name/molecule 
on the US market, as well as patent and exclusivity data.
28
 For each candidate molecule, 
patent data was checked against information provided by the United States Patent Office 
for details regarding patent filing dates. A parallel search was also conducted at the Centre 
for Drug Evaluation and Research of the USA FDA, to identify the chemical type of the 
active ingredient/molecule. All products falling in the domain of candidate molecules were 
assessed in terms of trends regarding market shares, as well as in terms of the overall cost 
to consumers during the period 2004-2008 for which data was available. 
 
                                                 
28
 The FDA has been selected as the key source of information regarding new pharmaceutical molecules 
because of the sheer size of the US market as well as the fact that the US is the home country of some of the 
largest of the research-based pharmaceutical companies.  
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7.5 Quantifying the Impact of the Trips Agreement on Egypt’s Pharmaceutical 
Market 
The impact of enforcing TRIPS consistent pharmaceutical patent protection in Egypt has 
been manifested in the market absence of domestic as well as imported generic- products 
whose active pharmaceutical ingredients are protected by patents. While these patents are 
mainly foreign, applications have also been made in Egypt.  
 
Two scenarios regarding impact can be expected. Firstly, if new patent protected products 
do not capture market shares of significance in the concerned therapeutic classes, with 
consumers favouring to retain consumption of already existing bioequivalent products 
within the same therapeutic class, then the static impact will not be felt. Secondly, if 
consumers/prescribing physicians shift their demand/prescription preferences to newly 
introduced products, whereby significant changes in the market shares of new and old 
products within the concerned class become evident, then the static impact in terms of 
adverse welfare effects occurs through relatively higher prices, as well as immediate shifts 
in market shares. The pertinent question is thus related to the nature of shifts in the market 
shares of new versus old substitutes within the same therapeutic class, as well as the 
relative prices of these products and the associated cost to consumers.  
 
7.5.1 New patent protected products on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market 
A first step was to identify new products which have not been facing generic competition 
on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. Results indicate that in 14 of the 42 study therapeutic 
classes, there was evidence regarding launches of new molecule by research-based 
pharmaceutical companies on the Egyptian market, with no evident generic competition. 
Together the 14 therapeutic classes account for 2 percent of the Egyptian pharmaceutical 
market by value, as well as 14 percent of the sample therapeutic classes.  
 
Table 7-2 presents the summary results concerning the assessment of the impact of the 
TRIPS Agreement on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. Within the 14 therapeutic classes, 
which have been impacted on by the TRIPS Agreement, a total of 24 molecules have not 
been facing generic competition against brand-name products falling within their domain. 
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Between 2004 and 2008, Egyptian consumers paid a total LE 605 million for products 
falling within the domain of new molecules, which faced no generic competition. 
 
Examining the patentability status of the 24 molecules indicated that 5 molecules did not 
qualify as 'new'. The patent filing dates for these molecules were dated before the TRIPS 
Agreement came into force. These molecules are Insulin Lispro in the domain of human 
insulin, Benazepril and Fosinopril in the domain of ace inhibitors plain, Perindopril in the 
domain of Ace Inhibitors and Fluvastatin in the domain of Statins. The absence of generic 
competition within the domain of the 5 molecules, however, indicated that other barriers 
have prevented generic products from emerging on the market. Among the barriers 
encountered by local generic companies are those related to the difficulty in procuring the 
active ingredient. A case in point was related to the failure to import the active ingredient of 
human insulin, owing to the monopoly position enjoyed by one of the largest research-
based companies in this domain (Interview, Hossam Aboulenein, Business Development 
Manager, SEDICO, April 2004). For the 5 molecules, consumers paid a total LE 126 
million for products falling in their domain (Table 7-3).   
 
The results of the analysis presented in chapter 5 indicated that for the sample of molecules 
covered, average generic-to-originator prices in Egypt stood as high as 73  percent. On this 
basis, had generics been present on the market, and on the assumption that consumers will 
opt for the generic version, then the real cost to consumers is the difference between what 
they incurred in cost towards purchasing patent protected drugs and what they would have 
otherwise paid for generics. This difference stood at a total of LE 129 million between 2004 
and 2008. 
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Table  7-2: New molecules facing no generic competition in Egypt, 2004-08 
 Class/ Propriety 
name 
Molecule Manufacturer Launch 
in 
Egypt 
Marketing 
approval 
by the FDA 
First patent to expire Last patent to expire Market 
share 
Sales 
Value LE 
       Filling 
date 
Expiry date Filling date Expiry date 2004  2008 04-08 
1 Nexium Esomeprazole AstraZeneca 2006 Feb. 2001 Sept.94 2014 Feb. 2000 Nov. 2019 4.9 8.2 39,277 
2 Novomix 30 Insulin Aspart Novo Nordisk 2004 Jun-00 Sep.93 Sep, 2013 Jun-97 2017 0.58 5.5 17,048 
3 Plavix Clopidogrel Sanofi-Synthelabo 2001 Nov. 1997 Feb. 88 Nov. 2011 Jun-02 2019 99 64 187,232 
4 Atacand Plus Candesartan Cilexetil AstraZeneca 2006 4-Jun-98 Nov. 06 18-Apr-11 Nov. 18, 1992 Jul 9, 2013. 1.9 7.4 11,101 
5 Micardis Plus Telmisartan Boehringer 2005 Nov. 17, 2000 Jun-95 Jan. 7, 2014 Jan. 10, 2000 Jan. 10, 2020 4 5 10,271 
6 Lipostat Pravastatin. BMS Egypt 1994 Oct. 31, 1991 Mar. 31, 88 9-Jul-08 19-Apr-95 22-Apr-14 9.7 2.3 24,308 
7 Tazocin**** Piperacillin Wyeth 2000 Oct. 22, 1993 3-Apr 14-Apr-23   0.47 0.32 1,454 
8 Ketek Telithromycin Aventis 2002 1-Apr-04 Apr-95 1-Apr-18 Sept. 24, 2001 Sept. 24, 2015 4.8 0 5,307 
9 Hepsera Adefovir Dipivoxil GSK 2008 20-Sep-02 Oct. 94 Sept. 2, 2014 Sept. 10, 2001 23-Jul-18  1.2 1,109 
10 Reiferon Retard Interferon ALFA Rhein 2007 Oct. 10, 1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.26 17.9 18,041 
11 Pegasys Peginterferon Alfa-2A Roche 2006 Oct. 16, 2002 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.3 41.5 65,110 
12 Pegintron Peginterferon Alfa-2A Schering Plough 2006 Jan. 19, 2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.9 8.3 23,110 
13 Trileptal Oxcarbazepine Novartis Egypt 1994 25-May-01 May 03. Feb. 12, 2018 n.a. n.a. 3.8 6 35,440 
14 Zeldox Ziprasidone Pfizer Egypt 2004 Feb. 5, 2001 Jan. 88. 2-Mar-12 27-May-99 27-May-19 7.8 1.6 8,366 
15 Serdolect Sertindole Lundbeck 2008 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  0.9 716 
16 Seroquel Quetiapine AstraZeneca 2004 Sept. 26, 1997 Mar-87 26-Sep-11 28-May-97 28-Nov-17 7 9 21,811 
17 Vigamox Moxifloxacin Alcon 2007 15-Apr-03 Jun-89 Dec. 8, 2011 22-Jul-02 29-Sep-19 5.4 6 9,585 
 Cost to consumers           479,286 
Table  7-3: Molecules facing no generic competition, with patent filing dates falling before 1995 
 Class/ Propriety 
name 
Molecule Manufacturer Launc
h in 
Egypt 
Marketing  
approval  
by the FDA 
First patent to expire Last patent to expire Market share Sales Value 
LE 
            Filling 
date 
Expiry date Filling date Expiry date 2004(1) 2008 04-08 
1 Humalog Mix 25 Insulin Lispro Eli Lilly 2005 June 1996 Jun. 94 2014 May 1993 2013 0.06 3.10 6,640  
2 Cibacen Benazepril Novartis Egypt 1993 March 1995 Mar. 92 Dec. 2017 n.a. n.a. 0.46 0.37 1,041  
3 Monopril Fosinopril BMS Egypt 1995 May16, 1991 June 90 2009 n.a. n.a. 4.60 3.20 13,256  
4 Cibadrex Benazepril Novartis Egypt 1995 March 1995 March 92 Dec. 2017 n.a. n.a. 0.10 1.27 2,177  
5 Monozide Fosinopril BMS 1999 May16, 1991 June 90 2009 n.a. n.a. 8.70 5.08 23,638  
6 Preterax Perindopril Servier Egypt. 2003 Dec.30, 1993 Dec. 83 Nov. 2009 n.a. n.a. 5.33 5.98 20,258  
7 Lescol Fluvastatin. Novartis Egypt 1994 Dec.31, 1993 Nov. 93 Oct.11, 
2011 
Dec. 22, 1992 Jun 12, 
2012 
14.50 9.50 58,490  
 Cost to 
consumers 
          125,499 
2004 was selected as the base year, as EMR have been enforced prior to 2005 and hence it was also important to capture its’ impact 
Sources: IMS Egypt , 2009; USA Patent Office, 2011; Orange Book, 2011  
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7.5.2 To what extent have Egyptian consumers been willing to trade-off lower prices 
of older drugs, for more innovative new products? 
In order to assess the extent to which Egyptian consumers have been willing to trade-off 
lower prices of older drugs for more innovative new products, results concerning shifts in 
market shares between old and new molecules have revealed important findings regarding 
consumer preference for new generation molecules. In 15 out of the 24 molecules, 
consumer demand has been gradually shifting in favour of new products introduced (Table 
7-4). This shift has been occurring despite the fact that relative prices of new products are 
much higher than older generation molecules already present within the same class. The 
shaded rows in Table 7-4 highlight new molecules in which only originator products are 
present. 
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Table  7-4: Shifts in consumer demand towards new generation molecules placed on the Egyptian market between 2004-
2008 
Class and Molecule Number of 
products 
Number 
of 
generics 
Launch 
year 
Sales as a % of total class Mean 
price* in 
molecule 
    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
1- A02B2 ACID PUMP INHIBITORS SALES (LE ‘000)         76,882   115,403    151,168    191,371    234,445    
OMEPRAZOLE 19 18 1993   68.4  60.1  50.3  47.8  44.9    44  
LANSOPRAZOLE 8 7 1994  9.9  8.4  7.0  6.9  5.3    39  
PANTOPRAZOLE 9 8 1997   10.6  20.6  26.7  28.2  30.7    33  
DOXYCYCLINE 1 1 1998 
     
  51  
TINIDAZOLE 4 4 1998  4.2  4.0  4.5  3.8  3.8    70  
RABEPRAZOLE 5 2 2001   11.1  10.8  11.1  10.5  10.9    19  
CLARITHROMYCIN 3 3 2003  3.8  3.8  4.3  3.7  3.8    76  
NEW - ESOMEPRAZOLE 1 0 2006 -  - 4.9  6.6  8.2  132  
2-A10C3 H INSUL+ANA INT+FAST ACT SALES (LE ‘000)       45,830.2  71,699.7  89,428.3  99,662.0    101,632.4    
INSULIN HUMAN ISOPHANE 3 1 1991   96.1  95.4  90.7  82.5  83.6    40  
INSULIN HUMAN BASE 2 1 2002  3.0  1.2  3.6  10.4  7.8    16  
NEW- INSULIN ASPART PROTAMINE CRYSTALLINE 1 0 2004  0.9  3.4  4.3  4.8  5.5  340  
NEW- INSULIN LISPRO PROTAMINE 1 0 2005 - 0.1  1.4  2.2  3.1  330  
3-B01C2 ADP RECEP ANTAG PLAT INH SALES (LE ‘000)       24,707.4  36,253.3  51,091.9  65,062.1  78,017.2       
TICLOPIDINE 2 1 1993  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0   -   49  
CLOPIDOGREL 8 5 2001   99.7  99.9    100.0    100.0    100.0  139  
4-C09A0 ACE INHIBITORS PLAIN SALES  (LE ‘000)         61,554.2  70,882.3  80,213.3  90,252.1  91,213.3       
CAPTOPRIL 6 5 1983   27.2  33.0  30.5  32.9  31.8  9  
NEW- BENAZEPRIL 1 0 1993  0.5  0.1   - 0.4  0.4    25  
LISINOPRIL 5 4 1994   17.3  14.5  15.4  15.1  12.4    13  
PERINDOPRIL 2 1 1994   19.0  17.3  19.5  17.6  17.5    61  
RAMIPRIL 4 3 1994   25.9  23.7  24.5  24.8  26.4    23  
ENALAPRIL 5 4 1995  4.9  6.0  4.8  4.2  6.6    11  
NEW- FOSINOPRIL 1 0 1995  4.5  4.0  3.4  3.0  2.8    20  
NEW- MOEXIPRIL 1 0 2004  0.7  1.4  1.9  2.0  2.1  27 
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Cont. Table 7-4 
Class and Molecule Number of 
products 
Number 
of 
generics 
Launch year Sales as a % of total class Mean price* 
in molecule 
    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
5-C09B1 ACE INH COMB+A-HYP/DIURET SALES  (LE ‘000) 44,125.2  64,750.7  80,556.7  96,621.8  98,566.7       
CAPTOPRIL 5 4 1990   40.6  48.8  46.5  48.8  43.9    18  
NEW- BENAZEPRIL 1 0 1995  0.1  0.0   - 0.9  1.3    35  
ENALAPRIL 4 3 1995  8.2  10.0  10.7  11.7  18.7    16  
LISINOPRIL 3 2 1997   21.1  17.0  19.8  17.4  13.8    21  
NEW- RAMIPRIL 1 0 1997   16.0  12.1  11.6  11.0  11.4    19  
NEW- FOSINOPRIL 1 0 1999  8.7  7.1  6.2  5.4  5.1    21  
INDAPAMIDE 3 1 1999  8.6  7.8  7.6  7.1  8.4    58  
NEW- PERINDOPRIL 2 0 2003  5.3  4.9  5.2  4.9  6.0    71  
6-C09D1 AT2 ANTG COMB C2 &/O DIU SALES (LE ‘000)       22,114.9  31,092.4  46,670.6  63,495.8  81,447.9       
LOSARTAN 11 9 1998   37.0  32.8  31.4  30.3  27.0    26  
VALSARTAN 3 1 1998   63.0  63.1  57.5  49.4  43.6    45  
TELMISARTAN 1 1 2005 - 4.0  4.1  4.7  5.1  121  
NEW-CANDESARTAN CILEXETIL 1 0 2006 -  - 1.9  6.5  7.4    90  
IRBESARTAN 2 1 2006 -  - 5.1  9.2  16.9    52  
7-J01F0 MACROLIDES & SIMILAR TYPE SALES  (LE ‘000)       94,033.9    109,243.0    128,336.7    147,974.0    169,640.5       
ERYTHROMYCIN 5 4 1984  8.8  9.0  6.1  5.3  4.5  7  
SPIRAMYCIN 9 7 1994   20.1  18.4  19.0  19.4  16.2    15  
CLINDAMYCIN 5 3 1987   10.2  11.9  12.3  12.3  12.7    17  
NEW- LINCOMYCIN 1 0 1987  1.4  2.3  3.1  2.1  2.3    15  
ROXITHROMYCIN 3 2 1993  0.4  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.5    20  
AZITHROMYCIN 11 10 1995   41.4  46.3  48.1  49.7  53.2    27  
CLARITHROMYCIN 4 2 1999   12.1  10.7  10.7  10.8  10.7    40  
MIDECAMYCIN 1 1 2001  0.9  0.6  0.2  0.0  0.0    26  
NEW- TELITHROMYCIN 1 0 2002  4.8  0.6  0.1  0.0   - 126  
METRONIDAZOLE 1 1 2003  0.1  0.0  0.5  1.6  1.7    13  
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Cont. Table 7-4 
Class and Molecule Number of 
products 
Number 
of 
generics 
Launch  
year 
Sales as a % of total class Mean price* 
in molecule 
    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
8-J05B1 VIRAL HEPATITIS PRODUCTS SALES  (LE ‘000)   11,248.6  15,429.8  29,018.8  57,665.7  95,663.3       
RIBAVIRIN 5 5 1997   54.5  60.2  38.0  33.1  31.8    63  
LAMIVUDINE 2 1 2002   45.5  21.5  13.0  10.6  7.7  180  
NEW- INTERFERON ALFA 1 0 2006 -  - 0.3  1.5  17.9  213  
NEW- PEGINTERFERON ALFA-2B 2 0 2006 - 18.3  48.7  54.9  41.4  1,253  
NEW- ADEFOVIR DIPIVOXIL 1 0 2008 -  -  -  - 1.2  520  
9-N03A0 ANTI-EPILEPTICS SALES  (LE ‘000)       79,889.8  105,449.6  122,939.6  166,779.8  195,646.8       
CLONAZEPAM 9 8 1978  6.2  11.2  9.7  8.0  6.9  8  
CARBAMAZEPINE 8 7 1985   37.4  33.2  29.4  26.8  25.7    25  
NEW- OXCARBAZEPINE 1 0 1994  3.8  3.7  5.5  5.9  6.1    78  
VALPROIC ACID 5 3 1994   27.1  24.0  23.6  19.7  17.1    20  
PHENYTOIN 5 3 1995  5.3  4.8  3.9  3.2  2.4    11  
GABAPENTIN 4 3 2002   10.7  12.8  14.5  14.1  15.1    46  
LAMOTRIGINE 3 2 2002  7.0  6.9  8.8  7.8  8.4    40  
TOPIRAMATE 3 2 2002  2.3  3.3  4.3  4.0  4.1  108  
LEVETIRACETAM 3 3 2006 -  - 0.3  1.5  2.8  261  
PREGABALIN 2 1 2007 -  -  - 9.0  11.3  119  
10-N05A1 ATYPICAL ANTIPSYCHOTICS SALES (LE ‘000)     30,488.9  44,055.9  56,569.0  65,769.5  83,582.5       
CLOZAPINE 5 4 1982   33.7  27.2  20.7  20.1  18.9    49  
RISPERIDONE 9 8 1997   47.8  43.7  41.2  40.2  38.2    87  
OLANZAPINE 3 2 1998   10.3  15.5  17.9  18.0  18.9  131  
NEW- QUETIAPINE 1 0 2004  0.4  6.9  8.6  9.0  9.5  310  
NEW- ZIPRASIDONE 1 0 2004  7.8  4.3  2.2  2.2  1.6  120  
ARIPIPRAZOLE 3 1 2005 - 2.4  9.4  10.5  12.0  115  
NEW- SERTINDOLE 1 0 2008 -  -  -  - 0.9  304  
 
  
 229 
 
Cont. Table 7-4 
 
Class and Molecule Number of 
products 
Number 
of 
generics 
Launch  
year 
Sales as a % of total class Mean price* 
in molecule 
    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
11-S01A0 ANTI-INFECTIVES-EYE SALES  (LE ‘000)    50,861.9  58,290.5  63,543.9  73,903.7  92,226.8    
GRAMICIDIN 2 1 1978  0.8  0.7  0.8  1.0  0.7  5  
CHLORAMPHENICOL 7 7 1980   14.1  12.2  10.8  9.1  6.9  2  
NEOMYCIN 4 3 1980  0.9  1.3  1.6  2.1  2.0  4  
NEW- HYPROMELLOSE 1 0 1982  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  5  
BACITRACIN 2 2 1983  0.0  0.0  0.0   -  - 7  
GENTAMICIN 5 4 1983  1.7  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.4  3  
SULFACETAMIDE 3 2 1984  1.3  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.3  1  
TOBRAMYCIN 6 4 1985   12.2  12.5  14.1  16.0  15.2  8  
FUSIDIC ACID 2 1 1993  5.3  7.1  6.6  8.2  7.4    14  
OFLOXACIN 7 6 1996   12.5  11.8  11.3  11.2  9.9  8  
CIPROFLOXACIN 4 3 1999  9.6  8.6  9.7  8.6  6.4  9  
OXYTETRACYCLINE 3 2 1999   32.4  35.5  33.1  26.0  30.4  3  
NEW- TRIMETHOPRIM 1 0 1999  0.4  0.2   -  -  -   14  
NORFLOXACIN 1 1 2000  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  2  
LOMEFLOXACIN 2 2 2003  8.0  6.8  6.6  7.1  5.9    12  
GATIFLOXACIN 4 4 2005 - 0.9  3.8  3.6  7.4    20  
NEW- MOXIFLOXACIN 1 0 2007 -  -  - 5.4  6.1  45  
*Per pack 
Source: IMS, 2009 
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7.5.3 Shifts in the market shares of local versus research-based companies 
Within the context of evaluating the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on Egypt’s 
pharmaceutical market, it was important to also assess the extent to which the post-2005 
environment has been associated with a parallel decrease in the market shares of local 
versus foreign players in the domain of the therapeutic classes which saw the introduction 
of new patent protected products. 
 
Market data indicated that between 2004 and 2008, the local private sector has maintained 
the position of the dominant player in 6 out of the 14-candidate therapeutic classes which 
saw the introduction of patent-protected products (Table 7-5). In 5 of these classes, in 
addition to maintaining the largest market share, the local private sector has actually been 
consolidating its position of dominance by virtue of increasing market shares. While still 
accounting for the dominant share, in only one of the 6 classes, was there evidence that the 
private sector has been losing market shares, namely in the acid pump inhibitors class. The 
acid pump inhibitors class is the largest in terms of market value among the 14 classes.  
 
Local generics companies have been consolidating their position in 3 classes in which they 
maintain a minority share. These are the anti-epileptics, the Human insulin and in the AT2 
antagonist combination C2 &/O DIU class. The sharpest increase in market shares 
accounted for by the private sector occurred in the AT2 antagonist combination C2 &/O 
DIU class, with an increase in market shares from 0.5 percent in 2004 to 16.7 percent in 
2008.   
 
The local private sector has, nonetheless, been losing market shares in 5 classes. The 
sharpest decline in market shares has been in the domain of the Ace inhibitors INH 
COMB+A-HYP/DIURET class, whereby its market share dropped from 25.3 percent in 
2004 to 10.7 percent in 2008.  
 
Unlike the local private sector, which has exhibited relatively healthy trends regarding 
market shares, indicating resilience in the face of competition from the imported sector as 
well as from subsidiaries of research-based companies manufacturing under license in 
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Egypt, the situation of the public business sector sends an important message regarding 
agility. Historically, the public business sector has been the provider of the lowest priced 
pharmaceutical products in Egypt. The gradual loss in market shares indicates that this 
sector has not been keeping up with the private sector in terms of new product launches, 
and has largely retained a product portfolio which is dominated by older generation drugs. 
While marketing resources available to the public business sector have also been 
significantly lower than that of the private sector, this situation reflects the overall financial 
well-being of this sector, which for years has been captivated to fulfil the social objective of 
providing low-priced pharmaceuticals to the majority of Egyptian consumers (indirectly 
subsidised prices by virtue of the government controlling upward price movements).   
 
Subsidiaries of research-based pharmaceutical companies are the dominant players in only 
three out of the 14-study therapeutic classes. These are the anti-epileptics, the ace inhibitors 
INH COMB+A-HYP/DIURET and the AT2 antagonist COMB C2 &/O DIU classes. While 
maintaining a position of dominance in the three classes, the multinational sector has been 
gradually loosing market shares in all three. 
 
In five of the 14 classes, there has been evident deterioration in the market shares of 
subsidiaries of research-based pharmaceutical companies, the sharpest of which has been in 
the broad spectrum penicillin (8.7 percent), in the statins class (16.3 percent) and in the 
viral hepatitis products (39.1 percent). In only one therapeutic class has the multinational 
sector been consolidating its share, namely in the macrolides & similar type class, from a 
minority share of 17.7 percent in 2004, to 20.2 percent in 2008. Otherwise, market shares 
have remained largely unchanged. 
 
The important observation regarding market shares concerns the imported segment, which 
has been the dominant player in the four therapeutic classes of Human insulin +ANA 
INT+FAST ACT, Anti-Infectives-Eye, Atypical Antipsychotics and ADP RECEP ANTAG 
PLAT INH. In two of the classes in which imported products have been the dominant 
market players, has there been evidence of market share consolidation. In 6 of the classes in 
which imported products have maintained a minority share, there was evidence of 
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consolidation in market position. The sharpest increases in market shares has been evident 
in the ACE INH COMB+A-HYP/DIURET class of 18 percent between 2004 and 2008, and 
VIRAL HEPATITIS PRODUCTS of 39 percent during the same period.  
 
In summary, trends regarding market shares mirror important observations. The public 
business has been losing share on the Egyptian market, and imported products have been 
rapidly consolidating its position on the market. In fact the most important observation is 
that contrary to the concerns of the local private sector, the strengthening of the country’s 
IPRs regime in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement has not run parallel to market shifts 
which indicate that the foreign sector is crowding out the local private sector. In fact, the 
private sector has been consolidating its position, both in terms of overall market, with 
visible increases in market shares, as well as within classes which have seen the 
introduction of new patent protected products. 
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Table  7-5: Market shares in molecules which saw the introduction of new patent-
protected products  
  Percent of Therapeutic Class 
  Y/2004 Y/2005 Y/2006 Y/2007 Y/2008 
Acid Pump Inhibitors LE Sales*  76,882 115,404 151,168 191,371 234,445 
Holdipharma   ↓ 4.4 4.1 3.0 2.7 2.2 
Imported   ↑ 23.0 26.8 27.3 27.4 28.5 
Multinational   ↓ 4.7 2.7 3.4 4.3 4.4 
Private   ↓ 67.8 66.4 66.3 65.6 64.8 
       
N03A0 ANTI-EPILEPTICS LE Sales  
 
 79,890 105,450 122,940 166,780 195,647 
Holdipharma  ↓ 5.5 5.0 4.5 3.8 3.1 
Imported   ↓ 30.1 26.6 28.2 23.4 25.2 
Multinational  ↑ 44.3 39.9 38.9 45.0 46.2 
Private  ↑ 20.1 28.4 28.3 27.8 25.5 
       
BROAD SPECT PENICILL INJ LE Sales   76,192 98,455 126,173 156,252 173,068 
Holdipharma  ↓ 6.9 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.5 
Imported   ↓ 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 
Multinational   ↓ 22.7 16.2 14.7 13.3 14.0 
Private  ↑ 70.0 78.7 81.0 82.6 82.2 
       
MACROLIDES & SIMILAR TYPE LE Sales   94,034 109,243 128,337 147,974 169,641 
Holdipharma  ↓ 34.4 32.2 28.4 21.7 21.2 
Imported   ↓ 4.8 0.7 0.3 1.3 3.5 
Multinational  ↑ 17.7 18.0 19.3 23.4 20.2 
Private  ↑ 43.1 49.0 52.0 53.7 55.1 
       
Hepatic Proct Lipotropics LE Sales   87,316 109,094 114,201 131,609 157,547 
Holdipharma  ↓ 7.2 8.5 7.4 7.0 5.9 
Imported  ↑ 12.4 11.7 11.0 12.9 12.8 
Private   ↑ 80.4 79.9 81.7 80.1 81.4 
       
STATINS (HMG-COA RED) LE Sales   60,777 74,415 93,765 116,632 131,268 
Holdipharma ↑ 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Imported  ↑ 0.0 0.0 0.4 5.5 12.9 
Multinational   ↓ 57.6 57.6 53.1 47.4 41.3 
Private  ↑ 42.2 42.2 46.2 46.9 45.5 
       
Human INSUL+ANA INT+FAST ACT LE Sales   45,830 71,700 89,428 99,662 101,632 
Holdipharma  ↑ 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.0 3.7 
Imported   ↓ 94.3 98.7 94.5 84.9 89.3 
Private  ↑ 5.7 1.3 5.3 11.0 7.0 
       
ACE INH COMB+A-HYP/DIURET LE Sales   44,125 64,751 80,557 96,622 98,567 
Holdipharma  ↓ 7.2 9.2 10.0 11.1 4.5 
Imported  ↑ 8.7 7.4 6.6 12.2 26.6 
Multinational  ↑ 58.7 62.2 59.2 61.2 58.2 
Private   ↓ 25.3 21.3 24.2 15.5 10.7 
       
VIRAL HEPATITIS PRODUCTS LE Sales   11,249 15,430 29,019 57,666 95,663 
Holdipharma  ↓ 15.7 11.4 3.4 1.6 0.3 
Imported  ↑ 0.0 18.3 48.7 54.9 41.4 
Multinational   ↓ 45.5 20.4 10.3 7.9 6.4 
Private  ↑ 38.8 49.9 37.7 35.6 51.8 
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Cont.       
  Percent of Therapeutic Class 
  Y/2004 Y/2005 Y/2006 Y/2007 Y/2008 
Anti-Infectives-Eye LE Sales   50,862 58,291 63,544 73,904 92,227 
Holdipharma  ↓ 16.4 16.5 13.9 12.2 10.5 
Imported  ↑ 32.2 30.7 34.5 42.0 41.3 
Multinational  ↑ 29.8 32.5 31.8 25.0 30.0 
Private   ↓ 21.6 20.3 19.8 20.9 18.2 
       
Ace Inhibitors Plain LE Sales   61,554 70,882 80,213 90,252 91,213 
Holdipharma  ↓ 4.4 5.9 4.9 4.2 1.8 
Imported  ↑ 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 14.0 
Multinational   ↓ 71.4 70.7 69.4 69.9 70.3 
Private   ↓ 24.2 23.4 25.7 22.3 13.9 
       
Atypical Antipsychotics LE Sales   30,489 44,056 56,569 65,770 83,583 
Imported  ↑ 31.5 38.5 42.0 41.3 59.4 
Multinational   ↓ 26.8 18.5 11.4 11.5 10.5 
Private   ↓ 41.8 43.0 46.6 47.2 30.1 
       
AT2 ANTG COMB C2 &/O DIU LE Sales   22,115 31,092 46,671 63,496 81,448 
Imported  ↑ 36.5 32.1 32.9 38.5 38.1 
Multinational   ↓ 63.0 63.1 57.5 49.4 45.2 
Private  ↑ 0.5 4.7 9.6 12.1 16.7 
       
ADP RECEP ANTAG PLAT INH LE Sales  24,707 36,253 51,092 65,062 78,017 
Imported   ↓ 100.0 81.5 72.8 70.5 82.8 
Private  ↑ 0.0 18.5 27.2 29.5 17.2 
       
(LE thousand) 
Source: Based on IMS, 2009 
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7.6 Evaluating Perceptions Regarding the Impact of the Trips Agreement on 
Companies Operating on Egypt’s Pharmaceutical Market 
In April, 2004, a survey was conducted to evaluate perceptions regarding the impact of the 
TRIPS Agreement on the various firms which operated on the Egyptian manufacturing 
scene. All companies operating in the domain of pharmaceutical production in Egypt have 
been approached to take part of the survey. A total of 25 out of the 42 companies present on 
the Egyptian market agreed to participate in the survey (nonprobability ‘convenience’ 
sampling was followed), including the public business sector, the private sector, 
subsidiaries of research-based companies as well as local generics companies with a foreign 
equity share.  Face-to-face meetings have been arranged to conduct the survey, whereby for 
the firms covered, meetings were held with either the chief operating officer or the business 
development manager. Comparing responses to actual trends during the post-January 2005 
phase indicated that accuracy regarding the scope of impact was rather flawed. 
 
The following section presents the survey results and discusses the perceived outcome of 
the TRIPS Agreement versus the actual outcome on the ground. 
 
Will your ability to introduce new products change after 2005? 
  Public Private 
local 
Private 
foreign 
Private local  
with foreign  
equity partnership 
Significantly decline 20.0% 18.2% 0.0% 66.7% 
Moderately decline 20.0% 27.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
No decline 20.0% 18.2% 33.3% 0.0% 
Moderately increase 40.0% 36.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
Significantly increase 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 
Total number of companies 
companies 
5 11 6 3 
 
Responding to the question regarding the pace by which companies operating under 
different ownership structures will introduce new products during the post-January 2005 
phase reflected significant differences between the responses of each sector. Public 
business sector companies, as well as local private companies, indicated moderate 
likelihood in terms of ability to introduce new products. These responses were based on the 
assumption that the palate of new products which were to be available for copying will no 
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longer exist. Introducing new products can only be achieved through the manufacturing of 
‘pure’ generics in its strict interpretation according to the TRIPS Agreement. In contrast, 
and as expected, 67 percent of the respondents to this question from subsidiaries of 
research-based companies indicated that their rate of new product introductions to the 
Egyptian market beyond January 2005 was likely to increase significantly owing to the 
safety awarded to these new products from infringing activities. The response of the mixed 
ownership segment of the surveyed companies, in which there is a foreign equity share 
indicated that there will be significant decline in new product introductions, owing to the 
preference of the licensors to cater to the market through the arms-length exports. 
 
While it has been true that in the domain of molecules examined in this chapter, which are 
patent protected, there have been no competing product introductions by the generics 
industry, the overall increase in the market share of the local private sector reflects another 
story. With respect to the local private sector, the results of the survey are not consistent 
with the increase in the overall market shares gained by the private sector between 2004 
and 2008. The number of products has been on the rise owing to opportunities which 
emanate from non-infringing activities. The same flaw in perception held true for 
subsidiaries of research-based companies, who have lost market shares during the same 
period. 
 
Give the percentage of your sales which may be negatively affected by opening the ‘mail-
box’ after 2005?  
  Public Private local Private local with foreign equity 
partnership 0% 25.0% 9.1% 66.7% 
<25% 50.0% 45.5% 33.3% 
25% + 25.0% 45.5% 0.0% 
Total number of companies 4 11 3 
 
A question concerning the impact of opening the mailbox on the market shares of 
companies surveyed also indicated inaccurate forecasts. As highlighted earlier, the “mail-
box” provision basically deals with situations in which countries that choose to delay the 
introduction of patent protection for pharmaceutical products will have to provide a 
mechanism of accepting patent applications for inventions which were patented after the 
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Agreement came into force in January 1995. These patent applications resided unprocessed 
in this ‘mailbox’ until this country introduces a TRIPS consistent patent law for 
pharmaceuticals. Patents for products which were in the mailbox are then granted as if they 
have been in effect since the Agreement came into force. The patent is therefore enforced 
for the remaining duration of what is left of the standard 20-year period of patent 
protection.  
 
Of the 23 companies responding to this question, the response indicated that the bulk of 
their product portfolios will in fact be jeopardized by the opening of the mail-box in 
January 2005. The local public as well as private companies indicated that more than 75 
percent of their product portfolios will be exposed to market exit or production under 
proper licensing agreements with the patent-owner once the mail-box is opened. In contrast 
to these assessment, non-of the products registered on the Egyptian market before the 
opening of the mail-box in January 2005, have actually exited the market.  
 
Do you anticipate a decline in market share following the enforcement of 20 years of 
product patent protection after 2005?      
  Public Private local Private foreign Private local with  
foreign equity share 
Yes 80.0% 36.4% .0% 66.7% 
No 20.0% 63.6% 100.0% 33.3% 
Total number of companies 5 11 6 3 
 
One of the questions for which the response was mixed in terms of accuracy, as indicated 
by real market shifts after January 2005, was that pertaining to the extent to which the 
surveyed companies anticipated market shifts of significance in the aftermath of enforcing 
higher standards of IPRs in Egypt.  
 
Some 80 percent of pubic business companies correctly anticipated a decline in market 
shares, while the majority of private and foreign companies anticipated an increase in 
market shares (63 percent and 100 percent respectively). It is important to note that there 
should be no intrinsic differences in loss of market shares in the aftermath of Janaury-2005 
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between public as well as private sector companies. In fact, from interviewing company 
executives, it was repeatedly indicated that public sector companies have been less active in 
infringing patents than their private counterparts. The loss in market shares is invariably 
linked to other important limitations at the sector level, most importantly low marketing 
budgets as well as failure to introduce new generic products at the pace needed to maintain 
as well as expand current market shares on the side of the public business sector.  
 
The response of the subsidiaries of research-based companies reflected inaccuracy in terms 
of anticipated market outlook. Subsidiaries of research-based companies have been losing 
market share in Egypt. This loss of market share may in fact be a phenomenon which 
warrants concern by policy makers. As indicated earlier, the prices of products 
manufactured by subsidiaries of research-based companies in Egypt are relatively lower 
compared to a situation whereby these products were to be imported. Consumers are 
actually the key beneficiaries from these significant price differentials. Whether or not the 
decrease in market share, which has in fact run parallel to an increase in the market share of 
imported products, is an indicator that subsidiaries of research-based companies are shifting 
their supply to the market from locally manufactured to imported products in order to 
escape pricing rigidities in Egypt, is an issue which should warrant attention by policy 
makers. 
 
Has your company encountered any difficulties in introducing new products as a result 
of enforcing EMR?            
  Public Private local Private local with foreign equity 
partnership Yes 25.0% 18.2% 33.3% 
No 75.0% 81.8% 66.7% 
Total number of companies 4 11 3 
 
Issues related to EMR have been on top of the lobbying agenda of local companies in 
building a case against the TRIPS Agreement since 1995. However, the majority of 
companies surveyed indicated that they have not encountered any problems in relation to 
EMRs since coming into force in 2000. These results run in line with actual evidence that 
EMRs has not been an issue of legal conflict on the Egyptian market. 
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Do you perceive a threat from TRIPS to export levels of local companies?   
  Public Private local Private foreign Private local with foreign equity 
partnership Yes 60.0% 63.6% .0% 66.7% 
No 40.0% 36.4% 100.0% 33.3% 
Total number of companies 5 11 5 3 
 
The majority of private sector companies surveyed indicated that they foresee a direct 
threat from the enforcement of higher standards of IPRs to their export volumes. In light of 
the fact that infringing activities on the Egyptian pharmaceutical market stand as low as 5 
percent, this share seems to have been placed out of scale. 
 
7.7 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to provide an answer to the research question concerned 
with the impact of strengthening the country’s IPRs regime in conformity with the TRIPs 
Agreement on pharmaceutical price levels in Egypt, as well as the market shares of key 
players. 
 
This chapter, therefore, probed deeper into the costs associated with enforcing 
pharmaceutical product patent protection in Egypt as of January-2005, whereby costs have 
been narrowed down to the differential between what consumers actually pay for new 
originator products -which are protected by patents- and that they would have incurred in 
terms of prices and cost had generic products been available. This chapter relied on 
proprietary data concerning a selection of the top 42 therapeutic classes from IMS 
(accounting for 50 percent of Egypt’s pharmaceutical market) in order to examine 
pharmaceutical market dynamics in Egypt during the period 2004-2008. 
 
Results have indicated that in 14 of Egypt’s top 42 study therapeutic classes, there was 
evidence regarding launches of new molecule by research-based pharmaceutical companies 
on the Egyptian market, with no evident generic competition. Together the 14 therapeutic 
classes account for 2 percent of the Egyptian pharmaceutical market by value, as well as 14 
percent of the sample therapeutic classes.  
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Within the 14 therapeutic classes, which have been impacted on by the TRIPS Agreement, 
a total of 24 molecules have not been facing generic competition against brand-name 
products falling within their domain. Between 2004 and 2008, Egyptian consumers paid a 
total LE 605 million for products falling within the domain of new molecules, which faced 
no generic competition. 
 
Of the total cost to consumers, some LE 126 million were incurred over products, which 
are not protected by patents, and yet have no visible generics competitors. These results 
indicate that the impact of the TRIPS Agreement has so far been relatively modest, 
compared to the overall market size. Of no less importance, the fact that it is not only 
patents that disallow generic competition warrants attention.  
 
Chapter Seven also assessed the extent to which Egyptian consumers have been willing to 
trade-off lower prices of older drugs for more innovative new products.  Results concerning 
shifts in market shares between old and new molecules have revealed important trends 
regarding consumer preference for new generation molecules within the scope of the 
country’s top 42 therapeutic classes. In 15 out of some 24 molecules in which there has 
been no evidence of generic competition in Egypt between 2004 and 2008, consumer 
demand has been gradually shifting in favour of new products introduced. This shift has 
been occurring despite the fact that relative prices of new products were much higher than 
older generation molecules already present within the same therapeutic class. Market data 
has also indicated that between 2004 and 2008, the local private sector has maintained the 
position of the dominant player in 6 out of the 14 therapeutic classes which saw the 
introduction of patent-protected products. In addition, the private sector has consolidated its 
position in four classes in which it held a minority share. The same did not hold true for the 
public business sector, which has been losing share. This loss is, however, not necessarily 
attributable to the impact of the TRIPS Agreement, but rather to sector specific ownership 
related problems, which have not allowed this important segment of the manufacturing 
sector to invest sufficient resources needed to compete in what is becoming a highly 
aggressive market.  
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While the impact of the TRIPS Agreement has clearly been visible as reflected in the 
number of new products that have come to the market, with no generic competition, it is 
safe to argue that relative to the overall size of the market, this impact remains modest. 
Shifts in terms of consumer/prescribing physician’s preference in favour of new versus 
mature molecules was, nonetheless, already underway. Such a shift has not yet been 
reflected in a full-fledged movement in market shares to the disadvantage of local 
companies. In fact the local private sector has been gaining market shares at a remarkably 
agile fashion. 
 
The same, however, does not apply to the public business sector, which has been fast in 
terms of losing market share. It is important to highlight that such a loss in market share is 
not necessarily attributable to the TRIPS Agreement, but to the set of problems alluded to 
earlier in Chapter Three.  
 
Survey results covering 25 companies operating on Egypt’s pharmaceutical manufacturing 
scene, have indicated that evaluating perceptions regarding the future state of the business 
after full respect of pharmaceutical product patent protection in Egypt -as reflected in the 
responses of the various players- against actual market trends indicated lack of accuracy 
and flaws in judgment. The business energy of practically all companies operating on 
Egypt’s pharmaceutical manufacturing scene has been dedicated to magnifying the threat of 
the TRIPS Agreement on their business, while neglecting another very important threat as 
manifested by impending increased import competition as well as the threat of being 
marginalised on the world production scene for not dedicating adequate resources to 
technological upgrades and to investments in R&D even at their most modest levels.  
 242 
8. CONNECTING THE DOTS OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND KEY FINDINGS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an overview of the research is presented in section 8.2. The contribution of 
the research to researchers and the debate on industrial policy is presented in section 8.3. 
The contribution of the research to policy is presented in section 8.4, and the limitations of 
the research and areas which warrant future research efforts are presented in section 8.5. 
 
This thesis has been motivated by the debate concerning one important facet of government 
intervention in the economy, namely industrial policy. Industrial policy as structured 
differently in developed as well as in developing nations has invariably shaped their growth 
outcomes. The case study of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry provided an 
interesting avenue to contribute to the debate on industrial policy. 
 
The fact that the development and expansion of pharmaceutical productive capacity has 
occurred within the context of protective non-tariff regulatory trade barriers, which have 
historically kept generics import competition at bay, is what rendered the case study of 
Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry relevant to the debate on industrial policy. 
Examining the efficiency levels exhibited by this industry, as well as a host of attributes 
including export performance as well as relative prices, has been the angle through which 
the contribution to the debate on industrial policy has been planned. Additionally, the 
environment within which this industry currently operates has made the case study even 
more interesting. Under the context of the currently ruling regulatory and policy 
environment, the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry has been a prime candidate to be 
affected in a major way as a result of the country’s process patent regime having given way 
to a product patent regime since January 2005. The gradual increase in generic import 
penetration, has also been levying significant competitive pressure on the local segment of 
this industry.  
 
In retrospect, this thesis investigated patterns of 'association' between trade and industrial 
policies, the country’s national pharmaceutical policy (including pricing), the pre-January 
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2005 intellectual property rights regime, productivity and productivity growth in the 
Egyptian generics pharmaceutical sector. This thesis also compared relative prices on the 
Egyptian pharmaceutical market and the extent to which consumers have been able to fully 
capture the benefits associated with having access to the largest generics manufacturing 
base in the region. This thesis took the first attempt to quantify the actual burden on 
consumers as a result of enforcing higher standards of IPRs in conformity with the TRIPS 
Agreement on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. 
 
The following research questions have been posed and answered by the research: 
 To what extent have mechanisms used to protect and regulate the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical industry been associated with productivity growth?  
 To what extent has there been evidence of productivity dispersion in the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical industry in accordance to ownership, and output orientation? 
 How far and in what ways have the regulatory framework(s) governing this industry 
allowed local generics companies to charge higher than average prices compared to 
other world markets? 
 What has been the impact of strengthening the country’s IPRs regime in conformity 
with the TRIPS Agreement on pharmaceutical price levels in Egypt, the associated 
cost to consumers, as well as on the market shares of key players? 
 
In light of the above research questions, this thesis has managed to contribute to a diverse 
set of academic literature, as well as provide valuable policy guidance.  
 
First, the estimation of firm-level productivity growth under a protectionist regulatory 
regime has been one important avenue to contribute to the literature on industrial policy 
(evaluating productivity growth under a protectionist trade and regulatory regime).  
 
Second, the verification of whether there has been evidence of firm-level productivity 
dispersion in relation to ownership and output orientation in Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry has provided guidance to policies dictating the pace and nature of 
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privatisation policies, as well as to policies which aim at diluting excessive inward 
orientation and soliciting increased export-penetration. 
 
Third, and in light of the absence of research on relative prices on the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical market, this thesis has contributed to the evaluation of the extent to which 
the country’s pharmaceutical policy -including pricing- has been successful in terms of 
ensuring the prevalence of fair prices to consumers. By undertaking this analysis, the thesis 
has been able to contribute to the body of literature which examines the nature and 
determinants of relative prices on pharmaceutical markets. 
 
Fourth, an important contribution of this thesis has been in the area of quantifying the 
impact of the TRIPS Agreement in terms of cost to consumers on Egypt’s pharmaceutical 
market. Using real market data, empirical results have provided valuable policy guidance, 
particularly in terms of throwing light on the nature of policy interventions which are 
needed in order to protect low-income consumers against the impact of catastrophic health 
care expenditure as it pertains to pharmaceutical needs. Empirical results contribute to the 
body of literature concerned with evaluating the impact of the global harmonisation of IPRs 
in the domain of the pharmaceutical industry in emerging markets. 
 
8.2 Overview of the Research and Summary of Key Findings 
The following sections present the summary of the thesis chapters, as well as the key 
findings. 
 
Following the introductory Chapter, Chapter Two presented the review of the literature on 
industrial policy, which embraced a wide continuum of policy options, ranging from free 
trade to protectionism as two extreme poles. Various incentive measures such as tax 
holidays, extending subsidized credit facilities, state-led investments in training and re-
training, provided by governments to solicit certain outcomes also fall on this wide 
continuum. How and why have the industrial policy choices made by governments 
differentially elevated some of the developing nations to the status of newly industrialized 
countries (NICs), while others have lagged behind, is perhaps the most important of 
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insights to be derived from this body of literature. It is safe to argue that the empirical 
evidence concerning the outcome of industrial policy choices in various parts of the world 
has fueled rather than resolved the debate concerning what an optimal industrial policy 
should be. 
 
While the neoclassical paradigm, which propagated minimal involvement of governments 
in economic activity and the supremacy of the rules of comparative advantage in dictating 
specialization has dominated during the aftermath of World War Two, the Prebisch-Singer 
Thesis regarding the secular decline in the terms of trade of industrial versus primary 
commodities has managed to elevate import-substitution-industrialization as the preferred 
policy option by the majority of developing nations eager to achieve rapid industrial growth 
and diversification, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
The infant industry argument has heavily influenced industrial policy in most -if not all- 
developing nations. The case of Egypt was no exception. Governments chose to erect tariff 
barriers to shield their nascent industries against import competition, with the objective of 
altering static comparative advantage in the production and trade of primary commodities. 
During the debt crisis of the late 1980s, neoliberalism, nonetheless, challenged the basic 
foundations of the import-substitution paradigm, by providing mounting evidence that 
protection has retarded productivity growth rather than supported it. Evidence has been 
provided from Latin American countries, that the total exclusion of export promotion 
strategies subjected them to the brunt of external shocks triggered by rising oil prices, while 
their protected manufacturing industries have not able to capture any shares of significance 
on export markets or withstand competition on local markets. 
 
The review of the literature also provided the interesting case of the first tier of NICs, 
accordingly enriching the literature on industrial policy with a new model which blended 
import-substitution with export promotion strategies. In this respect, import-substitution-
industrialization and export-led growth were never mutually exclusive options for 
industrialization for the NICs. Policy interventions in the NICs provided subsidized credit 
to selected industries, protected domestic and import substitutes and made public 
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investments in applied research on condition that firms met industry-specific export targets. 
Import-substitution-industrialization and export-led growth were never mutually exclusive 
options for industrialization for the NICs. 
 
The rich set of country experiences, documenting the outcomes of various industrial 
policies has, nonetheless, not finally resolved the debate concerning what an optimal 
industrial policy should be.  
 
Chapter Two also presented the concept of efficiency, as well as the underlying reasons 
behind differential efficiency/productivity outcomes among various countries/ industries/ 
firms. The literature has indicated that variances in observed productivity levels may arise 
from a plethora of sources. Trends in TFP may mirror the efficiency of a particular reform 
program, learning effects, the deployment of new generations of technology, technical 
know-how, organizational skills, enterprise response to changes in competition and other 
related aspects of market structure. In addition, TFP trends may also reflect the impact of 
social, political and institutional obstacles to potentially useful innovations. However, it has 
remained difficult to ascertain the causes of productivity movements (Jefferson, Rawski 
and Zhend, 1996: 147). 
 
Chapter Two, provided the review of the literature on industrial policy as well as 
conceptual framework needed to contribute to the debate on industrial policy through 
examining the growth trajectory and key performance attributes of Egypt’s generics 
pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Chapter Three presented the salient characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry, with the 
objective of highlighting the key differences between research-based and generics 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, as well as the structure of the world pharmaceutical market, 
in terms of both production and trade. The objective of this review was to be able to 
identify how different countries/companies have been defining and accordingly establishing 
their specialisation in the domain of the pharmaceutical industry, from the perspective of 
presence on the world production and trade scenes. Chapter Three also examined in detail 
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the growth trajectory of Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical industry against the nature of the 
industrial policy regime, which ruled during the study period. The key objective was to 
provide the background against which some of the performance attributes of this industry 
were to be highlighted, as well as provide the context to address the research question 
concerning the extent to which mechanisms used to regulate and protect the Egyptian 
generics pharmaceutical industry have been associated with productivity growth.  
 
Chapter Three explained how the presence/absence of the basic scientific infrastructure in 
universities, government research institutes and within industry has initially dictated an 
international divide, whereby developed countries specialised in the production and trade of 
single-source products, while developing nations focused on multiple-source drugs. It has 
been highlighted that small generics companies have, nonetheless been capable of 
contributing to the drive for innovation in the domain of the pharmaceutical industry. This 
is particularly true with respect to the ‘discovery’ phase of new drugs, where it has been 
demonstrated that generics companies can discover new drugs with minimal investments. 
The emergence of China and India as two key players on the world generics pharmaceutical 
production and trade scenes has also been a key highlight of Chapter Three. Upgrading 
technological capabilities, engaging in pharmaceutical R&D, as well as a succinct drive to 
support export penetration have proved to be significantly important in elevating some 
companies in emerging markets to the status of key players on the global pharmaceutical 
scene. It was on all these fronts that the Egyptian generics pharmaceutical industry 
performed below-par compared to its competitors in other emerging nations, most notably 
in India and Jordan.  
 
Chapter Three provided evidence that since the formative years of the Egyptian generics 
pharmaceutical industry, and passing through different policy and regulatory regimes, the 
focus as well as the key criteria for success for this industry has primarily been on 
increasing the levels of self-sufficiency, in what has been regarded as a strategic sector. The 
various shifts in economic policy direction, as well as episodes of institutional and 
regulatory reforms have consistently defaulted in shifting the relatively excessive inward 
orientation of this industry.  
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Chapter Three documented the extent to which the key changes in Egypt’s industrial policy 
regime during the study period have been primarily concerned with addressing institutional 
as well as regulatory issues such as public sector reform, privatisation, and price 
liberalisation. None of these pillars of reform impacted the generics pharmaceutical 
industry in a positive way, in terms of creating the right environment for export growth, for 
efficiency enhancement and for technological advancement. A key limitation of Egypt’s 
industrial policy as implemented within the domain of the generics pharmaceutical sector 
and as contrasted against the review of the literature presented in Chapter Two, was that it 
failed to clearly tie up regulatory protection to performance outcomes such as exporting 
levels, as well as advancing technological capabilities. The outcome of this policy pitfall is 
that Egyptian generics companies have been outpaced by their counterparts in other parts of 
the emerging markets, such as with the case of India. Indian companies have emerged at a 
far more advantageous position when it comes to competing on what is turning to be a 
highly aggressive global pharmaceutical market.  
 
To date, non-tariff regulatory trade barriers remain to be manifested in the extent to which 
registration procedures facing imported products -as administered by the Ministry of 
Health- are made both stringent and cumbersome for generic products. The most important 
pitfall of the reform program as applied during the 1990s, was that by maintaining non-
tariff regulatory barriers in the domain of the pharmaceutical industry, modest results have 
been achieved in terms of instigating the needed export supply response from this sector of 
manufacturing activities. The captive consumer market of some 80 million inhabitants, 
proved to be more attractive to generics companies than the relatively challenging 
pharmaceutical export market. 
 
In Chapter Three, it has been argued that starting from the early 1960s, and passing through 
the major policy shifts of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990, Egypt’s pharmaceutical industry was 
targeting the attainment of one key objective, namely improving the levels of self-
sufficiency. Reaching high levels of self-sufficiency became one of the most important 
indicators of success from policy makers’ perspective. With the pharmaceutical industry 
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meeting 81 percent of local demand by value, the attainment of equally important 
objectives such as penetrating export markets, achieving technological advancment and 
investing in R&D proper have been overshadowed. These three limitations have in in fact 
been the key pitfalls of the reform programme and the industrial policy regime which 
remains to govern the pharmaceutical industry. These pitfalls have proved to be in sharp 
contrast to the successes attained in East Asia, as a result of tying up protection from import 
competition, to expanding presence on the export front. The experience of Indian generics 
companies, also falls in marked contrast to the case of Egypt. The performance of India’s 
giant pharmaceutical company Ranbaxy is a case in point. Unlike Egyptian generics 
companies, Ranbaxy established international presence and operations in 40 countries, and 
manufacturing facilities in 6 countries, with export sales also accounting for 50 percent of 
total output (Ranbaxy, 2009). India’s generics companies have assumed this advantageous 
position as a result of the government creating a home environment which has forced firms 
to improve their technological capabilities (Mourshed, 1999). 
 
Privatisation as implemented in the domain of the pharmaceutical industry was also 
circumscribed by allowing the private sector to only hold minority stakes in public business 
sector companies. Maintaining majority ownership by the state has been specifically 
designed to relegate the full pursuit of profit maximisation to secondary importance. In 
spite of legislative changes such as Public Business Sector Law 203 of 1991, state-owned 
pharmaceutical companies have not been able to award priority to achieving higher levels 
of profit maximisation as well as economic efficiency. Relatively low profitability levels 
have obstructed adequate investments in upgrading technological capabilities. These 
companies remained to be held captive under state ownership, to realise the social objective 
of providing affordable drugs to the Egyptian population at large.  
 
The liberalisation of pharmaceutical prices also proved to be resilient to reform. While the 
cost-plus pricing system does ensure a positive returns to all manufactures, the fact that this 
industry imports the bulk of its raw material inputs has rendered it particularly sensitive to 
exchange rate fluctuations. While all companies operating on the Egyptian pharmaceutical 
market have been negatively impacted by pricing rigidities, public business sector 
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companies have been particularly vulnerable to the rigidity in adjusting pharmaceutical 
prices to accommodate for inflation and foreign currency movements, because most of their 
products have been priced during the 1960s and 1970s with marginal flexibilities in price 
adjustments. This rigidity has levied a heavy toll on their profitability levels and hence their 
subsequent abilities to both modernise their plant and equipment as well as to engage in 
significant marketing initiatives. The private sector has also been facing the same 
constraint, yet at a relatively less disability magnitude compared to the public sector. 
 
The outcome of such an environment was that while Egypt’s generics pharmaceutical 
industry has managed to successfully close down on the levels of self-sufficiency, it has 
consistently failed to contribute to export growth at any level of significance. Transcending 
the boundaries of engaging in sheer pharmaceutical formulation activities and venturing 
towards expanding R&D capabilities is also one of the most visible outcomes of the 
aforementioned policy and regulatory environment. Some of the local companies (such as 
EIPICO for example) have, nonetheless, achieved remarkably high export-to-output ratios. 
 
In Chapter Four, I presented the key components of the national drug policy in Egypt, with 
the objective of throwing light on the characteristics of the pharmaceutical regulatory 
regime as it has been influencing relative prices on the market. Chapter Four has been 
structured to provide the background against which the research question concerning 
relative price levels on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market has been addressed. 
 
Chapter Four examined the pharmaceutical industry in the context of the Egyptian health 
care system and how it "interacted" with it, both from a formal perspective (covering the 
costs and purchasing of medicines by the state/health system) and from the perspective of 
patients through direct purchases outside the remit of the health system. The objective has 
been to place the findings concerning relative price levels in the context of ‘who’ shoulders 
the burden of pharmaceutical expenditure in Egypt. 
 
Among the key findings of Chapter Four is that while the Egyptian government has been 
endeavoring to extend the benefits of social health insurance to the maximum number of 
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beneficiaries, Egypt’s health care system remains largely inequitable, leaving close to half 
of the country’s population to be fully vulnerable to potential catastrophic health care 
expenditure.  
 
Of equal importance from a policy stance, and despite the fact that Egypt has the largest 
generic manufacturing base in the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as the 
largest consumer market, the review of the country’s health care system and pharmaceutical 
regulatory regime indicated that a clear and coherent generics policy remains to be largely 
absent. This absence raised concern in light of the fact 68 percent of expenditure on drugs 
remains to be shouldered by out-of-pocket expenditure. The exclusion of pharmaceutical 
products from patentability, was perhaps the most “easy to capture” component of supply-
side related generics policy in Egypt. Such exclusion from patentability has primarily 
targeted supporting access to affordable drugs rather than supporting the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing base from an industrial policy perspective. While a 20-year period of 
pharmaceutical patent protection has been enforced in Egypt since January 2005, Bolar-
kind of practices are, nonetheless, allowed under Patent Law 82 of 2002,
 
in a clear stance of 
supporting generics penetrate the market once a patent expires. Marketing authorization in 
Egypt, however, remains to be largely indifferent as to whether or not a product is an 
originator brand or a generic product, particularly from a timeframe perspective. In other 
words, generics do not follow an accelerated track for obtaining marketing authorisation. 
 
Supporting the penetration of generics by verture of a lax patent regime has been a key 
“undeclared” component of generics policy in Egypt. However, becuase such support has 
been not matched with clear policies which target iliciting increased demand for gnerics on 
behalf of prescribing physisians, insurares and  consumers, the outcome has not been 
effective in any major way. This has been the actual case in Egypt. To date the retail 
market, which caters to the largest demand base, remains to operate without clear policy 
guidelines with regards generic policy. In the domain of private health care services, where 
the scope of the associated retail pharmaceutical market stands in excess of LE 13 billion, 
there is no formal policy on promoting generic prescription. While in 2008, generics 
accounted for 50 percent of Egypt’s retail market by value, local generic companies have 
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often complained that the marketing budgets of research-based companies, as well as first-
movers in the generics market are relatively large. In light of the fact that direct-to-
consumer pharmaceutical advertising in Egypt is prohibited by law, these large marketing 
budgets have been translated into more frequent sales visits per physician as well as a larger 
number of free samples for giveaways which directly influence market shares. 
Additionally, while the share of generic pharmaceutical products listed on the 
reimbursement (positive) list of key institutional insurers such as the HIO, as well as for 
MOH tenders is larger than the share of originator products, the demand base of these two 
largest institutional consumers of medicine in Egypt remains to be relatively small.  
 
Generic substitution in pharmacies is not formally supported from a formal policy 
perspective, nor is it common practice in Egypt. While dispensing pharmacists in private 
pharmacies often propose alternatives to products which may not be available, this practice 
is rarely exercised in a systemic method to relieve patients from paying higher prices for 
originator/brand-name drugs by proposing generic substitutes.  
 
With regards requirements for co-payments towards the cost of drugs for the three largest 
groups of beneficiaries under the umbrella of social health insurance, differential co-
payments to promote generic drugs remain to be absent. In other words, generics do not 
attract lower copayments compared to the branded version of the same medicine. 
 
The fact that no more than four identical products in terms of therapeutic value and dosage 
forms are allowed sale on the local market is one of the key policy limitations to enhancing 
price competition on Egypt’s generics market. 
 
Chapter Four, therefore, provided the necessary context against which the research question 
concerning relative price levels on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market was to be addressed. In 
this respect, Chapter Four has set the scene to examine in more detail, and based on real 
market data, the nature of price competition between various products on Egypt’s 
pharmaceutical market and the extent to which consumers (patients) have been able to 
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capitalize fully on the cost advantage of having access to a large generics medicine 
manufacturing base. 
 
In Chapter Five, the two research questions concerning the extent to which mechanisms 
used to protect and regulate the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry been associated with 
productivity growth and the nature of productivity dispersion in the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical industry in accordance to ownership, and output orientation have been 
addressed.  
 
Chapter Five started with presenting the methodology to estimate TFP growth in Egypt’s 
generics pharmaceutical industry during the period 1993-2005, for which data was 
available. The details of the non-parametric, frontier methodology known as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) to obtain the Malmquist productivity index at the firm-level 
for a representative sample of firms operating in the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry was 
also presented in detail. The key empirical findings presented in Chapter Five indicated that 
the best-practice firm in terms of TFP change belonged to the private sector, while the 
laggard firm belonged to the state-owned public business sector. In addition, no differences 
of major significance existed between the performance of private sector and state-owned 
generics companies. State-owned companies which have been subject to partial 
privatization did not exhibit higher levels of TFP change compared to those which 
remained under full state-ownership. Under the protectionist regime which shielded 
generics companies from import competition, empirical results indicated that mean TFP 
change for the sample firms throughout the study period (1.01) exceeded the mean TFP 
change for all Egyptian industries (0.75), and that there was evident disassociation or weak 
correlation -at best- between productivity growth and the degree of export orientation. 
 
While there has been empirical evidence regarding positive TFP growth in Egypt's 
pharmaceutical industry (for these ample firms), under the ruling -relatively protectionist- 
regulatory regime, which has historically kept generics import competition at bay, this 
should not be judged to be a healthy phenomenon. Protectionism may have supported this 
industry to survive during its formative years, especially since there has been ample 
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historical proof of the unequal and possibly detrimental competition with foreign 
companies during the 1930s (Handoussa, 1974). Had Egyptian policy makers supported a 
free trade regime, and eliminated non-tariff regulatory trade barriers in the domain of the 
pharmaceutical sector beyond the 1930s, it is most likely that Egypt would not have had a 
local pharmaceutical industry of the magnitude which is currently present.   
 
While efficiency levels seem to be respectable compared to Egypt’s manufacturing sector at 
large, protracted non-tariff regulatory barriers in the domain of the generics pharmaceutical 
industry in Egypt has ran parallel to prolonging its inward orientation. The relevant 
question which came to mind was related to why has an industry that was relatively 
efficient compared to other sectors of manufacturing activity in Egypt not been exploiting 
export markets to further support growth in output and associated profitability. The answer 
has actually been provided in Chapter Six. If this industry has been successfully able to 
charge atypical prices compared to standard generic-to-originator price ratios prevalent in 
other world markets, then why venture on the tough track of exporting.  
 
In addition, there is evidence that pharmaceutical exports are made cumbersome due to the 
high cost of registration fees with the regulatory authorities in export markets, not to 
mention having to compete with heavy weight generics manufacturers such as India and 
China. It has also been often argued by industrialists operating in this sector that exporting 
in the case of pharmaceuticals also involved atypical costs, whereby pharmaceutical 
registration procedures in importing markets sometimes involve expenses which may go as 
high as USD 200,000 thousand for a single product, with no grantee that the product will 
eventually obtain the registration license. This has been judged to be one of the reasons 
behind the absence of positive a correlation between productivity growth and outward 
orientation. 
 
If the local market is large enough to support output growth and is profitable -if not more 
so- enough compared to export markets, then there is little incentives for companies to 
actually export. 
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The absence of a positive correlation between export orientation and TFP growth must, 
however, be interpreted with caution. As explained earlier, because of pricing rigidities, 
which have in fact been present during the entire period which saw the rise of Egypt's 
modern generics pharmaceutical industry, some companies have limited exports to 
products, which in their judgment, reflect fair pricing and hence fair profitability levels. In 
light of rigid price readjustments to accommodate for inflation and currency devaluation, 
some local companies have intentionally excluded a large segment of their product 
portfolio from being exported. Because importing markets stipulate that import prices 
should reflect the same prices on the local markets, there have been little incentives for 
these companies to actually export products on which they incur very low 
profitability/losses to risky export markets.  
 
Chapter Six provided a brief review of the literature on the nature of competition on the 
pharmaceutical market, thus setting the scene to address the research question concerning 
relative prices of pharmaceuticals on the Egyptian market. In major world markets, when 
10 firms manufacture and distribute generic versions of a particular drug, the generic retail 
price of this drug falls to an average of 60-34 percent of the brand-name price. With 20 
manufacturers, the generic price may well go to 20 percent of the brand-name price (CBO, 
1998).  
 
Because it was not feasible to examine the prices of all generic products relative to 
originator products on the Egyptian market, and based on the WHO/HAI (2006) 
methodology, the evaluation was confined to the list of 21 molecules operating in the 
domain of 14 therapeutic classes. The 21 study-molecules account for 4.4 percent of 
Egypt’s pharmaceutical market, and involved competition between some 196 products.  
 
The examination of price competition on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market indicated that for 
the sample molecules, generic-to-originator prices have been found to be higher than the 
standard ratios observed in major world markets. Of no less importance, generic diffusion 
has not necessarily been bringing down average prices. Evidence was also presented that 
prescribing habits have resulted in a situation whereby the least priced generics were not 
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necessarily the most prescribed. A key finding was that in only 4 out of the 18 study 
molecules (3 molecules have been excluded because there was no originator brand to 
compare with), the price of the examined list of generic equivalents went below the 50 
percent threshold of the price of the originator brand. What was even more important to 
note, has been the finding that in roughly half of the cases, the prices of generic products 
which were late market entrants, exceeded the price of originator products or the first 
market entrant in the therapeutic class. This observation was evident in the case of 9 out of 
19 sample-molecules which qualified for examination.  
 
An equally important finding presented in Chapter Six, is that by examining prices in 
conjunction with the rate of generic diffusion for the sample molecules, is was evident that 
generic diffusion did not significantly bring down average prices on the Egyptian market. 
The prices of subsequent market entrants were found to be clustered around the price of the 
first market entrant. With only one exception, for products competing within the domain of 
the 21 molecules, the prices of subsequent market were either clustered around the first 
entrant, or went above it.  
 
Chapter Six also presented an evaluation regarding the extent to which Egyptian consumers 
(patients) have been capitalizing fully on the cost advantage of a highly genericised market. 
The prices and market shares of originator products were compared to those of the most 
sold generic and the least priced generic within the domain of the study molecule. Results 
indicated that of 21 study-molecules, in only 2 cases were the most sold generic also the 
least priced generic. In roughly half of the molecules examined (10) the single largest 
product market share was held by the originator brand(s).  
 
These results indicate that pricing policies in Egypt need to be revised to induce a visible 
downward trend regarding relative prices for new generics market entrants, similar to 
observed patterns in major world markets. There is a visible need for a generics prescribing 
policy in Egypt, whereby the physician is to prescribe by generics name and the dispensing 
pharmacists becomes obliged to dispense the least priced generic, unless otherwise not 
allowed due to valid medical reasons. This need is made all the more pertinent, in light of 
 257 
the upward pressure on prices as a result of enforcing pharmaceutical product patent 
protection in Egypt, as detailed in Chapter Seven. 
 
Since 1995, the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on Egypt’s pharmaceutical industry has 
been one of the key concerns of industrialists, policy makers as well as consumers alike. 
However, no attempt has been made to make use of real market data to place accurate 
numbers on the bill associated with strengthening the country’s IPR regime starting with 
the date of enforcing pharmaceutical product patent protection in January 2005.  
 
In Chapter Seven, having access to IMS data for Egypt allowed for providing accurate 
numbers with regards to the toll associated with the TRIPS Agreement, both from a 
demand side perspective by looking at overall prices, as well as from a supply side 
perspective by examining shifts in market shares between the various players on the 
Egyptian market. 
 
Chapter Seven began by documenting why IPRs issues have been included on the agenda 
of the Uruguay Round as well as, highlighting the concerns raised around the price 
implications of the TRIPS Agreement, particularly from the perspective of consumers of 
pharmaceutical products in developing countries. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health eventually came against a background of evidence regarding 
the fact that the global harmonization of IPR standards sharply curtailed the traditional 
capacity of suppliers of some of the public goods, such as in the case of health care to 
properly address priority needs of the less affluent members of society, particularly in the 
case of developing countries. The Doha Declaration was in fact the first acknowledgment 
by the WTO of the potential adverse ‘effects on prices’ of the enforcement of higher 
standards of IPRs in the domain of pharmaceutical production in developing countries. It 
was the concern about the adverse ‘effects on prices’ that motivated the investigation 
concerning the quantification of the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on Egypt’s 
pharmaceutical market. 
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Chapter Seven also presented the highlights of Egypt’s IPRs regime. Patent Law 132 of 
1949, which ruled up to 2002, emerged as one of the most consistent denominators which 
characterized Egypt's pharmaceutical policy regimes during the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s. Law 132 of 1949 excluded pharmaceutical products from the framework of 
patents, thus ending the generous privilege enjoyed by generics pharmaceutical companies, 
to manufacture products which were still under patent protection in major world markets. In 
2002, the new Patent Law 82 introduced pharmaceutical product protection for the first 
time in Egypt, and enforced it as of January 2005. 
 
The costs associated with enforcing pharmaceutical product patent protection in Egypt as of 
January-2005 were quantified in Chapter Seven. Costs have been narrowed down to the 
differential between what consumers actually pay for new originator products -which are 
protected by patents- and what they would have incurred in terms of prices had generic 
products been available. Survey results, which covered 25 of Egypt’s key players on the 
pharmaceutical market, including public business sector companies, local generics 
manufacturers and subsidiaries of research-based pharmaceutical companies concerning 
their forecasts regarding the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on their business, were also 
presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
A first step was to identify new products which have not been facing generic competition 
on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market. Because it was not possible to study the whole market 
(600 therapeutic classes), the focus was narrowed down to the therapeutic classes which 
accounted for 50 percent of the Egyptian retail market. Results indicate that in 14 of 
Egypt’s top 42 study therapeutic classes as identified through IMS, there was evidence 
regarding launches of new molecule by research-based pharmaceutical companies on the 
Egyptian market, with no evident generic competition. Together the 14 therapeutic classes 
account for 2 percent of the Egyptian pharmaceutical market by value, as well as 14 percent 
of the sample therapeutic classes.  
 
Within the 14 therapeutic classes, which have been impacted on by the TRIPS Agreement, 
a total of 24 molecules have not been facing generic competition against brand-name 
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products falling within their domain. Between 2004 and 2008, Egyptian consumers paid a 
total LE 605 million for products falling within the domain of new molecules, which faced 
no generic competition. 
 
Of the total cost to consumers, some LE 126 million were incurred over products, which 
are not protected by patents, and yet had no visible generics competitors. These results 
indicate that the impact of the TRIPS Agreement has so far been relatively modest, 
compared to the overall market size. Of no less importance, the fact that it was not only 
patents that disallow generic competition warrants attention. Based on the sample 
molecules presented in Chapter Six, because generic-to-innovator prices in Egypt proved to 
average 73 percent, the actual cost of imposing a 20-year period of pharmaceutical patent 
protection as of January 2005 can then be calculated as the wedge between what consumers 
paid for new products which had not generic equivalents and what they would have 
incurred had generics been available on the market. The actual cost to consumers then 
becomes the relatively smaller value of LE 129 million during the period 2004-2008. 
 
Chapter Seven also assessed the extent to which Egyptian consumers have been willing to 
trade-off lower prices of older drugs for more innovative new products.  Results concerning 
shifts in market shares between old and new molecules have revealed important trends 
regarding consumer preference for new generation molecules within the scope of the 
country’s top 42 therapeutic classes. In 15 out of the 24 molecules in which there has been 
no evidence of generic competition in Egypt between 2004 and 2008, consumer demand 
has been gradually shifting in favour of new products introduced. This shift has been 
occurring despite the fact that relative prices of new products were much higher than older 
generation molecules already present within the same therapeutic class. Market data has 
also indicated that between 2004 and 2008, the local private sector has maintained the 
position of the dominant player in 6 out of the 14 therapeutic classes which saw the 
introduction of patent-protected products. The same did not hold true for the public 
business sector, which has been losing share. This loss is, however, not necessarily 
attributable to the impact of the TRIPS Agreement, but rather to sector specific ownership 
related problems, which have not allowed this important segment of the manufacturing 
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sector to invest sufficient resources needed to compete in what is becoming a highly 
aggressive market.  
 
By contrasting the results of the survey, which covered 25 of Egypt’s pharmaceutical 
companies, against actual market data, significant flows in perceptions regarding the future 
state of the business were detected. On one front, the viewpoint of the local private sector, 
concerning a negative impact of the TRIPS Agreement on their ability to introduce new 
products and hence the loss of market shares was not in consistency with the increase in the 
market shares gained by the local private sector between 2004 and 2008. The opposite held 
true for subsidiaries of research-based companies, who have lost market shares during the 
same period. The situation of the public business sector is more complex. While the public 
business sector companies surveyed correctly anticipated a loss in market share, this is not 
necessarily a reflection of a negative impact of the TRIPS Agreement, but rather a 
reflection of a combination of factors, which have been slowing down the ability of this 
segment of the manufacturing sector from keeping up with the private sector, be it local or 
foreign. Public business sector companies suffer from ailing plant and equipment, relatively 
scarce marketing resources, and a legacy of meeting social rather than pure profit 
maximization objectives. Any one of these factors alone is sufficient to impact negatively 
on market shares.  
 
After having placed together the ‘mosaic’ of findings, the actual contribution of this thesis 
has mainly been in the domain of providing in-depth insight to the subject matter of 
competition on Egypt’s pharmaceutical market, the extent to which Egyptian consumers are 
deriving real benefits from having access to one of the largest pharmaceutical 
manufacturing facilities in Africa and the Middle East, the impact of the TRIPS Agreement 
on this sector, and the levels of efficiency exhibited by local generics companies under 
what is clearly a relatively protected market. 
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8.3 The contribution to the research to researchers: the debate concerning 
protectionism 
It has often been argued that the debate surrounding ISI and protectionism is ‘old’, meaning 
that this debate has been largely resolved in favor of the neoclassical/neoliberal paradigm 
of openness and free trade, particularly with the ascendency of the WTO during the mid-
1990s. With protectionist sentiment being still visible in many parts of the world, including 
the industrialized countries, there is no doubt that this debate is still alive.  
 
From an efficiency perspective, and taking efficiency at the manufacturing sector-wide 
level in Egypt as a bench-mark for comparison, it was evident that an industry can be 
protected, yet exhibit positive productivity growth as well as relatively healthy efficiency 
levels. The caveat, which however remains, as has been alluded to earlier in relation to the 
limitations of DEA, is that by restricting relative comparisons to Egypt, it is possible that 
all pharmaceutical firms covered in the thesis, as well as Egypt’s manufacturing industries 
at large could be inefficient, but with some being relatively less inefficient than others. 
 
The case of Egypt’s pharmaceutical industry also provided several important contributions 
to the debate concerning the merits of industrial policy as manifested in interrupting free 
trade by virtue of imposing regulatory trade barriers, which have in fact entrenched ISI 
beyond its formal demise as a policy direction in Egypt. During the very early years of this 
industry, and precisely during the 1930s, had free trade ruled, Egypt would not have had a 
pharmaceutical manufacturing base. Cut-throat competition as documented by Handoussa 
(1974), would have killed this infant industry in its cradle. However, what held true during 
the 1930s, does not necessarily hold true beyond the 1980s. While the private sector, which 
emerged during the 1980s and beyond proved to operate at relatively respectable levels of 
efficiency, it was clearly taking advantage of the captive local market as well as the absence 
of pharmaceutical product patent protection to drive up prices beyond standard world 
generic-to-originator prices as evident in the sample molecules.  The consumer, who pays 
his/her pharmaceutical bill out-of-pocket is the ultimate loser from this protectionist 
formula. This protectionist formula is even harsher in light of the fact that the national drug 
policy in Egypt provides no clear guidelines to the private health care sector to either 
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promote generic prescription, nor to allow generic substitution by the dispensing 
pharmacists of the least priced generic available. 
 
8.4 Contribution of the research to policy makers- practical contribution 
The policy implications in relation to the key findings of this thesis are focused on the three 
areas of industrial policy, pricing policy and generics policy.  
 
On the manufacturing front, public business sector pharmaceutical companies have been 
bearing the full brunt of acting as the social arm of the state in terms of the provision of 
low-priced pharmaceuticals. This situation has remained unchanged, in spite of the 
institutional and legislative change brought about by the ERSAP as early as 1991. By 
interviewing public business sector managers, it was repeatedly expressed that maintaining 
the policies of the pre-reform period has impacted negatively on the profitability levels of 
these companies, and hence their ability to invest in technological upgrades, needed to 
support higher levels of efficiency. Privatization alone has not been a panacea, as the 
performance of companies, which have been subject to partial privatization did not indicate 
significant differences in efficiency levels compared to companies, which have remained 
under full state ownership. Ensuring affordable medicine can be achieved through many 
channels, which do not jeopardize manufacturing efficiency as well as overall market 
health. One option, though a long-term one is to strengthen the outreach of the social health 
insurance scheme in terms of scope as well as coverage of pharmaceutical needs. This 
option, will grant these manufacturing entities breathing space to advance in the right 
direction in terms of sharpening their competitive abilities. 
 
Another important policy message is related to the observed levels of export performance. 
While it held true that the Egyptian market has been relatively shielded from generic import 
competition, there has been evident infiltration of generics imports, with the expectation 
that a more aggressive generics import penetration stance is inevitable. For local generics 
companies to secure acceptable levels of turnover and profitability, exporting is no longer 
an option, it has become imperative for survival. The state has an important role to play, by 
supporting the efforts of local companies to overcome regulatory hurdles in export markets. 
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Government-to-government collaboration on this front has proved to be successful in terms 
of supporting the export drive of the local pharmaceutical industry, as has been documented 
in the case of Jordan.   
 
On the price competition front, while local companies have been complaining of the 
rigidity of the pricing system, it was evident, that generic products need a new pricing 
formula to ensure that prices align with standards world generics-to-originator ratios. Of no 
less importance, the option of obliging physicians to prescribe on the basis of the generic 
rather than the brand-name will gradually allow the least-priced-generic to emerge as the 
most-sold-generic. In light of the fact that close to half of Egypt’s population do not have 
access to health insurance schemes, policy interventions, which aim to alleviate hardship on 
consumers, should be prioritized. 
 
While it was evident that the TRIPS Agreement was already impacting on consumers in 
terms of increased relative prices of new products, which have been facing no generics 
competition, it is safe to argue that the impact has been relatively modest, compared to the 
overall size of the market. This, however, does not mean that policy implications should be 
absent. The price impact is gradually building up in terms of potentially adding hardship on 
the uninsured masses, and a safety net, which is to support low-income consumers has to be 
structured as early as possible. 
 
8.5 Limitations and areas for further research 
One of the key limitations of this research has been related to the number of pharmaceutical 
companies covered, as well as their sectorial affiliation. The results would have been more 
robust, and findings more solid, had there been access to data from a larger number of 
companies. The fact that the public business sector accounts for the largest number of 
companies in the sample is also one of the key limitations. As highlighted earlier, the public 
business sector suffers from a plethora of weaknesses, which are invariably reflected in 
performance and efficiency levels. This has definitely brought down the bar in terms of 
relative efficiency levels, compared to a sample in which a larger number of private sector 
companies would have been present. Adding subsidiaries of research-based companies to 
 264 
the sample, would again have provided another important and interesting dimension to the 
analysis. It is, however, important to mention that data availability in Egypt remains to be a 
serious impediment to the research community. Obtaining access to primary company level 
data, for 13 companies, for the relatively long study-period was considered a relatively 
commendable achievement. 
 
An equally important limitation, was that Egypt has been the sole focus of analysis when it 
came to evaluating efficiency levels. Had access to company level data from comparator 
countries been available, again the research would have taken another interesting angle, by 
placing the findings in a comparative country perspective. Comparison would have in this 
case focused on the ruling policy and regulatory regimes in the two comparator countries 
which host a generics pharmaceutical industry, and then looking at respective performance 
in light observed differences in the ruling regimes as well as consequent performance 
outcomes. 
 
Another limitation, which may impact on the focus of this thesis, is related to the fact that 
while one industry has been covered, the issues raised may be divergent, with each of the 
research questions in-and-of itself warranting separate research. What has been attempted 
in this thesis was to bring the diversity of issues under the one umbrella of the regulatory 
and policy regimes governing the pharmaceutical industry in order to simplify the reach 
approach and make the findings more relevant and coherent. 
 
It is these limitations that open the door for areas of future research. Each of the core 
chapters of this thesis, may stand as an area of more focused research by widening the 
sample size and hence having more generalizable findings. The impact of the TRIPS 
Agreement is an area which warrants additional future focus by researchers. IMS data 
provides researchers with a rich database to analyses the impact of the Agreement on the 
entire market and hence possibly providing more targeted policy interventions based on 
impact on individual therapeutic classes in conjunction with the epidemiological scene in 
Egypt. 
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Comparing efficiency levels in the Indian generics pharmaceutical industry to the Egyptian 
counterpart, is one important avenue for future research. Access to data, however remains 
to be an important impediment. One angle to overcome this impediment, is to present the 
analysis on the sector-wide level versus the firm-level. For example, data needed to 
estimate TFP growth in India’s pharmaceutical industry is actually available through 
India’s Statistical Agency, while Egypt’s data is available from the Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics. The two country comparison will provide new insight to 
the issue of regulatory protectionism in relation to efficiency levels, as generic import 
penetration in India is also fairly absent, yet its generics industry has practically penetrated 
the world’s most important markets. 
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ANNEXES  
Annex 1 
 
List of Interveiwees and Their Professional Affiliation 
 
Dr. Ali Mohammad, Managing Director, CID, May 2004 
Dr. Gala Ghorab, Director, Drug Holding Company, April 2004 
Dr. Gamila Moussa, Director, Central Pharmaceutical Afairs, MOH, March 1999 
Dr. Hossam AbouElEnein, Busniess Development Manager, SEDICO, May 2004 
Dr. Hussein Zewail, Director, Al-Kahira Company, March 1999 
Dr. Magdy Hassan, Chairman, Drug Holding Company, January 2006 
Dr. Mohamed Roushdy, Regional Deirector, Pfizer Middle East, March 1999 and April 
2004  
Dr. Negad Sharawi, Former CEO GlaxoSmithKlein Egypt, April 2004 
Dr. Samia Saleh, Director, Drug Planning and Policy Center, May 2007 
Dr. Tharwat Bassily, Founder and CEO Amoun, January 2004 
Mr. Ahmed Saleh, First Undersectreaty, Minsitry of Industry, February 1999 
Mr. Khaled Nosseir, Chariman, Alkan, May 1999 
Mr. Tharwat Abdelshahid, CFO, EIPICO, June 1999 
 
  
 267 
Annex 2 
Three Stages of Human and Clinical Testing   
Preclinical testing and clinical evaluation are usually conducted before a new 
protein/compound is tested in humans. Laboratory and animal studies are carried out to 
determine their safety and biological activity. When a compound appears to have important 
biological activity, special tests are conducted to evaluate its safety in the major organ 
systems. The most important goal of preclinical studies on animals is to establish the 
relationship between increased doses of the drug and its toxic effects in animals. With the 
completion of testing the regulatory authority (FDA, EMEA) is approached to request to 
test the new product in humans in the clinical trials (Hansen, 1979). 
 
The first step for of clinical testing is safety or Phase I. The goal of this phase is to establish 
the drug’s safety and side effects profile in human beings. In most cases, about 100 health 
human volunteers participate in the phase I, and are administered a single dose of the drug. 
If the drug proves to be safe, multiple doses of the product are evaluated for safety (Hansen, 
1979).   
 
During Phase II, the efficacy of the drug becomes the prime goal of trials conducted, while 
safety is also tested for. The main objectives of phase II is to identify with accuracy the 
optimal dosage levels, dose regimen, route of administration, and exact patient type and 
circumstances in which the drug should be used.  This phase is conducted on patients 
instead of healthy volunteers. The participants of phase I are usually larger than phase II 
trials (Hansen, 1979). 
 
 
Phase III is called the statistical efficacy phase when products which display efficacy and 
safety in Phase II move towards larger clinical evaluation setting to verify the results. Phase 
III requires hundreds and sometimes thousands of patients, as it primarily targets the 
establishment of a statistically significant difference in the primary end point between 
patients on drugs and those on placebos (Hansen, 1979). 
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Annex 3 
Macroeconomic Performance During the Study Period 
The growth performance of the Egyptian economy reflected major fluctuations, with a 
boom-bust pattern observed throughout the study period. While the study period spans 
almost two decades, in presenting the macroeconomic setting it was important to briefly 
shed light on the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s as each of the three decades marked important 
points of departure with regards shifts in economic ideology, the build-up of structural 
imbalances and a change in the industrial policy governing the pharmaceutical sector.  
 
The 1960s 
The 1960s was the decade which witnessed the rapid expansion in the productive capacities 
of the country’s pharmaceutical industry. The 1960s was also the decade which saw the 
radical change in economic ideology from a free market economy, to a state-dominated 
socialist one. Following the endorsement of socialism and an etatist economic policy during 
the early 1960s, the growth performance of the Egyptian economy was judged to be 
remarkable. In 1965 GDP growth accelerating to reach 9.2 percent, up from 4.3 percent in 
1960. However, the combination of excessive inward orientation, a deteriorating balance of 
trade, foreign exchange shortages and the burden of financing a war economy brought 
growth to a complete halt in the aftermath of the 1967 war with Israel, after which GDP 
growth significantly slowed down to less than one  percent (World Bank, 2009). A modest 
recovery followed towards the end of the 1960s, but with GDP growth decelerating once 
more as a result of the October, 1973 Arab-Israeli war.  
 
The 1970s 
In 1974 the Open Door Policy (ODP) was endorsed, with socialism abandoned for a more 
liberal, private sector driven economic policy. During the onset of the ODP, windfall 
earnings from the Suez Canal, oil exports, workers’ remittances, tourism and official 
development assistance played an instrumental role in instigating historically high rates of 
GDP growth in Egypt. By 1980 GDP growth accelerated to reach 10 percent, the highest 
rate achieved throughout the previous four decades. Growth potential was, however, stifled 
as a result of macroeconomic imbalances, which began to emerge towards the late 1970s 
and were reinforced throughout the 1980s. 
 
The 1980s 
By the mid-80s, growth slowed down to a point of stagnation as a result of Egypt’s industry 
remaining excessively inward oriented, as well as a regional economic slowdown, which 
was brought about by declining oil prices (World Bank, 1998). Chronic imbalances were 
manifested in a rising budget deficit (23 percent of GDP in FY 1988/89), a double-digit 
inflation rate (average annual rate of inflation reached and average of 18.5 percent during 
the 1987-90 period), and a dramatic increase in the merchandise trade deficit (from USD 4 
billion in 1985 to USD 7 billion in 1990). External debt surged (USD 52.2 billion in 1988), 
with the burden of debt service accounting for 25 percent of the total value of the Egypt’s 
exports of goods and services (UNIDO, 1994). Average annual growth of real GDP 
decelerated to reach 1 percent between 1989/90 and 1992/93 (Howard,1998). 
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Economic reform and structural adjustment: 1990s 
In recognition of mounting economic imbalances, the government initiated an economic 
reform and structural adjustment program (ERSAP) in 1991. Internal and external balance 
was achieved, and recovery followed, albeit at a relatively slow average annual GDP 
growth rate of 4.6 percent during the 1991-98 period.  
 
Following a short-lived recovery period during the first half of the 1990s, the Egyptian 
economy was once again facing economic hardship as a result of a worsening internal and 
external economic environment. On the domestic front, rapid expansion in credit facilities 
by the banking system, large public investment in infrastructure projects, a slowdown in the 
reform program, coupled with an increase in the import bill, worked on slowing real GDP 
growth. More importantly, the export sector did not seem to have fulfilled the expectations 
of the early 1990s, with export volumes remaining relatively low. Foreign exchange 
shortages became a chronic problem towards the end of the 1990s, reflecting the weakness 
of the export sector and the dependency on imports of capital and intermediate goods.  
Between 1998 and 2001 average annual GDP growth hovered at 4 percent.  
 
Revisiting reform: the new millennium and beyond 
Sustaining high levels of GDP growth targeted at 6-7 percent annually became the prime 
challenge facing policy makers in Egypt. The sustainability of acceptable levels of growth 
became imperative to improve the standards of living, and to absorb the large number of 
new entrants to the Egyptian labor market (600 thousand new entrants annually).  
 
In February 2002 at the meeting with the Consultative Group of Egypt’s donors, the 
government promised to put in place “an appropriate flexible market-oriented exchange 
rate, customs reform, and an acceleration of privatization and fiscal discipline” (EIU, 
2002). In other words, the government promised to re-visit the reform agenda of 1991. In 
June of 2004, a new government took office in Egypt, and a comprehensive reform agenda 
was endorsed, instigating a growth spurt which brought GDP growth to 6.8 percent in 
2005/06. Key components of the reform agenda included addressing some of the binding 
constraints facing investment in Egypt. Significant progress has been achieved in terms of 
restructuring in the financial sector, the reduction of corporate and personal income taxes, 
reforming tax administration, prudent and more transparent management of public finance, 
monetary policy reform, and expanding the scope for private sector participation through 
streamlining investment procedures as well as the revitalization of the privatization 
program (IMF, 2008).  
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Annex 4: List of imported generics on the Egyptian pharmaceutical market 
List of generic products imported from CIPLA LTD INDIA 
Trade name Generic name Dosage form Pack unit Pack # Pack price Strength value Strength unit 
CYTOBLASTIN 10mg/10ml vial VINBLASTINE injection vial 1 LE40.000 10 mg/10ml 
CYTOMID 250mg tab. FLUTAMIDE tablet tablets 10 LE 38.000 250 mg 
METHOCIP 50mg/2ml vial METHOTREXATE injection vial 1 LE14.000 50 mg/2ml 
PACLTAX 30mg/5ml vial PACLITAXEL injection vial 1 LE420.000 30 mg/5ml 
PHOTERICIN B 50mg/15ml vial AMPHOTERICIN B injection vial 1 LE55.000 50 mg/15ml 
CYTOCARB 150mg/15ml vial CARBOPLATIN injection vial 1 LE180.000 150 mg/15ml 
NEOPHOS 200mg/15ml vial CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE injection vial 1 LE6.000 200 mg/15ml 
ETOSID 100mg/5ml vial ETOPOSIDE injection vial 1 LE36.000 100 mg/5ml 
CYTOCARB 450mg/45ml vial CARBOPLATIN injection vial 1 LE480.000 450 mg/45ml 
KELFER 500mg hard gelatin caps. DEFERIPRONE capsule capsules 50 LE62.000 500 mg 
NEOPHOS 1000mg/50ml vial CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE injection vial 50 LE17.500 1000 mg/50ml 
IFOS 1gm vial IFOSFAMIDE injection vial 1 LE60.000 1 gm 
NEOFLUR 250mg/5ml amp. FLUOROURACIL injection ampoule 5 LE28.000 250 mg/5ml 
CYTODROX 500mg caps. HYDROXYUREA capsule capsules 10 LE16.000 500 mg 
ONCODOX-50 50mg vial DOXORUBICIN injection vial 1 LE130.000 50 mg 
BLEOCIP 15I.U./vial BLEOMYCIN injection vial 1 LE85.000 15 I.U. 
CYTOPLATIN 10mg/20 vial CISPLATIN injection vial 1 LE12.000 10 mg/20ml 
CYTOPLATIN 50mg/50ml vial CISPLATIN injection vial 1 LE38.000 50 mg/50ml 
DOCETAX INJECTION CONCENTRATE 80mg vial DOCETAXEL injection vial 1 LE350.000 80 mg 
INJECTION OF MESNA 100mg/ml amp. MESNA injection ampoule 10 LE50.000 100 mg/ml 
ETOSID 50mg soft gelatin caps. ETOPOSIDE capsule caps.& tab. 4 LE50.000 50 mg 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2009 
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Cont. Annex 4 
List of generic products imported from China 
Trade name Generic name Dosage form Pack unit Pack # Pack price Strength value Strength unit Manufacturer Name 
TDA 0.1g/10g oint. FTIBAMZONE topical ointment gram 10 LE15.750 0.1 gm/10g Bejing Union  
D.D.B 1.5mg pillules BIPHENYL DICARBOXYLATE pillules pillules 500 LE12.000 1.5 mg Bejing Union  
BIFENDATE 1.5mg tab. BIFENDATE pillules tablets 500 LE6.500 1.5 mg Guangzhou Xing Gun -  
BIFENDATE 1.5mg tab. BIFENDATE pillules tablets 250 LE3.500 1.5 mg Guangzhou Xing Gun -  
INTEFEN 5M.I.U. vial INTERFERON ALFA-2a injection vial 1 LE70.000 5 M.I.U. Shenyang Sunshine  
INTEFEN 3M.I.U. vial INTERFERON ALFA-2a injection vial 1 LE40.000 3 M.I.U. Shenyang Sunshine  
EPIAO 10000I.u./ml vial ERYTHROPOIETIN-ALPHA injection vial 1 LE160.000 10000 I.U./ml Shenyang Sunshine  
EPIAO 4000I.U./ml vial ERYTHROPOIETIN-ALPHA injection vial 1 LE70.000 4000 I.U./ml Shenyang Sunshine  
EPIAO 2000I.U./ml vial ERYTHROPOIETIN-ALPHA injection vial 1 LE37.000 2000 I.U./ml Shenyang Sunshine  
TETANUS ANTITOXIN 1500 IU/ml VACCINE TETANUS injection vial 1 LE2.500 1500 I.U./ml Sinochem Ningbo  
PENCITARD 1200000 I.U./vial BENZATHINE PENICILLIN G injection vial 1 LE3.750 1.2 M.I.U. Ncpc North Best Co 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2009 
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Annex 5 
Investment deflator for Egypt 
 
 
Investments in current 
prices 
(LE billion) 
 
Investments in constant prices 
(LE billion) 
 
Index 
 
 
1992/93 29 6.2         100  
1993/94 34 6.9         105  
1994/95 39.1 7.3         115  
1995/96 39.7 8.2         104  
1996/97 47.7 9.3         110  
1997/98 61.3 11.4         115  
1998/99 64 11.8         116  
1999/00 64.4 11.5         120  
2000/01 63.6 11.3         120  
2001/02 67.5 11.9         121  
2002/03 68.1 11         132  
2003/04 79.6 11.7         145  
2004/05 96.5 13.4         154  
2005/06 115.7 15.2         163  
2006/07 155.3 20         166  
Source: Ministry of Economic Development, 2009 
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Annex 6 
 
Wholesale Price Index (1986/87=100 )* 
 
End of June 1993** 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
                            
General Index 287.0 300.4 316.7 348.6 365.2 367.5 373.6 379.4 384.2 397.7 469.2 543.7 571.5 
Farm Products 199.1 214.6 227.9 266.1 284.3  275.9 292.8 302.9 316.9 333.0 432.2 488.8 497.3 
Food Stuffs 376.3 395.7 408.7 464.4 497.7  494.3  502.7 503.6 500.3 517.9 631.7 741.1 787.1 
Beverages & Tobacco 265.0 265.4 272.0 294.2 298.5  298.5 325.6 325.6 328.5 328.5 340.9 394.7 405.0 
Yarn &Textiles 266.6 275.0 291.7 320.6 328.2 334.3 336.5 366.2 389.3 396.4 426.3 555.4 582.6 
Wearing Apparel 335.2 351.6 368.7 376.1 378.4 386.6 393.9 410.4 417.9 429.3 444.6 495.0 506.3 
Leather & Footwear 347.8 355.5 363.5 363.9 388.5 388.5 388.5 386.2 395.4 404.2 425.4 500.2 526.7 
Wood & its Products 278.7 283.3 310.9 313.6 314.8 315.7 317.1 311.4 310.3 311.0 401.3 470.2 407.7 
Paper & Printing 283.7 284.0 365.5 389.9 390.4 400.2 339.1 356.7 354.4 354.4 409.2 452.1 488.6 
Chemicals & its products 311.5 330.7 346.4 375.3 385.2 402.2 402.3 404.5 400.4 405.5 419.1 462.0 486.3 
Fuel & Related Products 610.5 620.9 623.3 632.7 632.7 684.0 684.1 679.2 679.2 690.4 686.7 733.9 845.3 
Rubber & Plastic Products 213.7 217.3 260.0 293.5 295.6 300.5 306.5 306.2 269.4 313.5 336.3 377.4 405.1 
Nonmetallic Mineral Products 232.6 262.3 273.8 293.9 297.2 317.4 320.1 323.8 320.9 332.7 338.7 386.6 427.1 
Metals 279.0 279.1 325.9 338.0 352.7 361.9 322.0 333.4 333.4 352.8 454.0 630.2 707.8 
Metallic Prods.,Machinery 
&Equipment 
271.9 279.7 284.6 293.7 301.1 308.9 314.2 306.7 308.8 317.8 348.1 389.9 408.4 
Transportation Equipment 340.0 341.4 385.6 393.6 393.6 401.2 370.8 362.0 362.0 362.5 428.0 589.2 572.5 
Other Manufacturing Products 204.1 209.5 214.2 227.6 346.2  344.8 358.7 398.7 399.4 426.7 486.8 503.9 614.8 
 * As from January 1994. The base year became 1986/87 = 100, instead of 1965/66=100.               
** at End of  July 1993.                           
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, 2009 
 
 
Annex 7 
Egypt Consumer price index (2000 = 100) 
 
  Year     
1987      25.50  
1988      30.00  
1989      36.38  
1990      42.48  
1991      50.87  
1992      57.80  
1993      64.79  
1994      70.07  
1995      81.10  
1996      86.93  
1997      90.95  
1998      94.48  
1999      97.39  
2000     100.00  
2001     102.27  
2002     105.07  
2003     109.81  
2004     122.18  
2005     128.13  
Source: World Bank, 2009b 
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Annex 8 
List of pharmaceutical companies in Egypt and their establishment dates 
Company Establishment 
Date 
First year in 
operation 
BMS Egypt 12/15/1974 1979/13/25 
SICAM Labs 5/24/1997 1981/13/28 
EIPICO 12/18/1981 1985/11/14 
GSK 2/27/1981 1985/14/24 
ATOS Pharma 1/1/1986 1986/17/11 
PHARCO 5/18/1982 1987/11/12 
J&J 9/11/1983 1988/16/12 
Amiriya 3/1/1984 1988/11/11 
Amoun 12/13/1988 1988/12/13 
Adweya 5/6/1984 1989/13/11 
Santigenta Agro 3/22/1989 1989/13/22 
MUP 1/1/1984 1989/19/13 
)Mepaco 1/1/1984 1991/14/19 
SEDICO 5/5/1983 1991/16/12 
Phizer Egypt 11/16/1973 1991/18/21 
Sanofi Aventis 1/26/1973 1991/18/21 
Novartis  4/2/1973 1991/18/21 
Apex 1/1/1991 1991/11/18 
Hikma 12/1/1991 1992/11/15 
October 1/1/1987 1993/12/12 
Servier Egypt 1/28/1992 1994/14/19 
T3A 6/15/1994 1994/17/25 
Ten of Remadan 7/1/1985 1994/17/26 
Egypt Otsuka 11/7/1992 1995/15/23 
Smith Kline Becham Egypt 1/12/1997 1997/11/12 
Akapi Egypt 9/4/1994 1997/13/22 
Global Napi 1/1/1991 1998/12/11 
Egyptian European 2/18/1998 1998/12/22 
Amoun Pharma 11/17/1998 1998/11/17 
Elli Lilly 6/13/1995 1999/13/17 
Egyptin Swiss Pharma 2/1/1998 1999/14/24 
Eva 6/19/1997 1999/17/27 
Delta Pharma 12/6/1997 1999/19/11 
Wyth Egypt 9/8/1999 1999/19/18 
Sigma 12/11/1998 2111/13/25 
T3A Industrial 11/13/1997 2111/12/21 
Adweya 4/22/1999 2114/18/22 
Hayat 11/11/2115 2115/11/11 
AstraZenka Egypt 5/5/2114 2116/12/31 
EGYPHAR 5/31/2115 2117/18/18 
Source: GAFI Database, 2009  
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Annex 9  
Output, intermediate inputs, number of workers and invested capital for the sample firms 
(deflated) 
  Output Intermediate 
input 
Number 
of Workers 
Invested 
Capital 
Alex 1993 93,880,000 52,612,974 0.001154 32,221,000 
Alex 1994 97,408,979 51,154,875 0.001173 42,612,377 
Alex 1995 104,229,303 55,455,988 0.001232 43,851,644 
Alex 1996 109,798,562 60,064,329 0.001593 55,575,871 
Alex 1997 113,314,999 55,693,942 0.001568 56,191,604 
Alex 1998 113,660,324 55,360,708 0.00152 59,140,222 
Alex 1999 121,956,547 60,155,784 0.001469 64,614,397 
Alex 2000 130,108,429 60,340,831 0.001405 64,255,213 
Alex 2001 129,937,666 65,909,926 0.001392 65,657,178 
Alex 2002 133,206,004 66,977,844 0.00143 69,497,450 
Alex 2003 132,044,486 62,995,421 0.001471 63,900,486 
Alex 2004 130,124,068 73,581,775 0.00155 70,107,471 
Alex 2005 136,234,970 73,440,792 0.00157 69,831,738 
 
 
 
  Output Intermediate 
input 
Number of 
Workers 
Invested 
Capital 
Memphis 1993 100,524,000 62,431,020 0.001923 52,395,000 
Memphis 1994 104,536,650 59,207,330 0.001874 65,702,664 
Memphis 1995 107,463,004 57,674,086 0.00215 63,613,047 
Memphis 1996 97,928,694 54,434,186 0.001828 77,680,625 
Memphis 1997 103,924,713 52,582,797 0.001836 75,256,824 
Memphis 1998 93,060,431 46,807,089 0.001687 74,784,702 
Memphis 1999 98,373,760 46,946,215 0.001656 79,510,618 
Memphis 2000 100,052,722 46,350,921 0.00105 77,871,515 
Memphis 2001 103,120,192 49,050,068 0.001495 78,909,947 
Memphis 2002 103,743,711 49,472,699 0.001484 79,417,529 
Memphis 2003 103,698,803 53,223,134 0.001443 73,222,974 
Memphis 2004 97,615,470 55,930,642 0.001454 76,945,446 
Memphis 2005 105,245,108 58,927,243 0.001532 79,000,828 
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Cont. Annex 9  
 
  Output Intermediate  
input 
Number of  
Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
Misr 1993 82,868,000 57,782,516 0.002625 34,703,000 
Misr 1994 82,951,122 49,812,641 0.002407 34,400,493 
Misr 1995 73,954,273 44,588,102 0.002388 37,815,548 
Misr 1996 80,701,989 46,910,822 0.002311 42,595,126 
Misr 1997 86,847,203 45,497,713 0.002239 39,319,623 
Misr 1998 81,141,800 41,611,145 0.002201 37,862,512 
Misr 1999 79,590,070 41,828,145 0.001921 37,529,026 
Misr 2000 77,399,087 29,791,653 0.001718 37,294,902 
Misr 2001 84,439,528 36,241,160 0.001593 37,403,109 
Misr 2002 83,353,713 34,764,131 0.001544 37,013,521 
Misr 2003 75,063,993 36,877,236 0.001449 34,662,219 
Misr 2004 75,010,144 33,541,529 0.001572 31,851,657 
Misr 2005 86,204,086 35,638,806 0.001572 33,743,834 
 
 
  Output Intermediate  
input 
Number of  
Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
CID 1993 117,650,000 65,266,348 0.004193 58,271,000 
CID 1994 121,016,855 71,980,386 0.003848 61,080,810 
CID 1995 138,015,003 67,666,570 0.003621 64,989,333 
CID 1996 135,085,424 71,900,213 0.003766 73,104,129 
CID 1997 145,732,995 77,165,291 0.003855 71,522,390 
CID 1998 147,480,767 73,471,959 0.003799 70,210,094 
CID 1999 153,727,534 68,617,153 0.003229 77,201,113 
CID 2000 151,328,163 69,838,728 0.002377 55,132,575 
CID 2001 153,060,551 70,211,214 0.002284 58,382,989 
CID 2002 154,730,615 70,150,811 0.002244 61,144,134 
CID 2003 134,590,892 69,956,225 0.002195 57,928,774 
CID 2004 143,249,545 81,210,106 0.00214 53,685,604 
CID 2005 148,620,666 88,256,669 0.002435 58,245,184 
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  Output Intermediate  
input 
Number of  
Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
Nasr 1993 117,679,000 88,603,511 0.004271 97,669,000 
Nasr 1994 73,129,500 74,740,794 0.00393 104,426,950 
Nasr 1995 88,924,977 45,951,998 0.003866 107,356,404 
Nasr 1996 113,363,424 48,952,611 0.004069 119,950,169 
Nasr 1997 123,132,262 72,925,999 0.003777 114,648,491 
Nasr 1998 102,157,594 75,976,259 0.003582 117,321,855 
Nasr 1999 101,827,128 58,789,696 0.003049 117,688,168 
Nasr 2000 103,732,965 54,047,611 0.002998 136,523,848 
Nasr 2001 148,375,603 54,732,540 0.002908 154,161,608 
Nasr 2002 167,504,804 89,041,824 0.00287 159,438,674 
Nasr 2003 157,747,138 86,757,942 0.002863 156,761,203 
Nasr 2004 147,090,705 76,756,326 0.002859 145,631,146 
Nasr 2005 152,034,804 87,219,502 0.002807 139,367,301 
 
 
  Output Intermediate  
input 
Number of  
Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
Nile 1993 153,673,000 99,184,685 0.003102 45,348,000 
Nile 1994 167,521,441 96,072,254 0.00303 78,239,290 
Nile 1995 162,785,727 90,255,661 0.002777 81,597,329 
Nile 1996 159,928,233 89,828,179 0.00268 99,879,092 
Nile 1997 152,359,243 81,302,891 0.00312 107,642,893 
Nile 1998 153,101,243 77,530,072 0.002992 105,774,429 
Nile 1999 166,144,948 81,387,595 0.002734 109,504,000 
Nile 2000 170,679,667 83,874,939 0.002533 115,705,991 
Nile 2001 186,279,956 94,134,727 0.002434 117,835,541 
Nile 2002 171,547,774 89,846,546 0.002417 127,128,738 
Nile 2003 185,328,750 89,856,208 0.00244 126,173,559 
Nile 2004 176,338,667 94,565,565 0.002388 119,911,925 
Nile 2005 178,380,030 85,472,792 0.002439 122,326,837 
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  Output Intermediate  
input 
Number of  
Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
Kahira 1993 112,739,000 69,995,548 0.002825 29,425,000 
Kahira 1994 122,204,643 64,329,462 0.002819 31,664,781 
Kahira 1995 132,853,311 71,014,476 0.002897 33,665,732 
Kahira 1996 121,084,939 65,448,483 0.002943 43,485,885 
Kahira 1997 132,105,274 68,014,584 0.002826 43,512,767 
Kahira 1998 123,686,876 65,425,318 0.002766 49,654,370 
Kahira 1999 133,859,053 68,682,603 0.002488 71,322,138 
Kahira 2000 129,388,398 63,281,361 0.002476 73,570,795 
Kahira 2001 130,136,827 67,574,409 0.002398 74,619,231 
Kahira 2002 138,146,985 78,024,137 0.002391 76,495,105 
Kahira 2003 138,587,398 74,387,273 0.002391 80,541,796 
Kahira 2004 128,498,470 66,149,444 0.00231 79,178,479 
Kahira 2005 142,537,993 79,172,666 0.002272 75,548,049 
 
Cont. Annex 9  
 
  Output Intermediate  
input 
Number of  
Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
ADCO 1993 66,309,000 44,150,824 0.0017 23,603,000 
ADCO 1994 78,262,138 44,584,193 0.0016 25,408,333 
ADCO 1995 73,318,503 42,959,200 0.0016 27,060,259 
ADCO 1996 81,668,112 47,819,276 0.0016 30,662,616 
ADCO 1997 85,612,362 44,063,695 0.0016 37,060,723 
ADCO 1998 84,492,245 43,743,049 0.0019 36,216,732 
ADCO 1999 92,191,766 53,614,547 0.0015 36,686,462 
ADCO 2000 91,861,311 47,938,838 0.0013 37,047,667 
ADCO 2001 102,029,476 50,173,065 0.0013 37,147,145 
ADCO 2002 95,449,592 43,820,827 0.0012 36,528,649 
ADCO 2003 89,020,174 41,072,789 0.0012 35,082,294 
ADCO 2004 88,144,386 45,076,799 0.0013 34,539,134 
ADCO 2005 97,461,772 49,534,127 0.0014 35,717,036 
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  Output Intermediate  
input 
Number of  
Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
SEDICO 1993 51,831,000 21,083,000 0.000328 40,818,000 
SEDICO 1994 64,532,401 26,331,374 0.000353 40,607,580 
SEDICO 1995 73,589,177 30,975,653 0.000429 39,840,679 
SEDICO 1996 78,079,181 32,769,953 0.000494 45,820,990 
SEDICO 1997 92,768,290 38,271,283 0.000513 55,632,579 
SEDICO 1998 106,981,895 40,099,016 0.000612 58,581,770 
SEDICO 1999 114,479,928 43,171,709 0.000654 65,287,931 
SEDICO 2000 109,745,801 35,757,652 0.000741 107,861,290 
SEDICO 2001 132,348,601 54,972,508 0.000795 112,106,276 
SEDICO 2002 136,374,777 57,887,233 0.000835 116,083,889 
SEDICO 2003 172,437,659 72,533,956 0.000864 112,196,248 
SEDICO 2004 176,838,280 77,694,160 0.001022 105,855,935 
SEDICO 2005 203,032,279 83,214,473 0.001087 112,265,975 
 
 
   Output Intermediate  
input 
Number  
of Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
PHARCO 1993 92,500,000 49,929,019 0.000562 14,243,545 
PHARCO 1994 108,982,613 60,435,075 0.000629 14,721,597 
PHARCO 1995 125,445,294 67,829,877 0.000714 14,237,770 
PHARCO 1996 137,282,441 72,098,328 0.000861 24,580,863 
PHARCO 1997 147,986,760 72,305,426 0.000853 26,296,214 
PHARCO 1998 160,551,840 73,167,753 0.001024 23,170,418 
PHARCO 1999 173,287,845 77,142,571 0.001045 25,245,814 
PHARCO 2000 196,911,125 79,432,838 0.001177 78,936,990 
PHARCO 2001 185,235,140 93,369,206 0.001292 76,825,711 
PHARCO 2002 186,746,363 95,215,468 0.001312 83,056,016 
PHARCO 2003 225,430,565 115,069,188 0.001345 76,396,799 
PHARCO 2004 257,493,182 132,031,933 0.001408 68,531,039 
PHARCO 2005 308,112,009 145,006,533 0.001585 63,476,875 
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   Output Intermediate  
input 
Number  
of Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
EIPICO 1993 196,100,000 94,328,911 0.001451 39,986,521 
EIPICO 1994 230,116,269 50,494,705 0.001511 37,598,739 
EIPICO 1995 235,243,649 118,087,183 0.001547 29,473,564 
EIPICO 1996 243,583,372 112,133,873 0.001623 82,939,231 
EIPICO 1997 276,241,952 126,302,579 0.001743 80,360,006 
EIPICO 1998 270,839,259 131,259,206 0.001882 79,023,191 
EIPICO 1999 312,196,868 124,413,407 0.012237 122,218,508 
EIPICO 2000 319,585,909 122,571,483 0.002039 290,745,953 
EIPICO 2001 340,129,371 152,681,354 0.002138 272,173,948 
EIPICO 2002 384,170,530 157,164,727 0.002249 271,311,525 
EIPICO 2003 408,941,303 181,704,095 0.002274 240,028,937 
EIPICO 2004 439,471,212 195,272,895 0.002549 205,959,904 
EIPICO 2005 483,680,136 202,965,055 0.002745 187,256,308 
 
 
 
   Output Intermediate  
input 
Number of  
Workers 
Invested  
Capital 
MUP 1993 54,410,000 30,583,606 0.000350 56,248,747 
MUP 1994 83,766,843 42,514,668 0.000402 53,728,365 
MUP 1995 113,671,362 59,577,825 0.000453 501,938,911 
MUP 1996 133,969,698 64,991,198 0.000504 52,818,256 
MUP 1997 149,101,400 62,666,884 0.000551 54,589,951 
MUP 1998 173,395,385 70,622,112 0.000643 58,458,366 
MUP 1999 188,994,795 74,121,128 0.000754 143,574,752 
MUP 2000 204,852,913 73,874,532 0.000786 137,916,667 
MUP 2001 229,264,819 91,792,799 0.000921 133,561,547 
MUP 2002 241,456,682 98,087,277 0.000948 128,090,660 
MUP 2003 248,241,126 121,973,537 0.001044 113,726,886 
MUP 2004 284,341,049 125,943,481 0.009131 103,646,087 
MUP 2005 324,512,517 129,191,739 0.001212 100,933,066 
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   Output Value  Intermediate  
inputs 
Number  
of Workers 
Invested  
Capital+ 
Amirya 1993 70,534,590 27,989,941    0.000674  35,920,936 
Amirya 1994 86,176,882 29,834,361    0.000713  39,516,276 
Amirya 1995 109,606,074 37,323,689    0.000816  40,745,768 
Amirya 1996 116,086,920 37,948,978    0.000918  63,520,807 
Amirya 1997 127,743,583 42,616,792    0.000982  81,585,663 
Amirya 1998 129,966,993 38,297,765    0.001060  110,452,137 
Amirya 1999 140,329,914 42,011,113    0.001191  121,709,372 
Amirya 2000 145,201,691 39,222,518    0.001270  125,399,702 
Amirya 2001 155,714,801 40,934,999    0.001474  106,468,283 
Amirya 2002 167,533,535 47,347,868    0.001402  135,788,988 
Amirya 2003 164,719,276 51,289,695    0.001440  144,004,314 
Amirya 2004 160,402,440 48,316,201    0.001474  128,384,684 
Amirya 2005 117,415,661 38,553,368    0.001529  119,981,585 
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Annex 10 
TFP Growth in Manufacturing Industries in Egypt, 1980/81-2000/01 
 
Sector / TFP Growth 
1980/81- 
1994/85 
1985/86- 
1990/91 
1991/92- 
1995/96 
1996/97- 
2000/01 
1980/81- 
2000/01 
Food Processing -0.46 1.48 1.42 0.67 0.75 
Spinning and Weaving -0.04 0.96 1.72 0.59 0.81 
Readymade Garments 0.67 2.16 1.89 0.59 1.33 
Leather and Leather Products 1.61 -0.27 -0.9 1.32 0.44 
Footwear -1.25 0.62 2.44 0.77 0.65 
Wood and Wood Products 0.46 -0.3 1.7 5.44 1.83 
Furniture 1.72 0.75 -0.42 1.17 0.81 
Paper and Printing 0.55 -0.3 1.11 1.06 0.61 
Chemicals 0.96 5.39 -0.57 -0.24 1.39 
Rubber, Plastic and Related Products 1.36 2.4 2.78 -0.65 1.47 
Porcelain, China and Ceramics 0.1 2.33 3.01 -2.48 0.74 
Glass Products 0.57 0.3 0.88 -0.14 0.4 
Non-Metal Products 1.55 -1.56 -0.75 -0.92 -0.42 
Steel, Iron and Metal Products 1.76 -1.29 0.85 0.02 0.34 
Machinery and Equipment -0.06 1.92 1.91 -1.38 0.6 
Means of Transportation 1.29 0.86 -0.48 -0.96 0.18 
Mean 0.67 0.97 1.04 0.3 0.75 
Standard Deviation 0.84 1.64 0.26 0.67 0.53 
 
Source: Galal and El-Megharbel, 2005 
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Annex 11 
Generic-to-originator prices in Egypt for the sample molecules 
Sector Company PRODUCT PACK/ Strength LAUNCH  Price per 
unit 
Generic: 
Innovator 
Mean 
price 
per new 
entrant 
ANTACID 
       1 OMEPRAZOLE 
       IMPORTED SECTOR ASTRAZENECA LOSEC ENT.FILM CAP 20 MG 14 1993 10.00 
  IMPORTED SECTOR ASTRAZENECA LOSEC ENT.FILM CAP 20 MG 7 2003 7.00   
 PRIVATE SECTOR AMRIYA PHARMACEUT. GASTRAZOLE CAPS ENTERIC 20 MG 14 1994 3.03 30 3.03 
PRIVATE SECTOR EIPICO EPIRAZOLE CAPS ENTERIC 20 MG 14 1994 3.14 31 3.09 
PRIVATE SECTOR PHARAONIA PH. OMEZ CAPS 20 MG 14 2007 0.96 10 2.38 
PRIVATE SECTOR UNITED PH.MNF. OMISEC CAPS 20 MG 14 2007 3.00 30 2.53 
Number of companies 13   
  
  
  Number of products 17 
   
  
  Mean price per unit 2.52 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 25 
      
        2 RANITIDINE 
       MULTINATIONAL SECTOR GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG ZANTAC FILM C.TABS 150 MG 20 1994 1.00 
  MULTINATIONAL SECTOR GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG ZANTAC TABS EFF 150 MG 20 1997 1.20 
  PRIVATE SECTOR MEDICAL UNION PHAR RANITIDINE C.TAB 150 MG 20 1989 0.63 52 0.63 
PRIVATE SECTOR UNI PHARMA RANTIBLOCK FILM C.CAPS 150 MG 20 2009 0.45 38 0.54 
Number of companies 10   
     Number of products 13 
      Mean price per unit 0.61 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 61 
      
        ANTIASTHMATIC 
       3 BECLOMETASONE 
       MULTINATIONAL SECTOR GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG BECONASE SPRAY 50 Y 200 1996             19.0  
  HOLDIPHARMA ADCO CHIESI CLENIL COMPOSITUM INHA.DOSIER 50 Y /DOS 200 15 G 1985             16.0               84  16 
PRIVATE SECTOR AMOUN PHARM.CO. BECLO NASAL SPRAY 50 Y /DOS 200 20 ML 2006             19.0             100       17.50  
Number of companies 2     
     Number of products 2 
      Mean price per unit 16.33   
     Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 86  
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ANTIBACTERIAL 
       4 AMOXICILLIN 
       PRIVATE SECTOR PHARCO BMS HICONCIL CAPS 250 MG 12 1990 0.38 
  HOLDIPHARMA CID AMOXYCID CAPS 250 MG 12 1980 0.36 96 96 
HOLDIPHARMA ADCO AMOXYCILLIN CAPS 250 MG 12 oooo 0.23 60 78 
Number of companies 5   
     Number of products 6 
      Mean price per unit 0.41 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 110 
      
        5 CEFTRIAXONE 
       PRIVATE SECTOR EIPICO ROCHE ROCEPHIN V.IM DRY 1 G 1 1988 46.00 
  HOLDIPHARMA CID T3A CEFOTRIX T3A V.IM/IV DRY 1 G 1 1998 30.00 65 30 
PRIVATE SECTOR PHARCO CEFAXONE V.IV DRY 1 G 1 2008 20.00 43 25.00 
Number of companies 4 
      Number of products 5 
      Mean price per unit 28.00 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 61 
      
        6 CIPROFLOXACIN 
       PRIVATE SECTOR HIKMA BAYER CIPROBAY FILM C.TABS 500 MG 10 1997 0.22 
  MULTINATIONAL SECTOR NPE SANDOZ SERVIFLOX TABS 500 MG 10 1997 0.36 
  PRIVATE SECTOR EIPICO CIPROCIN TABS 500 MG 10 1996 0.31 88 0.31 
PRIVATE SECTOR EURO.EGY.PH. CIPROFLOXACIN TABS 500 MG 10 2006 0.33 93 0.32 
Number of companies 6 
      Number of products 6 
      Mean price per unit 0.39 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 108 
      
        ANTIDEPRESSANT 
       7 FLUOXETINE 
       IMPORTED SECTOR ELI LILLY PROZAC CAPS 20 MG 14 1996 4.64 
  IMPORTED SECTOR ELI LILLY PROZAC TABS DISPERS 20 MG 7 2002 4.71 
  HOLDIPHARMA MISR FLUXOTINE CAPS 20 MG 10 1996 1.55 33 1.55 
PRIVATE SECTOR EIPICO FLUTIN CAPS 20 MG 14 2003 0.66 14 1.10 
Number of companies 6   
     Number of products 6 
      Mean price per unit 1.22 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 26 
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        ANTIDIABETIC 
       8 GLIBENCLAMIDE 
       PRIVATE SECTOR GLAXO EG. ROCHE EUGLUCON TABS 5 MG 30 1980 0.09 
 
  
PRIVATE SECTOR PHARCO DIABEN TABS 5 MG 20 1988 0.10 107.142859 1.1 
Number of companies 1 
      Number of products 1.00 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 107 
          
      9 METFORMIN 
       MULTINATIONAL SECTOR NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT GLUCOFORMIN TABS 500 MG 20 2002 0.10 
  MULTINATIONAL SECTOR NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT GLUCOFORMIN TABS 500 MG 80 2002 0.10 
  HOLDIPHARMA NASR METFORMIN TABS STRIPS 500 MG 200 0000 0.10 100 
 PRIVATE SECTOR MINAPHARM MERCK GLUCOPHAGE FILM C.TABS 500 MG 50 2006 0.30 300 0.30 
Number of companies 6   
     Number of products 10 
   
  
  Mean price per unit 0.14 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 138 
      
        ANTIEPILEPTIC 
       10 CARBAMAZEPINE 
       MULTINATIONAL SECTOR NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT TEGRETOL TABS C.R 200 MG 20 1991 0.80 
  MULTINATIONAL SECTOR NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT TEGRETOL TABS 200 MG 30 2005 0.55 69 0.19 
MULTINATIONAL SECTOR NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT TEGRETOL TABS 200 MG 20 1986 0.55 69 
 HOLDIPHARMA CID TEGRAL TABS 200 MG 10 1985 0.19 35 0.19 
HOLDIPHARMA CID TEGRAL TABS 200 MG 50 1985 0.19 35 0.19 
IMPORTED SECTOR MULTIAPEX PH. CARBAPEX TABS 200 MG 30 2008 0.60 109 0.33 
Number of companies 6   
     Number of products 12 
      Mean price per unit 0.40 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 73 
      
        11 PHENYTOIN 
       HOLDIPHARMA NILE PFIZER EPANUTIN TABS 100 MG 100 2000 0.10 
  HOLDIPHARMA NILE PFIZER EPANUTIN CAPS 100 MG 100 1995 0.10 
  PRIVATE SECTOR NILE PFIZER EPANUTIN CAPS 50 MG 100 1995 0.05 
  HOLDIPHARMA ALEXANDRIA BAYER COMITAL L TABS 100 2000   
  HOLDIPHARMA NILE PFIZER EPANUTIN CAPS 100 MG 50 2000 0.24 
  HOLDIPHARMA NASR PHENYTOIN CAPS 100 MG 40 1998 0.15 145 0.15 
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HOLDIPHARMA MEMPHIS PHENYTOIN CAPS 100 MG 50 2006 0.28 280 0.21 
Number of companies 4   
     Number of products 4 
      Mean price per unit 0.25 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 246 
      
 
  
      ANTIFUNGAL 
       12 FLUCONAZOLE 
       MULTINATIONAL SECTOR PFIZER EGYPT DIFLUCAN CAPS 150 MG 1 1993 27.00 
  PRIVATE SECTOR SEDICO FLUCORAL CAPS 150 MG 2 1996 7.30 27 7.3 
IMPORTED SECTOR SPIMACO FLOCAZOLE CAPS 150 MG 1 2006 18.00 67 12.65 
Number of companies 6   
     Number of products 6 
      Mean price per unit 12.12 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 45 
      
        ANTIHYPERTENSIVE 
       13 ATENOLOL 
       HOLDIPHARMA KAHIRA ASTRAZENECA TENORMIN TABS 50 MG 14 1993 0.47 
  IMPORTED SECTOR ASTRAZENECA EGYPT TENORET FILM C.TABS 50 MG /12 14 2007 0.64 
  IMPORTED SECTOR ASTRAZENECA EGYPT TENORMIN FILM C.TABS 50 MG 14 2007 0.57 
  PRIVATE SECTOR MUP PRODES BLOKIUM TABS 50 MG 15 1993 0.33 71 0.33 
HOLDIPHARMA KAHIRA TENOTENS TABS 50 MG 14 2008 0.43 91 0.38 
Number of companies 6   
     Number of products 6 
      Mean price per unit 0.33 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 69 
      
        14 CAPTOPRIL 
       MULTINATIONAL SECTOR BMS EGYPT CAPOTEN TABS 25 MG 20 1983 0.50 
  MULTINATIONAL SECTOR BMS EGYPT CAPOTEN TABS 25 MG 40 2003 0.50 
  HOLDIPHARMA KAHIRA LONTENSIN TABS 25 MG 20 1995 0.35 70 0.35 
PRIVATE SECTOR AMOUN PHARM.CO. HYPOPRESS TABS 25 MG 30 2008 0.30 60 0.33 
MULTINATIONAL SECTOR GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG CAPOTEN TABS 25 MG 20 2008 0.50 100 0.38 
MULTINATIONAL SECTOR GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG CAPOTEN TABS 25 MG 40 2008 0.50 100 0.41 
Number of companies 5   
     Number of products 6 
      Mean price per unit 0.38 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 76 
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        15 LOSARTAN 
       IMPORTED SECTOR M.S.D. HYZAAR TABS 50 MG 14 1998 3.71 
  IMPORTED SECTOR M.S.D. COZAAR TABS 50 MG 14 1998 3.71 
  PRIVATE SECTOR SIGMA LOZAPRESS TABS 50 MG 14 2001 1.93 52 1.93 
PRIVATE SECTOR AMRIYA PHARMACEUT. LOSARTAN TABS 50 MG 10 2001 1.80 48 1.86 
PRIVATE SECTOR PHARAONIA PH. LOSARTAN TABS 50 MG 14 2008 1.29 35 1.67 
Number of companies 5   
     Number of products 9 
      Mean price per unit 1.80 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 49 
      16 NIFEDIPINE 
       HOLDIPHARMA ALEXANDRIA BAYER ADALAT TABS 20 MG 30 1995 0.35 
  PRIVATE SECTOR EIPICO EPILAT TABS L.A 20 MG 20 1989 0.53 150 0.53 
PRIVATE SECTOR SIGMA TIBA TENOLAT CAPS S.R 30 2004 0.50 143 0.51 
Number of companies 4   
     Number of products 4 
      Mean price per unit 0.46 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 133 
      
        ANTI-INFLAMMATORY 
       17 DICLOFENAC 
       MULTINATIONAL SECTOR NPE NOVARTIS C.H. VOLTAREN C.H. ENTER.C.TABS 25 MG 30 1989 0.38 
  MULTINATIONAL SECTOR NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT CATAFLAM C.TAB 25 MG 10 1991 0.50 
  MULTINATIONAL SECTOR NOVARTIS PH. EGYPT CATAFLAM C.TAB 25 MG 20 2005 0.50 
  PRIVATE SECTOR PHARCO DECLOPHEN TABS 25 MG 20 1991 0.23 60 0.23 
PRIVATE SECTOR DELTA DOLPHIN-K TABS 25 MG 20 2008 0.30 80 0.53 
PRIVATE SECTOR EIPICO EPIFENAC TABS 25 MG 20 2008 0.20 53 0.73 
Number of companies 9   
     Number of products 12 
      Mean price per unit 0.30 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 80 
      
        ANTIVIRAL 
       18 Acyclovir 
       MULTINATIONAL SECTOR GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG NOVIRUS CAPS 200 MG 8 1994 1.38 
  MULTINATIONAL SECTOR GLAXOSMITHKLINE EG ZOVIRAX TABS 200 MG 25 1986 6.67 
  PRIVATE SECTOR SEDICO CYCLOVIRAL TABS 200 MG 20 1997 1.05 
  Number of companies 1 
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Number of products 1.00 
      Generic-to-originator price in molecule (%) 76 
      Source: IMS, 2009 
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Annex 12  
Egypt’s 42 largest therapeutic classes by market value 
THERAPEUTIC CLASS 
Units 
Y/2004 
 (‘000) 
Units 
Y/2005 
 (‘000) 
Units 
Y/2006 
 (‘000) 
Units 
Y/2007 
 (‘000) 
Units 
Y/2008 
 (‘000) 
LE Sales 
Y/2004 
 (‘000) 
LE Sales 
Y/2005 
 (‘000) 
LE Sales 
Y/2006 
 (‘000) 
LE Sales 
Y/2007 
 (‘000) 
LE Sales 
Y/2008 
 (‘000) 
Total market 873,498 1,013,349 1,105,487 1,209,421 1,323,496 6,279,026 7,864,763 9,319,250 10,954,963 12,565,859 
M01A1 ANTIRHEUMATICS NON-S PLN 64,018 74,498 83,741 89,256 102,727 411,267 514,757 616,154 693,570 810,652 
J01C1 BROAD SPECT PENICILL ORAL 28,544 32,191 37,247 39,596 39,276 270,667 340,815 423,025 512,271 563,625 
N02B0 NON-NARCOTIC ANALGESICS 51,848 66,479 67,267 76,693 76,874 168,943 301,762 357,980 455,428 470,829 
J01D2 CEPHALOSPORINS INJECT 11,101 14,454 18,407 22,407 27,925 137,477 175,585 230,223 293,960 355,261 
J01D1 CEPHALOSPORINS ORAL 20,069 20,663 22,585 23,875 27,087 214,400 228,313 254,657 272,538 320,191 
J01G1 ORAL FLUOROQUINOLONES 4,434 5,573 6,590 7,897 9,104 125,084 157,631 184,789 220,183 257,461 
A10H0 SULPHONYLUREA A-DIABS 20,839 18,666 21,806 20,540 21,951 145,119 153,253 216,551 217,051 243,131 
A02B2 ACID PUMP INHIBITORS 2,856 4,173 5,410 6,992 8,121 76,882 115,404 151,168 191,371 234,445 
R05A0 COLD PREPARATIONS 25,937 26,114 29,378 34,820 45,928 84,931 98,589 120,191 150,544 203,257 
N03A0 ANTI-EPILEPTICS 5,460 6,327 6,603 7,659 8,045 79,890 105,450 122,940 166,780 195,647 
A02B1 H2 ANTAGONISTS 8,885 11,680 13,087 15,163 18,013 101,580 128,030 139,045 159,703 178,535 
J01C2 BROAD SPECT PENICILL INJ 16,264 20,348 25,706 30,036 31,458 76,192 98,455 126,173 156,252 173,068 
J01F0 MACROLIDES & SIMILAR TYPE 5,522 6,201 7,002 7,923 9,119 94,034 109,243 128,337 147,974 169,641 
R05C0 EXPECTORANTS 27,026 28,674 30,966 29,862 34,073 103,716 118,156 137,855 138,665 162,261 
A05B0 HEPATIC PROCT LIPOTROPICS 5,523 6,299 6,244 7,098 8,265 87,316 109,094 114,201 131,609 157,547 
R06A0 ANTIHISTAMINES SYSTEMIC 11,433 13,070 15,190 14,730 15,978 84,508 96,454 117,061 129,164 140,947 
C10A1 STATINS (HMG-COA RED) 1,408 1,733 2,252 2,872 3,333 60,777 74,415 93,765 116,632 131,268 
C04A1 CEREB/PERIPH VASOTHERAPS 6,211 6,129 6,470 6,555 6,235 82,316 84,782 109,273 120,781 119,440 
C07A0 BETA BLOCKING AGENT PLAIN 5,863 7,757 7,984 9,217 10,507 49,698 68,322 78,533 94,100 107,513 
A03F0 GASTROPROKINETICS 7,843 9,061 10,284 11,478 13,019 54,181 66,353 76,665 87,800 106,737 
A10C3 H INSUL+ANA INT+FAST ACT 4,256 6,118 6,797 7,132 6,760 45,830 71,700 89,428 99,662 101,632 
A07A0 ANTI-INFECTIVE ANTIDIARR 13,120 16,882 17,523 20,833 22,148 53,530 71,536 74,910 91,073 100,439 
C09B1 ACE INH COMB+A-HYP/DIURET 2,094 2,871 3,541 4,190 4,441 44,125 64,751 80,557 96,622 98,567 
J05B1 VIRAL HEPATITIS PRODUCTS 111 190 286 558 1,033 11,249 15,430 29,019 57,666 95,663 
S01A0 ANTI-INFECTIVES-EYE 13,578 14,753 14,834 14,703 16,779 50,862 58,291 63,544 73,904 92,227 
C09A0 ACE INHIBITORS PLAIN 3,979 4,401 4,666 5,288 5,224 61,554 70,882 80,213 90,252 91,213 
M02A0 TOP A-RHEUMATICS & ANALG 9,742 11,795 13,874 15,039 15,673 41,405 54,992 70,088 81,833 90,560 
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G03G0 GONADOTROPHINS 1,768 1,635 1,780 1,848 2,292 44,724 52,941 52,104 61,871 87,799 
D11A0 OTHER DERMATOLOGICAL PREP 5,947 7,771 6,771 7,025 7,683 43,009 60,682 63,054 71,692 87,190 
C08A0 CALCIUM ANTAGONISTS PLAIN 3,880 4,717 5,411 5,692 6,454 44,972 55,900 67,727 78,472 86,954 
N06A4 SSRI ANTIDEPRESSANTS 1,253 1,451 1,567 1,772 2,077 35,848 46,921 57,603 68,435 85,381 
M05X0 OTH MUSCULO-SKELETAL PRDS 1,290 1,900 2,045 2,762 3,283 27,865 40,980 46,424 66,267 83,658 
N05A1 ATYPICAL ANTIPSYCHOTICS 528 643 783 898 1,126 30,489 44,056 56,569 65,770 83,583 
C09D1 AT2 ANTG COMB C2 &/O DIU 460 658 962 1,272 1,699 22,115 31,092 46,671 63,496 81,448 
A08A0 ANTIOBESITY PREPARATIONS 347 509 674 807 1,157 23,824 33,056 55,066 63,431 81,357 
S01C1 OPHTH STEROID+ANTI-INFEC 5,513 6,855 7,614 9,013 9,861 35,345 49,486 54,934 70,650 79,711 
B01C2 ADP RECEP ANTAG PLAT INH 90 127 229 311 391 24,707 36,253 51,092 65,062 78,017 
H02A1 INJ CORTICOSTEROIDS PLAIN 9,847 9,399 11,581 11,785 14,684 42,629 51,593 60,582 67,142 76,045 
D06A0 TOPICAL ANTIBACTERIALS 9,826 11,240 12,433 13,465 14,963 35,668 46,788 54,683 64,047 74,454 
A09A0 DIGESTIVES INC ENZYMES 8,734 9,899 10,056 10,762 11,876 46,394 57,974 60,695 64,519 73,072 
D07B3 WITH ANTIBACT/ANTIFUNGALS 6,149 8,420 9,035 10,866 13,032 32,572 46,011 49,534 59,845 72,048 
M03B0 MUSCLE RELAXANTS.CENTRAL 5,548 6,526 7,293 7,822 8,262 40,444 47,330 55,250 62,260 69,854 
Source: IMS, 2009 
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